Prepared by John Kingston, AIAI, University of Edinburgh
A PostScript version of this document is available here. This version may be better for printing on a black and white printer.
This document contains text and diagrams which represent models of the Air Campaign Planning process. These diagrams are based on knowledge which was acquired between 11 and 15 September 1995 from Doug Holmes of ISX. The purpose of these diagrams is to help members of the ARPI community identify the relevance of their own work to particular parts of the ACP process, and to promote discussion about ARPI projects and about the ACP process itself.
The knowledge which was acquired were determined by the modelling technique which was used. This technique was the CommonKADS approach to knowledge modelling [Wielinga et al, 1992] [Breuker and Van de Velde, 1994], focusing on an enriched version of the CommonKADS Organizational Model. The diagrams below show the various models which were produced.
This document provides:
The JFACC can be appointed from several locations. If an entire numbered
air force is put in the JTF, the the commander of the numbered air force
will be the JFACC. If more than one numbered air force is involved, then
the commander with the highest rank will be the JFACC. If a portion of a
numbered air force is put in the JTF, then the JFACC will come from Central
Command (CENTCOM) because the commander of the numbered air force will have
to continue to run the troops not assigned to the JTF. If there is no
numbered air force stationed in the theater of operations,
then the JFACC will come from CENTCOM. To some degree, the CINC
will know who he wants to be the JFACC and will appoint that person
regardless of who is supposed to be the JFACC.
Guidance is given throughout the planning process by every level of
command. Although the guidance is considered more of an order than a
suggestion, negotiation does take place. If a commanding officer wants to
establish objectives or goals that are unreasonable, then participants of
the planning process have the responsibility for convincing the commanding
officer to take a different approach. For example, the planners may want more
time. But, to buy time in a crisis, something diplomatic has to be given
up. The commanding officer may not be willing to make a diplomatic sacrifice.
In some such situations, the commanding officer will enforce the initial
guidance; in other cases, the initial guidance may be relaxed. Rules of
Engagement are never negotiable, however.
Initial planning steps include assessing the situation and organizing the
planning staff. Assessing the situation involves identifying enemy COGs
and air defenses as well as determining a method (strategy), goals and
targets. A lot of knowledge about the theater is needed. Typically the
planning staff has been studying the theater for years. The types of
information they know are whether the enemy has nuclear weapons, the nature
of the crisis, and the history of the conflict. The planning staff have, and
use, many maps with different perspectives of the theater.
These maps give the staff valuable insight into the theater and what is
possible.
When the planners cannot find the needed details,
they will rely on contacts with people who have the information or can get
the information. Typically these are intelligence people on the planning team.
Missions may be conducted to find the needed information. Planners are always
skeptical of intelligence data; for example, databases are never fully populated
ed and are continuously being updated. The planners will use data more current
than what is in the target database if the planning staff has access to the
data. It's also impossible to prove the accuracy of intelligence data, because
INTEL (the intelligence group) must protect their sources; however,
duplication of INTEL effort between different branches, which is encouraged,
may corroborate information or
provide additional information.
Usually, the
right information gets to the right person eventually. Tracking down
information is not always conventional, easy or practical. It often
depends on who you know or how much ingenuity is used to get the
information. The planners may not get some needed information for 3 days, so
they will make assumptions and move to the next step.
The planning staff hold 4-hourly meetings to discuss progress, obtain a
consensus of opinion, and to make sure that there is a smooth
transition between phases. The latter is very important, since it is
imperative that friendly forces are not
perceived by the enemy as being indecisive. Planning teams normally work 8-hour
shifts; in a crisis, the planning team work overlapping 12-hour shifts.
Planning consists of three stages:
Interaction with land forces gives the relevant land forces rights to view the
Master Air Attack plan, for the sake of deconfliction of operations.
It's important to note that the planning process does not always continue
until each stage is fully completed. Often, the planning staff may only be
75% finished with some activities when it is time to move on to the next
stage.
However, the dynamic environment makes it difficult to complete a stage
without the situation changing simultaneously. The time spent on any one task
depends on the situation.
The JFACC will not want to be involved in the planning process except for a
daily briefing to make sure that guidance has been communicated correctly.
