

Joint Publication 3-50



Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery



Second Draft
19 July 2004



PREFACE

1. Scope

~~This publication incorporates joint and Service doctrine into a single source publication and provides the guidance and procedures necessary to plan, coordinate, and conduct personnel recovery across the range of military operations. This publication provides the fundamental principles and doctrine, and establishes joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP), that guide the Armed Forces of the United States in the preparation and planning for personnel recovery and its execution during the conduct of joint and multinational operations.~~

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine and selected ~~joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP)~~ to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures

1 not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational
2 command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and
3 doctrine.

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6 For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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11 T. J. KEATING
12 Vice Admiral, USN
13 Director, Joint Staff
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

~~"We value every life. Our Enemies value none...not even their own."~~

~~"On a tape claiming responsibility for the atrocities in Madrid, a man is heard to say, 'We choose death, while you chose life.' We don't know if this is the voice of the actual killers, but we do know it expresses the creed of the enemy. It is a mindset that rejoices in suicide, incites murder, and celebrates every death we mourn. And we who stand on the other side of the line must be equally clear and certain of our convictions. We do love life, the life given to us and to all. We believe in the values that uphold the dignity of life, tolerance, and freedom, and the right of conscience. And we know that this way of life is worth defending."~~

President George W. Bush

~~"By pledging to put every effort into recovering our highly trained [personnel], we send a powerful signal about their importance and help sustain their spirit under the stress of combat."~~

General Hugh Shelton
Chairman, ~~of the~~ Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Overview

a. **Scope and Policy.** Personnel ~~R~~recovery (PR) is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to effect the recovery ~~and debrief~~ and reintegration of US military, Department of Defense (DOD) civilians, and DOD contractor personnel who are isolated or missing while participating in a US-sponsored military activity or mission. Additionally, when directed by the President of the United States or the Secretary of Defense, the Department of Defense shall provide PR support to other governments, agencies, organizations, and individuals in accordance with all applicable laws, regulations, and memoranda of agreement or understanding. Preserving the lives of those participating in a US-sponsored activity or mission is one of the highest priorities of the Department of Defense. ~~The specific objective of PR~~ PR is a system in which the objective is to return isolated personnel to friendly control without further loss of friendly assets, thus denying our adversary a source of intelligence and/or ~~political-diplomatic~~ exploitation and enhancing the morale of our own forces.

b. ~~PR Target Set.~~ Title 10, US Code (USC), Chapter 76, Sections 1501 - 1513, also known as the 1996 "Missing Persons Act (MPA)," is the law that ~~defines "covered persons."~~ ~~This coverage extends to any member of the armed forces on active duty, civilian employee of the Department of Defense, and employee of a contractor of the Department of Defense who is involuntarily absent as a result, or presumed result, of hostile action while in service to the United States. The MPA further defines "missing person" to mean missing, missing in action, interned in a foreign country, captured, beleaguered, besieged, or detained in a foreign country against that person's will. This publication uses the term "isolated personnel" to specifically focus the PR~~

~~“target set.”~~ Isolated personnel are those individuals mentioned above who are in support of a military operation that have become separated from their unit or organization in an environment requiring them to survive, evade, resist, or escape ~~while awaiting recovery~~. It is important to note that PR does not include the recovery of the general public or “distressed” persons. Nevertheless, it is a DOD policy to provide support to civil authorities conducting search and rescue (SAR) for “distressed” persons (i.e., civil SAR) when requested, but on a strict not-to-interfere basis with primary military duties. There are international agreements and procedures, as well as national policy, directives, plans, and guidelines that govern military support to civil SAR efforts (Appendix A, “Military Support to Civil Search and Rescue”).

2. The Department of Defense Personnel Recovery System

PR is a system, not a cycle, because although the activities can happen consecutively, generally they occur concurrently or at least overlap in their execution. The elements are not discrete steps, but rather activities that continuously interact with one another and adjust or adapt until the mission is complete.

~~ea. Essential Elements of Success. Preparation.~~ The essential elements of PR are comprised of commanders and staffs, recovery forces, and the isolated personnel working together through a credible command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) architecture ~~(Figure I-1)~~. Each of these PR elements must be thoroughly trained, properly organized and equipped to perform its own unique set of actions, seamlessly to interface effectively with the other elements to accomplish the five PR execution tasks: report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate. ~~(discussed below) and gain and maintain situational awareness (SA) and situational superiority for PR. SA is achieved when an element believes it has sufficient knowledge of those events that affect PR in its area of interest. Situational superiority, on the other hand, is the ability to achieve desired objectives (or bring about desired effects) given one’s situation in the area of influence.~~ The foundation for everything that the Department of Defense does to prepare these elements must be rooted in sound PR policy; validated doctrine; current tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP); and enhanced by a robust education and training program.

2. Personnel Recovery Options and Categories

b. Planning

(1) **General.** Joint force commanders (JFCs) and their planners-staffs must consider all available PR options and categories ~~(Figure I-2)~~ to successfully plan for PR operations within their operational area. JFCs and their planners cannot control or, in many cases, influence the nonmilitary options; ~~however, JFCs and planners should control the composition of, and influence the preparation and training for, all DOD recovery assets necessary to accomplish PR missions within their operational area.~~

(2) **PR Options.** The President of the United States or the Secretary of Defense can choose to exercise military, diplomatic, and/or civil options; ~~or a combination thereof,~~ to recover isolated personnel. The ~~M~~**military PR**-option includes the planning and execution of activities by commanders and staffs, recovery forces, and/or isolated personnel across the range of military operations to report, locate, support, recover ~~and debrief~~ and reintegrate (~~D&R~~) isolated personnel. ~~The D~~**The Diplomatic PR**-approach may include negotiation, armistice, and/or treaty. In 2001, a US Navy EP-3 performed an emergency landing in the People's Republic of China (PRC). The PRC government detained the crew, which offered the new US Administration its first high-visibility **PR** international test. The US Embassy assigned the Defense Attaché to ~~work with the Administration as it assist as the United States Government (USG)~~ successfully recovered the isolated crew through diplomatic means. The use of C**civil PR**-resources may include intervention by international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), influential persons, and/or private citizens. The 1982 return of US Navy ~~LT~~**Lieutenant** Goodman from Syria was achieved through a civil effort, sanctioned by the United States, and led by an influential US citizen. In some cases, civil organizations, especially non-US, may act independently without the knowledge of the US military or government. Diplomatic and civil options can be imposed upon or requested by the military commander and are most effective when the isolated personnel are captured or detained. ~~While the focus of this publication is employment of the military PR option,~~ JFCs and ~~planners need their staffs work~~ to ensure that all military efforts are coordinated, to the maximum extent possible, with diplomatic and civil options.

(3) **PR Categories.** **Within the military option,** commanders and staffs, recovery forces, and isolated personnel fulfill their functions and responsibilities by working through a **C4I** architecture composed of ~~PR~~**Joint Personnel Recovery** ~~e~~**Coordination** ~~e~~**Centers** and **Personnel Recovery Coordination** ~~e~~**Cells**, delegated authorities, mission and functional area specialists, and unique equipment and procedures ~~with the ultimate goal of achieving both SA and situational superiority to achieve situational awareness (SA) and situational superiority to accomplish the ultimate goal of recovering isolated personnel.~~ The six PR categories (**unassisted, opportune, component, joint, multinational, and multi-agency**) represent various types and degrees of command and control (C2), force composition, and ~~Service~~ component capabilities that can be used to conduct PR ~~within the operational area.~~ These categories may be used individually, or several may be used concurrently. ~~The joint force planner JFC and staff~~ needs to be fully cognizant of the benefits and/or limitations of ~~the Service or each~~ component's capabilities ~~and be able to apply them in the appropriate PR category to achieve the JFC's PR objectives to optimize them during PR operations.~~ In the event the JFC's PR responsibilities can not be met, these shortfalls must be clearly identified and articulated through appropriate mechanisms for resolution by higher authority. ~~(e.g., joint requirements oversight council).~~ ~~Since many of these processes are programmatic and require long lead times, planners need to identify any PR requirement shortfalls at the earliest possible time, preferably during deliberate planning. Early identification and formal validation of the JFC's PR requirements is essential in order for the Services to properly organize, train, and equip their forces to meet the JFC's PR needs.~~




Figure I-1. Personnel Recovery Options, Methods, and Categories

(4) **Use of PR Categories.** During operations, PR can be conducted via any of the six PR categories, or combination thereof. These categories ~~represent a means of assessing~~ provide an organized model to assess capabilities, ~~and planning~~ train, and plan the employment of those capabilities to meet the operational area PR requirements. The joint force ~~planner staff~~ must assess the PR environment (i.e., threats, distances, geography, weather, communications, diplomatic considerations, civil capabilities, etc.) within the assigned operational area to determine the necessary and/or optimum C2 and force capabilities to successfully accomplish the five PR execution tasks (report, locate, support, recover, and ~~D&R~~ reintegrate) discussed in paragraph 32c below.

(a) **Unassisted PR** requires isolated personnel to independently evade back to friendly control. Preparation for unassisted PR is a hedge against the failure of recovery efforts or those periods of time where the situation or location of isolated personnel are not known to friendly forces. Preparation for unassisted PR is accomplished through survival, evasion, resistance and escape (SERE) training; the level of which is determined by the combatant commander and promulgated through theater clearance guides and deployment orders. Theater specific High Risk

of Isolation (HRI) preparation is also a critical link in ensuring isolated personnel are properly prepared. Additionally, evasion aids (i.e., evasion charts (EVCs), blood chits, etc.) are issued to assist the evader to successfully survive and avoid capture. Those isolated have a responsibility to contribute to their own recovery as much as possible. Most wartime isolation episodes will have an unassisted phase, even if only for a very short time. How well prepared the evader is, their health, their willingness to recognize and take advantage of opportunities, their proximity to hostile forces, and luck can seriously affect success of recovery.

(b) **Opportune PR**, ~~unlike the other categories, is not normally planned or directed~~ —it usually occurs through simple “blind luck” or a chance encounter with isolated personnel. ~~The availability of military forces, indigenous persons, or others not specifically trained for, dedicated to, or designated for PR may provide an opportune recovery capability due to their proximity and/or willingness to assist. Evasion aids, especially blood chits, can enhance an isolated person’s chances of an opportune recovery.~~ is a survivor-initiated, indigenous-assisted recovery, whereby an isolated person takes advantage of an opportunity to enlist the aid of indigenous personnel in finding their way back to friendly forces. The isolated person may be still evading, making it an overt effort on his part, or may have been discovered by indigenous personnel, at which point a decision must be made as to the utility of asking for an act of mercy or using a blood chit. In either circumstance, it is a very high-risk decision because of limited SA.

(c) **Component PR** results from each Service or functional component ~~(including special operations)~~ being responsible for performing PR in support of their own operations, or within their area of operation, consistent with their assigned functions and capabilities. See Appendices B, “US Army Personnel Recovery,” through G, “Special Operations Forces Personnel Recovery.” Component PR is performed by appropriately equipped dedicated or designated military forces of a single Service or functional component. **At the same time, each Service or functional component has the additional responsibility to provide PR capability-capabilities that will support the JFC’s overall theater PR plan for joint PR effort.** ~~If a component cannot accomplish the five PR execution tasks, this must be identified—identify capability and resource shortfalls~~ to the JFC ~~so joint PR planners and his staff so they can plan properly and, where required, request additional support/resources. can marshal resources to ensure those tasks can be accomplished throughout the operational area.~~

(d) **Joint PR** is a difficult mission and is extremely risky when performed by an ad hoc compilation of available assets. Successful joint PR requires proper planning, preparation, training, organizing, and equipping of different forces to jointly conduct the same PR mission. For these reasons, it is imperative that ~~joint force planners identify~~ the JFC’s joint PR concept of operations (CONOPS) be clearly articulated and distributed as early as possible to enable the ~~Services and Service~~ components and supporting commands and organizations to properly prepare their forces to meet their PR responsibilities.

(e) The JFC may use, or combine PR capabilities from other categories with, allied or coalition participants in order to conduct **multinational PR**. While T~~his~~ could provide the

commander with a broader range of PR capabilities, ~~and it could increase~~ interoperability concerns ~~when combined with Service and component capabilities.~~ While joint PR is difficult, multinational PR ~~may~~ poses greater challenges. Security classification restrictions, interoperability of C2 architectures, recovery force equipment, procedures, and language ~~may~~ have a significant impact on planning for, and employing, multinational PR capabilities.

(f) Additionally, the JFC could use designated US PR forces combined with the capabilities of other government agencies (OGAs), both US and foreign, to execute **multi-agency PR** missions. Coordinating with, or employing, nonmilitary agencies will ~~present unique organizational challenges; as well as broaden~~ PR task execution options such as support to prisoners of war (POWs) or reporting isolated personnel events. However, it will present unique organizational challenges.

3.—Personnel Recovery Execution Tasks

c. Execution

(1) **General.** The DOD PR system exists to ensure a complete and coordinated effort to recover US military, DOD civilians, ~~and~~ DOD contractor personnel, and those other personnel directed by the President of the United States or Secretary of Defense. This system is centered on tasks and supporting activities that must be accomplished once an isolating event has occurred ~~to achieve successful PR.~~ The five PR execution tasks are: **report, locate, support, recover, and D&R reintegrate.** The capability to complete each of these tasks does not reside within a single entity, but instead resides among all command and staff elements (including Services), recovery forces, and isolated personnel. The Services provide manning, ~~equipping, equipment,~~ training, and processes for ~~the Service components to accomplishing~~ the five PR execution tasks ~~in support of their operations or within their operational area.~~ The PR execution tasks are discussed briefly below; however, the joint procedures used to accomplish them are thoroughly discussed in Chapter VI, “Joint ~~Operational Personnel Recovery Procedures and Techniques~~ Techniques and Procedures.” In addition, individual Service PR capabilities, including Service-unique PR terminology, are further amplified in Appendices B, “US Army Personnel Recovery,” through G, “Special Operations Forces Personnel Recovery,” of this publication.

(2) **Report** is the notification that personnel have or may have become isolated. Various procedures are used to notify all appropriate organizations and personnel to validate the isolation event and collect information. Anyone can report a probable isolated or missing individual(s) based on actual sighting, a missed report time or waypoint, intelligence collection assets, etc. It is important ~~for the PR planner~~ to develop reporting procedures that take advantage of existing accountability procedures and to establish pertinent elements of information to be passed and key nodes to be notified. As discussed later, all reports are usually passed as quickly as possible to the joint personnel recovery center (JPRC), which initiates validation and location procedures.

(3) **Locate** is the action taken to precisely find and confirm the identity of isolated personnel. Locate is usually the most difficult task and normally the least practiced. It starts as soon as the report of an isolated person is received and continues until the isolated personnel are recovered. Locating and authenticating may be accomplished by intelligence collection assets, (airborne, space-based, surface-based, and sea-borne C2 nodes), commercial aircraft, the isolated person's wingman, the JPRC, ground elements, etc. An accurate location and positive identification are normally required prior to committing recovery forces. ~~The~~ This location and identification information must be maintained throughout the mission.

(4) **Support** is the planned effort necessary to ensure the security and the mental, physical, and emotional sustainment of the isolated person. The support process begins the moment the individual is reported missing or isolated and will continue through the D&R-reintegration process. Support should include not just operational support, but also activating necessary personnel support mechanisms (i.e., casualty reporting, public affairs (PA), family support, etc.). JFCs must be aware of other DOD and Service responsibilities and efforts to provide this personnel support. Once the isolated individual(s) has been located and authenticated, operational support efforts will intensify. These efforts can include establishing two-way communications, providing morale-building support using all available means, suppressing enemy-adversary threats, dropping delivering of subsistence and supplies, or providing directions to a cache. It may also encompass the protection of isolated personnel from capture and, as necessary, the disruption of any adversary response to friendly PR operations. A joint, multinational, or multi-agency effort will most likely be required to provide adequate support.

(5) **Recover** is the process of coordinated actions and efforts of commanders and staffs, recovery forces, and isolated personnel to bring isolated personnel under the control of a recovery force. The recover task starts when the report of isolated personnel is received and ends when the recovery force transfers control to the organization responsible for the D&R-reintegration process. This task normally includes confirming the location and authentication of the isolated individual(s) ~~in the objective area~~. Prerequisites for recovery force execution of this task are mission planning, a responsive decision process, and command authorization. It should be reemphasized that the isolated individual(s) has a significant responsibility in the recovery process. Each Service component maintains various degrees of capability to perform the recover task. The methods and respective terminology that Service and functional components use to recover isolated personnel are discussed in Appendices B, "US Army Personnel Recovery" through G, "Special Operations Forces Personnel Recovery" of this publication. **Recognizing that each Service or functional component may use different terminology to describe their own recovery methods, for simplicity, this publication prescribes combat search and rescue (CSAR) and combat search and rescue task force (CSARTF) as standard terms to be used for all joint (and multinational) PR missions.** CSAR and CSARTF operations are thoroughly addressed in Chapter VI, "Joint Operational Personnel Recovery Procedures and Techniques."

~~(6) **Debrief and Reintegrate.** D&R is part of YELLOW RIBBON—DOD plans and actions related to processing returned US personnel that is outlined in DODI 2310.4,~~

~~Repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel.~~ The YELLOW RIBBON process, as described in DODI 2310.4, is primarily for captives and detainees; while the PR D&R task focuses on gathering essential intelligence and SERE information while protecting the health and welfare of recovered isolated personnel and allowing them to reintegrate into their DOD duties. The D&R **intelligence and SERE debriefs** are designed to obtain specific information regarding the experience of recovered isolated personnel. The intelligence debrief focuses on specific mission essential and captivity related, time sensitive information (perishable and actionable) which is quickly turned around and provided to operators in theater, as well as the general intelligence community. The SERE debrief occurs as soon as possible after the event and focuses on the recovered isolated person's account of the overall isolation event to evaluate the value and adequacy of the preparation, products, and services provided to them. It is conducted by a JPRA qualified SERE debriefer. **Reintegration** encompasses the decompression process which is overseen by a SERE psychologist and focuses on the health and well being of recovered isolated personnel. SERE psychologists execute decompression protocols that are critical to the successful reintegration of the recovered isolated personnel by allowing them to process their experience thoroughly and receive feedback from subject matter experts. In doing so, the recovered isolated personnel can exit the D&R process without lingering doubt about how well they performed their mission. The PR D&R task activities are coordinated and integrated with the other YELLOW RIBBON command activities (i.e. medical treatment, accident investigation, operational intelligence debrief, etc.) as shown in Figure I-3. The associated records are maintained and disposed of in accordance with this publication, DOD policy, and Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) guidance. **Reintegrate.** The reintegration task begins when the recovery force relinquishes positive control of the recovered isolated personnel to a designated member of a team or organization in the theater reintegration process. The goal of the reintegrate task is to gather critical and essential information from recovered isolated personnel while protecting their health and welfare allowing them to return to duty, emotionally and physically healthy, as expeditiously as possible. The execution of the reintegrate task requires the cooperative efforts of the geographic combatant command staff, the components and the Services. The conduct of, and procedures involved in, the reintegrate task are directed by theater standing operating procedures (SOPs) and directives, and operation orders (OPORDs), all of which are governed by the guidance in Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 2310.4, *Repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel*. The reintegrate task employs systematic methods, well planned scientific and controlled events, to process recovered isolated personnel from the time they are recovered until they are returned to their unit. This process is normally conducted in three phases as dictated by the amount of control points required to collect immediate, perishable information and SERE information from recovered isolated personnel and evaluate their mental and physical status.

(a) The location of phase I activities is characterized by the best available, accessible, and closest secure point. Phase I activities consist of comprehensive medical triage, emergency medical treatment and stabilization, completion of authentication and identification, collection of time sensitive, perishable information (i.e. people still missing, location of adversaries or places of




Figure I-2. The Department of Defense Personnel Recovery System

captivity, etc). At this point, it is also important to explain the reintegration process to recovered isolated personnel (best done by a qualified SERE psychologist, if available).

(b) SERE psychologists are specially trained and hold credentials to practice all aspects of the DOD Code of Conduct (CoC) training. This specialty includes training in SERE as well as reintegration. As reintegration experts they will provide one-on-one intervention as required and group counseling and support to the recovered isolated individuals.

1 (c) Phase II begins when positive control of recovered isolated personnel is
2 transferred from a member of the phase I team or organization to a member of the phase II team.
3 The location of phase II is characterized by a mature infrastructure that can provide the best security
4 and medical care available in the theater. Long-established military installations and naval vessels
5 are excellent choices. Phase II activities consist of more in-depth medical treatment,
6 decompression, debriefings and personnel actions and services. The primary focus of phase II is
7 providing required medical care while balancing the right application of structured SERE debriefings
8 and decompression protocols, in addition to other required debriefing, investigation, legal, financial,
9 personnel and chaplain activities.

10
11 (d) Decompression consists of established and proven protocols that allow
12 recovered isolated personnel to methodically process their isolation experience and to return to
13 normal and stable professional, family and community activities. The SERE psychologist
14 orchestrates the correct balance of all activities and decompression protocols in all phases of the
15 reintegration process.

16
17 (e) Phase III begins when control of recovered isolated personnel is transferred from
18 the phase II team to the phase III team. Phase III activities and locations are controlled by the
19 respective Service as opposed to the combatant commander who controls the conduct of phases I
20 and II. However, the recovered isolated personnel remains the responsibility of the respective
21 Service, component or organization of assignment throughout the reintegration process. It is the
22 Service, component or organization of assignment that has the responsibility to ensure recovered
23 isolated personnel complete the required phases and processes of reintegration as dictated by
24 theater and Service SOPs, directives, and orders, as governed by DODI 2310.4, *Repatriation of*
25 *Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees and Other Missing or*
26 *Isolated Personnel*. Phase III ends when the SERE debriefing and decompression protocols are
27 complete as determined by the respective Service.

28
29 **d. Adaptation.** This ongoing activity assures continuous improvements to the PR system
30 because it provides the feedback (in the form of lessons learned, assessments, etc.) to the rest of the
31 system, and forces it to adapt to new ideas and concepts in order to better accomplish the mission.
32 As adaptation is a continuous activity, it impacts the others elements of the system while they are
33 being accomplished. It should not be restricted to post-mission input.



Mission Accomplished

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CHAPTER II

FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

"[We] must have a 'social contract' with the troops, and must never see them as expendable."

General James Jones
Commandant, USMC

1. General

The **Secretary of Defense** is responsible for policy, control, and oversight over PR matters. The **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff** is responsible for operational implementation of joint PR policy and development of joint PR doctrine. Specific PR responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Commander, United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) (DOD PR executive agent less policy); Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) (DOD Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for PR); Services (including the US Coast Guard (USCG) when operating under the command of DOD); combatant commanders; Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); ~~National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA); National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA);~~ National Security Agency (NSA); ~~and~~ National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are described in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3270.01A, Personnel Recovery Within the Department of Defense, (Secret). ~~Users of this joint publication should ensure they are familiar with that document.~~

2. Geographic Combatant Commanders

a. **General.** The PR responsibilities of combatant commanders are listed in Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 2310.2, Personnel Recovery; DODI 2310.4, *Repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel*; DODI 1300.21, *Code of Conduct (CoC) Training and Education*; DODI 1300.23XX, *Isolated Personnel Training for Department of Defense Civilian and Contractor Employee*; DODI 2310.6, *Nonconventional Assisted Recovery in the Department of Defense*; and CJCSI 3270.01A, *Personnel Recovery* ~~W~~within ~~T~~the Department of Defense, (Secret).

b. Key Responsibilities

(1) Establish and maintain a **PR/OPR**. This staff function should be located within the combatant command headquarters to ensure appropriate horizontal (i.e., all staff directorates, other combatant commands) and vertical coordination is accomplished on all joint PR issues. This activity will require a full time staff to focus on the PR system, continually update theater plans for PR, and be prepared for potential isolated persons at any time, especially given the US Global War On Terrorism. Ideally, the Director of this office would have tactical PR expertise from his/her Service and have served at least one tour as a JPRC Director. This office should recommend that

1 | the components and the JPRC are properly funded and manned. Typical command PR/OPR
2 | functions and responsibilities are:

3 |
4 | (a) Ensuring a coordinated PR program for their ~~assigned operational~~-area of
5 | responsibility (AOR) is developed, and that all assigned forces possessing PR capabilities and
6 | assets are prepared to execute component PR responsibilities and contribute to joint PR efforts, if
7 | required.

8 |
9 | (b) Maintaining direct and continuous liaison with designated recovery assets and
10 | other component commands.

11 |
12 | (c) Developing and maintaining joint force PR SOPs.

13 |
14 | (d) Act as liaison for local/host nation forces that are capable of PR. This liaison
15 | should help establish procedures between forces and establish formalized relations at the tactical
16 | and operational level for future planning. The JPRC may not be stood up and the PR/OPR may
17 | be the primary point of contact (POC) until a JPRC is operational.

18 |
19 | (e) Coordinating with the components, Services, US Special Operations
20 | Command (USSOCOM) (for non-conventional assisted recovery [NAR]), USJFCOM (for
21 | theater support), and other pertinent combatant commands the joint doctrine development
22 | community, and DOD agencies to ensure all PR equipment, directives, doctrine, and TTP are
23 | acceptable and disseminated to potential users meet PR requirements and responsibilities.

24 |
25 | (f) Establishing procedures to ~~task-provide~~ support to recovery forces and monitor
26 | mission progress and status of recovery assets.

27 |
28 | (g) Establishing procedures to locate and communicate with isolated personnel.

29 |
30 | (h) Determining requirements for JPRA intelligence support, isolated personnel
31 | guidance, evasion aids, support team assistance, and training. ~~Coordinate~~ Coordinating with
32 | JPRA for the production of evasion aids as appropriate.

33 |
34 | (i) Developing an integrated PR CONOPS₂ across the range of military
35 | operations₂ in coordination with other component commands.

36 |
37 | (j) Developing Appendix 5, "PR Operations," to Annex C, "Operations," to
38 | operation plans (OPLANs) and OPORDs. Ensure that Appendix 5 and associated tabs are
39 | complementary to related annexes or appendices for personnel; intelligence; medical services;
40 | processing of formerly captured, missing, or detained US personnel; mortuary affairs; PA; and
41 | reports. ~~Ensure~~ Ensuring the PR appendix and relevant supporting plans are properly distributed
42 | to all required agencies.

43 |
44 | (k) Developing a reintegration plan for ~~initial~~-processing ~~of~~-returned isolated
45 | personnel, ~~to include PR D&R which compliments and supports YELLOW RIBBON~~
46 | repatriation requirements.

1
2 (l) Developing supplemental rules of engagement (ROE) to support PR.

3
4 (m) Coordinating and deconflicting component PR plans and reviewing them for
5 supportability.

6
7 (n) Developing the PR portion of communications plans.

8
9 (o) Establishing reporting requirements for the JPRC and component PR
10 coordination cells (PRCCs).

11
12 ~~(p) Conducting or providing on-the-job and informal training for JPRC personnel~~
13 ~~and component PRCC augmentation personnel — providing selected personnel for specialized~~
14 ~~briefings or PR training when directed. Ensuring JPRC and component PRCC are capable of~~
15 ~~accomplishing their assigned duties and meeting their functional responsibilities.~~

16
17 (q) Organizing and conducting PR mission training exercises for the joint force.
18 ~~Ensure~~ Ensuring PR scenarios during field and command post exercises are realistic, adequate,
19 and reflect the theater environment and operating conditions.

20
21 (r) Developing a plan to transition from peacetime to combat operations, and back
22 to peacetime to include:

23
24 1. Developing augmentation personnel requirements.

25
26 2. Establishing additional communications support requirements.

27
28 (s) Designating a NAR⁴ OPR. Plan, coordinate, and prepare to execute NAR.
29 Coordinate with the theater special operations command (SOC), and with USSOCOM as
30 necessary, for all command NAR requirements.

31
32 ~~(t) Coordinate with combatant command PA agencies for establishment and~~
33 ~~dissemination of specific guidance for release of PR information to media by US DOD~~
34 ~~personnel.~~

35
36 (2) Establish dedicated national, theater, and component PR intelligence support
37 requirements ~~to gather information relating to isolated personnel and the threat that may affect~~
38 ~~their successful recovery.~~

39
40 (3) Include PR as an integral part of all operational planning and training. This shall
41 include the full spectrum of recovery operations. The combatant commander is responsible for
42 developing the procedures for establishing a JPRC and the components' responsibility to support
43 it. The combatant commander must clearly delineate those JPRC support responsibilities to the
44 components.

(4) Develop standards, in coordination with the Services and USSOCOM, for determining personnel requiring mid- and high-risk-of-isolation training (Levels B and C). Categories of personnel which should be considered for HRI training (Level C) include, but are not limited to, special operations forces (SOF), aviators, and other personnel who operate deep within or over hostile territory or whose duties make them especially vulnerable to exploitation by adversary forces if captured. Theater specific PR ~~training-preparation~~ and equipment requirements for DOD personnel (includes DOD civilians and contractors) should be included in theater admission requirements and contracts. Include SERE training requirements for DOD civilians and contract personnel operating in-theater in accordance with the “risk-of-capture” environment in which they will work per DODI 1300.XX, *Isolated Personnel Training for Civilian Workforce Members and Contractor Employees in the Department of Defense*.

(5) Support requests for PR assistance from allied, coalition, and paramilitary forces, when directed by the President of the United States or the Secretary of Defense.

c. **USSOCOM.** In addition to the responsibilities listed above:

(1) Develop special operations (SO) strategy, doctrine, and TTP for NAR.

(2) Develop and acquire SO-specific ~~peculiar~~ equipment, material, supplies, and services to support NAR.

3. Joint Force Commanders and Staffs

a. **General.** JFCs are responsible for including PR in their ~~operation plans-OPLANs and OPORDs~~ and have primary authority and responsibility for the recovery ~~of isolated personnel~~, and ~~the~~ initial processing ~~to include debriefing and reintegration~~ of recovered isolated personnel, and those designated by the President of the United States or Secretary of Defense, within their assigned ~~operational-joint operations~~ area (JOA). When planning and executing this responsibility, JFCs should, where appropriate, ensure that appropriate host-nation policies, laws, regulations, and capabilities are taken into consideration. JFCs also:

(1) ~~Develop, in coordination with the Services and USSOCOM, In coordination with the combatant commander, the Services and USSOCOM, identify operational billets and assist in the development of~~ standards for determining personnel requiring mid- and HRI-high-risk-of-isolation training (Levels B and C). Categories of personnel which should be considered for HRI training (Level C) include, but are not limited to, SOF, aviators, and other personnel who operate deep within or over hostile territory or whose duties make them especially vulnerable to exploitation by adversary forces if captured.

(2) Ensure that PR trained personnel are assigned to key PR positions. See Chapter V, “Planning.”

(3) Ensure all joint force components support PR operations of the other components to the fullest extent practicable.

(4) Provide mutual support in PR matters of common concern to adjacent JFCs. Normally, this mutual PR support is coordinated through the respective JPRCs and may require the temporary exchange of liaison personnel to facilitate a timely and appropriately organized PR mission response.

~~b. **Director of Operations.** The J-3 assists the JFC in the planning, C2, and integration of PR operations with other joint operations. In this capacity, the J-3 ensures the PR portions of operation plans and OPODs are complete and fully coordinated among the components and other staff directorates/sections. During joint operations, the J-3 will oversee PR missions by primarily monitoring communications between the joint operations center and the JPRC, and provide information management services and direct other related operations when required.~~

b. Joint Personnel Recovery Center. JFCs normally establish a JPRC to plan, coordinate, monitor, and/or execute PR missions; and to integrate PR activities with other operations and activities within the assigned operational area. The JPRC also is the JFC's primary coordinator of PR assistance to a host nations or other appropriate civil entities within the assigned operational area, when such assistance is ~~requested~~, authorized by the President of the United States or Secretary of Defense, or outlined in prior agreements. ~~Contingency-j~~ Joint task force (JTF) commanders should establish a JPRC in the earliest stages of forming the JTF to ensure integration with other C2 entities. The JPRC should arrive well ahead of the main force to allow for PR architecture and theater orientation prior to combat operations. The JPRC is operated jointly by personnel from two or more US Services, to include the USCG, or functional components, ~~or it may have a~~ If JPRC is operated by multinational staff of personnel from two or more allied or coalition nations, it is a combined JPRC. Ideally, the JPRC will be collocated in the Joint Operations Center of the designated command responsible for PR.

(1) ~~In those joint operations in which there is significant involvement by joint force components and their staffs,~~ The JFC normally may establishes the JPRC by tasking one of the component commanders to designate their component PRCC to also function as the JPRC. The designated component should possess the necessary forces and capabilities, such as C4I and surveillance, to coordinate, monitor, plan, and execute PR missions expeditiously. The JFC should give the designated component commander the authority and responsibility that the JFC deems necessary for operating the JPRC to properly provide a joint force PR capability. The designated component commander designates the JPRC ~~D~~director, who has overall responsibility for operation of the JPRC.

(2) ~~If a joint operation is limited in nature and there is no significant involvement by joint force component forces or their staffs,~~ The JFC may establish a JPRC (or its functional equivalent) as part of the JFC's staff. In this case, the JFC ~~normally may~~ designates a JPRC ~~D~~director ~~as the JFC's representative~~ with overall responsibility for operation of the JPRC. A PR mission analysis will determine the scope of PR and the viability of this action.

(3) If the combatant commander's assigned missions require establishing multiple subordinate joint force commands with separate missions and/or operational areas, multiple JPRCs within the combatant commander's AOR may be required. The ~~decision commander has the option~~ to establish multiple JPRCs for each joint force command, or rather than

~~consolidating~~ consolidate PR coordination functions under one JPRC. The decision should be carefully evaluated with respect to joint PR requirements. Considerations include the following:

(a) Availability of the C4I architecture to adequately control and support PR operations.

(b) Potential operations tempo of a consolidated JPRC and its ability to handle additional PR mission activity.

(c) Availability and experience level of JPRC personnel, including the JPRC ~~D~~director(s).

(d) Capability and/or availability of PR forces within each joint force.

(e) Distances between the operational al areas.

(f) Relationship between (e.g., support, separate entities, etc.) and responsibilities of the JPRCs.

(g) Command level(s) where each JPRC will reside and their responsibilities (i.e., joint force headquarters, component command headquarters).

(h) If more than one JPRC is established, the overall authority for PR in theater should be identified.

~~(4) JPRCs are established only during contingency and wartime operations. They do not exist during peacetime; however, combatant commands may elect to designate and use existing or “standing” Service component rescue coordination centers (RCCs) to assist and support the theater PR/OPR to accomplish its PR responsibilities outlined in paragraphs 2b(1)(a through r) above. JPRCs should be established when operations dictate a requirement for PR support. Effective execution of JPRC functions requires specifically trained personnel (i.e., PR controllers, SERE specialists, PR Intel Support specialists), proper C2 architecture, and extensive exercise training. The JPRC must be in place and functioning to conduct PR preparation tasks well before operations begin and a potential isolating event occurs. Components should have deployable PRCC capabilities that include the physical hardware and manning (see Chapter IV, “Products and Preparation”) capable of rapid deployment and operations within very short notice. These PRCCs should practice augmenting and or train to act as the baseline footprint of a JPRC in the event their component is tasked to act as lead component for PR in their assigned AOR.~~

~~(5) During contingency or wartime military operations, typical JPRC responsibilities and functions include the following:~~

~~(a) Develop a joint force PR threat decision matrix tailored to the current threat assessment.~~

~~(b) Coordinate rules of engagement (ROE) for approval or dissemination.~~

~~(c) Develop and disseminate special instructions (SPINS) to be included in air tasking orders (ATOs) that outline PR guidance, concepts, and specific procedures to be followed by all high-risk combatants.~~

~~(d) Develop the PR CONOPS.~~

~~(e) Coordinate with component PRCCs and the joint air operations center (JAOC) to maintain a current location and status of forces/assets capable of PR.~~

~~(f) Ensure that available data, including all source intelligence, on the evasion environment in the theater is collected, maintained, and disseminated to appropriate commands.~~

~~(g) Coordinate with the joint psychological operations (PSYOP) task force/proponent on ways to influence favorably the local population regarding PR efforts.~~

~~(h) Coordinate with the joint force deception planners for tactical deception support.~~

~~(i) Coordinate with the joint force surgeon to obtain current locations on medical treatment facilities and pass that information to all PRCCs and recovery forces, if required.~~

~~(j) Coordinate the status of isolated personnel with appropriate command staffs directorates.~~

~~(k) Develop the debriefing and reintegration plan in coordination with command staff directorates and the PRCCs.~~

~~(l) Establish PR reporting requirements for component units.~~

~~(m) Determine the location(s) of isolated personnel and disseminate to the PRCCs and recovery forces.~~

~~(n) Alert appropriate organizations of the known or probable location(s) of isolated personnel.~~

~~(o) Obtain isolated personnel report (ISOPREP) and evasion plan of action (EPA) data for further dissemination to recovery forces.~~

~~(p) Coordinate with appropriate intelligence organizations to gather information relating to the location and status of isolated personnel and the threat that may affect their successful recovery.~~

~~(q) Coordinate with the JAOC, components, multinational forces, etc. to obtain assets in support of PR missions, as required.~~

1 ~~(r) Coordinate PA releases with joint force and component public affairs offices~~
2 ~~(PAOs).~~

3
4 ~~(s) Coordinate and deconflict mutual PR support operations by joint force~~
5 ~~components and multinational forces and multiagency organizations.~~

6
7 ~~(t) Determine when recovery cannot be accomplished through conventional~~
8 ~~means and facilitate mission handoff to the unconventional assisted recovery coordination center~~
9 ~~(UARCC).~~

10
11 ~~(u) Monitor and support all PR missions prosecuted by component PRCCs and~~
12 ~~the UARCC.~~

13
14 ~~(v) Keep affected component and DOD organizations informed on the status of~~
15 ~~ongoing PR missions.~~

16
17 ~~(w) Maintain a database and file on each isolated person until recovery is~~
18 ~~complete. Forward all files and the database to USJFCOM JPRA once the recovery mission is~~
19 ~~complete and the JFC no longer has a requirement to maintain the files. The files should not be~~
20 ~~destroyed, regardless of whether a recovery operation was executed successfully or not.~~

21
22 ~~(x) Ensure recovered isolated personnel who receive assistance from recovery~~
23 ~~mechanisms are debriefed by JPRA designated intelligence personnel in accordance DOD~~
24 ~~policy and instructions.~~

25
26 ~~(y) Ensure that the results of recovered isolated personnel debriefs are properly~~
27 ~~disseminated in accordance with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance.~~

28
29 ~~(z) Assist the JFC and the Service components in executing their repatriation~~
30 ~~plans.~~

31
32 (5) Typical JPRC functions and responsibilities include the following:

33
34 (a) Develop the PR CONOPS.

35
36 (b) Coordinate and plan joint PR operations.

37
38 (c) Review “PR Operations” appendices to component OPLANs/OPORDs.

39
40 (d) Recommend tasking of forces of component commands to support joint or
41 component PR missions or PR missions when another component needs assistance or cannot
42 accomplish the mission as necessary.

43
44 (e) Coordinate with all sources, the [joint air operations center \(JAOC\)](#),
45 components, multinational forces, etc. to obtain assets in support of PR missions, as required.
46

1 (f) Coordinate with component PRCCs and the JAOC to maintain a current
2 location and status of forces/assets capable of PR.

3
4 (g) Coordinate and deconflict mutual PR support operations by joint force
5 components and multinational forces and multi-agency organizations.

6
7 (h) Ensure that the JPRC authority, responsibilities, and support requirements are
8 clearly identified to combatant command/JFC, component commanders, PRCCs, and all
9 interagency and allied PR forces through operating instructions and stand up message traffic.

10
11 (i) Establish PR reporting requirements for component units.

12
13 (j) Ensure that available data, including all-source intelligence, on the evasion
14 environment in the theater is collected, maintained, and disseminated to appropriate commands.

15
16 (k) Coordinate and ensure establishment and dissemination of operation-specific
17 isolated personnel guidance, theater HRI preparation, evasion aids, and SERE intelligence.

18
19 (l) Develop and disseminate guidelines for completion and compilation of isolated
20 personnel report (ISOPREP) and evasion plan of action (EPA), and obtain ISOPREP and EPA
21 data for further dissemination to recovery forces.

22
23 (m) Coordinate with appropriate intelligence organizations to gather information
24 relating to the location and status of isolated personnel and the threat that may affect their
25 successful recovery.

26
27 (n) Develop joint force PR communications plans. Coordinate with joint force
28 communications directorate and Service communications directors to ensure the JPRC has triple
29 redundancy secure communications to ensure all PR operations can be accomplished under any
30 conditions. The JPRC director must establish this as a combatant command/JFC GO/NO GO
31 item for combat operations.

32
33 (o) Coordinate with [air and space operations center \(AOC\)](#) Space division
34 representatives for theater satellite coverage

35
36 (p) Coordinate with assigned JAOC National reps for specific survival radio
37 waveform frequencies and blue-force tracking devices used by recovery forces and isolated
38 personnel.

39 (q) Develop theater specific, PR oriented, preparatory materials; direct Services to
40 provide theater entry required briefings to select HRI forces. Recommend [evasion and recovery](#)
41 (E&R) TTP and appropriate clothing equipment. Develop a backup/contingency system of [no](#)
42 [radio \(NORDO\)](#) signals for isolated personnel use

43 (r) Coordinate with the joint psychological operations (PSYOP) task
44 force/proponent on ways to influence favorably the local population regarding PR efforts.
45

1 (s) Coordinate with the joint force deception planners for tactical deception
2 support.

3
4 (t) Ensure ROE considers PR equities (i.e., status of personnel, etc.).

5
6 (u) Develop PR guidance for all mission taskings and disseminate specific
7 procedures to follow, through a standardized notification process, to all personnel (i.e., [special](#)
8 [instructions \[SPINS\]](#)).

9
10 (v) Coordinate the status of isolated personnel with appropriate command's staff
11 directorates.

12
13 (w) Determine the location(s) of isolated personnel and disseminate to the PRCCs
14 and recovery forces.

15
16 (x) Alert appropriate organizations of the known or probable location(s) of
17 isolated personnel.

18
19 (y) Ensure unconventional assisted recovery coordination center (UARCC)
20 receives all pertinent information so they can plan in parallel and are fully prepared to assume
21 control of the mission, if necessary.

22
23 (z) Monitor and support all PR missions prosecuted by component PRCCs and the
24 UARCC.

25
26 (aa) Monitor all PR operations prosecuted within the JFC's operational area.

27
28 (bb) Coordinate PA releases with joint force and component public affairs offices
29 (PAOs).

30
31 (cc) Keep affected component and DOD organizations informed on the status of
32 ongoing PR missions.

33
34 (dd) Maintain a database and file on each isolated person until recovery is
35 complete. Coordinate the collection of all files and databases and forward to USJFCOM JPRA
36 once the recovery mission is complete and the JFC no longer has a requirement to maintain the
37 files. The files should not be destroyed, regardless of whether a recovery operation was
38 executed successfully or not.

39
40 (ee) Ensure recovered isolated personnel who receive assistance from recovery
41 mechanisms, are debriefed by JPRA-designated personnel in accordance DOD policy and
42 instructions.

43
44 (ff) Ensure that the results of recovered isolated personnel debriefs are properly
45 disseminated in accordance with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance.
46

(gg) Assist the JFC and the components in executing their reintegration plans.

(hh) Develop the debriefing and reintegration plan in coordination with command staff directorates and the PRCCs.

(ii) Coordinate with the joint force surgeon to obtain current locations of medical treatment facilities and pass that information to all PRCCs and recovery forces, if required.

For further guidance on ~~repatriation~~ reintegration, refer to ~~DODD-DODI~~ 2310.4, Repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel; Appendix S, "Personnel Recovery Considerations," of Joint Publication (JP) 1-0, Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations; and Appendix N, "~~Debrief and Reintegrate~~ Reintegration Administration," to this publication.

4. Component Commanders, Staffs, and Subordinate Organizations

a. **General.** Joint force component commanders ~~(to include the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC))~~ are responsible for planning and conducting PR in support of their own operations, in support of PR events within their area of operations and, within their capabilities and consistent with the priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks, supporting PR taskings from the JFC. Joint force component PR planning should consider the availability and capability of forces of the other components, ~~including the US Coast Guard (USCG) if assigned~~ coalition forces and other governmental and nongovernmental organizations operating in the JOA. Additionally, component commanders will:

(1) Ensure subordinate units and key personnel, such as HRI and recovery force personnel, are familiar with joint PR TTP, joint force PR ~~SOPs~~ CONOPS, air tasking order (ATO) SPINS, theater SERE procedures, and any unique or specific PR TTP that may ~~especially~~ pertain to their operational area and/or component operations.

(2) Ensure a PRCC capability is established with trained personnel familiar with the joint PR TTP, joint force PR SOPs, ATO SPINS, and JPRC designated C2 architecture and has proper authority to accomplish PR missions and objectives.

(3) Ensure that units and personnel develop and maintain current EPAs that are readily available to the JPRC upon request through the component PRCC.

(4) Ensure that all subordinate units properly prepare and maintain ISOPREPs for personnel whose duties may place them in danger of isolation and make them readily available to the JPRC or other higher authority upon request through the PRCC.

(5) Participate in the operation and maintenance of the JPRC by providing trained personnel to staff the center when tasked. These augmentation personnel should be knowledgeable regarding component PR capabilities and TTP and familiar with joint PR plans and operations.

1 (6) Assist in preparing PR appendices to joint force ~~operation plans~~OPLANs/OPORDs
2 and prepare PR appendices for supporting ~~operation plans~~OPLANs/OPORDs.

3
4 (7) Clearly articulate launch and execute ~~authority as described in Chapter III,~~
5 ~~“Command and Control.”~~parameters, if authorized by higher headquarters.

6
7 (8) Ensure intelligence data to support PR planning and training are sent in a timely
8 manner to subordinate units.

9
10 (9) Provide mutual support to the PR operations of the other components to the
11 greatest extent possible. Such support normally is requested and coordinated through the JPRC
12 using established PR communications channels maintained and monitored in the PRCC.

13
14 (10) Provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and information
15 operations (IO) support as required.

16
17 (11) Support reintegration efforts by crafting supporting plans; identifying
18 reintegration team key personnel and ensuring those personnel attend training prior to
19 commencement of reintegration activities.

20
21 **b. Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell.** Component commanders (to include the joint
22 force special operations component commander [JFSOCC]) normally establish a PRCC to
23 coordinate all component PR activities, including coordination with the JPRC and other
24 component PRCCs. If a component commander does not establish a PRCC, those PR activities
25 and responsibilities normally assigned to the PRCC must be assigned to another component staff
26 organization, normally the operations section. The PRCC director is responsible, in the name of
27 the component commander, for the coordination of component forces committed to PR missions.
28 ~~Similar to a JPRC, a PRCC is established only during military operations. Component~~
29 ~~commanders may elect to task existing or “standing” peacetime RCCs to perform PRCC~~
30 ~~functions. This PRCC should be completely dedicated, manned, and funded to accomplish the~~
31 ~~components PR function. This PRCC should also have the manning, training, and equipment to~~
32 ~~stand up and deploy into the AOR as a PRCC and be able to form the basic footprint of a JPRC~~
33 ~~if directed.~~ Typical PRCC responsibilities and functions include the following:

34
35 (1) Develop specific component PR SOPs and PRCC procedures.

36
37 (2) Maintain staff cognizance for preparing and maintaining ISOPREPs, EPAs,
38 isolated personnel guidance, unconventional assisted recovery (UAR) options, legal status, and
39 ROE for the primary AOR.

40
41 (3) Establish points of contact and filing locations for EPAs within subordinate
42 commands.

43
44 (4) Establish communications with the JPRC and other PRCCs and develop
45 procedures to ensure the timely flow and protection of PR-related information. During

preparation, establish standards and standard equipment for redundant communications between C2 nodes and the IP to PRCC functions.

(5) Develop and review PR appendices to Annex C (Operations) for component supporting ~~operation plans~~OPLANs/OPORDs.

(6) Extract planning factors from the theater PR CONOPS, ~~operation plans~~OPLANs/OPORDs, and other guidance and provide them to subordinate units for the development of plans for PR and SERE.

(7) Establish PR reporting requirements for component units.

(8) Develop and promulgate component PR communications plans. These plans are coordinated with the component command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems directorate and included in ~~operation plans~~OPLANs/OPORDs.

(9) Ensure survival radio identification (ID) numbers and blue force tracker device numbers are forwarded to the JPRC as part of the component communication PR plan.

(10) Ensure PR SPINS are disseminated to all component ~~aviation~~ units at risk of isolation, and to all HRI personnel.

(11) ~~Establish a liaison~~ Coordinate with the component medical treatment facility. If no component facility exists, establish liaison with primary facility within JOA/AOR, and include procedures for receiving PR incidents and at least phase I repatriation potential for component PR operations.

(12) ~~Establish liaison~~ Coordinate with the component staff legal officer for ROE issues, legal status, and other matters as required.

(13) ~~Establish operational interfaces~~ Coordinate with other component staff sections and elements, including interagency, as ~~considered appropriate and necessary~~ required.

(14) Monitor all PR operations prosecuted by component forces.

(15) Notify and coordinate with the JPRC when conducting component PR missions.

(16) Report overdue or missing personnel to the JPRC as soon as possible. Reporting an overdue incident does not mean the JPRC is taking the mission, but reporting must happen up the PR chain for accountability as soon as the overdue incident occurs.

(17) Forward pertinent data regarding isolated personnel, their status, and/or location to the JPRC, recovery force and others as required.

(18) Coordinate with the JPRC for PR support provided to or received from other components.

1 (19) Ensure recovered isolated personnel are processed according to established
2 theater procedures.

3
4 (20) Maintain a file on each isolated person until recovery has been completed or
5 confirmation of death has been verified. Pass files on successful recoveries or closed incidents
6 to the JPRC for forwarding to JPRA for review and storage.

7
8 **c. Unconventional Assisted Recovery Coordination Center.** The JFC normally
9 designates the JFSOCC with overall responsibility for planning, coordinating and executing all
10 NAR operations in support of the PR plan. The JFSOCC retains command authority of all SOF
11 UAR forces in ~~theater~~ the operational area. The JFSOCC exercises control through the
12 operations officer, who designates an UARCC director and, when directed, establishes the
13 UARCC. The UARCC is a compartmented SOF facility staffed on a continuous basis by
14 supervisory personnel and tactical planners who are representative of each NAR capability. The
15 UARCC integrates, coordinates, deconflicts, and synchronizes all existing unconventional and
16 NAR capabilities and activities in support of the JFC's PR requirements. The UARCC
17 interfaces with the JFSOCC's operations center, the JPRC, and the other component PRCCs.
18 The UARCC coordinates all NAR activities but does not exercise command authority. Other
19 organizations supporting theater NAR operations normally retain operational control (OPCON)
20 of their forces or capabilities. Once established, the UARCC responsibilities include:

21
22 (1) Coordinate for the use of NAR forces and supporting forces and capabilities, to
23 include joint force recovery forces.

24
25 (2) Provide connectivity between NAR forces and other PR coordination organizations
26 to provide time critical information.

27
28 (3) Advise the JFSOCC on the development and employment of NAR capabilities in
29 support of the JFC's PR plan.

30
31 (4) Integrate the use of NAR into the JFC's PR plan. The JPRC Director must be fully
32 aware of and briefed on NAR capabilities. Close coordination must occur to maximize PR
33 coverage during wartime operations. It is paramount the UARCC establish liaison during
34 peacetime to blend the NAR capabilities into the JPRC Director's PR architecture due to time
35 constraints needed to develop a theater.

36
37 (5) Act as the conduit through which launch and execute authority for NAR operations
38 is passed.

39
40 (6) Deconflict NAR operations internally with all NAR forces conducting a single
41 recovery operation, and externally with other joint and component operations to aid mission
42 execution and avoid disruption of ongoing operations and fratricide.

43
44 (7) Synchronize ground tactical plans between NAR forces; and synchronize NAR
45 operations and other PR operations, military operations, and interagency activity.

(8) Establish connectivity with JFSOCC PRCC for coordination and deconfliction of time critical PR activities and information.

d. **Joint Air Operations Center.** The joint force air component commander (JFACC) normally will establish the JAOC (when a JFACC is designated). The JAOC is responsible for including ~~rotary and fixed wing sorties made available to the JFACC for~~ PR missions ~~sorties~~ in the ATO. Each component liaison team should have sufficient expertise to assist the JAOC with PR support options. The JPRC will not always be colocated with the AOC. The expertise of the liaison teams is paramount to success since the AOC teams may have limited joint PR expertise. If the component PRCC is in the AOC, the liaison teams should establish contact with the PRCC for assistance in establishing contact with combat plans and operations. The liaison team must ensure that the PR mission assignment in the ATO is in agreement with aircraft capabilities and unit operating procedures. The liaison team and personnel recovery duty officer (PRDO) should ensure SPINS provide all necessary guidance for mission success prior to ATO execution by recommending timely changes. Consideration must be given to allow the assigned unit the greatest flexibility for mission success. The JAOC is normally divided into ~~two~~ five divisions. The two divisions that encompass PR support are as follows:

(1) **Combat Plans** integrates precautionary and mission planning for PR with other ~~planning efforts~~ divisions and support teams in the JAOC.

(2) **Combat Operations** is the current operations command center for the JAOC with component representation to monitor and change ongoing missions. Normally, the JPRC is assigned under the Combat Operations Director in the JAOC. Consequently, PR mission planning, coordinating, and execution by the JPRC should be fully integrated with JAOC activities and procedures.

e. **Intelligence Support**

(1) **General.** ~~Commanders and staffs and operations, intelligence, and support personnel involved in PR matters must be familiar with the many roles that intelligence plays in support of personnel recovery at all levels of command and throughout all phases of an operation (Figure IV-1).~~—An understanding of relevant intelligence support organizations, products, and procedures is essential to effectively apply intelligence capabilities ~~to~~ in PR ~~plans and~~ operations. Intelligence support organizations at every level must have PR-knowledgeable personnel integrated into their staffs. Dedicated intelligence personnel must be assigned to the JPRC, component PRCCs, the UARCC, and PR-dedicated forces to ~~interface~~ coordinate with intelligence support organizations and ensure that intelligence requirements are addressed and satisfied in a timely manner.

(2) **Intelligence Organizations.** Commanders and staffs should be aware of the intelligence capabilities and support available to assist them in the PR planning and decision-making process. A thorough understanding of the appropriate organization to request a specific requirement is essential to avoid critical delays in obtaining time-sensitive information, and helps ensure that available intelligence resources are applied most effectively. See Figure ~~IV-2~~ II-1.

1 (a) **Joint Intelligence Center (JIC).** The JPRC at theater level receives its
2 intelligence support from the JIC, which can assign or attach dedicated intelligence personnel to
3 service PR requirements. The JIC is responsible for providing and producing the intelligence
4 required to support the combatant commander and staff, components, subordinate joint forces
5 and elements, and the national intelligence community. Requests for external intelligence
6 resources, including national agency support, are validated by the combatant command
7 intelligence directorate (J-2) and submitted by the JIC.

8
9 (b) **Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE).** A subordinate joint force forms
10 a JISE as the focus for intelligence support for joint operations, providing the JFC, joint staff,
11 and components with the complete air, space, ground, and maritime adversary situation. The
12 JISE supports the JPRC, PRCC, or UARCC at the JTF- or component-level, and, in turn,
13 receives its intelligence support from the JIC.