The lack of involvement from the JFACC is deliberate, to foster openness and
innovation. The air planning team does not communicate with other branches
either, in order to enhance creativity. Keeping the number of participants
involved in the detailed planning to a minimum reduces the constraints of
reconciling too many points of view.
Figure 1:Enriched organizational model: perspectives and
cross-products
The Dictionary perspectives are simply sets of activities (or agents or
resources) which are used as a basis for building the other perspectives. The
Network perspectives show how entities of the same type relate to one
another:
Further details on each perspective will be given in the next section.
Figure 3: ACP Process Perspective: Prepare for ACP Planning
Description of Activities:
Obtain policy and guidance from CinC/JFC: The JFACC must receive
instructions, and guidance on military and political policy, before he can
initiate the planning of an air campaign.
Organize planning staff: The Director of Planning divides his planning
staff into small groups to work on different aspects of the plan. Typically,
the groups will be pairs, with one member of the Planning unit working with
one member of the INTEL unit.
Assess situation: Assess the military (and political) situation, using
background information and local knowledge.
Identify campaign objectives and military objectives: The JFACC must
identify campaign objectives and military objectives from the policy and
guidance which he has received from higher echelons. It's actually possible
that the JFACC might negotiate these objectives, though it's unlikely until
the later stages of planning, when there may be a good case for the
negotiation of objectives.
Decide on enemy's most likely course of action: The JFACC must decide
on the enemy's most likely course of
action. This requires background knowledge as well as a good assessment of the
current situation.
Subdivide the planning problem: The production of the ACP is subdivided
to allow different planning groups to work on different aspects of the
problem. The subdivision will use one or more of the following criteria:
Assuming that the planning staff breaks the plan down by phase, the way
phases are broken down depends on the experience of the staff and the
personalities involved. The team will determine how to split people
between the phases. The first phase almost always has priority, because phase
1 of a plan is used to gain control of the crisis, stabilize the situation and
set up for the next phases. The team will also establish metrics for
evaluation of the effectiveness of a phase; the metrics may include cost,
logistics, intelligence reports, and resources.
Obtain feedback on situation: This activity is not explicitly
carried out as part of the planning process, which explains why it is not
linked to any other activity. Doug thinks it should be carried out, though.
Figure 5: ACP Process Perspective: Produce Prioritized Air Objectives
Description of activities:
Identify enemy Centres of Gravity (in each sub-area): This activity is
carried out by each planning team, each of whom is assigned to a particular
sub-area (see Subdivide planning problem above). Their task is to
analyze the enemy's military forces, infrastructure, and limitations.
This information is continuously updated throughout the planning, because the
position of the enemy is constantly changing.
The planning staff will find intelligence documents and books for details.
The planners will look at cultural issues, the enemy's intent, how many
weapons the enemy has, how the enemy works and how the enemy hides their
resources.
The planners then
use this analysis to identify key points in enemy territory which, if
damaged or destroyed, would seriously disrupt the enemy's military operations.
These key points are known as Centres of Gravity.
For example, the staff will want to know the most likely
situation if the enemy troops loose their command and control. Some troops
are trained to not think on their own so loss of command and control would
result in immediate chaos. In this situation, enemy command and control
centres would be considered to be centers of gravity.
Identify air objectives (for each sub-area): This activity is carried
out by each planning team, each of whom is assigned to a particular sub-area
(see Subdivide planning problem above). Their task is to identify
objectives for the air forces to achieve. These objectives should be chosen to
provide maximum benefit to the friendly forces (with respect to the identified
military objectives), based on the situation
assessment, the expected enemy course of action, and above all on the
description of enemy Centres of Gravity.
Planners usually take a breadth-first approach to the identification of
air objectives.
A good description of different categories of air objectives can be found in
[Warden, 1989].
Identify own Centres of Gravity: This is an activity which is not
currently performed (and therefore it is not linked to the other activities in
the diagram). However, Doug believes that it should be performed, in order to
support strategic planning for defense as well as attack.