14
15 (c) **National Intelligence Support Team (NIST).** During crisis or contingency
16 operations, a JTF or component may have a NIST assigned. The NIST is composed of
17 intelligence and communications experts from DIA, CIA, NSA, NIMANGA, or any
18 combination of these agencies. The NIST has a direct link to the National Military Joint
19 Intelligence Center (NMJIC) request for information (RFI) desk for time-sensitive RFI that
20 require national “reachback” support and an interactive link to the national intelligence
21 community through the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (JWICS) ~~and~~
22 ~~Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS).~~ The NMJIC is the single point of entry
23 at the national level for crisis RFIs. The JPRC, PRCC, or UARCC can draw upon NIST
24 expertise and connectivity, through the JISE, to pursue time-sensitive information that is beyond
25 the reach of theater resources.




Figure II-1. Personnel Recovery Intelligence Nodes

- 1
- 2 (d) **Organic Intelligence Support.** Units typically have organic personnel to
- 3 perform routine intelligence tasks in support of operations at the tactical level. Unit commanders
- 4 should ensure that assigned intelligence personnel are familiar with other intelligence
- 5 organizations at higher echelons of command that function in support of PR operations. Unit
- 6 intelligence personnel must maintain an unambiguous channel of communication with the JISE
- 7 or JIC to facilitate mission planning and maintain SA.
- 8

(3) **Determining and Managing Intel Requirements.** The JIC or JISE must establish procedures with the JPRC, PRCCs, and UARCC to promptly satisfy their standing or ad hoc intelligence requirements ~~promptly~~. Many situations may require external resources (i.e., satellite imagery collection or other national-level capability) ~~to successfully plan and conduct PR~~. Commanders, ~~and their~~ staffs, and recovery forces should be aware of the national intelligence capabilities and how to request support that can assist them in the PR planning and decision-making process. A comprehensive PR-focused intelligence collection and production plan gives the JIC and JISE the framework to produce relevant finished intelligence prior to commencement of combat operations. ~~Ongoing military operations necessitate the adaptation of standing requirements to support forces operating in a fluid environment.~~ Intelligence organizations must have procedures in place to dynamically re-task collection and support assets during PR mission execution. ~~In addition, clear and effective communication measures are essential to quickly close intelligence gaps and respond to inquiries from supported units.~~

(a) **Connectivity.** Intelligence personnel supporting the JPRC, PRCC, and UARCC need direct access to dedicated intelligence communications systems with connectivity among intelligence entities from national to unit level. ~~Intelligence systems provide secure, high-speed multimedia information handling capabilities that work in parallel to operations communications systems and message centers. The joint architecture that provides the infrastructure for intelligence support is not hierarchical; however, formal command relationships exist. This arrangement facilitates RFI management and optimizes complementary intelligence functions by echelon without obstructing the timely flow of critical intelligence up, down, or laterally.~~

1. JWICS and Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS). ~~JWICS is the sensitive compartmented information portion of the Defense Information System Network. JDISS is a transportable workstation that electronically extends a joint intelligence center to a JTF or other tactical user via JWICS, where available, or via other secure networks. All-source intelligence dissemination in support of joint operations at the national, theater, and subordinate joint force levels will be via JWICS. The architecture provides access to data from national, theater and tactical intelligence organizations and sources primarily from a “push-pull” system. A “pull” concept allows users to obtain relevant intelligence on demand based on their mission, and time sensitive intelligence can be deliberately “pushed” to appropriate units based on preplanned information requirements. Security and facility constraints permitting, a JDISS terminal should be collocated with or in close proximity to the JPRC, PRCC, or UARCC to enhance the operations—intelligence interface.~~

2. SECERT Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). Because JWICS is a dedicated intelligence network operating at the sensitive compartmented information (SCI) level, much of the information carried on JWICS-it is not available to operational users reliant on SIPRNET systems. Regardless of the proximity of JWICS terminals to PR C2 nodes, intelligence personnel must act as a bridge between the two networks and ensure that commanders and PR forces have the information they need. Intelligence products and analysis disseminated via JWICS must be replicated on SIPRNET, within security restrictions, to afford maximum utility to the end users.

(b) **Collection Plan.** ~~A peacetime standing intelligence collection plan derives from the JFC's priority information requirements (PIRs) as stated in the applicable operation plan.~~ Collection managers should be familiar with PR planning and operational needs, enabling them to match requirements to appropriate collection platforms and intelligence disciplines. ~~Standing collection yields information applied toward finished intelligence production that satisfies PIRs and supporting information requirements. At the onset of a crisis, increased emphasis can be placed on certain requirements and others can be developed or suspended as PIRs are added, deleted, or changed.~~ In addition to providing battlespace SA and support to general intelligence analysis, collection carried out under each intelligence discipline has its own unique role in satisfying PR requirements.

1. Human Intelligence (HUMINT). Although establishment of a HUMINT capability requires a long lead time to develop sources, HUMINT can provide PR information unreachable or unobtainable by remote sensors. Assessment of the mind-set of a country's population and their stance toward friendly PR activities relies heavily on HUMINT reporting. The most significant role of HUMINT is in support of NAR planning. However, HUMINT operational matters that involve NAR support are handled separately from routine intelligence collection management channels.

2. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) can be used to assess adversary threat to PR forces' and isolated persons' communications and navigation systems, and to perform direction finding and geolocation of distress signals. SIGINT analysis of the available frequency spectrum can provide channel selection recommendations for PR forces' communications to reduce the risk of interference or adversary exploitation.

3. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT). Imagery support for the joint personnel recovery support product (JPRSP) production and for the creation of geospatial products such as EVCs is essential. Imagery can provide detailed characteristics of potential detention facilities, recovery sites, and other operationally significant features.

4. Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT). Advanced MASINT technologies and analytic methods can complement other disciplines by detecting PR-related items that other sensors might miss. The capability to discern aircraft wreckage from background clutter, or to determine whether or not a prison camp is occupied are examples of possible PR applications for MASINT.

5. Open Source Intelligence. Open source materials from an adversary's own government or press services can be used to confirm that a missing person is in captivity, provide insight into the thoughts and beliefs of the nation's people and leaders, and help gauge the potential use of persons in captivity for propaganda purposes.

For further information on intelligence collection disciplines, refer to Appendix C, "Intelligence Disciplines," (Secret) of JP 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

(c) While specific **intelligence requirements** will vary depending on the nature of an operation, fundamental PR intelligence needs are fairly constant. The following are some generic PR-related intelligence requirements:

1. Adversary order of battle, to include disposition, strength, capabilities, and activities of air, ground, maritime, SO, paramilitary, and security forces. While order of battle information is already a standard requirement for operating forces, adversary capabilities to threaten recovery forces, including rotary-wing aircraft, must be given special emphasis.

2. Adversary electronic capabilities to detect, locate, track, jam, or deceive recovery forces or survival communications equipment.

3. Adversary resources used to find isolated personnel (direction finding equipment, helicopters, dogs, infrared trackers, night vision goggles, etc.).

4. Policy, practices, and intentions of adversary or neutral countries toward friendly isolated personnel, hostages, detainees, POWs, and recovery forces.

5. Attitude of the populace toward isolated personnel, including their susceptibility to ~~enemy-adversary~~ pressure to provide information about or assist in the search for isolated personnel. Information about minority or opposition groups that may assist, or at least not oppose, evasion and PR operations.

6. Information about the physical environment pertinent to isolated personnel and recovery forces to include terrain, climate and weather, food and water sources, flora and fauna, concealment, lines of communications, and avenues of approach.

7. Location and characteristics of potential detention or interrogation facilities and medical facilities where personnel may be held.

(d) **RFIs**. The command PR/OPR, JPRC, component PRCCs, UARCC, and PR-capable units submit formal RFIs to higher echelons to satisfy requirements for intelligence that exceed local capabilities and resources. Responses must be tailored to the needs of the requestor and must be timely, accurate, and in a usable format. Formal RFIs will be submitted and tracked using community on-line intelligence system for end users and managers (COLISEUM) to facilitate visibility at all levels of command. Critical, time-sensitive RFIs in support of an emergent PR incident may require temporary suspension of formal RFI procedures. Direct point-to-point exchanges of information should be followed up with record communications and documented in COLISEUM as soon as time permits.

~~1. Once submitted, the RFI will undergo a validation process through the chain of command to the theater JIC or beyond. All elements of the RFI will be satisfied at the lowest level possible. The responding intelligence support organization may disseminate existing products, modify existing products tailored to the new requirement, or the RFI may prompt a new production or collection effort.~~

~~2. RFIs at the theater JIC level that require national agency input will be validated by the combatant command J-2 and referred to the NMJIC. The NMJIC brokers support from the various national intelligence agencies and tasks appropriate national collection assets. At the JTF or component level, the NIST, if deployed, may assist in obtaining direct national agency input to satisfy an RFI. Absent a NIST, some JTF or component headquarters retain selected national agency liaison officers to facilitate access to national support.~~

~~3. Critical, time sensitive RFIs in support of an emergent PR incident may require temporary suspension of formal RFI procedures. Direct point to point exchanges of information should be followed up with record communications and documented in COLISEUM as soon as time permits.~~

For further information regarding RFIs from national agencies and NIST, refer to JP 2-02, National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.

(e) Skip-echelon Intelligence Support. ~~Senior commanders should authorize skip-echelon direct intelligence support for forces preparing to conduct PR operations. Command authorization of skip-echelon intelligence support does not alleviate the requirement to provide the same intelligence to intermediate commands through the chain of command and to supporting commands and organizations. When the first indication of a possible PR incident is obtained through intelligence means, intelligence personnel must be able to transmit that information immediately and securely to all participating units, agencies, and command centers to facilitate deconfliction and parallel planning. However, skip-echelon measures shall not be used to circumvent chain-of-command or transmit operational information outside of proper channels. See Figure IV-2~~ When the first indication of a possible PR incident is obtained through intelligence means, intelligence personnel must be able to transmit that information immediately and securely to all participating units, agencies, and command centers to facilitate deconfliction and parallel planning, without going through the chain-of-command. Senior commanders should authorize “skip-echelon” direct intelligence support for forces preparing to conduct PR operations. Command authorization of skip-echelon intelligence support does not negate the requirement to provide the same intelligence to intermediate commands through the chain of command and to supporting commands and organizations. Nor should skip-echelon measures be used to circumvent the chain-of-command or transmit operational information outside of proper channels. See Figure II-1.

(4) Intelligence Support to PR Planning. The combatant command or subordinate joint force J-2 that produces the intelligence annex to ~~concept/operation plans~~ operation plans in concept format, OPLANs, and OPORDs should specifically address PR-specific requirements and support architecture. Annex B, “Intelligence,” to ~~operation plans~~ OPLANs and OPORDs will provide a foundation for the procedures for intelligence support, identify intelligence gaps, and establish standing collection and production requirements and task theater intelligence resources to support PR. It must clearly address specialized communications and reporting procedures tailored to the unique nature of PR operations. ~~During crisis action planning, Annex B will need dynamic adjustments prior to execution based on the developing situation and the course of action selected.~~ Lessons learned in the execution phase of an operation should be continuously applied through the deliberate planning process to preserve and improve

intelligence support to forces at risk of isolation or capture in future operations. ~~Intelligence guidance to~~ Appendix 5, “Personnel Recovery Operations,” of Annex C, “Operations,” should reflect the guidance in Annex B, “Intelligence,” and provide the concept of intelligence support to PR.

(5) **Operational Intelligence Support.** ~~The moral obligation to protect and D&R isolated personnel extends to all intelligence personnel involved in an operation, and imposes upon them the imperative that they bring to bear all intelligence disciplines and resources for maximum effect.~~ Commanders, and their staffs, recovery forces, and HRI personnel require comprehensive PR-focused intelligence support throughout all phases of mission planning and execution.

(6) **Intelligence Products.** A variety of off-the-shelf resources are available to ~~intelligence personnel involved in~~ support to PR activities. Most existing products are available in electronic form on INTELINK, the principal electronic means for intelligence product dissemination. ~~Dissemination program managers at Service and combatant command headquarters can obtain older publications on request based upon unit mission requirements.~~ Requests for new production should be submitted via the COLISEUM through the command validation chain.

(a) **Joint PR Support Product.** The JPRSP is the basic reference document for PR-specific information on a particular country or region of interest. JPRSP is the successor to traditional printed intelligence products (e.g., selected area for evasion (SAFE) area intelligence descriptions (SAIDs), SERE contingency guides, etc.). JPRSP production is a collaborative process among multiple intelligence centers and PR subject matter experts resulting in a series of tailored products suitable for users at various levels of command. USJFCOM’s Joint Forces Intelligence Command (JFIC) has primary responsibility for production of JPRSPs, in collaboration with the combatant command JICs. Content of the requested JPRSP is driven by initial request from combatant command. Individual portions of the JPRSP series address information needs of commanders and staffs, theater planners, recovery forces, and potential isolated personnel. Elements of JPRSP are shown in Figure II-2.

(b) **Special Assessments.** When standardized references such as a JPRSP are insufficient, special assessments can be produced ~~by an appropriate intelligence production center in response to a requester’s PR information requirements.~~ Country, region, or operation-specific assessments can provide information such as an adversary government’s policies for handling POWs or hostages, unique technologies that can threaten recovery forces, or other topics. JPRA provides this information through the theater isolated personnel guidance.



Figure II-2. Joint Personnel Recovery Support Product

(c) **Legacy Products.** Although the JPRSP supercedes previously used hardcopy and digital PR support products, archive materials available in intelligence libraries or via INTELINK contain useful background information for general planning and study. Much of the information in these products, such as physical environment characteristics, is not likely to change rapidly. However, care should always be taken to supplement information contained in legacy products with current intelligence when conducting evasion planning or PR mission preparation. Legacy products include:

1. SAID, (SAFE Area Intel Description).
2. Evasion and recovery, country, and regional studies.
3. Designated area for recovery studies.
4. SERE guides and bulletins.

(d) **Other Products.** The following supplemental publications may assist HRI personnel, recovery forces, and intelligence personnel: EVCs, pointee-talkies, joint expeditionary support products, country handbooks, PR update messages, and ATO SPINS.

(7) Reconnaissance and Surveillance Resources

(a) **Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)** are capable of providing streaming video in real time of an objective area hundreds of nautical miles (nm) from home base with longer loiter times ~~than other reconnaissance assets~~. This ~~valuable~~-resource could provide PR mission planners with key information on the adversary and pinpoint the location of isolated personnel.

(b) **Reconnaissance flights** are an alternative when the isolated person's location has been somewhat refined. The JPRC should be prepared to coordinate with appropriate elements of the JAOC for reconnaissance flights over high-threat areas. The threat, isolated personnel training/guidance, and equipment capabilities dictate whether operations should be conducted during the day or night, if at all.

For further guidance regarding ISR support to joint operations, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, and JP 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations, ~~and 3-55, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Target Acquisition (TA)~~.

5. ~~Secretaries of the Military Departments~~Service Responsibilities

a. **General.** Each ~~Secretary of a Military Department~~Service Chief is responsible for ~~organizing, training, and equipping training, manning and equipping~~, their forces for PR, and providing forces and processes as required to accomplish the five PR execution tasks, consistent with their capabilities and assigned functions. In so doing, each ~~Secretary~~Service Chief should take into account the availability ~~and of~~ PR ~~capability of the capable~~ forces of the ~~others, other~~

components, as well as ~~and~~ the USCG. The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for USCG PR Assistance and coordination with other Service components.

b. Specific

(1) Provide the appropriate level of ~~Code of Conduct (CoC)~~ training, as directed in DODD 1300.7, *Training and Education Measures Necessary to Support the Code of Conduct*, DODI 1300.21, *Code of Conduct (CoC) Training and Education*, to those forces designated and assigned to a combatant commander, and USJFCOM Executive Agent Instructions (EAI) *Requirement for Wartime Level C Training in Support of Code of Conduct*, *Requirement for Peacetime Level C Training in Support of Code of Conduct*, *Requirement for Wartime Level B Training in Support of Code of Conduct*, and *Requirement for Peacetime Level B Training in Support of Code of Conduct*.

(a) Conduct applicable predeployment refresher training for SERE to include the ISOPREP and EPA, prior to deployment of personnel participating in contingency operations.

(b) In coordination with the combatant commanders, develop standards for determining personnel requiring mid- and high-risk-of-isolation training (levels B and C).

(c) Ensure DOD civilians and contract personnel receive applicable levels of SERE training commensurate with theater admission and combatant command requirements prior to deployment to overseas locations.

(2) Ensure policies and procedures are in place to identify and track personnel who have been trained or are experienced in PR operations and C4I and ensure the JPRC and PRCC has access to this data for coordination and sourcing.

(3) Train personnel and develop and procure equipment that meets the requirements for NAR identified by the combatant commanders.

(4) Establish ~~repatriation-reintegration~~ plans incorporating guidance from applicable DODIs, the combatant commands, and JPRA and exercise this capability in order to maintain required effectiveness.

(5) ~~Provide trained personnel to participate in the operation of a JPRC. Man, train, and equip a dedicated core of individuals or team to form a PRCC, with the capability to staff a JPRC if necessary.~~

(6) Comply with provisions of DODI 2310.5, *Accounting for Missing Persons*, for determining the status of missing persons; and for the systematic, comprehensive, and timely collection, analysis, review, dissemination, and periodic update of information related to such persons.

(7) Provide evasion aids (i.e. EVC, bloodchits, etc.) to designated risk of isolation personnel prior to deployment.

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CHAPTER III

COMMAND AND CONTROL

~~“Combat operations will not commence until our CSAR capability is in place.”~~

General Tommy R. Franks
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM

~~“We couldn't start anything until the CSAR [taskforce] was in place.”~~

General Richard Myers prior to OEF
“Bush at War,” Bob Woodward, Simon and Schuster, New York, NY, 2002, pg 178.

1. Command and Organizational Relationships

a. **Unity of Command.** ~~Effective and efficient C2 is a critical element of PR operations.~~ Properly coordinated, ~~and~~-synchronized, ~~and integrated~~ PR operations facilitate the timely recovery of isolated personnel, reduce the risk to recovery forces and isolated personnel, and limit potential interference with ongoing operations. Unity of command will ensure the PR unity of effort among air, land, sea, space, and SOF. This is aided by the planned integration of PR capabilities within and external to the joint force. Unity of command becomes more critical as the capabilities of more than one component, other nations, or other non-DOD organizations are used to accomplish the five PR execution tasks.

b. **Command Authority.** JFCs may exercise command authority for PR through a component commander, who has been designated the **supported commander for PR** and directed to establish and operate the JPRC. ~~Alternatively, JFCs may exercise command authority directly through the director of operations when directed to establish and operate the JPRC.~~ Typical joint force command and organizational relationships for PR are provided in Figure III-1 and Figure III-2. ~~When components conduct PR missions with organic forces to recover isolated personnel, OPCON is exercised by the component commander.~~ The JFC will normally designate the supported and supporting commanders during PR mission and execution. It is critical for command relationships to be specified as early as possible during operational planning for PR and prior to conducting PR operations. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) products and/or coordinated and published theater PR CONOPS should articulate command relationships clearly. Within the joint force, PR may be conducted by forces of one component assigned or attached to that component, or PR may be augmented by or conducted entirely by forces of one or more supporting components. Depending on C2 capabilities, the specific situation and established command relationships, the forces of one component may be placed under the tactical control (TACON) or in support of another component for a specified mission(s). However, OPCON of forces is normally retained by the respective component commanders




Figure III-1. Personnel Recovery Command and Control — Joint Force Commander Retains Authority for Personnel Recovery

(2) ~~When a component needs augmentation to complete a PR mission, the JFC may task one or more other components, through mission type orders, to provide forces or capabilities to that component. The JFC normally will delegate tactical control (TACON) of the supporting forces to the supported component commander during PR mission planning and execution, or establish a support relationship between the component commanders, or execute OPCON through the JPRC.~~




Figure III-2. Personnel Recovery Command and Control — Joint Force Commander Delegates Authority for Personnel Recovery

(3) ~~When a component is unable to execute a PR mission~~, the JFC may task another component, through mission type orders, to complete the PR mission. ~~In this case, the component commander tasked to conduct the PR mission maintains OPCON of its forces conducting the PR mission for another component.~~

(4) ~~When a component is unable to conduct a PR mission and there is no other component capable of completing the PR mission~~, the JFC may direct joint force components

to provide specific PR forces or capabilities to a designated supported component commander to conduct a joint PR mission. The JFC will delegate the appropriate command relationship, **normally TACON**, to the designated supported component commander employing these capabilities in a joint PR mission or execute OPCON through the JPRC.

c. PR Mission-Related Authorities. JFCs must effectively use and/or delegate key authorities to affect the efficiency and timeliness of PR missions.

(1) **CSARTF Command Authority.** The JFC or the supported commander for PR, must clearly define the command authorities among the various C2 nodes necessary to conduct a CSARTF (e.g., JPRC, PRCC, the airborne mission commander (AMC), on scene commander (OSC), the recovery force aircraft commander, etc.).

(2) **Planning authority** enables a component or recovery force to coordinate with and task supporting organizations for information and resources necessary to develop courses of action, including force and logistics requirements, to accomplish a PR mission. Planning authority must be established during deliberate/crisis action planning to compensate for time critical aspects of a PR event.

(3) **Launch authority** allows a recovery force, or portion thereof, to proceed to a point short of execution (e.g., air recovery vehicles may launch and proceed to alert orbit out of hostile territory awaiting further orders to execute a recovery), which enhances reaction time and enables a commander to exercise flexibility during planning and execution.

(4) **Execute authority** empowers a commander to commence PR operations with approved forces. Commanders may delegate this authority but should only do so if the receiving commander has the ability to maintain an acceptable level of SA to support accurate decision making. The JFC may task more than one component (parallel planning) to plan for the PR mission and, upon approval of a plan, the JFC may retain execute authority to maintain a high degree of SA and control, but grant launch authority to facilitate the responsiveness and flexibility of the supported component commander's recovery forces.

c. JPRC Authority. The JFC and/or supported commander for PR should ensure that the JPRC director is granted the authorities that are commensurate with PR responsibilities assigned. If the JFC has tasked a component commander to establish a JPRC, the JFC should give the necessary authority to that component commander, who subsequently may grant the necessary authority to the JPRC director. If the JPRC is established as part of the JFC's staff, the JFC should give the necessary authority to the director of operations, who subsequently may grant the necessary authority to the JPRC director. The JPRC director's authority and responsibilities should be outlined in special instructions or an SOP jointly coordinated and disseminated CONOPS. The JPRC makes recommendations that are acted upon, modified, or discarded by commanders. The types of authority that may be delegated to the JPRC director may include:

~~(1) Authority to develop and promulgate joint force PR CONOPS and SOPs.~~

~~(2) Authority to establish reporting requirements for the JPRC, component PRCCs, and the UARCC.~~

~~(3) Authority to coordinate and plan joint PR operations.~~

~~(4) Authority to develop joint force PR communications plans. These plans are included in operation plans/OPORDs and should be coordinated with the joint force C4 systems directorate (J6) for deconfliction.~~

~~(5) Authority to review “PR Operations” appendices to component operation plans/OPORDs.~~

~~(6) Authority to establish operational interfaces with other joint force staff sections and elements as considered appropriate and necessary.~~

~~(7) Authority to establish coordination with multinational PR agencies and forces as appropriate.~~

~~(8) Authority to task component commands to support joint PR missions or component PR missions when another component needs assistance or cannot accomplish the mission.~~

~~(9) Authority to launch recovery forces for joint PR operations.~~

~~(10) Authority to direct execution and control joint PR operations.~~

~~(11) Authority to coordinate and deconflict support provided to component PR operations.~~

~~(12) Authority to monitor all PR operations prosecuted within the JFC’s operational area.~~

d. **PRCC Authority.** Component PRCCs should be granted authority commensurate with PR responsibilities assigned. Component commanders normally exercise their authority to task and control component forces committed to conduct PR missions through component PR controllers in their PRCC.

e. **UARCC Authority**

(1) ~~The JFSOCC is the JFC’s supported commander for NAR. The JFSOCC will direct the JFSOC J3 to coordinate operational and tactical level NAR operations in support of the theater through the UARCC. The JFSOCC. The JFC designates the JFSOCC as the OPR for the planning, coordination and execution of all NAR activities in support of the theater PR campaign.~~

To integrate, coordinate and synchronize compartmented NAR support to the JFC's PR plans and procedures, the JFSOCC, on order, establishes an UARCC, or functional equivalent, with clear and expeditious lines of communications with the joint search and rescue center (JSRC).

(2) ~~The JPRC director normally exercises tasking authority of the UARCC director for planning. The UARCC director will coordinate its statement of requirements and concept of operations directly with the JPRC director.~~ The JFSOCC retains command authority of all SOF UAR forces in theater. The JFSOCC exercises C2 through the joint command operations directorate (J-3), who designates a UARCC Director and establishes the UARCC. The UARCC coordinates NAR activities but does not exercise command authority. Other government agencies in support of NAR normally retain C2 of their respective forces. This concept of operations should include direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) with PRCCs.

(3) NAR mission "launch" and "execute" authorities normally are combined and defined by the JFC. Generally, the JFC has three options.

(a) The JFC may retain "launch" and "execute" authorities.

(b) The JFC may delegate "launch" and "execute" ~~authorities—decision to—the supported commander for PR~~ the JFSOCC.

(c) The JFC may delegate "launch" and "execute" authorities to the JFSOCC, as the supported commander for NAR.

2. Coordination and Liaison

a. **General.** Coordination is ~~the-a~~ key element for successful prosecution of PR missions. Coordination should be both vertical and horizontal and should be conducted continuously. Principal nodes where coordination takes place and ~~major functions of that coordination activities and information to be coordinated~~ are described below.

b. **Within-By the JPRC.** The JPRC should have ~~direct liaison authority~~ DIRLAUTH with all agencies and organizations, as required. The JPRC will be responsible for ~~continually-effectively~~ coordinating information among the JFC, responsible staff director or component commander (responsible for the JPRC), component PRCCs, and the UARCC. Other key coordination nodes include elements of the joint force such as representatives of the SOC, the joint staff, ~~PSYOP officer, J2, J3, J6, pertinent joint force staff directorates (J-2, J-3, etc.),~~ air operations, supporting arms, ~~and~~ medical representatives, ~~other US governmental agency liaison officers (LNOs), friendly government LNOs, as well as nongovernmental agencies and liaisons as appropriate for the PR and operational situation being addressed.~~ Coordinated information should include, but is not limited to:

(1) The status report of all PR incidents and requests.

(2) Recommendations concerning PR priorities and capabilities, and on redirecting resources to conduct PR missions.

(3) PR parallel planning.

(4) All information that mutually benefits the SA of all nodes.

(5) Status of recovered isolated personnel and disposition of records.

(6) Capturing, disseminating, and processing lessons learned.

(7) Recommendations for ROE modifications.

c. **Between the JPRC and the JAOC.** The JAOC is the focal point for planning, directing, and executing joint air operations. Since PR operations ~~often~~ normally rely on air assets to accomplish various PR execution tasks; coordination between the JPRC and JAOC on planning, directing, and executing precautionary PR and PR missions must be accomplished. ~~Normally, the JPRC is integrated in the JAOC, however, if this is not possible, a PR duty officer (PRDO) should be placed in the JAOC combat operations division. Ideally, the JPRC will operate out of the JAOC. If better resources are available elsewhere, it may be moved, but then will require a PRDO to be assigned from the JPRC to coordinate and inform the JFACC of operations and planning concerning PR.~~

(1) Joint air operations planning is a continuous, interactive process. The JAOC combat plans division develops an ATO ~~and its SPINS~~ to cover three days of air operations along with associated SPINS. The JPRC, or the Air ~~Force~~ component PRCC director should ensure the ATO includes near-term guidance, apportionment and allocation, and tasking instructions for dedicated and designated recovery assets. The JPRC director is responsible for producing the PR portion of the ATO SPINS. ~~Therefore, JPRC members must be made aware of the procedures for submitting inputs to the ATO SPINS.~~

(2) During execution, the JFACC is the command authority for revising the tasking of joint air ~~capabilities and forces~~ operations, unless authority to redirect and task is delegated to a subordinate C2 organization. ~~During a PR event, the JPRC will be responsible for coordinating PR mission requirements, and deconflicting PR requirements with other air missions, with the JAOC combat operations division or other delegated authority. It is essential that all affected commanders and forces be notified of all redirected missions. Deconfliction of PR missions from other air missions is normally accomplished through the ATO, target process, communications plans and procedures, positive and procedural control using written instructions as well as airborne and land based assets. Deconfliction with other components operations is achieved in like manner, as well as through coordination with the liaison elements in the JAOC or combined air operations center~~

(CAOC) (i.e. battlefield coordination detachment, special operations liaison element, Marine liaison officer, naval liaison officer, etc.).

For further information of ATO development and C2 of joint air operations, refer to JP 3-30, Command ~~of~~ and Control for Joint Air Operations.

d. **Between the JPRC and Component PR Coordination Cells (or equivalent).** The JPRC coordinates ~~and tasks~~ PR support requirements ~~for when~~ those PR missions ~~involving involve~~ 1) forces from more than one component, ~~or~~ 2) forces from another nation, 3) ~~when~~ forces from one component conduct PR missions in support of another component, or ~~when other~~ 4) nonmilitary agencies ~~are involved~~. The ~~When the~~ JPRC receives a requests for PR support ~~from the components and it~~ initiates action to locate the isolated person(s), makes recommendations for, and coordinates the and-tasking of PR forces ~~within the joint force as appropriate~~. This coordination is essential to prevent duplication of PR efforts, facilitate efficient exchange of PR information, and provide the most efficient use of PR resources. Coordination is particularly important when a PR incident occurs near the boundary between two component operational areas. **When a component independently initiates a PR mission, it is required to notify the JPRC through its PRCC to help ensure effective coordination and deconfliction.** Thereafter, the JPRC will monitor the mission and be prepared to support as required. ~~If the component cannot conduct the mission alone, the JPRC will either task other components for support or task another better-suited component, or combination of components, to conduct the mission.~~

e. **Between the JPRC and External Agencies.** The JPRC coordinates joint force PR operations with ~~external other government~~ OGAs, such as multinational forces, ~~OGAs,~~ and other US joint forces. This coordination normally is accomplished through the external agency's PR organization or designated POC/LNO. The coordination enhances relationships to facilitate PR support to other agencies, who either have limited or no PR capability, or from other agencies who want to participate in theater PR operations.

f. **Between Component PR Coordination Cells (or equivalent) and their Respective Forces.** Each component PRCC will coordinate component PR operations with assigned and attached forces within its designated operational area consistent with the component commander's guidance. This coordination is essential to facilitate PR C2, timely tasking, and accurate reporting.

g. ~~**Liaison Officers.** Exchange of PR liaison officers facilitates communications and enhances understanding between components and commands, particularly during the early phases of a joint operation when component PRCCs may be forming or normal PR communications nets have yet to be established. An exchange of PR liaison officers between the JPRC and coalition forces is critical to the success of PR operations during multinational operations. JFCs can enhance multinational relations by planning for, and implementing, procedures to affect the sharing of PR information. Effective use of established liaison channels is critical to successful PR coordination. LNOs and/or their elements can foster valuable information exchange regarding other component operations,~~

deconfliction of those operations, and force capabilities. However, these channels must not supersede operational coordination between the component PRCCs and JPRC.

3. Communications

a. **General.** Communications play a major role in PR missions. Joint and component communications planning should include potential PR requirements, to include requirements for ~~Service and functional~~ component communications interoperability as it relates to communicating air-to-air, air-to-surface, or surface-to-surface. ~~The primary form of PR communications will be verbal by radio and/or landline in both secure and unsecure modes. Every effort should be made to use secure communications as the compromise of critical information could easily jeopardize the entire PR effort, including the loss of scarce PR resources. JPRC and component PRCC/UARCC controllers should maintain an active, real time, two way dialogue. The JPRC and component PRCCs/UARCC should follow up all verbal communications using appropriate United States message text formats (USMTFs) or other designated communications medium such as Internet Web sites.~~ PR communications must be rapid, reliable, secure, and flexible. A combination of secure/non-secure commercial and Defense Switched Network (DSN) landline, satellite communications (SATCOM) radios and phones, ultra high frequency (UHF)/very high frequency (VHF)/high frequency (HF) radios, and computer/network “chat” capabilities should be built into communications plans. These communications nodes should be stand-alone, discrete, and dedicated systems in the JPRC, PRCCs, UARCC, and other pertinent organizations and functions that must interact real-time to prosecute PR missions.

b. **Communications Plan.** An effective PR communications plan should:

(1) Provide for the use of communications systems to maintain C2 of forces, carry out operations security (OPSEC) measures, and execute military deception actions.

(2) Provide for secure transmission and cryptographic security to deny the adversary OPSEC indicators, isolated personnel locations, and classified information.

(3) Provide for low probability of detection, interception, and jamming.

(4) Provide triple redundancy while ensuring proper authentication and physical defense of communications systems.

(5) Provide for avoidance of mutual interference and jamming by friendly communications.

(6) Exploit the capabilities of advanced survival radios to provide morale, medical, navigation, and intelligence support to isolated personnel.

(7) Include the use of local or host nations communications. While not the most effective and secure mode of communication, the varied circumstances in which a PR event could arise, may make host nation capabilities a viable or only option.

c. **Voice Communications and Circuits.** The number of voice circuits established to prosecute a PR mission should be kept to a minimum, but backup circuits should be preplanned and available as necessary. Secure voice circuits ~~should~~must be used whenever possible. Use of communications equipment with a low probability of detection or intercept mode should be considered to decrease the risk to the survivor and recovery force.

(1) **Radio Use.** Because of the distances typically involved and the requirement for speed and flexibility, radio communications are the best (and most common) means of sending and receiving information and instructions during PR operations. However, this form of communications is also the most susceptible to adversary exploitation. The possibility of adversary monitoring requires that secure radio communications equipment be provided to the JPRC, component PRCCs, participating PR units, and potential isolated personnel. Communications means resulting in low probability of detection and intercept should be used to the maximum extent possible. The requirement for JPRC and component PR coordinators to maintain an active two-way dialogue during every phase of a PR mission also dictates the need for dedicated or planned backup radios for the JPRC and component coordination centers. Satellite communications (SATCOM) ~~can~~will usually be required to provide support when PR operations extend beyond the range of terrestrially-based communications systems.

~~(2) **Landline Use.** Landlines in the form of secure telephone unit-III (STU-III) or field telephones are a secure means of communicating and should be available in all PR coordination organizations and related operations centers. STU-III enables end-to-end encryption, allowing secure voice and data to be exchanged over non secure commercial and Defense Switched Network (DSN) circuits. Secure landlines (e.g. secure telephone unit-III, secure telephone equipment, or field telephones) are a secure means of communicating and should be available in all PR coordination organizations and related operations centers. Secure landlines enable end-to-end encryption, allowing secure voice and data to be exchanged over non-secure commercial and DSN circuits.~~

(3) **Frequency Management/Deconfliction.** It is extremely important that the PR frequencies be dedicated for use by only the survivor and units involved in the recovery. Uncoordinated use of PR frequencies can result in poor survivor-to-recovery force communications because the weak transmissions of the survivor's radio are easily overpowered. Detailed communications plans should be outlined in the ATO SPINS. A well-planned communications matrix is essential to any PR mission.

d. **Authentication.** ~~In combat,~~ Depending on the specific situation and operational environment, isolated personnel normally ~~will~~may not receive assistance until their identity has been authenticated. An effective authentication system is essential to protect PR forces from adversary

1 entrapment. To achieve this objective, authentication information should be used in a manner that
2 maintains security and durability. Isolated personnel use ground-to-air signals as well as radios to
3 indicate their presence, readiness for recovery, and initial authentication. ~~A predetermined signal,~~
4 ~~like the letter of the day, provides communication and authentication when technical means have~~
5 ~~failed.~~

6
7 (1) **System.** Authentication of isolated personnel may be accomplished by several
8 means, depending on the situation. The principal method of authentication is by radio using
9 word/letter/number of the day from ATO SPINS, unit authentication numbers, data from the
10 isolated personnel's ISOPREP, or locally developed authentication codes (not recommended, but if
11 used should be minimized and reported to the PRCC or JPRC). All instructions concerning
12 authentication procedures should be published in ATO SPINS. Personal survival radios may be
13 capable of transmitting various types of secure locating information depending on the model of the
14 radio. Voice communications may still be a necessary alternative in some situations. Authentication
15 can also be accomplished using visual signals or time on target requirements. Isolated personnel
16 authentication may also include fingerprints or physical characteristics during an UAR.

17
18 (a) **Unit Authentication.** Tactical ground and flying forces who are not included in
19 the ATO should be provided a unit authentication number consisting of four randomly-generated
20 digits. These numbers should be assigned to units down to and including company or squadron
21 level. Personnel assigned or attached to these units ~~should~~ use these numbers for authentication
22 purposes upon becoming isolated.

23
24 (b) **Personal-Individual Authentication.** ~~Personal-Individual~~ authentication ~~should~~
25 ~~be-is~~ accomplished through use of a previously submitted ISOPREP ~~data~~.

26
27 (c) **Local Authentication Codes.** ~~Local PR letter, word, color, number of the day,~~
28 ~~and other codes are sometimes developed by DOD military organizations, civilians, and contractors~~
29 ~~who do not have access to SPINS or the ATO. JFCs should recognize the potential for confusion~~
30 ~~when local authentication codes are implemented, and should pursue a policy that standardizes the~~
31 ~~use ISOPREPS and codes published in the ATO and SPINS. JFCs must develop SPINS to cover~~
32 ~~all personnel in their theater and ensure their proper dissemination to the lowest level. While not the~~
33 ~~preferred option, DOD organizations committing personnel to missions with the possibility of~~
34 ~~isolation, who have not been included in the SPINS, should develop local authentication codes and~~
35 ~~procedures. These must be coordinated with the JPRC and the JFC.~~ If local authentication codes
36 are absolutely necessary, then they should be passed by the originating unit to the component
37 PRCC and JPRC as appropriate. Local authentication codes for long-term evaders should be kept
38 on file with the parent unit and component PRCC.

39
40 (2) **Security.** Authentication information must be kept from adversary forces because
41 they could use this information to deceive PR forces or deprive these forces of the ability to
42 authenticate isolated personnel.
43

(3) **Durability.** Authentication information must be adequate to allow multiple authentications and it must be used in a manner that allows PR forces to continue to authenticate isolated personnel over a long period of time. Forces involved in PR operations should exercise judicious use of information to ensure adequate and appropriate authentication is not compromised for use at a later time. The JPRC and/or component PRCC must monitor and track compromised authentication information and immediately promulgate that information through established protocols.

e. **Data Communications.** Completion, database storage, and transmission of ISOPREPs and EPAs using modern electronic technology is now possible. Additionally, current and advanced survival radios are data capable. Ground and airborne forces, properly equipped, have the capability to use direct, secure data transmissions to the isolated person. The SIPRNET is the primary means of communications via collaborative tools such as Internet relay chat and the PR Mission Software (PRMS) for text messaging and ISOPREP and/or EPA transmission. PRMS has the advantage of accessing a ISOPREP/EPA database that units can populate from any SIPRNET terminals ~~at their home station with access to the web.~~ PR C2 nodes should use PRMS as an electronic mission folder. Electronic transmission provides a significant tool to rapidly disseminate ISOPREP and EPA data; however, OPSEC must be assured. ISOPREP and EPA hardcopy backups should be produced and available. See Chapter IV, "Products and Preparation," for the detailed use and description of PRMS.

f. **Message Traffic.** ~~USMTFs are~~ The Defense Message System (DMS) is used to back up verbal communications that cross Service or functional component lines or are forwarded to joint commands and activities. Primary ~~USMTFs-DMS~~ formats for PR messages are as follows:

(1) **Search and Rescue Incident Report (SARIR)** is used to report a situation that may require a PR mission. Normally, the parent unit of the isolated personnel reports the incident. However, anyone observing a potential PR incident should initiate a voice report to be followed by a backup record message. Within component chains of command, unformatted or other designated message formats may be used up to the component PRCC. The SARIR should contain the following minimum information:

- (a) Sea, air, or ground event leading to the PR incident.
- (b) Adversary activity, terrain, and weather in the PR incident locale.
- (c) Number of isolated personnel and their status.
- (d) Location of isolated personnel and objective area.
- (e) Unit and component PR resources available.
- (f) Designated areas that may affect the PR mission.

(g) Communications capability of isolated personnel.

(h) Date-time group of incident and last sighting and/or contact with isolated personnel.

(i) Any other evidence that isolated personnel are still alive and evading capture.

(j) Identification and location of known media outlets (friendly or non-friendly) that could compromise PR operations.

(2) **Search and Rescue Situation (SARSIT) Summary Report** coordinates, summarizes, or terminates joint PR operations. The SARSIT should be transmitted at least once daily from the component PRCCs to the JPRC and forwarded as appropriate to the joint force operations officer.

(3) **Search and Rescue Request (SARREQ)** requests forces to participate in a PR mission. This message normally is sent from the JPRC to component PRCCs and any designated functional commanders to record arrangements made to employ resources from two or more components to prosecute a PR mission. The SARREQ should contain the following minimum information:

(a) Lost (or suspected lost) ships, aircraft, or ground units.

(b) Capabilities required from the various components to support a specific PR mission.

(c) Coordinating instructions for resources supporting a specific PR mission.

(d) Adversary activity that may affect a specific PR mission.

(4) **Search Action Plan** (~~SEARCHPLAN~~) delineates the C2, communications, search area, and search methods to be used to locate the isolated personnel. This message normally is sent from the requesting or executing unit to the JPRC.

(5) **Other** ~~USMTFs~~ DMS formats that may be used in conjunction with planning, supporting, and prosecuting PR missions include the following:

(a) Air allocation request.

(b) Sortie allotment.

(c) ~~Air tasking order~~ ATO confirmation.

(d) Request confirmation.

(e) Air mission request status tasking.

(f) Alert launch order.

(g) Joint launch report.

(h) In-flight report-voice only.

(i) Airlift mission schedule.

(j) Mission report.

(k) Designated area message.

(l) Acknowledge message.

For further information on the format of PR-specific ~~USMTEs~~ DMS, refer to Military Standard (MIL-STD) 6040, US Message Text Formatting Program.

CHAPTER IV

PRODUCTS AND PREPARATION

"I cannot express the full measure of appreciation felt by this Wing for the men of your unit who participated in the successful search and recovery effort on 18 July 1967. Everyone of us holds your troops in the highest esteem, for cool courage, for professional capability, and for that élan and esprit de corps which makes all of you the true heroes of this war in our minds."

Colonel Robin Olds, 29 July 1967
Letter of appreciation to Commander, 602nd Fighter Squadron

~~PR products and preparation are focused on commanders and staffs, recovery forces, and isolated personnel to enable them to achieve SA and situational superiority to accomplish the five PR execution tasks. Personnel Recovery products and preparation are developed to enable commanders and staffs, recovery forces, and isolated personnel to achieve SA and situational superiority in the accomplishment of the five PR execution tasks.~~

SECTION A. PRODUCTS

1. Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems

a. **General.** The JPRC, component PRCCs, and the UARCC must ~~interface-communicate and coordinate~~ with other organizations (see Figure IV-1) through secure interoperable C4 systems. The ~~required-recommended~~ minimum capabilities are described below.

b. **Communication.** Because of the distances typically involved and the requirement for speed and flexibility, radio communications are the best (and most common) means of sending and receiving information and instructions during PR missions. However, this form of communications is also the most susceptible to adversary exploitation. The possibility of adversary monitoring requires that **secure PR frequency and data burst authorization and access for HF, VHF, and UHF line of sight (LOS) communications and SATCOM be provided to the JPRC, component PRCCs, UARCC, and recovery forces.** ~~Frequency clearance should be obtained for single sideband, amplitude modulation, and frequency modulation modes.~~ Communications means resulting in low probability of detection and intercept should be used to the maximum extent possible. The requirement for JPRC and component PR coordination organizations to maintain an active two-way dialogue during every phase of a PR mission also dictates the need for dedicated or planned backup radios. SATCOM can provide support when PR operations extend beyond the range of terrestrially based communications systems. Specific communication requirements, ~~and~~ architecture, and/or capabilities include:




Figure IV-1. Personnel Recovery Significant Coordination Nodes

- 1 (1) UAVs. The JPRC and component PRCCs require near real time (NRT) audio
- 2 linkage/video feeds from UAV systems to provide a link between LOS and beyond line of sight
- 3 (BLOS) participants. RQ-1 and RQ-4 UAV systems provide surveillance information to the

1 network and horizontal integration within the C2 architecture, as well as providing
2 reachback/forward support from LOS participants to BLOS participants. The RQ-1, as a
3 forward-staged data link, can obtain and disseminate detailed SA data, and exchange
4 information with Link 16-equipped C4 and ISR nodes and recovery forces. The RQ-4 system
5 offers a stand-off data link capability that supplements other data-gathering platforms in the
6 tactical digital information link (TADIL) network.

7
8 **(2) Tactical Digital Information Links.** Tactical data links transmit digital
9 information that is exchanged via data links known as TADILs. The TADIL program facilitates
10 information exchange between the United States and Allied commands. A TADIL is a Joint
11 Chiefs of Staff approved standardized communication link suitable for transmission of machine-
12 readable, digital information. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) designation,
13 Link-16, is synonymous with TADIL J. Similarly, Link-11 is synonymous with TADIL A and
14 Link-4A with TADIL C. The TADIL program is critical for recovery forces, the JPRC and
15 PRCCs to exchange real-time tactical data among TADIL equipped units.

16
17 **(3) Situational Awareness Data Link (SADL),** a short-term data link capability, was
18 developed to afford needed SA. The SADL gateway allows for direct interface with the Link-16
19 network. SADLs provide the means of obtaining mission critical information (survivor, mission,
20 threat) as quickly as possible over a highly secure, jam resistant means. Currently, most
21 recovery assets must pass data over voice systems to update other recovery force elements and
22 PR C2 nodes. SADL is outfitted on some A-10 and F-16 Block 30 aircraft and enables quick
23 response reactions to dynamic air and ground tactical situations.

24
25 ~~**(c) Global Personnel Recovery System (GPRS)** will be used to quickly locate,~~
26 ~~authenticate, and recover isolated personnel anytime, anywhere in the world. It provides an~~
27 ~~integrated system with two distinct architectures, the public Distress Alerting Satellite System~~
28 ~~and government search and rescue (GSAR). The GPRS capability can also support special~~
29 ~~capabilities for approved government users, such as PR networking and coordination~~
30 ~~communications and asset tracking. The long-term goal is to implement a two-way data~~
31 ~~capability to provide secure, NRT communications between the user and the user's organization.~~
32 ~~GSAR will be available to DOD, any government agency, and coalition allies. In its present~~
33 ~~state of development, GPRS requires appropriately configured global positioning system (GPS)~~
34 ~~satellites; is not compatible with the Link-16 network; and requires a specialized ground station~~
35 ~~to receive, process, and interpolate the assigned distress signal.~~

36
37 **(4) Integrated Broadcast Service (IBS).** IBS delivers threat warning and critical SA
38 information to forces operating with a combatant commander's AOR and to the operating forces
39 of IBS collaborating nations. IBS provides for the integration of various SIGINT broadcast
40 dissemination systems into standardized protocols with compatible hardware and software, to
41 include the Tactical Information Broadcast Service, Tactical Related Applications Data
42 Dissemination System, Tactical Reconnaissance Intelligence Exchange System, Tactical Data
43 Information Exchange System-B and BINOCULAR. IBS is an integrated, interactive
44 dissemination system, focusing on tactical users' information requirements and will unify the
45 existing intelligence broadcast systems. IBS is critical for recovery forces, the JPRC and PRCCs
46 to exchange threat warning and SA data among IBS equipped units.

(5) As mentioned earlier, **PRMS** can electronically complete, provide database storage for and transmit ISOPREPs and EPAs. PRMS has two major software components—ISOPREP and EPA management, and rescue coordination.

(a) The **ISOPREP and EPA management component** is a Web-based application for HRI personnel to enter ISOPREPs and EPAs into a database for later retrieval by PR mission coordinators. The ISOPREP Web-based form is an automated version of the standard DD Form 1833. It includes DD Form 1833 fields for entering photographs but does not contain fingerprint fields. Additionally, some other relevant fields were added as enhancements to the standard form, such as sex and the form's date of approval. The EPA Web-based form automates and standardizes the evasion planning information recommended in this publication.

(b) The **rescue coordination component** is an information management tool for JPRC and PRCC members to use in coordinating recovery efforts. This software tool downloads previously entered ISOPREP and EPA information and automates many other recovery coordination efforts. Its capabilities include information collection and analysis using an electronic "mission folder" for each PR incident; efficient distribution and notification of incident information by automating SARIR and SARSIT generation; PR tools for decoding or encoding SAR numerical encryption group (SARNEG) locations, calculating location to or from a [search and rescue dot \(SARDOT\)](#), parachute drift calculations, and coordinate conversions; procedural support using process flow charts and checklists; and event-logging functions to capture all messages and actions associated with an incident. PRMS depends on interfaces with primary C2 systems to effectively manage recovery missions. The rescue coordination component provides interfaces to several applications and systems:

1. Command and Control Personnel Computer (C2PC) is a Global Command and Control System mapping application. C2PC runs on the same workstation as the rescue coordination component. The rescue coordination component generates C2PC overlay files containing geographical PR information extracted from its database. In addition, C2PC provides common operational picture tracks and alerts.

2. Common Operating Environment Message Processor (CMP) provides ~~USMTF-DMS~~ preparation and decoding functions. The rescue coordination component generates messages in ~~USMTF-DMS~~ format and launches CMP to allow further message editing and/or sending.

(6) **Phones.** Secure telephone, telephone (DSN, commercial, and patch capability), and facsimile (FAX) capabilities are required. When geographic and tactical conditions permit, landlines for field phones should be established between the JPRC, component PRCCs, UARCC, and dedicated PR forces. Landlines permit the use of essential voice communications while lessening the risk of adversary monitoring.

(7) **Computer Networks.** A local-area network (LAN) established within the joint force or component headquarters and a wide-area network (WAN) established between joint force and component headquarters will facilitate the flow of information between staff sections

1 in the headquarters. The JPRC, component PRCCs, UARCC, and recovery forces should have
2 access to these LANs and WANs along with SIPRNET access to expeditiously receive essential
3 information and to properly coordinate PR activities and missions.

4
5 (8) **Search and rescue satellite-aided tracking (SARSAT)** ~~is considered a national~~
6 ~~asset to be employed in support of national interest operations, to include PR. The SARSAT and~~
7 ~~associated ground systems are capable of monitoring interference signals and transmitters that~~
8 ~~malfunction on guard frequencies. Malfunctioning transmitters could adversely affect the~~
9 ~~location process or compromise unit or aircraft locations. The JPRC should ensure that satellite~~
10 ~~visibility and availability schedules are published in ATO SPINS. It should also ensure that~~
11 ~~procedures are established to disseminate SARSAT visibility periods and ground station data to~~
12 ~~organizations and associated support agencies involved in PR.~~ is a satellite system designed to
13 provide distress alert and location data to assist search and rescue operations, using spacecraft
14 and ground facilities to detect and locate the signals of distress beacons operating on 406 or
15 121.5 megahertz (MHz). The SARSAT system is designed for civil use, and radio frequency
16 (RF) transmission characteristics make the beacons highly susceptible to adversary detection.
17 Accordingly, the system is not recommended for use in threat areas.

18
19 (9) **Message Support.** The JPRC, component PRCCs, UARCC, and recovery forces
20 should have timely message support. Most PR voice communications are eventually backed up
21 by message communications. Much of the intelligence required to plan and conduct PR
22 missions is provided by message. Furthermore, PR mission taskings and status reports normally
23 are transmitted by message.

24
25 Specific ~~USMTFs-DMS~~ for PR messages are found in MIL-STD 6040, *US Message Text*
26 *Formatting Program*.

27
28 (10) A **classified-capable FAX machine** (i.e., secure FAX) will facilitate the timely
29 transmission of PR-related documents such as ISOPREPs between the component PRCCs and
30 the JPRC.

31
32 ~~For further information on joint and Service C4 systems, refer to JP 6-02, Joint Doctrine for~~
33 ~~Employment of Operational/Tactical Command, Control, Communications, and Computer~~
34 ~~Systems JP 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems~~
35 ~~Support to Joint Operations.~~

2. Recovery Forces

a. **Automatic Direction Finding (ADF) Equipment.** Use of ADF equipment by recovery forces simplifies the task of locating isolated personnel. When tuned to the proper frequency, the relative bearing to the transmitting radio is displayed. Caution should be used with this technique, as adversary forces also employ direction finding (DF) techniques to locate isolated personnel. Adversary DF and intelligence-gathering methods should be understood by all recovery mission participants prior to utilizing DF locating methods. Use of high speed, accurate DF equipment, such as the ALD-9, will minimize required transmissions by isolated personnel and reduce the probability of adversary detection.

b. **Frequency Management/Deconfliction.** It is extremely important that the PR frequency be dedicated for use by only the survivor and units involved in the recovery. Uncoordinated use of the recovery frequencies can result in poor survivor-to-recovery force communications because the weak transmissions of the survivor's radio are easily overpowered. Detailed communications plans should be outlined in the SPINS. A well-planned communications matrix is essential to any PR mission.

c. **TADIL Network.** PR C2 nodes need the capability to receive and pass critical information by the most secure means available to reduce adversary interference and prevent mission compromise. Key recovery force assets require TADILs to capture rapidly evolving information and enable quick-response reactions to the dynamic air and ground tactical situation. PR C4 systems support must include direct links (or immediate access to links) from all available data-gatherers and the capability to pass that data down-range to recovery forces accurately and quickly. This time-criticality can be satisfied by TADIL, exchanging tactical digital information in real, or NRT, and complementing (not replacing) secure voice communications. TADIL may be employed to send single-source data-bursts with commands and NRT situation updates forward to the recovery forces or isolated personnel.