Prioritize Air Objectives: This requires decisions about which air
objectives are the most important. The key factors in this decision are the
Centers of Gravity which are targeted, and the campaign objectives and
military objectives. However, a number of factors make this a complex task:
the time delay between missions taking place and the enemy's capabilities
being affected; the possibility that some missions could achieve more than
one air objective; and limitations on the resources available for carrying out
certain types of missions.
Finally review and unify lists of objectives: This activity takes place
at a meeting where, as the name suggests, the air objectives identified and
prioritized by the different planning teams are brought together and unified
into a single prioritized list of air objectives. The reviewing is an
important activity, because it is intended to identify any enemy Centres of
Gravity or likely enemy activity which is not addressed by any of the
identified air objectives.
Brief JFACC and Obtain feedback from JFACC on Air Objectives: The
JFACC is briefed every day, usually at a set time. On the first day of
planning, he will be briefed on the chosen list of air objectives, with
justifications for prioritization. He will give feedback on his opinion of the
air objectives, especially their relevance to the campaign objectives and
military objectives; he may also give specific instructions for modifications,
based on his knowledge of operations which the Director of Planning is not
aware of.
Figure 7: ACP Process Perspective: Produce Prioritized Targets
Description of activities:
One of the main
discoveries from this modelling exercise has been that the processes involved
in producing prioritized air objectives, producing prioritized task objectives
and producing a prioritized target list are very similar. The text below
should therefore be read in conjunction with the description of activities
involved in producing prioritized air objectives.
Identify enemy Centers of Gravity (in a way which is specific to target identification): Although the air
objectives have already been designed to target enemy Centers of Gravity, it's
helpful to review the Centers of Gravity at this stage of planning. No
information has yet been acquired on any special features of Centers of
Gravity which are specific to target identification.
Identify targets: Identifying targets consists of choosing targets
which provide the maximum fulfilment of the task objectives, based on the task
objectives chosen and on identified enemy Centres of Gravity.
Prioritize targets should largely be based on the prioritization of
corresponding task objectives. In practice, the planners spend a lot of time
discussing the list of targets and moving certain targets up or down the
prioritization; this action effectively incorporates the review and
unification of the target list.
Analyze feasibility of plan is a computerized process. The format of
the output is not yet known.
Brief JFACC and Obtain feedback from JFACC on Targets: see
description of Obtain feedback from JFACC on Task Objectives above.
Doug Holmes highlighted a difficulty with modelling the structure of a Joint
Forces Command; sometimes the CinC chooses to adjust the structure according
to his own preferences. To be more precise, the CinC may alter the lines of
authority or reporting requirements, in order to improve his own liaison with
selected groups or individuals. For more detail on these alterations, see
section Rights
Figure 10: Structure of a typical Joint Task Force
Plan Components
A Campaign Plan is a plan for all forces participating in a JTF and
typically covers a 6 month period. An air plan, for the Air Force, also
covers a 6 month period. The Air Tasking Order (ATO), or battle plan,
takes 36 hours to produce and covers 24 hours. Mission plans are derived
from the ATO; a mission plan constitutes the directions for a specific sortie.
Pilots then develop an engagement plan, which specifies the
maneuvers that will be used to execute the mission plan.
Preparation for planning
Once a crisis occurs, the CINC assesses the situation, selects a Course of
Action (COA) and may decide to establish at JTF. Then a warning order is
given, normally 3 days in advance of the commencement of operations.
Operations are initiated by a further order from the CINC, known as the
operations order.
When a crisis occurs and the CINC decides to take some action, the CINC
will provide planning guidance to the Joint Forces Commander (JFC). The
guidance can take several forms including:
All of these types of guidance will change dynamically throughout the
planning process as well as the execution of the plan. The guidance is
communicated to the component commanders (e.g. the JFACC) through the JFC.
The component commanders will in turn communicate the guidance to their
planners. Based
on the guidance, the planning staff will take between 3 days and 1 week to
build a plan that may be executed. Planning
At this point, the staff is
organized according to plan alternatives. During this step, and throughout
the planning process, air planners are searching for alternatives,
vulnerabilities, consequences and contingencies.
The planners may consider alternative situations (the best case, worst case,
or most likely case) based on the enemy's predicted course of action; however,
the planning team usually consists of 8 people, which is only sufficient
to plan for one situation (the most likely case) and look very
hard at one other alternative (probably the worst case). There are usually
no more people available.