~~(1) **Reachback/Forward.** TDL provide the primary means for PR C2 nodes and recovery forces to share and disseminate SA information and must provide the reachback bridge from LOS participants to BLOS participants. Communication relays are not always practical, so TDLs must be available to support BLOS information exchange requirements between sensors, decision-makers, and all recovery forces. This ensures linked personnel can rapidly and accurately exchange relevant information to collectively assess the developing situation, make informed decisions for tasking or retasking assets, and ultimately assess mission results. TDLs provide seamless connectivity among airborne data-gathering platforms, airborne/ground-based C2 nodes, and airborne/ground recovery assets. All TDLs will eventually migrate to the multi-sensor C2 aircraft platform.~~

~~(2) **Terminals.** Recovery forces are incorporating SATCOM capabilities, which aid BLOS communications and collaborative SA during a PR mission. Standard SATCOM terminals and waveforms facilitate the integration of the BLOS media into the TDL infrastructure.~~

3. Isolated Personnel

1 a. **Survival Radios.** HRI personnel should be trained and capable of operating ~~at least one~~
2 ~~of the following devices~~ standard survival radios with emphasis on the radio the combatant
3 command is using. The current inventory of survival radios includes:
4

5 (1) The **AN/PRC-90** is an emergency UHF transceiver tuned to two preselected
6 frequencies for voice and beacon transmissions. It has no secure or low probability of intercept
7 capability. Because the adversary can intercept its signal, isolated personnel should limit radio
8 transmissions and use code words until the recovery or extraction phase.
9

10 (2) The **AN/PRC-112BA**, also an emergency transceiver, has five UHF and/or VHF
11 frequencies, two of which are programmable. When the AN/PRC-~~112A-112B~~ is turned on and
12 then interrogated, the transponder feature will transmit a preprogrammed, high-speed, short-
13 duration, pseudo-random, noise-coded message that is extremely difficult to intercept or jam. A
14 burst is transmitted by an aircraft, or any other vehicle equipped with the AN/ARS-6 personal
15 locator system (PLS) and/or downed aviator locator system (DALs). The AN/ARS-6, also
16 called the lightweight airborne recovery system ~~(LARS)~~, operates in the UHF 225-300 MHz
17 range. The burst transmission triggers a coded identification reply from the isolated personnel's
18 AN/~~PRC-112A~~**PRC-112B**. If the reply is valid, the AN/ARS-6 computes slant range and
19 direction to the radio being queried. The system's usable range varies from approximately 111
20 nm at 35,000 feet to approximately 70 nm at 5,000 feet above ground level. The AN/ARS-6 is
21 limited, however, by its LOS capability, thereby presenting a major concern for recovery
22 helicopters operating in a threat environment at low altitudes. In addition, final authentication
23 must still be ascertained to ensure the AN/~~PRC-112A~~**PRC-112B** operator is indeed the isolated
24 person.
25

26 (3) The ~~AN/PRC-112B-AN/PRC-112B/B1/G~~. The AN/PRC-112B is a modified
27 AN/~~PRC-112A~~**PRC-112B** radio with geopositioning, navigation, and data burst (DB)
28 capability. The [global positioning system \(GPS\)](#) functions of the radio provide geopositioning
29 data to the user. The GPS derived location is displayed to the user and can be transmitted to
30 rescue forces via ~~a low probability of intercept/low probability of detection~~ DB. The DB can be
31 received and decoded by any aircraft equipped with a **Quickdraw** interrogator system. The
32 Quickdraw interrogator is a hand-held unit for tactical aircraft use in the PR effort. The
33 interrogators also may query the hand-held units via DB with no isolated personnel action
34 required assuming the radio is on and in range. Each DB contains an eight element message that
35 includes radio identification number, most current GPS fix, datum in use, altitude, time of last
36 GPS fix, time of data transmission, and last entered text message. [Radios in this family also](#)
37 [have the capability to transmit an emergency message and location via the cosmicheskaya](#)
38 [sistyema poiska avariynch sudov \(COSPAS\)-space system for search of distressed vessels](#)
39 [\(Russian satellite system\), short title COSPAS, and/or SARSAT data system. The AN/PRC](#)
40 [112B1](#) is an updated version of the 112B with a 12-channel GPS receiver vice 8 channels for the
41 [112B; improved cold start times for the GPS; simultaneous GPS and PLS/\[distance measuring\]\(#\)](#)
42 [equipment](#) operation; increased battery life; and a maximum of 250 waypoints vice 99 for the
43 [112B. The AN/PRC-112G incorporates all the features of the PRC-112B/B1 with improved](#)
44 [internal componentry to allow for hardware expansion slots and software defined waveform](#)
45 [upgrades.](#)
46

(4) The **AN/PRQ-7 Comabt Survivor Evader Locator (CSEL)** system should significantly reduce the time and uncertainty associated with the search for isolated personnel. The CSEL system provides a two-way over the horizon (OTH) encrypted ~~data-burst-DB~~ communications capability along with precision GPS geolocation. This provides the JPRC, PRCC, or UARCC with the ability to positively locate and authenticate isolated personnel prior to employing recovery forces. CSEL messaging capability will also provide isolated personnel with a means to pass physical status, threat, weather, terrain, and other information critical to the recovery force. Additionally, it allows the JPRC, PRCC, or UARCC to pass information about the rescue mission back to isolated personnel. However, CSEL does not have the capability to DB recovery aircraft with a Quickdraw interrogator system or DALs. The primary vehicle for two-way OTH communications is UHF SATCOM. Collection of broadcast from remote assets ~~(or COBRA)~~ provides one-way communications through national systems. CSEL also has the capability to transmit an emergency message and location via the ~~cosmicheskaya-sistyema poiska-avariynch-sudov~~ COSPAS-space system for search of distressed vessels (Russian satellite system), ~~short-title-COSPAS~~, and/or SARSAT data system. Besides the OTH data communications, CSEL possesses a ten-frequency LOS UHF and/or VHF voice capability for communication with recovery forces.

(5) **Mobile SARSAT local user terminal.** ~~SARSAT is considered a national asset to be employed in support of national interest operations, to include PR. The SARSAT and associated ground systems are capable of monitoring interference signals and transmitters that malfunction on guard frequencies. Should isolated personnel possess the combat survivor evader locator (CSEL) system, an emergency message and location can be transmitted via the SARSAT data system.~~ SARSAT is a satellite system designed to provide distress alert and location data to assist search and rescue operations, using spacecraft and ground facilities to detect and locate the signals of distress beacons operating on 406 or 121.5 MHz. The SARSAT system is designed for civil use, and RF transmission characteristics make the beacons highly susceptible to adversary detection. Accordingly, the system is not recommended for use in threat areas.

b. **Aids to Evasion.** ~~Because isolation is usually sudden and unexpected,~~ HRI personnel should carry evasion aids. Evaders may be quickly separated from their equipment or may not have time to sort through it to select the most useful evasion items. Because space considerations and clothing configurations may limit the number of evasion aids which can be carried, consider selecting items of information and/or equipment that serve more than one purpose. Suggested equipment items include EVCs; blood chits, pointee-talkies, or other means of communicating with the local populace; general reference materials on medical, survival, or cultural information; collapsible water containers; water purification products; large leaf bags for shade, wind, moisture protection, floatation, or water storage; camouflage or environmental protection items; and miscellaneous items such as a small compass, survival knife, or signaling devices. HRI personnel should also be familiar with and follow the combatant command's minimum evasion requirements.


(1) EVCs are a JPRA managed program developed and printed jointly by JPRA and NGA. The EVC is designed to assist evaders to avoid capture and survive in hostile territory and to provide them with a means of locating and securely transmitting their position or

1 navigating to a recovery point. The EVC program supports operational force requirements with
2 a series of charts that covers geographic areas specifically identified by combatant commands.
3 ~~The EVC is a derivative of a standard product, the joint operations graphic (JOG), and is made~~
4 ~~up of approximately eight 1:250,000-scale JOG charts, usually four on each side. When JOGs~~
5 ~~of a particular area are not available, tactical pilotage charts (1:500,000 scale) are substituted.~~
6 The EVC is a derivative of the most up to date and best scale map data that NGA has.
7 Depending upon source availability and combatant command requirements this EVC may vary
8 from 1:24,000 to 1:300,000-scale. The EVC is produced on very strong material, which is
9 waterproof and resistant to tearing. Tailored to cover the individual environmental area
10 concerned, it is a unique, multi-purpose product which combines standard navigation charts with
11 evasion and survival information located on the margins. A typical EVC contains localized
12 information on navigation techniques, survival medicine, environmental hazards, personal
13 protection, and water and food procurement as well as color pictures of edible and poisonous
14 plants. Additionally, the chart is overprinted with a camouflage pattern similar to the natural
15 ground colors of the area, and may aid an evader in hiding when used as a shelter/cover. ~~The~~
16 ~~chart is folded to fit in a flight suit leg pocket and shows an American flag on one of the outer~~
17 ~~panels. The chart is folded to fit in a flight suit leg pocket or in the survival vest.~~ Evaders can
18 use this to identify themselves, especially when contacting friendly troops in a hostile area.
19 ~~Procedures for ordering EVCs are found in NIMA's Map Catalog, Part 1, "Aerospace Products,"~~
20 ~~Volume 1, "Aeronautical Charts and Flight Publications," Section 8, "Special Purpose~~
21 ~~Products."~~ Procedures for ordering EVCs are found in NGA's compact disk, "Catalog of Maps,
22 Charts, and Related Products."

23
24 (2) The **blood chit** is a small sheet of material on which is imprinted an American flag,
25 a statement in English and several languages ~~spoken-read~~ by the populace in the operational
26 area, and numbers in each corner and centered under the flag, in some cases, that identify the
27 particular chit. The blood chit identifies the bearer as an American and promises a reward to
28 anyone providing assistance to the bearer and/or after helping the bearer to return to friendly
29 control. When the blood chit number is presented to American authorities, the American has
30 been returned to friendly control, and the claim has been properly validated; it represents an
31 obligation of the USG to provide compensation to the claimant for services rendered to evaders.
32 NIMA-NGA maintains the capability to produce and reprint blood chits at the request of the
33 combatant commanders as coordinated through JPRA. The blood chit has certain limitations as
34 an evasion aid and form of identification:

35
36 (a) The person providing aid may be skeptical of the value of a "number" as
37 something that may produce a reward. Overcoming this difficulty will depend largely on the
38 salesmanship of the evader.

39
40 (b) When the evader is in the hands of friendly guerrilla organizations, use of the
41 blood chit as a means of identification may depend largely on the effectiveness of
42 communications between the guerrilla group and friendly forces. The evader should expect to
43 encounter some suspicion, because the guerrillas could suspect the chit may have been

117512

117512

ARABIC

انا اميركي ولا اناكلم لغتك. انا احتاج
الى مساعدتك للحصول على الطعام
والماوى والوقاية. ارجوك ان تأخذني
الى من يستطيع ان يحميني وان يرجمني
الى اهلي. سأعمل بكل طاقتي لحمايةك
من اي ضرر. وان حكومتي ستكافئك
مكافأة على مساعدتك لي عندما
تقدمون لها هذا الرقم مع ذكر
اسمي.

TURKISH

Ben Amerikalıyım ve Türkçe bilmiyorum. Benim size hiç bir zararım dokunmaz ! Sizin halkınıza benden hiç bir kötülük gelmez. Arkadaşım, lütfen bana yiyecek, su, barınak, giyim eşyası, ilaç ve doktor sağlar mısın ? Aynı zamanda benim Amerikalıların ve onların dostu olan diğer memleketlerin en yakındaki kuvvetlerine emniyetle gitmemi sağlayın. Benim ismini ve bu numarayı Amerikan makamlarına verdiğiniz zaman bana yardım ettiğiniz için size bir ödül verilecektir.

PERSIAN (FARSI)

امريکايی هستم - زبان شما حرف نمیزنم -
بمناسبت دچار بدبختی مجبورم از شما
مساعدت بخوراک و پناه و بست بخوام -
خواهشمندم مرا بکسی که وسائل سلامت
مرا فراهم کند ببرید و مراتبت کنید که من
تحت نظارتی دولت خود را گذار شوم -
نهایت کشش خوام کرد که هیچ اسیر
نشما نیاید - دولت شما پاداش قابلی
خواهد داد -

KURDISH

من نه مریکم و به زمانی نیوه قسه ناکه م
من به هیچ جوریک عه زیه تو ناره حتیو
ناخوشتان بی ناکه به نم.
براده ره کان تکاتان لی نه که م که یارمه تیم
بدنه به تا به به بی بو خواردنو خواره
مه نی وجلو به رک و نه که ر بیویستی
دکتور (حکیم) به.
هر وه ها براده ره کانم سبستان نه که م
نه که ره به خه نه دهستی له شکری براده ره
و هه رچی ولاتیک که وا یارمه تی و
دلسوزی نه مریکا نه دا.
و منیش نه م جانیه بی نیوه م له بیر ناجیت
و نه مه وی قازانجیکی زورتان بی بکه به نم.
هر ناوی من له که ل نه م نمره به بدنه
دهستی بیاوانی حکومه تی نه مریکا.
نیتر هه ر بترین.

ENGLISH

"I am an American and do not speak your language. I will not harm you! I bear no malice towards your people. My friend, please provide me food, water, shelter, clothing, and necessary medical attention. Also, please provide safe passage to the nearest friendly forces of any country supporting the Americans and their allies. You will be rewarded for assisting me when you present this number and my name to American authorities."

117512

PREPARED AND PUBLISHED BY THE
DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY AEROSPACE CENTER
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI

Lithographed by DMAAC 12 90

BLOCHTXXIA
(Desert Shield)

117512

Sample Blood Chit

captured, stolen, or could be a skillful counterfeit, and the bearer could be an adversary using it to penetrate the group.

For further guidance on the blood chit program, See Appendix H, "Blood Chit Program Administration."

(3) **Pointee-Talkees** ~~contain~~ are in a three column format with English phrases on the left side of the page, ~~and~~ the same phrases ~~written~~ in the foreign language in the middle, and the phonetic pronunciation on the right side ~~of the page~~. The evader selects the desired English phrase and points to the translation of the phrase beside it or tries to phonetically pronounce the desired phrase. The evader may augment the pointee-talkee by making drawings and signs to help communicate with a local national whose language the evader does not speak or understand. The major limitation of the pointee-talkee, as with the blood chit, is in trying to communicate with illiterates. In many countries the illiteracy rate can be very high, so personnel may have to resort to pantomime, phonetics, and sign language; tactics that have been relatively effective in the past. ~~Pointee talkees should be developed in theater, where the language expertise is available, with the assistance of the JPRA as required.~~ New pointee-talkee development should be requested through combatant commands to Headquarters JPRA.

(4) The **handheld GPS receiver**, whether issued or personally acquired, should be considered an important evasion aid.

(5) Handheld night vision devices also should be considered as an important evasion aid.

SECTION B. PREPARATION

4. Commanders and Staffs

a. JPRC

(1) **Composition and Organization.** The JPRC should consist of a director, deputy director, watch supervisors, controllers, PRDOs, SERE specialists, ~~component liaison officers, combat rescue officers (CROs),~~ dedicated intelligence support, and general communications support to provide 24-hour coverage. Representation from each participating component is key, with all personnel assigned to the JPRC being trained and integrated to perform a specific JPRC function while simultaneously bringing their particular service skill sets to the JPRC staff. Joint staffing facilitates timely coordination of ~~Service and functional~~ component PR requirements, provides quick access to information relative to specific ~~Service and functional~~ component PR resources and operational concepts, fosters component interest and participation in the overall joint PR effort, and spreads additional personnel support requirements throughout the joint force. A notional JPRC organizational chart is provided in Figure IV-2. Grades and numbers of personnel staffing the JPRC will vary based on the size of the joint force involved and availability of qualified individuals. Each JPRC requires a minimum number of controllers to be available during ongoing or projected PR missions, and be immediately available at all other times based on ongoing operations and projected plans. Intelligence specialists should either be

FARSI

INTRODUCTORY MATERIAL (معرفت)

ENGLISH	FARSI	FARSI PHONETIC
I am an American and I need your help, but I do not speak your language. I'll point to the question in your language and you can point to the answer in your language.	من آمریکائی هستم و به کمک شما احتیاج دارم ولی با زبان شما آشنا نیستم من از روی این ورقه سوال مورد نظرم را نشان خواهم داد و شما با استفاده از این ورقه جواب مورد نظرتان را نشان بدهید.	MAHN EHM-bree-koh EE hahs TAHM, vah beh koh-MAH-keh shoh-MOH ehx-tee-OHJ duh- RUHM, vah-LEE boh zah-BAH-neh shoh-MOH ohsh noh NEE-stahm. MAHN ahz-ROO yeh EEN-vah-RAH gah-eh soh-OH-leh MOH-reh deh NAH ZAH-rahm roh neh SHUHN HOH-hahn DOHT VAH-shoh-MOH BOH EH-seh foh DAH-zeen vah-rah-GAY jah VOH-veen MOH-reh-deh nah ZAH tahn-DOOR nee SHUHN BEH-dah-HEET.

COMMUNICATION (محواره)

ENGLISH	FARSI	FARSI PHONETIC
Will you help me?	حاضرین بمن کمک کنید؟	HOH ZEH-reen beh-MAHN koh MAH-koh-NEEK?
Is there someone that speaks English?	شخصی انگلیسی زبانی سراغ دارید؟	SHAX SAY EHN-glee-see zah BOH-nee suh-ROHK duh-REET?
Are they willing to help me?	ایشان حاضر به کمک من هستند؟	ee-SHOHN hoh-ZEHR beh KOH-mah-kay MAHN HAH-stahnd?
Can they come here?	میتوانند به اینجا بیایند؟	MEE-tah-voh-NAHND veh EEN-joh byoh-YAHND?
I must go now but, I want to thank you for your help.	باید الآن بروم ولی میخواهم از شما برای کمکتان تشکر کنم.	boh-YAHD ahl OHN BEH-rah-VAHM, vah LEE-nee xoh-XAHM ahs-shoh-MOH bah-roh YEH koh MAH keh tohn tah shah-KUHR KOH-nahm.
My government will repay you for your kindness.	دولت من از بابت کمکتان به من، به شما پاداش خواهد داد.	DOH LAH-tay-mahn ahz boh BAH-tay koh-MAH-kay-TUHN beh-MAHN beh shoh-MOH poh DOHSH hoh-HAHD-dohd.
I greatly appreciate your assistance.	از کمک شما واقعا ممنونم	AHS-koh-MAH-keh shoh-MOH voh-RAHN mahm NOO-nahm.

BASIC NEEDS (نیازهای اساسی)

ENGLISH	FARSI	FARSI PHONETIC
May I have some water?	میتوانید بمن کمی آب بدهید؟	MEE-tah-VOH-neet beh MAHN KEH-mee-OHB BEH-dah-HEET?
May I have some food?	میتوانید بمن کمی غذا بدهید؟	MEE-tah-VOH-neet beh MAHN KEH-mee RAH-zoh BEH-dah-HEET?
I am injured. Is there someone that can help me?	زخمی شده ام. کسی میتواند بمن کمک کند؟	zahx MEE-shoh-DAHM. KÆ see NEE-tah-VOH-nahd beh MAHN koh-MAH koh-NAHD?
Do you have any bandages?	وسایل پانسمان دارید؟	VAH-soh YEH-leh POHN-say-MOHN DOH-reet?
Can you contact someone to help me?	میتوانید با کسی برای کمک تماس بگیرید؟	MEE-tah-VOH-neet boh KÆ-seed BAH-roh-yeh koh-MAHK TÆ-mohs BEH-geh-REET?
Where is the latrine?	دستشویی کجا است؟	dahs-shoo-EE koh-JOHT?
I am very tired. Is there a place I can sleep?	خیلی خسته ام. جایی برای خواب دارید؟	XAY-lee XAHS-tahm. JOH-ee BAH-roh-yeh HOHB DOH-reet?
May I have a blanket, or more clothing?	میتوانید برایم یک پتو یا لباس فراهم کنید؟	MEE-tah-VOH-neet BAH-roh-YAHM YEHK pah-TOO YOH lay-BOHS FAH-roh hahm koh-NEET?

Sample Portion of a Pointee-Talkee

- 1 assigned to the JPRC Director/Watch Supervisor or provided as dedicated support to At a
- 2 ~~minimum, dedicated intelligence personnel must be identified to~~ provide recurring updates and
- 3 respond to JPRC intelligence requirements. Typically, the JISE will provide 24-hour
- 4 intelligence support for a JTF-level JPRC and the combatant command JIC will provide such
- 5 support to a theater-level JPRC.

(2) Individual Duties and Responsibilities




Figure IV-2. Joint Personnel Recovery Center Organization (Notional)

(a) The **JPRC director** and deputy director advise and inform the supported commander for PR and/or the JFC on PR matters, and manage all activities of the JPRC. The JPRC director is normally a field grade officer and must be familiar with knowledgeable of joint PR procedures, theater component recovery procedures, and have a SCI security clearance. Additionally, the JPRC director should be experienced in PR operations and a graduate of the JPRA PR plans and operations course and JPRC/PRCC director's course. ~~A combat rescue officer (CRO) should be considered for the director or deputy director position. A CRO is a dedicated PR subject matter expert in PR C2, employment of recovery forces, and isolated personnel procedures. The CRO is an experienced PR officer, a graduate of the JPRA plans and operations course, and has a SCI security clearance. The Deputy director will ideally have~~

1 similar qualifications as the director and should be from a different Service than the JPRC
2 director, to provide a breadth of knowledge at JPRC supervisory levels.
3

4 (b) The **watch supervisor** is the supervisor of the JPRC watch crew responsible
5 for tending to JPRC current operations and monitoring and coordinating oversees active
6 missions and provides advice on the employment of recovery forces. Watch supervisors should
7 be PR experienced and graduates of JPRA's PR controllers course or an equivalent.
8

9 (c) **Controllers (officers and enlisted)** fulfill key coordination functions. They
10 coordinate missions. Therefore, they should be PR experienced, and preferably be graduates of
11 the JPRA PR controllers course or equivalent.
12

13 (d) The PRDO functions as the coordination link between the JPRC and the JFC
14 combat operations division. Whether the JPRC is located at the JFC's joint operations center
15 (JOC), or established in another component commander's operations center, placement of a
16 PRDO in the appropriate JOC (JAOC, joint force land component commander (JFLCC), etc.) is
17 critical to ensure effective and efficient coordination of PR assets. from the JPRC for each shift
18 should augment the JAOC to ensure that PR operations are executed properly. The PRDO
19 should be a highly experienced PR officer, preferably a USAF Weapons School and C2 Warrior
20 School's JPRC coordination course graduate or a graduate of JPRA's JPRC/PRCC directors
21 course, an officer with PR experience and preferably a graduate of formalized PR education
22 provided by a Service or JPRA.
23

24 (e) Dedicated **intelligence personnel** must be familiar with collection
25 management procedures, the processing of RFIs, and procedures for obtaining national
26 intelligence support; and they must be able to effectively apply the various intelligence
27 disciplines to all phases of a PR incident.
28

29 (f) The **SERE specialist** should be a senior enlisted member a noncommissioned
30 officer (E7 or greater) experienced in the subject matter, who has completed appropriate JPRA
31 training and education, with extensive background in operational PR procedures. He must be
32 familiar with the reintegration process for recovered isolated personnel as well as DOD and
33 theater repatriation plans.
34

35 (g) The component liaison officers must be experts on their Service/functional
36 component's PR capabilities and operations. A CRO is a dedicated PR subject matter expert in
37 PR C2, RFD employment of recovery forces, and isolated personnel procedures. The CRO is an
38 experienced PR officer, a graduate of specific PR education and training programs and has a SCI
39 security clearance. A CRO is well-suited to and capable of fulfilling the SERE function if
40 necessary, and may be suited for the JPRC director, deputy director, or watch supervisor
41 positions.
42

43 b. **PRCCs** may vary from component to component in size, composition, and location; but
44 are usually a staff element of the operations section. They are typically located within the
45 operations directorate where coordination of active PR missions is possible. The PRCC must be
46 integrated into the organizational structure of a component in a manner where PRCC personnel

gain immediate access to the component's designated command/tasking authorities in order to expedite responses to component PR missions or requests for support to joint PR missions. Additionally, PRCC personnel must have visibility and input into component plans functions to ensure a PR capability is properly addressed. The PRCC typically consists of a PRCC Chief and enough trained and designated controllers to coordinate PR missions on a 24-hour basis. ~~Since the component controllers will be functioning with the component commander's authority to task component forces and may be assigned as a PR mission coordinator; they should be commissioned officers or senior noncommissioned officers; experienced in PR matters; familiar with~~ The PRCC staff must be knowledgeable of component and joint PR doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures TTP; and preferably ~~graduates of the JPRA fundamentals of PR course trained in appropriate level JPRA PR courses.~~

c. The UARCC normally consists of a director and enough controllers to coordinate or control NAR/UAR missions in the JFC's operational area. UARCC personnel must have SCI security clearances and be very familiar with unconventional PR doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. The UARCC director should be a graduate of the JPRA NAR Plans and Operations course.

d. Other Key Positions and Personnel Support

(1) **Combatant Command PR/OPR.** The size of the PR/OPR staff element may be affected by external activities to include the combatant command's operational tempo. At a minimum, it should have at least two full-time PR-experienced joint staff officers, who are graduates of the JPRA Plans and Operations course. While the combatant command PR/OPR staff element normally focuses on theater preparation and deliberate PR planning prior to mission planning and execution; it could also be tasked, in the absence of an established JPRC, to accomplish certain PR mission coordination and execution functions. The need to manage multiple PR events with potential 24-hour operations should be considered when determining the size, qualifications, and organization of the combatant command PR/OPR staff element.

(2) PR Liaisons

(a) The need to establish a PR liaison ~~at the joint force headquarters~~ may arise under certain circumstances. When a JPRC is ~~part of the JOC~~ formed from all the components of the JFC, the need for a PR liaison may neither be warranted or required. However, it may be required when 1) a component PRCC also serves as the JPRC in the component operations center; 2) a joint force headquarters PR liaison is recommended to assist in properly informing the JFC of all PR activities in the operational area. ~~In the rare event that a JPRC is not established either at the component or joint force headquarters level;~~ or 3) the need for a PR liaison function to coordinate joint force PR activities becomes critical and a PR liaison within the joint force headquarters that is capable of 24-hour operations may be necessary. ~~The stand up of a PR liaison may also be appropriate if, and when,~~ when multiple JPRCs are established within the combatant commander's ~~operational area~~ AOR. These PR LNOs assist in informing on and coordinating the PR activities of the JPRC (see Figure IV-2).

(b) ~~When the JFC designates the JFACC as the supported commander for PR, the JPRC normally becomes an integral part of the JAOC. Ideally, the JPRC will be located within~~

~~or adjacent to the JAOC to ensure close coordination with the JAOC's combat operations and combat plans divisions, and perhaps more importantly, the JFACC when required. Should this not be the case, the need to establish a PR liaison function in the JAOC to coordinate JPRC activities with the JFACC's should be considered.~~

(b) The need for liaisons with multinational/multi-agency organizations may be necessary to coordinate PR activities.

(3) **JPRA Theater Representatives.** Each geographic combatant command and USSOCOM may have a JPRA theater representative(s) to assist (in coordination with the command PR/OPR) in developing and maintaining a viable PR program. This individual provides the full “reachback” capability with the JPRA headquarters to provide additional PR support when requested by the combatant commander.

(a) **JPRA PR Support Teams (PRSTs)**

1. JPRA is organized internally to support each geographic combatant command and USSOCOM. When requested and if available, JPRA can provide a **tailored team of PR subject matter experts** to assist the geographic combatant command and USSOCOM. JPRA PRST support may include, but is not limited to, deliberate and crisis action planning (~~i.e., operation plan/order development~~), exercise support (i.e., scenario development, mission planning, mission execution), and operational support (i.e., SPINS, PR CONOPS development, repatriation, etc.). It is important to note that JPRA is a facilitator and educator, but not a force provider.

2. JPRA has the ability to provide a special PRST to assist the geographic combatant commands and USSOCOM in ~~debriefs and reintegration~~ activities that support their responsibility to provide initial processing of recovered isolated personnel. The primary purpose of JPRA's involvement in the ~~debrief and~~ reintegration process is to capture PR lessons learned that can be used to enhance future PR operations. JPRA's ability to assist in ~~D&R~~ reintegration of isolated personnel is also unique. With a goal of ensuring that recovered isolated personnel are mentally prepared and capable of returning to duty, JPRA maintains trained SERE psychologists on its staff ~~distinguishing it as the only DOD organization with this unique capability.~~

e. **Training and Education**

(1) **General.** Joint PR education and training efforts focus on three groups — commanders and their staffs, recovery forces, and individuals at risk of becoming isolated. Education and training programs for commanders and staffs are designed based on the following learning levels: Fundamentals, PR specialties, and PR program management. Specialized CoC training is available to select Service-designated personnel meeting established mission criteria.

(2) **Joint Education.** JPRA offers formal PR academic training courses with curricula ranging from a fundamental knowledge level to an application level. Courses are available in

1 residence at designated JPRA training facility locations or, on a limited basis, through Mobile
2 Training Teams.

3
4 (a) **Fundamentals.** JPRA offers courses that provide an overview of the DOD
5 PR system and JTF PR concepts, authorities, responsibilities, and functions. In addition,
6 seminars are tailored to focus on the PR responsibilities of joint force and component
7 commanders and their senior staff.

8
9 (b) **Specialties.** Training modules are designed to jump start a joint planning
10 group's efforts to conduct crisis action planning and meet JOPES requirements for PR.

11
12 (c) **Program Management.** These courses prepare students to support theater,
13 JTF, component, Service, and major command ~~(MAJCOM/MACOM)~~-level PR planning,
14 development, review, and execution. An additional course is offered to prepare students to
15 support theater NAR planning, development, review, and execution as well as manage the
16 theater NAR program.

17
18 (3) **Service Education.** Information on available Service education and other training
19 is provided in Appendices B, "US Army Personnel Recovery," through F, "US Air Force
20 Personnel Recovery."

21
22 (4) **Informal Training in Units.** Commanders and staffs at all levels should develop
23 training programs and integrate them into unit training plans to ensure the appropriate personnel
24 are skilled on applicable joint, Service, component, and unit PR doctrine/TTP and SOPs. This
25 can be accomplished through regular classes, required self-study, distance learning, and
26 correspondence courses.

27 28 (5) **Training Exercises**

29
30 (a) Joint ~~training~~-exercise planners should incorporate robust PR scenarios to
31 exercise commanders and staffs, recovery forces, isolated personnel, and key PR coordination
32 and support personnel at various levels. Combatant command PR ~~J~~-OPRs, JPRA representatives,
33 "standing" component rescue coordination centers (RCCs) and JPRCs (if established) can assist
34 exercise planners in designing the specific scenario.

35
36 (b) The JFC's PR OPR should organize and conduct PR mission training
37 exercises for the joint force, to include multinational forces and other agencies, before and after
38 deployment when practical or until stand up of a JPRC.

39
40 (c) PR-dedicated and -designated forces and supporting forces should be
41 exercised on a regular basis to promote joint interoperability and to allow for a smooth transition
42 to combat operations.

1 **(6) Predeployment Training.** It is essential that commanders prepare their
2 forces to meet the PR requirements of their specific theater prior to deployment for military
3 operations. Combatant commanders set theater entrance requirements for CoC training, theater
4 HRI preparation, small arms training, chemical warfare, etc. Commanders should develop a
5 predeployment program that identifies PR areas, (i.e., CoC training, PRCC formal training, etc.)
6 to ensure training is accomplished prior to any possible deployments. PR training in theater is
7 usually limited to HRI personnel.

8
9 **(7) On-the-Job Training (OJT)** should be provided regularly for all currently
10 assigned or potential JPRC/PRCC/UARCC personnel. OJT should not be used as a substitute
11 for essential predeployment training. Instead, OJT should be used to refine and improve the skill
12 sets that JPRC/PRCC/UARCC trained personnel bring with them.

13 14 **5. Recovery Forces**

15
16 a. **Intelligence Preparation.** Current intelligence briefings, situation displays, and
17 intelligence documents should be available to recovery forces early in the mission planning
18 process. Planned PR mission go/no-go criteria should be developed based upon an assessment
19 of adversary military capabilities in order to characterize the environment as hostile, uncertain,
20 or permissive and to formulate measures that mitigate the threat. PR procedures published in the
21 ATO SPINS must incorporate intelligence data to establish effective communications/signaling
22 procedures and recommendations that avoid adversary exploitation.

23
24 **(1) Report.** Recovery forces must receive accurate intelligence collection or other
25 reporting activity information as soon as possible.

26
27 (a) Intelligence units with SIGINT collection capabilities can preemptively
28 monitor friendly distress frequencies and beacons, report on possible PR incidents, and monitor
29 adversary reactions.

30
31 (b) Intelligence staffs of operational units may obtain initial or follow-up
32 information regarding isolated personnel through tactical reporting or debriefs of unit personnel.

33
34 **(2) Locate.** The ability to ascertain the location of isolated personnel and assess the
35 adversary threat in the mission area will have the greatest impact on the recovery force. Use of
36 intelligence resources to recognize friendly signals and detect adversary deception efforts is a
37 critical part of the authentication process. Intelligence collection tasking should commence
38 immediately upon confirmation of a PR incident to refine and characterize the location of the
39 isolated personnel. Timeliness and effectiveness of collected information varies widely
40 depending on platform and intelligence discipline applied; therefore, collection managers must
41 have plans in place that can be tailored for each PR incident.

42
43 (a) **IMINT and MASINT collection platforms**, properly cued using other
44 information, can help pinpoint the location of isolated personnel and obtain details about
45 surrounding terrain and adversary activity. Broad area searches conducted without cueing
46 information from other sources can be time consuming, and are reliant on significant visual

1 signals or signatures for there to be any reasonable probability of detection. Tactical or theater-
2 controlled airborne imagery platforms are likely to be more flexible and responsive than space-
3 based national systems for ad hoc collection in support of locating isolated personnel, but
4 competition with other collection priorities may affect availability. Collection managers should
5 select the platform most readily available for dedicated tasking that performs nearest to real time.

6
7 (b) **SIGINT** provides the fastest and most effective intelligence means to locate
8 isolated personnel, provided there are signal emitters available to exploit. SIGINT collectors can
9 supplement the DF capabilities of other reconnaissance, search, or recovery forces; however,
10 caution should be exercised with location information due to the inaccuracies inherent in DF
11 systems. Continuous monitoring of adversary communications and emitters in the area may
12 provide indications of hostile search activity or deception attempts.

13
14 *For further information on national PR support capabilities, refer to National Security Agency*
15 *and National Reconnaissance Office Information Memorandum, Personnel Recovery/Combat*
16 *Search and Rescue Concept of Operations for National SIGINT Support, (Secret).*

17
18 (3) **Support.** Commanders must be kept abreast of the intelligence situation
19 surrounding all ongoing PR events. Intelligence must continue to evaluate the adversary
20 situation and assess the potential threat to isolated personnel and support forces. Adversary
21 forces must be constantly monitored to detect and disrupt hostile search efforts. Intelligence
22 personnel involved in targeting must ensure that ongoing combat missions are deconflicted from
23 isolated personnel locations to avoid fratricide. Mission planners will require current
24 intelligence on adversary detection capabilities to avoid revealing an isolated person's position
25 during support or resupply missions.

26
27 (4) **Recover.** Recovery forces require detailed mission planning information on
28 adversary disposition, threat environment, en route and terminal area terrain, and adversary
29 detection, deception, and disruption capabilities. JIC or JISE collection managers should stage
30 collection assets before mission execution to monitor adversary reactions to PR forces and to
31 provide rapid warning of emerging threats once a mission is underway.

32
33 (5) **D&RReintegrate.** Intelligence personnel will perform debriefs of recovery force
34 crew members and recovered personnel. Tactical intelligence will be reported via established
35 channels in accordance with command guidance. Under no circumstances will intelligence
36 debriefers seek information pertaining to sensitive or covert PR activities unless properly cleared
37 for those activities and specifically designated to do so.

38
39 b. **Authentication.** Recovery forces need to be familiar with the use of authentication
40 products and procedures for authenticating isolated personnel.

41
42 (1) **Using ISOPREP for Authentication.** Effective authentication procedures require
43 creativity and commonality between joint force components. Guidelines for using ISOPREP
44 data and other authentication methods must be clear and properly sent to subordinate unit
45 personnel. The following techniques have been used effectively:

1 (a) ISOPREP information must be durable, providing usable authentication during
2 multiple or future recovery attempts. The PR mission coordinator best accomplishes this by
3 initially providing recovery forces with ~~the first~~ two of the four authentication statements,
4 leaving ~~the last~~ two in reserve for future missions. Isolated personnel must not provide, nor be
5 asked to provide any full ISOPREP item during a given recovery. Recovery forces in contact
6 with an isolated person, but unsure of his or her identity, should ask a question derived from a
7 portion of the four-digit number, or a portion of one of the two authentication statements. The
8 best methods are adding, subtracting, multiplying, or dividing two of the digits, or asking a
9 question using a single element from one of the statements. Examples: If the evader's
10 ISOPREP number is 8147, then a question is "Subtract your third digit from your first digit," and
11 the evader should respond with "4." If the evader's first ISOPREP statement reads "My first
12 dog was a three-legged, yellow, golden retriever named Lucky," then a question is "What color
13 was your first dog?" and the response should be "yellow."

14
15 (b) During initial contact, PR forces may need to validate their own authenticity to
16 isolated personnel prior to obtaining further information. PR forces can do this by using the
17 personal authentication statement. This method allows the recovery force to identify itself and
18 ask an authentication question to the isolated personnel. Another method is to use the isolated
19 personnel's authentication number. For example, "Jack 10, this is Jolly 50. The sum of your
20 first and third numbers is 9." Isolated personnel uncertain of the authenticity of PR forces may
21 reverse authenticate if time and conditions permit, but must be aware that the recovery force may
22 not have all ISOPREP data immediately available.

23
24 (c) ISOPREP data can be used effectively to validate instructions to the isolated
25 person. If adversary forces are attempting to deceive the isolated person with false radio calls,
26 the PR force can instruct the individual to follow only instructions accompanied by valid
27 combinations of the authentication number.

28
29 (2) **Theater Code Words.** The JPRC should develop standardized theater codes and
30 symbols for PR purposes. These usually are in the form of a PR word, letter, number, or color of
31 the day, week, or month, and are published in the ATO SPINS. For units not in the ATO, the
32 JPRC must send this information by other means. The use of these daily or frequently changed
33 codes can provide immediate authentication of isolated personnel. When using a word of the
34 day, using just one of the letters can extend durability of the code. For example if the word of
35 the day is BOXER, a quick authentication can be made by the recovery force asking the evader,
36 "The third letter of the word of the day is X-RAY, what is the second letter?" The evader should
37 respond, "OSCAR." This authenticates the recovery force to the evader while having the evader
38 authenticate back.

39
40 (3) **Local-Authentication Codes.** This authentication method is often used by ground
41 forces where ATOs/SPINS are not available. JFCs should recognize the potential for confusion
42 when local authentication codes are implemented, and should pursue a policy that standardizes
43 the use of ISOPREPS and codes published in the ATO and SPINS. If local authentication codes
44 are absolutely necessary, then they must be passed by the originating unit to the component
45 PRCC and JPRC. ~~They should be passed by the originating unit to the component PRCC and~~

~~JPRC as appropriate.~~—Local authentication codes for long-term evaders should be kept on file with the parent unit and component PRCC.

(4) **Visual Signals.** In some circumstances (i.e., radio silence, ~~no radio~~NORDO), visual (ground-to-air) signals may be the best (or only) way to communicate with PR forces. Information on ground-to-air signals should also be available in the ATO SPINS. Isolated personnel can use ground-to-air signals to notify search forces of their location when other means of communications are not practical or available. When isolated personnel are observing a friendly force, they should assume a predetermined, non-threatening body posture (e.g., standing or laying spread-eagled) preferably near a visual signal. As the friendly force gets closer, the isolated individual(s) destroys the signal and transitions to another position (e.g., kneel on the right knee). A large group of WWII POWs being strafed by an allied plane, improvised a large “POW” with their bodies and stopped the shooting. Imagination is the only limit. Formalizing it in an EPA improves the chances of it working.

For detailed information on signaling, see Annex C, “Signaling Techniques and Procedures,” to Appendix J, “Evasion.”

6. Isolated Personnel

a. **General.** ~~Isolated personnel have often been referred to as the “weakest link” in the PR chain. To strengthen this link, it is absolutely essential that~~ HRI personnel should:

(1) Obtain required formal SERE training prior to deployment (see SERE training discussed later);

(2) Acquire a comprehensive knowledge of their survival radio and a working knowledge of survival equipment and techniques, and evasion techniques and aids (e.g., EVCs, blood chits, pointee-talkies);

(3) Become familiar with the pertinent PR CONOPS, SOPs and/or ATO SPINS to include a thorough understanding of PR authentication and reporting requirements;

(4) Know what information the recovery forces likely will need, and be mentally and physically prepared to survive and evade (perhaps over an extended period) until recovered or upon reaching friendly forces; and

(5) Understand their moral and legal responsibilities as well as their legal status. Legal status will be coordinated by the combatant commander’s staff and will be critical to the isolated person’s ROE.



Lt. Collins being carried out after having evaded in the Burma jungle for 45 days.

(6) Theater HRI redeployment preparation programs are a key element in accomplishing items (2) – (4).

b. **Training.** Thorough preparation should increase the probability of mission success and decrease the amount of time that recovery forces must operate in a hostile or uncertain operational environment. The **well trained and educated survivor or evader** will be capable of adapting to the various types of military operations. The three levels of SERE training described below will provide HRI personnel skills to survive, and react appropriately and legally, while an evader, resistor, or escapee. Successful evasion and survival, for any extended period of time, is not possible if evaders do not possess at least some basic survival skills. The definition of the term “isolated personnel” specifically mentions the need to survive and evade. Degradation in the evader’s ability to survive likely will affect whether evasion is continued.

For further detailed information on specific survival TTP, refer to Appendix J, “Evasion,” Field Manual (FM) 21-76-1, Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-02H, Naval Warfighting Publication (NWP) 3-50.3, Air Force TTP (AFTTP) (I) 3-2.26, Survival, Evasion, and Recovery: Multi-Service Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery, and appropriate Service publications such as FM 21-76, Survival, and ~~AFR 64-4 Vol I, Search and Rescue Survival Training~~ Air Force Manual 36-2216, Vol I & 2, SERE Mobile Operations.

(1) **Individual SERE Education and Training.** The Services and USSOCOM, in coordination with the combatant commands, develop standards, using the JPRA-developed template, to identify personnel requiring Levels B and C CoC training (e.g., moderate and high-risk-of-capture personnel). DOD civilians and contract personnel shall receive applicable levels of SERE training commensurate with theater admission and combatant command requirements

prior to deployment to overseas locations. JPRA, in coordination with the Services, develops USJFCOM EAI to identify joint requisites for Level B and C SERE/CoC training.

For further information regarding civilian and contractor employee SERE training, refer to DODI 1300.XX, Isolated Personnel Training for Department of Defense Civilian and Contractor Employees.

(a) **Level A** training is CoC familiarization. All United States military personnel receive this training upon entry into the Armed Forces.

For further information regarding CoC training, refer to DODD 1300.7, Training and Education to Support the Code of Conduct (CoC), and DODI 1300.21, Code of Conduct (CoC) Training and Education.

(b) **Level B** training is for ~~Service members~~ DOD military, civilians, and contractors whose ~~military~~ jobs, specialties, or assignments entail at least a moderate-risk-of-capture and exploitation. Moderate-risk-of-isolation personnel receive this level of training through video training products. As a minimum, the following categories of personnel shall receive Level B training at least once in their careers: members of ground combat units, security forces for high threat targets, and anyone in the immediate vicinity of the forward edge of the ~~battlespace~~ battle area or the forward line of own troops. Training shall be conducted for such Service members as soon as they assume a duty that makes them eligible.

For further information on Level B training in support of the CoC, refer to USJFCOM Executive Agent Instructions, Requirements for Peacetime Level B Training in Support of the CoC, and, Requirements for Wartime Level B Training in Support of the CoC.

(c) **Level C** training is an application learning level conducted at formal schools. Per DODI 1300.21, *Code of Conduct (CoC) Training and Education*, personnel whose roles entail a relatively HRI or make them vulnerable to greater-than-average exploitation by a captor (e.g., aircrews and special mission forces such as Navy special warfare combat swimmers, Army special forces and ~~R~~ Rangers, Marine Corps force reconnaissance units, Air Force pararescue teams, psychological operations personnel, and military attaches) must attend a Level C SERE School (or complete Level C SERE course/training). Training shall be conducted for such Service members as soon as they assume duties or responsibilities that make them eligible.

For further information on Level C training in support of the CoC, refer to USJFCOM EAI, Requirements for Peacetime Level C Training in Support of the Code of Conduct, and Requirements for Wartime Level C Training in Support of the Code of Conduct.

(2) **Informal Training in Units.** SERE refresher training (classroom and field) at the unit level is essential if HRI personnel are to be adequately prepared to participate in combat operations at a moment's notice.

(3) **Training Exercises**

(a) All HRI personnel should receive periodic SERE refresher training and participate in evasion field exercises whenever possible. This training should include communications techniques and procedures, including radio discipline, use of aircrew call signs, team or individual call signs or identifiers, signaling devices, and other actions that enhance successful recovery.

(b) DOD policy and Service regulatory guidance prohibit operation of resistance training laboratories and practical resistance and escape hands-on training or exercises without approval of JPRA.

c. Document Preparation and Review. HRI personnel must complete and periodically review ISOPREP data. They also must develop an EPA or review and update an existing EPA for each mission and/or instance the operational area changes.

(1) Evasion Plan of Action. All individuals operating in or over hostile or uncertain territory should develop an EPA and review it prior to each mission. The EPA is one of the critical documents for successful recovery planning. The EPA is the vehicle by which HRI personnel, prior to their isolation in hostile territory, relay their evasion intentions to the recovery forces. EPAs should be completed by HRI personnel with the aid of trained SERE and intelligence personnel and should be based on a thorough knowledge of the ATO SPINS and operational environment where isolation may occur. Sources of information that should be used to develop EPAs include, but are not limited to; the theater and component concepts to locate, support, and recover isolated personnel; ATO SPINS; and the intelligence, ~~reconnaissance, and~~ surveillance, ~~and reconnaissance~~ resources described ~~above in subparagraph 3d of Chapter V,~~ ~~“Support Requirements.”~~ earlier in this manual. HRI personnel are responsible for ensuring that the information they put in their EPA complies with JFC’s policies and contact procedures outlined in the ATO SPINS, and, if isolated, they follow their EPA as closely as possible. Because extended unassisted recovery is always a possibility, EPAs should always address such contingencies. Accurate EPA data, and the evader’s subsequent adherence to the EPA once isolated, are the principal factors in successful contact and recovery operations. When possible, EPAs should be stored electronically ~~(using PRMS)~~ using a secure system to facilitate rapid transmission during contingencies. See Annex D, “Evasion Plan of Action Format,” to Appendix J, “Evasion,” for details on the content of an EPA.

(2) Isolated Personnel Report. DD Form 1833, ISOPREP, is the most important source of authentication data in use by US (and some allied) forces. It is the primary tool used by recovery forces to positively authenticate an isolated person. Proper completion, use, and archiving is critical to successful recovery. As a permanent record, it is a vital part of long term POW/missing in action (MIA) accountability and individuals must have two completed ISOPREPs on file. Each person subject to action in and over hostile territory will provide individual authentication data known only to the individual on an ISOPREP. When possible, ISOPREPs should be stored electronically ~~(using PRMS)~~ using a secure system to facilitate rapid transmission during contingencies. Detailed procedures for completing, maintaining, and controlling ISOPREPs can be found in Annex ~~EF~~ “Instructions for Isolated Personnel Report,” to Appendix J, “Evasion.”

(3) **ATO SPINS or Fragmentary Order (FRAGORD) to Appendix 5.** The ATO SPINS (or FRAGORD to Appendix 5) usually contain, among other items, very detailed guidance to HRI personnel. They may include information on survival radio programming data and procedures, ISOPREP review and handling, EPA development and documentation, daily authentication codes, communications schedules, recovery areas, contact plans and procedures, uniforms and equipment, isolated personnel immediate actions, communications procedures, authentication, evasion and survival, no-radio procedures, recovery procedures, and capture procedures. See Appendix K, “Sample Air Tasking Order Special Instructions.”

d. Pre-Mission Signaling Considerations

(1) Before mission execution, HRI personnel should be trained and equipped to signal recovery forces. The most important action isolated personnel can take to assist in their recovery is to provide evidence periodically to friendly forces that they are alive and still evading capture. This action can be best accomplished by effective signaling. Isolated personnel can indicate their location to overhead assets via ground-to-air signals in accordance with the individual’s EPA and ATO SPINS.

(2) They should know how to use issued communications ~~(e.g., PRC-112A/B radios)~~ (e.g. PRC-112B radios) and signaling equipment. This training should include “no-radio” procedures for a specific contingency. HRI personnel should also be equipped with primary and alternate signaling devices that facilitate detection in both day and low-light conditions. Further, environmental factors and the threat should be a major consideration when determining which particular signaling devices to utilize within the operational ~~area-of-operations~~.

For a detailed discussion of signaling refer to Annex C, “Signaling,” to Appendix J, “Evasion,” and recovery activation signal (RAS) and load signals in Appendix L, “Classified Planning Supplement,” (published separately).

e. **Recovery kits** provide isolated personnel with essential equipment, tools, and other items necessary for successful evasion. They can also be tailored to a specific operational environment. These kits should supplement/augment standard survival vest/kits that are designed to support a much wider range of operating conditions. Most importantly, recovery kits should contain items that support the JFC’s PR plan by including equipment that aids in evasion and recovery as well as enhancing the evader’s ability to execute long-term survival. Recovery kit composition considerations are as follows:

- (1) Tailored to specific units, missions, and PR plan, when possible.
- (2) Fits the operational area and specific environmental conditions.
- (3) Based on individual employment and space available.
- (4) Supplements issued survival and signaling equipment.
- (5) Emphasizes survival, signaling, and surface navigation.

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CHAPTER V PLANNING

"In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable."

Dwight D. Eisenhower

1. General

The combatant commander develops and promulgates strategic intent and operational focus through campaign plans and more detailed concepts and responsibilities through ~~operation plans~~ **OPLANS** or OPORDs. Regardless of the type of plan, PR planners must be aware of their commander's overall concept of operations, which includes the commander's intent, to complete a PR mission analysis and the PR supporting plan (see paragraph 4 below). The PR plan promulgates the PR CONOPS, supports the basic plan and directs guidance and responsibilities to subordinate organizations. In turn, component and subordinate commanders ~~planners~~ provide their PR ~~CONOPS-Annexes~~ to their subordinate commands for tactical planning. PR planning is a vertical and horizontal collaborative process that incorporates the principles of war to ensure the comprehensive preparation of commanders and staffs, recovery forces, and isolated personnel; and to efficiently employ capabilities from all available PR categories to accomplish the five PR execution tasks. The principles of war provide focus to ~~planners-commanders and their staffs~~ on the critical planning aspects of PR.

~~(1) **Objective.** The objective of PR is to return isolated personnel to friendly control without further loss of friendly assets, thus denying our adversary a source of intelligence and/or political exploitation and enhancing the morale of our own forces.~~

~~(2) **Offensive.** PR operations are offensive, time sensitive, and may lack the element of surprise. PR planning ensures that processes, products, and services are provided to commanders and staffs, recovery forces, and isolated personnel to achieve SA to successfully execute unique PR offensive missions.~~

~~(3) **Mass.** The PR plan supports the coherent synchronization and integration of available PR categories—unassisted, opportune, component, joint, multinational, and multiagency—and theater PR capabilities. These resources, along with SA, provides commanders with the situational superiority required for a given period of time to execute a successful recovery.~~

~~(4) **Economy of Force.** Collaborative planning is necessary to efficiently use and protect scarce PR resources and skills. The use of capabilities within all available PR categories also contributes to achieving economy of force.~~

~~(5) **Maneuver.** The flexibility of a CSARTF allows recovery forces to keep adversaries at a disadvantage (regarding situational superiority) especially when the element of surprise has been compromised. Planning must ensure CSARTFs have the resources and support necessary to suppress air and ground threats, employ deception techniques, and are organized to promote innovative thinking and quick responses.~~

~~(6) **Unity of Command.** PR planning must establish command and other authorities for various participants (i.e., JFC, component commanders, PR coordinator, JPRC director, PRCC director, UARCC director, AMC, OSC, etc.) with regard to their authority to execute, launch, and coordinate PR missions. Plans must especially address the challenges in achieving unity of effort when integrating multiagency and multinational capabilities.~~

~~(7) **Security.** Planning must include provisions for an integrated PR communication architecture to maintain OPSEC to protect isolated personnel and recovery forces from adversaries and possible capture. Plans must also address the security of certain recovery processes, products, and services to sustain the principle of maneuver and surprise.~~

~~(8) **Surprise.** The element of surprise may be compromised by various means such as the adversary being alerted by a highly visible isolation event or recovery force tactic. Plans can address support processes and products that enable commanders and staffs, recovery forces, and isolated personnel to develop surprise factors (e.g., intelligence, decision making, tactical military deception (paragraph 8a(5) of Chapter VI, “Joint Operational Procedures and Techniques”), and OPSEC) to achieve tactical surprise.~~

~~(9) **Simplicity.** Collaborative planning contributes to clear and concise plans that are executable and well understood at all levels of command. PR plans can maintain simplicity by promoting standardization, broad and secure dissemination of information, timely decision processes, and responsive C2.~~

2. Planning Tasks

a. The PR planner should coordinate with and assist other staff planners in developing the basic plan to:

(1) Ensure the PR CONOPS includes specific language addressing the component responsibility to accomplish the five PR execution tasks within their area of operation and to be prepared to support the JPRC when required.

(2) Ensure the PR CONOPS includes the individual component's responsibility to report their PR shortfalls immediately to the ~~appropriate combatant command staff element, usually the~~ PR/OPR JFC.

(3) Ensure ~~the responsibility for theater/operational area PR is that PR responsibilities are consistent with the CONOPS and~~ tasked to the appropriate subordinate command ~~headquarters (and is consistent with the PR mission analysis and CONOPS (below))~~.

b. The PR planners ~~develops~~ the PR supporting plans ~~and based on the approved~~ CONOPS and should:

(1) Complete a PR mission analysis. Develop PR requirements and planning tasks through a coordinated mission analysis based on the situation, the commanders overall concept of operations, other parts of the basic plan as it develops, master attack plans, time/phase projection of losses, and coordination with staff and component planners (component recovery plans and the JFSOCC's supporting plan). The scope and depth of the analysis may be affected by the time allowed, ~~i.e., deliberate vs. crisis action planning~~, however, the quality of the analysis is directly proportional to the quality of the PR plan that follows. The planning process is not necessarily linear; therefore the development of the operational situation, commander's concept of operations, mission analysis, supporting PR plan, and PR CONOPS may progress concurrently. For this reason, ~~combatant commands-JFCs~~ must organize their PR/OPR staff to have the capability to surge in time of crisis.

(2) Based on the mission analysis, and ongoing operation planning, create the PR supporting plan, Appendix 5 to Annex C, to the base plan as described in ~~the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System, JOPES~~, Volume II (see paragraph 4 below). The plan contains the PR situation and CONOPS that should complement the basic plan. Also, based on the mission analysis, in coordination with the joint force and component staffs, the plan will task commanders and staffs, isolated personnel, and recovery forces with actions that, when completed, will develop the ~~theater/operational area~~ PR capability envisioned by the JFC.

(3) Coordinate, ~~as required, with joint planners~~ to ensure ROE address unique PR requirements (e.g., legal status of isolated personnel, use of forces during recovery operations, access to potential recovery sites, host nation restrictions). See Appendix J, "Evasion."

(4) Develop a PR CONOPS to provide detailed guidance to the joint force on the preparation for and conduct of PR operations (see paragraph 6 below).

3. Mission Analysis

a. ~~A-e~~Commanders must identify the tasks that ~~commanders and their~~ staffs, recovery forces, and isolated personnel must perform, under various conditions, to accomplish the five PR execution tasks. ~~The quality of the mission analysis will directly affect the depth of the PR planner's SA and the quality of the PR plans that follow.~~ Mission analyses completed ~~in peacetime during~~ deliberate planning will be of benefit during ~~time constrained~~ crisis action planning. A PR mission analysis enables commanders to identify and maintain PR capabilities within the six PR categories and identify PR shortfalls/requirements. The PR mission analysis first determines the impact of the

environment on PR and ~~the then determines the~~ PR execution subtasks ~~required to accomplish the five PR execution tasks.~~

b. Determining the impact of the operational environment on PR establishes the conditions in which the five PR execution tasks will be accomplished. **The PR perspective of the operational environment is composed of the threat, physical elements, and factors that impact friendly forces.** The planner should use the situation from the basic plan and other staff and component resources (e.g., isolated personnel guidance (intelligence), lessons learned, weather) available to assist in determining the negative and positive impacts of the operational environment on PR.

(1) The **threat** includes the risk ~~to of~~ personnel being isolated and exploited, the ability of isolated personnel to survive or evade, the ability of adversary forces to respond to isolating events, and the ability of the recovery force to successfully recover isolated personnel.

(a) The threat of being isolated is based on an individual's proximity to uncertain and hostile areas, the level of individual training and mission preparation, and the joint force capability to obtain and disseminate timely reports of isolation events. The planner will analyze mission profiles and determine the force activities that could result in personnel being isolated and the areas where they occur.

(b) The threat of being exploited is based on the potential isolated person's duty position, access to classified information, level and type of individual resistance training, probable health and mental state (during isolation), and the length of time in isolation. It is also based on the captor's sophistication and skill in exploitation techniques.