Doug mentioned a few factors which are considered at each stage:
Introduction to the modelling technique used
The modelling technique used to model the ACP process was based on the
The CommonKADS Organizational Model
The stated aim of modelling the ACP process was to perform a ``task
analysis'' of the ACP process. However, after initial domain familiarization
it was felt that there was considerable benefit to be gained from producing an
a paper produced by
the KRSL Plans Working Group, I have chosen to use
the term ``activities'' throughout this document.),
Enriching the CommonKADS Organizational Model for the ACP domain
The process of domain familiarization also showed that some aspects of the
organization surrounding ACP -- in
particular, power/authority relationships -- would benefit from being
represented in more detail than the CommonKADS Organizational Model currently
permits. It was decided that the multi-perspective approach to organizational
modelling would be maintained, but that the perspectives would be altered to
permit the representation of rights of access to resources and
information, and the representation of who was responsible for performing
which activities. The result was that a set of perspectives were developed
based on three basic entities: activities, agents and
resources.(N.B.
This distinction was derived from the ORDIT
project which is intended to support organizational requirements definition
[Dobson and Strens, 1994].).
Figure 2 shows the perspectives which were used, and how they
were combined.
The Cross Product perspectives show how resources are produced, used,
consumed or modified within the process (Assets perspective, what rights
agents have to resources (Rights perspective), and the obligations and
responsibilities to perform activities and to create states of affairs (
Responsibilities perspective). Organizational Model of the ACP process
Process Perspective
Figures 2 to 8 show the activities involved in ACP, and how these activities
link to form processes. The six diagrams are a hierarchical decomposition:
Figure 2 is the top level diagram, figures 3, 4 and 8 show decompositions of
three
top-level activities (Prepare for ACP planning, Plan Air Campaign and Execute Air Campaign
Plan), and figures 5-7 show second-level decompositions of activities
connected with prioritization within the planning process.
Line type
Meaning
Solid link
the first activity precedes the second
Line type
Meaning
Solid link
the first activity precedes the second
Dashed link
there is an information flow from the first activity to
the second
Line type
Meaning
Solid link
the first activity precedes the second
Dashed link
there is an information flow from the first activity to
the second
Structure Perspective
Line type
Meaning
Solid link
the first agent reports to the second
Dashed link
the agent belongs to the department
In addition to the information shown in this diagram, Doug explained the
operational sequence within the Air Operations Center when an
ACP has to be produced. The INTEL group, who gather
information constantly, are assigned to work with the Planning group
(typically in pairs) on various sub-parts of the planning problem. Redundancy
(two pairs working on the same problem) is very rare. The parts of the plan
are unified by the head of the Planning group (Director of Planning), who
briefs the JFACC at various stages of the planning cycle. The completed plan
is then passed to the Ops group, who perform the activities shown in Figure 8.
States of Affairs
A State of Affairs indicates that one or more resources have reached a certain
status which is important to the ACP process. Since most of the resources used
by ACP planning are passive resources (e.g. documents), most of the important
states of affairs will correspond to the completion of certain documents.
No states of affairs have yet been fully identified; however, the diagram
of the Responsibilities perspective below
illustrates some possible states of affairs which might emerge as being important.
Assets Perspective
The Assets perspective takes the activities identified in the Process
perspective, but replaces the precedence links with information regarding the
resources which are produced, consumed, used or modified by the various
activities. A diamond-shaped node in the diagram represents a passive resource
(a document or file); ellipses represent computer resources (e.g. databases);
and there is one rectangle, labelled ``Background knowledge'', which
represents a human resource.
The diagrams in Figures 11 to 16 use the same hierarchical decomposition as
the Process perspective; thus Figure 11 displays the activities shown in
Figure 4, Figure 12 displays the activities shown in Figure 5, and so on.