(c) The threat to isolated personnel while surviving and evading is based on the ability of adversary forces to monitor friendly, to include isolated personnel, communications and to respond to isolation events. ~~The PR planner should use RFIs to determine specific enemy capabilities, as well as lessons learned and the enemy situation developed in the planning process.~~

(d) The threat to recovery forces includes adversary capabilities to execute traps, i.e., using isolated personnel as bait, and ambushes; ~~and~~ to use mines, ~~and~~ surface-to-air missiles, or other weapons against friendly forces; to intercept, jam, monitor, or intrude on friendly communications.

(2) The **physical elements** include the affects of weather, terrain, vegetation, and populace on isolated personnel and recovery forces. The affects of the physical environment can be good or bad and the PR planner must try to leverage the good and mitigate the bad. As an example, the planner should determine the physical environment's affect on:

(a) The capability of isolated personnel to:

1. Communicate (electronic or visual) their location and status.

2. Survive ~~(are there extreme or moderate temperatures, friendly, poisonous or dangerous animals, drinkable or undrinkable water, etc?)~~—will directly affect required response times.

3. Contact local population for assistance ~~(are they hostile or friendly?)~~.

4. Conceal and move with out detection ~~from~~ by adversary ground and air forces and the local population.

(b) The recovery force's capability to:

1. Search ~~(using visual or sensor)~~—for downed aircraft or isolated personnel—~~vegetation and terrain can restrict this capability for the recovery force as well as national collection assets.~~

2. Access isolated personnel at high altitudes or in adverse terrain, vegetation, and weather.

(3) **Friendly force factors** impact the JFC's capability to prepare for, plan, coordinate, and accomplish the five PR execution tasks. Some of these factors could include:

(a) An adequate number of trained and/or dedicated PR personnel to man JPRCs, PRCCs, and recovery forces; and plan for PR.

(b) Adequate policies and procedures for completing EPAs and ISOPREPS.

(c) Adequate guidance for developing PR ROE.

(d) Adequate policies and procedures to communicate PR information and requirements to all personnel in the operational area ~~(e.g., the use of SPINS)~~.

(e) An adequate number of SERE-qualified personnel to ensure programs are in place to prepare HRI and other personnel for a possible isolation event.

(f) The JFC's ability to properly exercise PR skills and tasks.

(g) The JFC's procedures for conducting PR (e.g., standardized checklists and processes for evasion aides, ISOPREPS, recovery mission planning, etc.).

(h) Properly equipped personnel and search and recovery vehicles to report and locate isolated personnel (e.g., compatible or interoperable ~~(Quickdraw)~~ radios, emergency locator transmitters, cell or international maritime satellite phone, GPS devices, etc.).

(i) ~~Adequate~~ Accurate and sufficient map coverage ~~and accuracy for the operational area.~~

(j) Adequate preparation to support isolated personnel with

1. Resupply kits and exercised resupply delivery capability.

2. Suppression of adversary threats.

3. Family casualty assistance to include information sharing and counseling.

4. Media management.

5. Personnel accountability management.

(k) Adequate policy and procedures for coordinating the ~~return, to include debriefing and reintegration, reintegration~~ of isolated personnel.

(l) Adequate procedures to collect lessons learned and forward them through the proper channels.

(m) ~~Status of forces~~ Status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs), where appropriate.

(n) ROE.

c. Determining the PR subtasks identifies those actions that must be taken to accomplish the five PR execution tasks. The identification of the subtasks will enable the planner to subsequently identify PR capabilities and shortfalls. **These PR subtasks are made up of program tasks (see Chapter II, “Functions and Responsibilities”), doctrinal tasks, and mission analysis tasks.** Program tasks are derived from DOD directed PR responsibilities. Doctrinal PR execution tasks are taken from the *Combatant Command Headquarters Master Training Guide* tasks. PR mission analysis tasks are those identified during the mission analysis and are usually related to a capability or shortfall unique to the theater or specific operation.

d. PR capabilities are determined by analyzing the capability of the joint or multinational force to perform the PR execution tasks and subtasks in the context of the PR operational environment. Where a capability does not exist, the planner must recommend a course of action the command can execute to obtain the capability or develop a requirement for the JFC to request from higher headquarters.

4. The Personnel Recovery Plan

1 a. **Format.** The operational situation, JFC's overall concept of operations and intent, mission
2 analysis and ongoing joint planning, and collaboration with other operation planners becomes the
3 foundation of information that fuels the development of the "PR operations plan," in Appendix 5,
4 "Personnel Recovery Operations," to Annex C, "Operations," of an ~~operation plan~~ OPLAN.
5 Appendix 5 describes the PR concept for a specific campaign or operation and includes seven tabs
6 as illustrated in Figure V-1. Appendix 5 provides detailed guidance (a checklist) for development
7 of the same appendix in a PR CONOPS. The PR CONOPS and tasks (these include the subtasks
8 from the mission analysis) should contain information that enables components to provide guidance
9 to their subordinate commands for further planning.

10




Figure V-1. Personnel Recovery Appendix and Tabs

1
2

Appendix 5 should include PR notification and tasking procedures (who, what, where, and when), operational areas, methods of PR employment, and coordination and tactical procedures that are not platform-specific. PR assets available through prearranged procedures should be delineated. The types of missions for which units are (or may be) tasked should also be stated. ROE as they apply to PR forces must be developed and considered in the PR planning. Plans should include the responsibilities of commanders and staffs, recovery forces, and isolated personnel, the procedures for ISOPREP preparation, ~~and~~ authentications, and the designation of authorities to plan and establish ~~debriefing and~~ reintegration procedures.

For further information on preparation of the PR appendix in ~~an operation plan~~ OPLAN, refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.03A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II: (Planning Formats and Guidance).

b. Planning Considerations

(1) **Operation Plan Concept of Operations.** PR planners should ensure the basic plan incorporates the commander's concept for the conduct of PR, C2, and who (staff, components, coalition, host nation) will support it to include their responsibilities. The concept should recognize the importance of and expectations from all PR categories. The concept should also address the commander's vision for integrating known political or legal issues and agreements into the operation. These political or legal issues could arise from host or other nation agreements that could restrict access to recovery forces or the return of recovered isolated personnel. In such cases, the direct assistance of indigenous forces may be necessary or the JFC may have to work with a multi-agency process to effect diplomatic assistance in the return of isolated personnel.

(2) **PR Categories.** With the authority of the basic plan's concept, PR planners can expand on the responsibilities for, and use of, all theater PR capabilities.

(a) **Unassisted.** Evasion is the process whereby ~~individuals who are~~ isolated ~~in hostile or unfriendly territory personnel~~ avoid capture with the goal of successfully returning to areas under friendly control. In the unassisted category, evaders independently exercise their capabilities to make their way back to friendly control or travel toward a point where contact with friendly force can be accomplished. The plan should promulgate the component and Service responsibility to identify HRI personnel and prepare them to survive, evade, or escape to effect their own recovery if it becomes necessary. This may be necessary when friendly forces are not aware that an isolation event has occurred, it is not possible to execute a recovery or support mission, or it is a back-up option to a failed recovery mission. In addition, to the extent possible and depending on the operational requirement, the JFC should place the same responsibility on DOD contractors, other agencies, and coalition partners.

For further information on evasion, refer to Appendix J, "Evasion."

(b) **Opportune.** ~~Because opportune PR is a survivor-initiated, indigenous-assisted recovery, a dedicated planning effort by PR planners will not occur. The planning will need to occur on the part of the potential isolated person as part of their EVC, to include considering a variety of evasion aids. They need to be fully aware of the risks when attempting opportune recovery, by gaining as much intelligence on the attitude of the local population and the activities of the adversary forces in the area. SA is paramount in a successful opportune recovery.~~

~~1. Assets from air, ground, or naval forces that, during the normal course of their activities, discover isolated personnel, may execute a recovery mission if they are capable. In such cases, recovery can originate at the lowest organizational level that is aware of the situation and can quickly react. In all cases, however, the JPRC, which continually monitors all ongoing and planned recovery operations, should be informed of the recovery effort.~~

~~2. PR planners should use all planning and mission tasking venues to make forces aware of their responsibilities to be vigilant of possible isolation incidents and to notify the PRCC/JPRC, should they happen to be in a position to react or assist.~~

~~3. Opportune recovery could pose additional risks associated with an ad hoc mission. Commanders at all levels should use caution and weigh the opportune situation carefully as the force involved is probably not PR-qualified, may need to divert from its intended mission, or adversaries may have been alerted to the isolated personnel as well. Notifying the PRCC or JPRC immediately can assist commanders in achieving SA to make an informed decision. In addition, the unit performing the recovery may not be able to return isolated personnel to designated locations and will need recovery force assistance.~~

~~4. Recoveries in the opportune category would most likely be the result of chance and the forces involved likely would not be PR-qualified and therefore, would be most effective in a permissive operational environment.~~

~~5. Planning also should address isolated personnel and other friendly force procedures if those performing acts of mercy are either offering information on the location or the status of isolated personnel or assisting isolated personnel in returning to friendly forces. US forces should be aware of the blood chit and its use in compensating those opportunists seeking monetary rewards.~~

(c) **Component.** Components are responsible for PR planning that encompasses the accomplishment of the five PR execution tasks in support of their own forces or forces within their operational area. Component PRCCs should coordinate PR plans to achieve maximum SA and situational superiority. Shortfalls in capabilities are reported to the JFC, JPRC, for resolution.

(d) **Joint.** JFCs should exploit all available component PR-dedicated or -capable resources to develop the optimum PR capability ~~within the operational area. Integrated joint capabilities is a PR multiplier and offers the joint commander robust SA and situational superiority~~

1 ~~with a combined arms capability to achieve mass and economy of force.~~ Unity of effort and the
2 integration of capabilities are the JFC's major challenges in joint PR operations; and require
3 planning, training, and exercise rehearsal to develop mission-capable skills.

4
5 (e) **Multinational.** JFCs must address their intent to work with and support allies
6 and coalition partners for PR. A PR relationship with multinational forces may be the deliberate
7 intent of the JFC or it may be directed from higher authority. In most cases, the JFC will at a
8 minimum have to consider the PR coordination between US forces and the host nation military. As
9 discussed in the previous categories, multinational PR capabilities may offer the JFC leverage (force
10 multiplier) that entails gaining, maintaining, and exploiting advantages in combat power across all
11 dimensions among the forces available. The JFC's PR CONOPS must address the multinational
12 PR architecture to promote detailed planning, coordination, and the implementation of legal
13 agreements to effect a multinational PR effort and recognize constraints. Achieving balance and
14 unity of effort among multinational forces is a major challenge that can be mitigated by planning,
15 training, and ~~exercising rehearsal~~.

16
17 (f) **Multi-agency.** The JFC may be directed to provide PR support to other
18 agencies in the operational area or incorporate their PR capabilities into military PR operations.
19 Directed or not, JFCs should investigate the activities of other agencies and determine the possibility
20 of those personnel becoming isolated in hostile or uncertain areas within the operational area. Multi-
21 agency personnel operating over, in, or near the operational area can be at risk of becoming
22 isolated. JFCs should take the initiative to request appropriate agencies plan PR with the use of
23 organic PR capabilities in support of their own personnel to mitigate the use of combat forces.
24 Should military support be required, taking the opportunity to do advance planning is a better choice
25 than confronting a crisis during operations. As in joint and multinational PR, unity of effort and
26 integration of capabilities are the JFC's major challenges in multi-agency PR operations; and require
27 planning, training, and exercise to develop mission capable skills.

28
29 1. Exploitation of other agencies' capabilities may offer the JFC a PR force
30 multiplier. PR planning should include multi-agency considerations and the coordination processes
31 and responsibilities for diplomatic support to PR. Diplomacy can emphasize agreements that can
32 affect isolated personnel, e.g., Geneva and Hague conventions, and implement negotiations that
33 directly accomplish the recovery of isolated personnel. ~~For example, Mr. Henry Kissinger~~
34 ~~accomplished this diplomacy with Vietnam. Preplanning will make commanders and staffs aware of~~
35 ~~diplomatic capacities and options plus prepare them to pull the right triggers when the time comes to~~
36 ~~execute them.~~

37
38 2. The Department of State and the Embassies-US Missions abroad are
39 ~~agencies that are~~ most likely to have resources to support ~~the commanders~~ PR operations,
40 especially when diplomatic options are required or host nation laws and agreements have to be
41 considered. The CIA and Department of Justice also may offer capabilities or need military PR
42 assistance.

TITLE???

During the negotiations leading up to the Paris Peace Accords, the chief U.S. negotiator, Dr. Henry Kissinger explicitly worked to include the release of all American prisoners as a major component of any agreement. Signed on 17 January 1973 in Paris, France, the agreement led to the release of 591 American POWs, 566 military and 25 civilians. The releases were conducted as the last U.S. forces departed South Vietnam.

SOURCE: Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam

Article 8, paragraph (a). “The return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties shall be carried out simultaneously with and completed not later that same day as troop withdrawal...”

(g) **Theater NAR Planning.** NAR capabilities are developed to recover isolated personnel in areas conventional recovery capability does not exist, is not feasible, or is not acceptable. NAR planning must be a coordinated effort of theater Personnel Recovery (PR) planners, component conventional recovery planners, and NAR planners. NAR requires pre-conflict deliberate planning, training, exercise of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and support to develop credible capabilities for employment.

1. Theater PR planners must develop a comprehensive PR Plan in accordance with Appendix 5, Annex C of JOPES Volume II. Initial PR planning will identify conventional recovery capabilities. Analysis of these capabilities will identify the gaps where conventional capabilities do not exist, are not feasible or are not acceptable. These identified gaps serve as the basis for NAR planning. In developing the theater PR plan several actions are required.

2. Analyze the operational PR environment.

a. Geopolitical situation.

b. Physical environment (terrain, weather, etc. that will affect both the evader and the recovery forces).

c. Theater of operations.

d. Target locations.

e. Campaign phases.

1 f. Number and types of combat sorties by campaign phase, synchronized
2 with target locations, including number, duration, and surge.

3
4 g. Attrition estimates. Modeling, using data from WMPS Volume 5, or
5 estimates of the number of all potential evaders operating in the deep battle area.

6
7 h. Determine estimated number of evaders.

8
9 i. Estimate threat to recovery forces (ingress/egress).

10
11 j. Battlespace geometry.

12
13 3. Analyze the PR mission.

14
15 a. Develop a Concept of Operation (in accordance with the Universal Joint
16 Task List/Joint Mission Essential Task List). Concept of the operations includes component
17 CSAR, component support to joint combat search and rescue and organization of joint combat
18 search and rescue task forces (as required).

19
20 b. Compare conventional recovery capabilities of apportioned forces to
21 estimated losses, by phase. This results in identification of conventional recovery shortfalls and
22 establishes the basis for NAR planning.

23
24 4. Develop the NAR requirement.

25
26 a. Identify SOF unilateral recovery capabilities.

27
28 b. If gaps still exist, identify and fully articulate additional NAR
29 requirements.

30
31 (1) What NAR capabilities do you require? Describe the
32 infrastructure capabilities required.

33
34 (2) Where do you need the infrastructure developed? Consider
35 placement and access in the vicinity of high threat areas and access to identified recovery areas.

36
37 (3) How many evaders need to be supported at one time?

38
39 (4) What is the maximum duration that support is required for the
40 evaders?

41
42 (5) Do you have a requirement to transport evaders to an exfiltration
43 point or cross borders?

(6) What types of communications are required? NRT activation in response to a PR incident.

(7) When must the developed capability be in place?

(8) How often/when do you want status reports on the development of the NAR capability?

5. Submit NAR requirements. Submit NAR requirements to Joint Staff J-3 for inter-agency action and staff coordination.

(3) **Assets and Availability.** Planners should identify the required PR resources and assets, delivery date, and employment location that will be required for a particular operation and ensure these requirements are supported by the time-phased ~~and~~-force ~~and~~ deployment data (TPFDD). Efforts to integrate Service and component warfighting requirements with joint PR requirements avoids duplication of effort, establishes complementary systems, and exploits unique and specialized resources. The most advantageous recovery force may consist of a complex mix of multi-Service and/or component assets and forces who are not familiar with one another's² operating procedures and techniques. Interoperability of dissimilar joint force assets is essential to safe and successful PR operations. ~~Planners-Commanders~~ must ensure the ~~TPFDD-force flow~~ includes mission capable PR forces that are commensurate with the risks of incurring an isolating event. ~~Planners-Commanders~~ must efficiently employ a broad range of PR abilities which may consist of:

(a) **PR-Dedicated Forces.** These forces are organized, trained, and equipped for PR and identified to the JFC by their component commander ~~to the JFC~~ as the primary forces to form a CSARTF in the conduct of PR operations. Ideally, planners can organize these manned, trained, and equipped component forces under ~~in~~ one unit type code within the TPFDD and deploy them as dedicated PR forces ~~reporting directly to the joint force PR coordinator~~.

(b) **PR-Designated Forces.** These are PR-capable forces not committed as primary PR assets, but identified as the assets to be tasked, if required.

(c) **PR-Capable Forces.** These are forces that are not necessarily organized, trained, or equipped for PR, but have a recognized ability to perform some elements of PR.

(4) **Response Options.** ~~PR-planners-Commanders~~ must consider the use of quick response and/or precautionary options. Quick response options reduce the time necessary to organize and launch forces by putting PR forces in alert postures, either on the ground or airborne, and include a specified maximum amount of time to launch from the time of notification. Precautionary options involve more deliberate planning and encompass the use of forward deployed, or pre-positioned PR forces in or near areas most likely to experience a PR event. Plans can require PR forces to respond in the least amount of time possible, however, the immediacy of

that response is contingent on the situation and circumstances in each event. ~~Immediate response is a product of the insight in planning and decision processes, SA, situational superiority, experience and “gut instinct.”~~ The decision to execute a recovery mission is based on asset availability and location, SA and situational superiority and is a product of insightful planning, the decision process, experience and “gut instinct.” Commanders should consider “immediate” to be a relative term and ~~should~~ accomplish the five PR execution tasks in the most deliberate manner possible using the plans and decision processes in place ~~and relying on their experience and judgment.~~

(5) Coordination with the JIC or JISE as appropriate to ensure the continuity of **planning information and intelligence support** to PR operations.

(6) Simple and clearly understood **C2 procedures** for PR operations and mission execution.

(7) The employment of and processes to properly use **NAR capabilities**.

(8) **ROE**. Establish PR ROE that incorporates the potential changing legal statuses of isolated personnel ~~as an evader vs. an escaper when interacting with and the affect of those statuses when combined with the ROE of the~~ recovery forces. Identification of rules for “what if situations” in the planning process may represent a time-critical element in a decision process that will save a life during a crisis situation.

See also Annex A, “Legal Aspects of Evasion,” to Appendix J, “Evasion.”

(9) **D&R Reintegration**. Geographic combatant commanders are responsible for the initial processing of recovered isolated personnel. ~~D&R planning will be coordinated with JPRA and should address the organization of, and provision for, debriefing and reintegration teams to conduct SERE and intelligence debriefings and decompression (performed by SERE psychologists). D&R must be planned and conducted in coordination with commanders and their staffs to include the surgeon general, staff judge advocate, PAO, chaplain, casualty assistance office, and intelligence. The objectives of D&R are to 1) collect intelligence that is of immediate value to operations, 2) collect SERE information from recovered isolated personnel to be applied to lessons learned and/or oral histories, and 3) protect and treat the mental health of recovered isolated personnel enabling commanders to return them to their DOD duties as soon as possible.~~

(a) Reintegration planning will be coordinated with JPRA and will address the following objectives:

1. Attend to the medical needs of the recovered isolated person(s).
2. Protect and treat the mental health of the isolated person(s).
3. Collect intelligence.

4. Collect SERE.

5. Provide SERE psychologist oversight to ensure proper decompression.

6. Attend to personal and family needs.

7. Enable the decompressed isolated person(s) to return to duty as soon as possible.

(b) D&R-Reintegration plans will be formatted as described in Annex C, “Evasion,” to Appendix 5, “Personnel Recovery Operations,” and must:

1. Establish a theater D&R team to manage the D&R process. The JPRC will normally publish the details of the theater D&R process in the PR CONOPS and oversee the team activities.—Establish a theater reintegration team to manage the reintegration process. The combatant commander will establish this team concurrently with the JPRC and ensure that both organizations’ processes support and collaborate with each other. The JPRC will normally publish the details of the theater reintegration process in the PR SOP. This team will normally include:

1. Team chief. Senior officer familiar with intelligence and SERE issues connected with the D&R process.

2. SERE debriefers. This should be a JPRA-qualified SERE debriefer.

3. Intelligence debriefers. This should be a qualified intelligence officer trained in debriefing recovered isolated personnel.

4. SERE psychologists. This should be a JPRA-qualified SERE psychologist.

5. Recorder and administrative specialist.

6. Other members of the geographic combatant commander or JTF staffs as the JFC considers appropriate.

a. Team chief. An individual familiar with the SERE debriefing process, the combatant command’s requirements for the administrative processing (personnel, financial, legal, accident investigations, etc.) of personnel and the theater joint coordination processes. The chief should be in the grade of O-6.

b. SERE and intelligence debrief team(s). Discussed in detail below.

1 c. **SERE psychologist.** Discussed in detail below.

2
3 d. **Medical officer.** Will advise the team chief on the physical condition of
4 the returned IP and their ability to perform the reintegration process.

5
6 e. **Legal representative.** This person can assist with the reintegration and
7 debriefing procedures especially when there are sensitive [Uniform Code of Military Justice \(UCMJ\)](#)
8 procedures to consider.

9
10 f. **Chaplin.** A [chaplin](#) should be provided as agreed to by the recovered
11 isolated personnel.

12
13 g. **Public Affairs Officer.** This person is very important to advise on the
14 proper disposition of media inquiries. This assistance is valuable to the team chief as well as
15 recovered isolated personnel and their families.

16
17 h. **Personnel representative.** This person ensures that the procedures
18 required by the theater joint personnel center or other personnel procedures are accomplished.
19 This person is also the [combatant commander's](#) key coordination link to the appropriate Service
20 casualty assistance office to ensure family support is provided.

21
22 i. **Service support representative(s).** The Service team member is an
23 individual that can provide for the personal needs of the recovered isolated personnel. This person
24 should have the ability to obtain clothing, hygiene items, Service identification cards, credit cards
25 and other personal items as required. If possible, someone familiar to the recovered isolated
26 personnel should be available to offer support and be a confidant.

27
28 j. **Service casualty assistance representative.** This is a very important
29 team member who ensures the continuation of family support that should have started during the
30 recovered isolated personnel's isolation. This team member provides for critical situational
31 awareness and coordination among the theater reintegration team chief, the PAO, the SERE
32 psychologist, the [continental United States \(CONUS\)](#) based casualty assistance team in direct
33 support of the family and the recovered [isolated person](#). This casualty assistance representative will
34 also play a key role in family visits and the transition of family support from phase II to phase III.

35
36 k. **Other team members** can be added as deemed appropriate to the
37 situation.

38
39 2. Establish component responsibilities for ~~D&R~~ reintegration. Components
40 may establish ~~D&R~~ reintegration teams that will be organized to capture time-sensitive PR
41 intelligence and perishable SERE information and, as required, basic decompression screening and
42 assessments. The PRCC normally will manage these teams.

3. Ensure procedures exist to notify promptly the Service OPRs, Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO), JPRA, the Service casualty offices, and the Chief of Chaplains offices of the initial release and of subsequent information, including medical information, on ~~returned-US-recovered isolated~~ personnel.

4. Establish procedures to take custody of returned isolated personnel from international organizations or NGO representatives as soon as possible after release.

For further detailed information on ~~debriefing-and~~ reintegration, refer to Section F, “~~Debrief and Reintegrate~~Reintegration,” of Chapter VI, “Joint Personnel Recovery Procedures and Techniques.”

(10) **Operational Constraints.** Typical PR operational constraints ~~that pertain to PR operations~~ include a limited capability of ~~manned~~ airborne assets to conduct searches in uncertain or hostile operational environments; and a scarcity of PR-dedicated resources in ~~Service~~ forces to include shortages of personnel knowledgeable in PR to staff the JPRC, PRCCs and PR liaisons. Work-arounds and alternate courses of action must be developed to overcome these operational constraints.

(a) **Search Capabilities.** The increasingly sophisticated weapons, especially air defense weapons, that are available to military forces worldwide, and in some cases insurgents and terrorists, make extended aerial searches by manned aircraft for isolated personnel in adversary-held territory highly prohibitive. In many cases, an aerial search cannot be conducted. Sensor searches or monitoring for radio and beacon transmissions by standoff airborne platforms, UAVs, ~~tactical-intratheater~~ aircraft engaged in ongoing air operations, and/or satellites should be considered and planned as appropriate.

(b) **PR-Dedicated Resources.** The ability of the Services to deploy PR-dedicated forces may be constrained by the combination of time and priorities to meet all mission requirements, synchronizing force deployment with other competing interest in a TPFDD, PR capable forces engaged in other operations, and readiness conditions. To mitigate these constraints, ~~joint force planners-commanders~~ may consider a collaborative effort with the components and Services to develop a joint PR force (JPRF) that will possess its own unit type code and therefore be supported, resourced, and deployed as the theater-dedicated PR force. The JPRF may be an option to develop a PR capability in a maturing theater of operations that is subject to the constraints previously mentioned. A JPRF is also attractive as it may be formed in the CONUS and allows time for preparation and interoperability training ~~and exercise~~.

(11) **Interoperability requirements.** ~~the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together—are usually identified when PR planning and operations involve forces from two or more joint force components. Since PR missions normally require an urgent response, an understanding of potential interoperability requirements is essential to successful and timely joint PR planning and execution. A PR system is born joint.~~

Successful PR depends on the accurate identification of interoperability requirements and shortfalls, including those of multinational and multi-agency organizations. Interoperability is essential to joint shipboard helicopter operations, communications, intelligence automated data processing (ADP), fuel and refueling, and maps and charts as discussed in Chapter VI, “Joint Operational Procedures and Techniques.”

(12) **OPSEC.** ~~Joint force planners must work closely with military PA personnel to develop~~ Guidelines should be developed that can be used by both military and news media personnel to avoid inadvertent disclosure of critical information that could, ultimately, increase the risk to the lives of isolated personnel or negatively affect national will. Specific, identifying information on missing or downed aircraft ~~or~~ and ships, or isolated personnel will not be released to the press while planning or conducting PR operations.

For more discussion on media, refer to Section D, “Support,” in Chapter VI, “Joint Personnel Recovery Procedures and Techniques.”

(13) **Electronic Warfare (EW).** The electronic attack (EA) and electronic protection (EP) portions of EW are used to support PR mission accomplishment. EA is used to deny an adversary commander use of the electronic spectrum to effectively detect and locate isolated personnel and rescue forces. EP guarantees use of the electronic spectrum by isolated personnel, coordinating agencies, and rescue forces.

(14) **PSYOP.** ~~Joint force planners need to ensure~~ The IO/PSYOP portions of ~~operation plans OPLANs/ and~~ OPORDs should includes products that are designed to influence the local population to aid isolated personnel and recovery forces. These products should be designed to decrease the potential that isolated personnel will be mistreated if captured and increase the probability that they will be helped, or at least not harmed, if they contact indigenous personnel.