Figure 12: ACP Assets Perspective: Plan Air Campaign
Line type | Meaning |
---|---|
Labelled link | the activity produces/consumes/uses/modifies the resource |
Diamond | Passive resource |
Ellipse | Computer Resource |
Rounded Rectangle | Activity |
(Blue) Rectangle | Human resource |
Figure 14: ACP Assets Perspective: Prioritize Task Objectives
Line type | Meaning |
---|---|
Labelled link | the activity produces/consumes/uses/modifies the resource |
Diamond | Passive resource |
Ellipse | Computer Resource |
Rounded Rectangle | Activity |
Figure 16: ACP Assets Perspective: Execute Air Campaign Plan
Line type | Meaning |
---|---|
Labelled link | the activity produces/consumes/uses/modifies the resource |
Diamond | Passive resource |
Ellipse | Computer Resource |
Rounded Rectangle | Activity |
An example of the consequences of changing rights can be drawn from Desert Storm [Thaler & Shlapak, 1995]. General Schwarzkopf, the CinC, not only briefed all Joint Force Commanders at meetings, he also sometimes gave out guidance or instructions to an individual Joint Force Commander by telephone or in private meetings. One such instruction, given to the JFACC, was that Iraqi units believed to be below 50\% of full combat strength should no longer be targeted for air strikes. This instruction was not communicated to the land commanders, who were left to wonder why the Air Force had ceased to support them; indeed, many did not find out about this instruction until after the war! It can be seen that the CinC decided to withdraw (or neglected to provide) the JFLCC's rights to view the instructions and guidance which the CinC was providing to the JFACC, and that the result was considerable scope for confusion and irritation. Of course, there may be advantages (e.g. in security) in General Schwarzkopf's approach; but it is important to have a framework for weighing the pros and cons of a particular decision.
The first four attributes in these grids were derived from previous experience of using this technique to obtain knowledge about activities. The final two attributes (Analytic vs Synthetic and Evaluation required) were suggested by Doug, after prompting using a triadic elicitation technique (choosing three domain items at random and asking the expert to specify a dimension on which one of the three items differs from the other two). There is much useful information to be gained from this technique, both by statistical analysis of the scores provided (see below) and also from the `asides' which the expert mentions as he is completing the grid (see below).
The repertory grid is also a good way of objectively identifying differences
in opinion between different experts. It is hoped that this technique will be
used with other experts in the ACP process in the course of this project.
Figure 20: Repertory Grid: Attributes of Tasks involved in Prioritization
Recording the ``aside'' comments which Doug made while completing the grid produces much useful information about the activities involved in air campaign planning. Doug made some general comments about the criteria which he used in filling in the numbers in the grid; these are listed below, followed by the information which was gathered on individual activities.
Experience required: The criterion which Doug was using here was the rank of the officer who normally carried out the activity; 3 indicated an activity which was normally assigned to a major, 4 an activity normally assigned to a lieutenant-colonel, and 5 an activity which normally required a colonel to perform it.
Seriousness of mistake: Doug's criterion here was the length of time for which a mistake could go uncorrected in the planning process. For example, an incorrect decision on the enemy's most likely course of action could go uncorrected until the end of the war (thus meriting a high score), while a mistake in obtaining policy and guidance from CinC/JFC will always be corrected at the first briefing.
Likelihood of mistake: No comments made.
Time required: Doug stated that he was considering activities within a 3-day time frame (the length of an average planning cycle), so a small number indicated an activity taking a few minutes, whereas a large number indicated an activity taking hours or even a whole day.
Analytic vs Synthetic: No comments made.
Evaluation required: No comments made.
Further information on ACP activities
Obtain policy and guidance from CinC/JFC: The instructions from the
CinC are not often misunderstood; if they are, the JFACC's understanding is
corrected (often painfully!) at the next briefing of the CJTF. The task
doesn't usually take very long, because the JFACC will probably have already
spent time considering the situation, and the policy and guidance which is
obtained is likely to confirm a previously formulated hypothesis.
Understanding the policy and guidance doesn't require much evaluation; it's an
order, so there is no option to decide whether to follow it or not.
Organize planning staff: A mistake here causes inefficiency, but it quickly becomes apparent when deadlines approach. However, mistakes are rare; Directors of Planning become fairly skilled at this job.
Assess situation: This is one of the most complex activities in the ACP process. It requires a high ranking officer to perform it, and considerable evaluation is required, both in the weighing of information, and in the weighing the costs and benefits of obtaining or using further information. It's not a completely analytic activity, because it's usually performed by formulating and testing hypotheses. Doug thought that the likelihood of a mistake was about average, although he admitted that he didn't have much evidence for this.
Identify campaign objectives and military objectives: This is also a complex activity; the main reasons for this are that there are many nuances in the language used which need to be understood, and the reader also requires a lot of previously acquired contextual information to understand the objectives fully. If the objectives are not understood properly (which happens sometimes), this is corrected (often painfully) at the first briefing of the CJTF.
Subdivide the planning problem: A mistake here causes inefficiency, but few other problems.
Decide on enemy's most likely course of action: The emphasis here is on making a decision which is ``good enough''. The assessment of the enemy's likely course of action could probably be made more accurate, but the marginal improvement is usually judged to be not worth the extra time required; this activity is therefore relatively swift. Despite the seriousness of mistakes on this activity, mistakes do happen; the beginning of Desert Storm is a good example, when few planners correctly predicted Saddam Hussein's dig-in-and-wait strategy. Fortunately, this strategy was less damaging than the one which had been predicted.
Review enemy course of action: Since this activity is not currently carried out explicitly, Doug made his own estimates of the characteristics of this task, using the scores for Decide on enemy's most likely course of action as a guide.
Communicate plan to subordinates: This activity is more complex than the name might suggest, because it includes both a completeness check and a ``sanity check'' on the completed plan. Once the checks have been done, mistakes in communication are very rare, since the plan is formatted as an Air Tasking Order and a Master Air Attack Plan.
Brief CJTF: This is a complex activity, perhaps surprisingly so. Doug hinted at the underlying complexity when he stated that this activity required a lot of evaluation ``because there's a lot of tradeoffs in what you say and what you do''.
Produce prioritized air objectives, task objectives and targets:
Producing and prioritizing air objectives is a more difficult activity than
doing
the same for task objectives; prioritizing targets is the easiest task of the
three, though the difference is not great. There isn't much experience
available concerning mistakes in these activities.
Identify enemy Centres of Gravity (in each sub-area): This activity
takes a long time -- maybe as much as half a day.
Identify air objectives (for each sub-area): This is a relatively quick
activity, once Centers of Gravity have been identified. However, it does require
some evaluation, because it requires some ``internal allocation of
resources''. Doug stated that this was a synthetic activity, but he also
pointed out that the identification of air objectives is really a selection
from a pre-existing set of objectives; in that case, it's probably a more
analytic activity (deciding which objectives are applicable in this situation)
than a synthetic activity.
Prioritize Air Objectives: This is done at a meeting which typically
lasts half an hour at most; it's not a difficult activity to perform.
Finally review and unify lists of objectives: There's a lot of implicit
internal weighting within this task; but mistakes (i.e. missing out important
air objectives) are rare, because every planner's work is available and easily verifiable.
Brief JFACC: Doug gave this activity a medium score for Likelihood
of mistakes, because ``when a general briefs a general, the former is right
about half the time''.
Identify enemy Centers of Gravity for review purposes: No further information.
Identify task objectives (for each Air Objective): No further
information.
Prioritize task objectives: This has a slightly higher likelihood of
mistakes than the prioritization of air objectives, simply because there are
more task objectives than air objectives.
Finally review and unify lists of tasks: This has a slightly higher
likelihood of mistakes than the prioritization of air objectives, simply
because there are more task objectives than air objectives.
Brief JFACC: The likelihood of a mistake is quite small in these
briefings, since anyone who is going to brief a general tends to spend a lot
of time making sure that the briefing is correct.
Identify enemy Centers of Gravity (in a way which is specific to target
identification): Despite the increased time required to consider Centers of
Gravity in relation to thousands of possible targets, the likelihood of a
mistake here is small -- 1.5 might be a better score than 2.
Identify targets: No further information.
Prioritize targets: The likelihood of a mistake here is high because
there are so many identified targets.
Analyze feasibility of plan is a computerized process, which reduces
the likelihood of a mistake to a score of around 2.5
Further information on prioritization activities