~~5.—Personnel Recovery Concept of Operations~~

~~a. **General.** JFCs should consider the development of a PR CONOPS to promulgate specific PR procedures and responsibilities for the operational area. The PR CONOPS is a compilation of PR information contained in the operation plan/OPORD, JTF plans, directives from the supported component commander for PR, and the procedures established by the JPRC in coordination with subordinate PRCCs. Other than the ATO, the PR CONOPS could become the “pocket PR smart book” for all PR-related information and procedures in the operational area.~~

~~**Format.** The PR CONOPS should follow the JOPES format and include:~~

~~An overview of all PR guidance for the operation.~~

~~(a) PR coordinator and responsibilities.~~

~~1. Location of JPRC(s).~~

~~2. Director JPRC responsibilities and JPRC functions.~~

~~(b) Component command responsibilities.~~

~~1. PRCCs.~~

~~2. PR incident notification.~~

~~3. Requesting assets.~~

~~4. CoC training.~~

~~5. HRI personnel preparation.~~

~~(e) Isolated personnel responsibilities.~~

~~(d) PR alert assets.~~

~~(2) PR objective.~~

~~(3) PR assumptions.~~

~~(4) PR critical tasks.~~

~~(5) CSAR mission execution.~~

~~(a) Concept.~~

~~(b) Organization.~~

~~(c) Planning factors that impact the CSAR mission.~~

~~(d) Decision process and key factors.~~

~~(6) PR communications architecture.~~

~~(7) AMC responsibilities.~~

~~(8) OSC responsibilities.~~

~~(9) Rescue escort (RESCORT) responsibilities.~~

~~(10) Authentication of isolated personnel.~~

~~(11) Rescue pick-up brief.~~

~~(12) Intelligence support.~~

~~(13) Space support.~~

~~(14) SAR.~~

~~(15) EW assets.~~

~~(16) SO conduct of CSAR.~~

~~(17) D&R.~~

5. Personnel Recovery Standing Operational Procedures

a. General. JFCs should consider the development of a concept of procedures to promulgate specific PR processes and responsibilities for the operational area. The PR SOP is a compilation of PR information contained in the OPLAN, OPORDs and directives, and the procedures established by the JPRC in coordination with subordinate PRCCs. Other than the ATO, the PR SOP could become the “pocket PR smart book.”

b. This document should follow the basic organization of JOPES to maintain consistency and include detailed descriptions of the PR organization and procedures, such as:

(1) Overview.

(a) Objective for theater PR.

(b) Command and control for PR.

(c) Assumptions (Includes such items as communication capabilities, recovery force available, etc.).

(2) Organization and Responsibilities.

(a) Component designated as lead for PR.

(b) JPRC.

1 (c) Component PRCCs.

2
3 (d) Recovery force.

4
5 1. Airborne mission coordinator (AMC).

6
7 2. On-scene commander (OSC).

8
9 3. Rescue mission commander (RMC).

10
11 4. Rescue escort (RESCORT).

12
13 5. Rescue combat air patrol (RESCAP).

14
15 (e) Isolated personnel. (Required training for possible isolation).

16
17 (3) Key terms.

18
19 (4) Key Planning Factors for a Recovery Mission. Describe the importance of, and
20 procedures to address, such as:

21
22 (a) Time.

23
24 (b) Location.

25
26 (c) Threat.

27
28 (d) Other.

29
30 (5) Mission Execution.

31
32 (a) Should address the basic procedures for conducting a PR mission to execute the
33 five PR tasks: report, locate, support, recover, reintegrate.

34
35 1. Alert and notification procedures to task-organize the recovery force.

36
37 2. Mission planning (include parallel planning procedures).

38
39 3. Communication procedures.

40
41 4. Launch and execute decision processes.

(b) Phases of recovery mission: alert status, PR mission alert, ingress, terminal, recovery and egress.

(6) PR Communications Plan/Architecture.

(7) Additional Information or Appendices as Needed.

(a) Equipment lists.

(b) PR mission flow/decision diagram.

(c) Checklists.

1. AMC.

2. OSC/RMC.

(d) Authentication procedures for isolated personnel.

c. Attachments should be used for information (i.e., communications) that may change, which will facilitate keeping the document updated; or special functions (e.g., intelligence, repatriation), which will provide convenient tear-offs for users. The PR ~~CONOPS-SOP~~ is a living document that is updated throughout the operation.

6. Personnel Recovery Mission Planning

a. **General.** Successful PR operations normally are preceded by extensive preparation that requires an “anticipate the mission” attitude. Preparation is a continual process of evaluating and exercising joint force mission profiles, lessons learned from completed recovery missions, changes in PR personnel and equipment, threat variations and environmental factors, and adjusting the PR CONOPS and procedures accordingly. ~~Commanders and staffs, recovery forces, and HRI personnel must be familiar with SOPs and useful techniques prior to PR mission execution. Once personnel are isolated, time is precious, swift action is required, and it is usually too late to conduct OJT, search for critical data, become familiar with survival equipment or component recovery capabilities, or reposition forces.~~ The guidance in this section ~~is provided to alert members of key command and staffs (e.g., JPRC, PRCC), recovery forces, and HRI personnel, of highlights~~ prudent preparations in anticipation of PR missions.

b. **Input to ATO SPINS.** The JPRC should develop **standardized operational area codes and symbols** for PR purposes. These usually are in the form of a PR word, letter, number, color of the day, week, or month, and are published in the ATO SPINS. For units not in the ATO, the JPRC must send this information by other means. **Locally developed authentication codes** should be minimized but, if developed, must be forwarded to the PRCC or JPRC. The JPRC also

1 should ensure information on **operational area-specific ground-to-air signals** is provided in the
2 ATO SPINS. The JPRC should coordinate with PRCCs and multinational liaisons to ensure
3 mechanisms are in place to provide information published in the ATO to all HRI forces, especially if
4 they do not have access to the ATO or use it as part of their operations. Furthermore, classification
5 and dissemination of this information to coalition forces who have a need to know must be a
6 consideration.

7
8 **c. Contact Procedures.** A critical aspect of PR is the moment when isolated personnel and
9 the recovery force initially come together. That moment of contact is very tense because it requires
10 two parties, unknown to each other and located in hostile territory, to meet without being detected
11 by either adversary forces or elements of the local population, and without compromising either
12 party's security. **Consequently, the JPRC assisted by component representatives, joint and**
13 **unit intelligence personnel, and PR operations specialists will ensure that appropriate**
14 **contact procedures are developed for use in the operational area.** When developing contact
15 procedures, recovery planners should adhere to JFC's policies to ensure operational consistency
16 throughout the joint force, and should address various recovery methods because each involves
17 different considerations (e.g., interface with air, ground, sea, SOF). The JPRC also will ensure that
18 joint force components, commanders, HRI personnel, recovery forces, mission planners, and
19 briefers are familiar with the contact procedures by publishing them in the ATO SPINS and any
20 ~~operation plans~~ OPLANs or OPORDs. However, specific contact procedures for a NAR/UAR
21 operation cannot be published in the ATO SPINS; ~~therefore, the JPRC/UARCC should have~~
22 ~~plans in place to pass this information to isolated personnel when necessary.~~ Procedures should be
23 passed by the UARCC to NAR/UAR assets, when required.

24 **d. Support Requests.** The Director, JPRC, should ensure that requests for imagery or
25 signals intelligence from national agencies ~~are-is~~ prepared in advance for submission upon ~~initiation~~
26 notification of a PR incident.
27

e. **Decision Making.** Commanders and staffs from the JPRC and PRCCs to unit levels need to develop a systematic process to enhance decision making during a PR mission (i.e., save time) and develop a “battle-rhythm” between C2 nodes. The decision process will be improved as PR missions are completed and updated as personnel, resources, environmental, and other factors change. A decision process tool, whether it is a flow chart (e.g., go/no-go) or procedure document, will guide decision makers from the time a report of isolated personnel is received through the D&R reintegration of those personnel. Figure V-2 provides an example of a PR decision flow chart. Reading left to right, it starts with a unit PR requirement and shows the necessary escalation to outside capabilities if the PR mission cannot be accomplished with organic resources. A decision process allows some criteria to be decided in advance and provides a reminder (checklist) of other items that must be remembered during times of crisis. This preplanned decision map assists commanders in developing, and delegating, launch and execute authority. Recovery efforts normally are not initiated until after authentication. Further, recovery forces normally will not enter hostile battlespace until the location and authentication of isolated personnel has been verified and recovery is feasible. However, theater specific SOPs may authorize some recovery forces to launch, but not enter hostile battlespace, upon initial distress notification. There may be occasions when the political climate in the operational area would make it impractical or impossible for US forces to be involved in the recovery of isolated personnel. In such cases, the direct assistance of indigenous forces may




Figure V-2. Personnel Recovery Decision Flow Chart

1 be necessary to successfully complete the recovery mission. Although each PR mission is unique, a
2 preplanned thought process can be mapped that will incorporate the known factors from the PR
3 mission analysis, the PR CONOPS, and the variables that form the PR elements of information.
4 These elements of information — communication, authentication, location, intentions, condition, and
5 situation (CALICS) — must be satisfied to some predetermined degree before committing recovery
6 forces in hostile or uncertain operating environments. The decision process can assist in developing
7 the acceptable launch and execution criteria by weighing the values and impacts contained in the
8 essential information, risk assessment, recovery selection process, and the operational risk
9 management analysis.

10
11 (1) **Essential Information.** The objective of the decision-making process is for the
12 decision maker, regardless of the level of command, to obtain a window of confidence ~~to~~ and
13 execute a PR mission. This window of confidence will primarily be based on the accuracy of
14 CALICS and other analyses in the decision process, which are necessary to establish SA. The
15 accuracy of the information will normally depend on the time allowed to collect it and the source.
16 The decision maker will usually have to balance the requirement for more or improved information
17 with the need to execute a PR mission as soon as possible. The most accurate source of
18 information is isolated personnel, followed by observers in visual contact with the isolated personnel,
19 and then all other information. It is possible that all three sources will be involved in developing the
20 following essential elements of information:

21
22 (a) **Communication.** To permit ~~interface~~ interaction and coordination with available
23 recovery forces, ~~PR planners~~ JFCs must ensure that all HRI personnel have access to appropriate
24 contact and communications procedures. ~~Planners~~ Commanders should also ensure that HRI
25 personnel are updated in a timely manner as changes occur in the operational recovery environment.
26 This element includes information on how and when isolated personnel are communicating, their
27 ability to communicate with recovery forces (secure or non-secure), and ~~their~~ other essential data,
28 for example:

- 29
30 1. Contact radio frequency, call sign, date time group of call.
31
32 2. Day and time of incident.
33
34 3. Cause of the isolation event.
35
36 4. Type/number/color of downed aircraft or disabled/hijacked vehicle to include
37 last known location, speed, and course/direction.
38
39 5. Number of isolated personnel.
40

41 (b) **Authentication.** This element will continuously assure the decision maker and
42 recovery forces that isolated personnel are an identifiable friendly target not under duress. This is
43 also an important element in identifying adversary ruses or tactics using isolated personnel as bait.

1 Authentication~~s~~ information can be acquired using ISOPREP data or, if not available, other
2 information provided by isolated personnel's organization.

3
4 (c) **Location.** This may be the isolated person's last known position and/or course
5 and speed with reference to landmarks or navigation aids. Accurate information concerning the
6 location and physical condition of isolated personnel prior to launching the recovery mission is
7 crucial. With this knowledge, planners can more readily determine the optimum force composition,
8 identify any requirements for special equipment and personnel, and plan recovery force ingress and
9 egress routes to minimize contact with hostile forces. There are many ways to determine the
10 isolated person's location, with varying degrees of accuracy, and they are discussed in detail in
11 Section C, "Locate," ~~of~~ Chapter ~~6~~VI, "Joint Personnel Recovery Procedures and Techniques."

12
13 (d) **Intentions.** This element can be satisfied by using the isolated person's EPA
14 and/or communication with isolated personnel to determine their future activities—where are they
15 going to do it and when. Individuals will not always be isolated within the range of recovery forces.
16 For example, individuals isolated in the vicinity of the forward line of own troops (FLOT) are in an
17 area where unconventional recovery forces normally do not operate and where intense adversary
18 activity restricts other recovery forces. Therefore, isolated personnel will be expected to follow an
19 EPA and hide or move to areas offering better recovery opportunities.

20
21 (e) **Condition.** This element is critical to determine the physical condition of isolated
22 personnel and their ability to survive and/or move (e.g., survival equipment and available food,
23 water, medicine, etc). With isolated personnel condition information, along with other elements of
24 information, planners can more readily identify requirements for special equipment and personnel,
25 and considerations for recovery force egress routes that are conducive to ambulatory or non-
26 ambulatory isolated personnel (especially if ground routes have to be used).

27
28 (f) **Situation.** This element includes ~~data on the weather in the objective area,~~
29 adversary activity, OPSEC concerns, and terrain.

30
31 (g) **Climate and weather information** including temperature, precipitation,
32 humidity, visibility at ground level, predicted winds, fog, cloud cover, dust storms, radio frequency
33 propagation, and other hazards to survival and recovery will have a great effect on PR mission
34 planning and execution. The decision maker will use this information to determine the affects on the
35 conduct, timing, and tempo of PR missions.

36
37 (h) **Astronomical conditions** including sunrise, sunset, moonrise, phases of the
38 moon, predicted ambient light, and hydrographic data affect PR operations much the same as
39 weather and also play an important role in the timing and tempo of PR missions.

40
41 (i) **Other critical factors** in the selection of any recovery site are: whether there is
42 air, land, or sea access to the site; and ~~the~~ Spatial relationships of the site with respect to bordering
43 friendly, ~~and neutral territory, regardless of whether the site is in adversary territory or in friendly~~

~~territory occupied by the adversary, should be considered neutral, or adversary controlled territory.~~
PR can be successful in any environment. Local conditions should be considered as exploitable, surmountable factors rather than absolute barriers to success. For example, permission to stage or fly over bordering territory may be critical to the success of the PR mission by enabling recovery forces to become better prepared, execute the PR mission in a shorter period of time, and reduce the exposure of the recovery force to threats.

(2) **Risk Assessment/Threat Decision Matrix.** The threat to PR forces can be affected by multiple factors such as geography, ~~enemy-adversary~~ weapons systems and tactics, weather, etc. During risk management, ~~planners-commanders and their staffs~~ should identify, assess, and mitigate risks arising from operational factors and make decisions that balance risk/cost with mission benefits. The PR mission coordinator and recovery forces participating in PR operations should carefully analyze the threat to aircraft, ground, and maritime recovery forces. Development of a standing joint force PR threat decision matrix tailored to the current threat analysis will assist the JPRC and component PRCCs in tasking forces and/or determining recovery methods. In some operational situations, it will be necessary to first determine whether a permissive, uncertain, or hostile operational environment exists. The threat will not affect all elements of a recovery force equally, therefore, go/no-go criteria based on a threat to type of recovery resource (i.e., air, ground, sea, slow-mover, fast-mover, etc.) matrix should be developed prior to beginning PR mission execution. Each component should develop a PR go/no-go criteria matrix. Joint recovery planners should understand the interrelationships of the various component decision matrices. These matrices provide commanders with a framework for making informed go/no-go or abort decisions. Component PR go/no-go criteria shall be forwarded to the JPRC. The matrix will assist the joint decision maker in making a timely risk assessment especially when recovery forces consist of a combination of airborne, surface, and/or subsurface resources. Threats should be evaluated carefully by the component PRCC or JPRC to determine the appropriate recovery method to be used.

(3) **Recovery Force Selection.** ~~Planners-Commanders and their staffs~~ should be knowledgeable of the type and characteristics of the resources that can be used for recovery operations, and their unique capabilities and limitations in order to properly employ them. This in-depth knowledge also enables ~~commanders and~~ recovery planners to quickly develop alternative courses of action and options in response to changing recovery scenarios. Prior planning assists operators in tasking recovery assets as they become available in ~~a maturing theater of operations the~~ operational areas. In addition to other SA information, the following considerations could affect the selection of an appropriate recovery force:

(a) **Activate Alert Forces.** As discussed earlier in precautionary planning, alert forces can be activated to execute the preplanned PR mission if decision makers are satisfied that the appropriate execute criteria have been met (i.e., CALICS and the results of the decision process).

(b) **Divert Forces from other Missions.** In some cases, forces assigned to other missions may be diverted to effect an immediate recovery. This option can be applied when the diverted forces are familiar with PR TTP and/or have conducted contingency PR plan briefings as part of their primary mission, or the risk (decision process) associated with an ad hoc mission is considered acceptable.

(c) The **tactics, training, capabilities, and limitations** of available recovery or supporting forces.

(d) **Capacity.** Recovery forces and assets are based or pre-positioned in locations where they are expected to most effectively facilitate recovery operations. Since individuals are often isolated in unexpected areas and numbers, in some cases the capacity of available recovery forces may be inadequate for the number of isolated personnel. ~~Recovery planners-Commanders~~ must be prepared to reallocate recovery assets to compensate for this imbalance or to establish priorities to determine which categories of isolated personnel will be recovered.

(e) **Other Combat Operations.** Other ongoing combat operations often contribute to a PR mission by diverting adversary activity from the area of the PR incident or by providing on-scene resources that may either complement a PR effort or conduct the recovery. Examples include aircraft returning with unexpended ordnance, airborne C2 platforms, and surface supporting arms within range of the PR objective.

(f) **Location of orbits** for support aircraft such as EW, aerial refueling, and airborne C2 platforms that are often required for PR missions. Because these assets are normally employed in a standoff role, range and altitude capabilities of threat systems will affect the usefulness of these support platforms.

(4) **Operational Risk Management.** PR missions are subject to cost and benefit considerations in the same manner as any other military operation. The benefit to be gained from a successful recovery should equal or outweigh the cost (actual or potential) associated with executing the mission. The psychological impact of the effort on remaining personnel should be weighed against the risk to recovery forces and the effect of diverting resources (if necessary) from the ongoing military effort. Recovery operations should not unduly risk isolating additional combat personnel, preclude execution of higher priority missions, routinely expose certain unique assets to extremely high risk, divert critically needed forces from ongoing operations, or allow the military situation to deteriorate. Commanders at all levels should carefully evaluate these factors before ordering or authorizing a PR effort.

f. **Precautionary Planning.** Precautionary planning involves the pre-positioning of PR aircraft, ships, or ground forces and facilities closer to an area most likely to have a PR incident before an operation commences. The planning of precautionary PR is usually done by the JPRC, PRCC, or operations staff with PR expertise and background. Precautionary PR planning may be conducted concurrently with mission planning or as a corollary planning effort when one joint force

1 or component is tasked to provide PR support to another joint force or component. Options
2 should also be established to support an unsuccessful recovery that requires an additional PR
3 mission. **Precautionary postures** include the following:

4
5 (1) **Lifeguard.** Naval vessels (including submarines) may be pre-positioned along
6 ingress and egress routes for lifeguard purposes when the mission indicates a need for waterborne
7 assistance or the PR function is compatible with or becomes the primary assigned mission of the
8 submarine or surface vessel. Organic or pre-positioned recovery helicopters based aboard ships
9 may provide a rapid response. Aircraft providing cover for a lifeguard vessel should establish
10 contact immediately upon arriving on station and then, when practical, search the area around the
11 lifeguard's position for adversary vessels. ~~An aircraft commander who wants to establish~~
12 ~~communications with an unknown submarine or surface ship in connection with PR should use the~~
13 ~~vessel voice call sign "Lifeguard."~~ Maritime vessels (surface or subsurface), when involved with PR
14 operations, will maintain the vessel voice call sign "Lifeguard." An aircraft commander involved with
15 PR operations who wants to establish communications with an unknown Lifeguard vessel will
16 maintain the aircraft voice call sign "Rescue." A lifeguard vessel commander who wants to establish
17 communications with an unknown PR aircraft should use the voice call sign "Rescue." Submarines
18 and surface vessels may be employed for lifeguard purposes when:

19
20 (a) The mission indicates a need for waterborne precautionary PR assistance along
21 the ingress or egress route; or

22
23 (b) This PR function is compatible with or becomes the primary assigned mission of
24 the submarine or surface vessel.

25
26 (2) **Duckbutt** is an overwater precautionary PR procedure normally used in
27 environments where the risk from adversary threats is low. Airborne aircraft are positioned along
28 an overwater route to provide PR if required, support deployment of single-engine aircraft, or meet
29 other specialized situations. Duckbutts normally are used as a precaution when single-engine
30 aircraft or aircraft with certain very important persons aboard have to cross large bodies of water in
31 the event they have to ditch. Duckbutts should be multi-place aircraft with sufficient endurance and
32 refueling, communications, airdrop, and navigational capabilities to support SAR requirements.
33 Duckbutt aircrews should be prepared to locate isolated personnel; airdrop survival equipment,
34 medical supplies and pararescue personnel (PJ); and coordinate additional PR assets.
35 Commanders are responsible for coordinating duckbutt support with the component PRCC or
36 JPRC.

37
38 (3) **Airborne Alert.** Suitable fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters when practicable, may
39 be tasked to provide PR airborne alert in support of operations. These aircraft should monitor
40 operating frequencies and may function as the AMC platform to coordinate CSARTF operations.
41 When not designated as the AMC platform, supporting PR aircraft should establish radio contact
42 with the AMC immediately upon departure from their home stations. If extraction is not imminent,
43 recovery forces must avoid compromising the isolated personnel's position. Airborne alert locations



Surface vessel performing precautionary personnel recovery with helicopter assistance.

1 should be outside the threat area and should not compromise PR mission intentions. Recovery
2 helicopters may land in a permissive area and maintain a listening watch through airborne platforms
3 or satellite communications networks.

4
5 (4) **Quick Response Posture (QRP).** Suitable combat and support aircraft may be
6 fueled, armed, and positioned (strip alert) for rapid launch in support of PR missions. A QRP can
7 be accomplished from main operating bases or with aircraft pre-positioned at forward operating
8 locations (e.g., forward arming and refueling point) near combat operations. This may include the
9 aircrew physically sitting in the seats, on auxiliary power. Though response time is decreased, a
10 QRP can adversely impact crew endurance over extended periods of time.

11
12 g. **Supporting Arms.** The development of supporting arms requirements and subsequent
13 supporting arms coordination are often factors in PR mission planning. Units capable of conducting
14 PR operations will develop ~~procedures to implement coordination of cross boundary fires~~
15 appropriate fire support coordinating measures to safeguard friendly forces and provide responsive
16 support to recovery operations.

17
18 *For further guidance on supporting arms refer to JP 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.*

19
20 h. **Airspace and Ground Operation Deconfliction.** The PR mission coordinator should
21 deconflict both ground and airspace activities with PR plans to ensure safe PR missions and prevent
22 adverse effects on other combat operations. The PR planner can prepare some deconfliction
23 actions in advance by considering artillery fire zones, amphibious objective areas (AOAs), strike

aircraft airflow patterns, no fire zones, restricted fire zones, and altitude restrictions. ~~The use of a situation map could assist component PRCCs and the JPRC in visualizing spatial relationship by depicting:~~ The JPRC and component PRCCs normally visualize spatial relationships by including the following on their situation maps:

(1) Adversary threat order of battle, disposition of friendly forces, and locations of future targets planned in the ATO.

(2) Information from the airspace control order, to include planned PR mission routes or waypoints, ~~BULLSEYE~~, Bullseye, and SARDOT.

(3) Location of orbits for support aircraft such as EW, aerial refueling, and airborne C2 platforms that are often required for PR missions.

For further guidance on airspace deconfliction refer to JP 3-52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.

i. **PR Mission Planning Checklist.** A notional checklist for joint PR mission planning is provided in Annex A, “Joint Personnel Recovery Mission Planning Checklist,” to Appendix M, “Sample Checklists.” ~~Service forces and units~~ Forces conducting PR missions should develop comprehensive and highly detailed mission checklists. A good example of such a checklist is the “Final Mission Planning Review Checklist” in Chapter 9 of NWP 3-50.22, *Combat Search and Rescue Manual*.

j. **Categorizing PR mission responses as immediate, deliberate, hold, and closed** assists JPRCs and PRCCs in prioritizing and tracking active PR missions. Categorizing should never be a unilateral decision by the JPRC or PRCC, it should be made jointly by intelligence personnel, weapon systems subject matter experts, and component representatives. Once categorized, folders and mission support data should be continually evaluated and recategorized to take advantage of changing tactical situations and optimize the PR response.

(1) **Immediate.** Based on the decision makers awareness of the situation, and level of confidence in CALICS, recovery forces can be launched and/or given an execute order at anytime after a PR incident report is received. **Immediate PR mission responses are generally used in low risk situations as determined in the risk assessment using available assets that are in the immediate vicinity of the isolated person’s location (e.g., wingman or remaining ground vehicles, troops, or maritime vessels), on alert, or can be expediently diverted from other missions.** The immediate response option is discussed in more detail in Section E, “Recover,” to Chapter VI, “Joint Personnel Recovery Procedures and Techniques.”

(2) **Deliberate.** The threat, asset availability, current operations, and isolated personnel situation may preclude using an immediate PR response option in favor of more detailed planning and real-time intelligence information. Consequently, the PR mission coordinator will need to plan

1 and organize a deliberate PR response that could involve the creation of a CSARTF comprised of
2 assets from a single component, joint or multinational forces, or multi-agency organizations.

3
4 (3) **Hold.** A PR mission placed on “hold” status typically reflects a lack of confidence in
5 the accuracy of, or amount of data collected on CALICS, and/or the outcome of the decision-
6 making process does not meet the launch and execute criteria (e.g., the location of isolated
7 personnel is unknown and there is no contact). Missions also may be placed in “hold” status by the
8 combatant commander due to overriding political concerns or to preclude compromise of strategic
9 or operational objectives. A PR mission should be put on “hold” when PR options other than
10 military, such as diplomatic or civil initiatives, may result in locating isolated personnel, determining
11 their fate, supporting them during captivity, and recovering them. Every incident placed in this
12 category should remain open and be continuously reviewed until the isolated personnel have been
13 recovered or declared dead by the appropriate authorities. It is possible for isolated personnel to
14 survive for long periods of time, or escape captivity, before finally making contact with friendly
15 forces.

16
17 (4) **Closed.** A PR mission is closed when the death of the isolated personnel is
18 confirmed or when the isolated person is returned to friendly control. A wingman report of “no
19 chute seen” is not justification for closing the PR mission. Closed folders will be transferred to the
20 JPRA. If the JFC has exhausted all PR means and the case is still open, the JPRC should formally
21 transfer it to DPMO for final resolution in accordance with established procedures normally
22 developed by DPMO for transferring POW, unaccounted for personnel, etc. information.

23
24 (5) **Mission Reports.** All data connected with a specific mission will be consolidated
25 into one full-spectrum PR mission package and sent to the JPRA for archival purposes.

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CHAPTER VI

JOINT ~~OPERATIONAL~~ PERSONNEL RECOVERY PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

"In critical and baffling situations, it is always best to refer to first principles and simple action."

Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill

PR missions, by design, are unique. A response may be required in any land or sea location, threat environment, and at a time and place not of the isolated personnel's or recovery force's choosing. Many military operations can be successfully planned based on intelligence and targeting data; however, successful execution of PR missions often require creativity, improvisations, and real-time intelligence; even when forces are well-trained, prepared, and pre-positioned. Military PR missions may involve single or multiple aircraft, ground elements, surface or subsurface naval assets, space assets, or any combination thereof. Commanders and staffs, recovery forces, and HRI personnel should use the following validated procedures and techniques to accomplish~~ment~~ the five PR execution tasks.

SECTION A. METHODS

Shortly after the PR incident report is received by the PRCC or JPRC, one or more component or joint PR methods may be planned, resulting in the implementation of ~~one, and the possible stand-by of another in case the first fails~~ a primary and alternate recovery method. In some cases, the reporting element may become the initial member of the method employed. This ~~publication promulgates chapter describes~~ the JTTP joint tactics, techniques, and procedures of the CSARTF as the foundation method CSAR and NAR, which are two methods to accomplish the five PR execution tasks in all the PR categories ~~(except unassisted and opportune)~~. A CSARTF is ~~a joint, multinational, or multiagency force that possesses assets and capabilities that are not available in a single joint force component or a single non DOD member of a multinational force component, joint, multinational, or interagency force comprised of all elements committed to a specific CSAR operation to locate, identify, support, and recover isolated personnel during war or military operations other than war (MOOTW). This includes those elements assigned to provide C2 and protect the rescue vehicle from adversary air or ground attack.~~ As mentioned above in PR planning, the CSARTF could be formed from in-theater components, ~~multiagency~~ multi-agency, or multinational forces, ~~or it Joint personnel recovery task force (PRTF) required assets~~ could be organized, manned and equipped within CONUS, identified within a PR unit type code listed on the TPFDD, and deployed to the theater reporting directly to the supported commander for PR. ~~This publication also promulgates NAR as another method that may be implemented when the PR mission requires the unique unconventional capabilities of SOF. The JFC will coordinate NAR with the JFSOCC.~~

For detailed information on ~~component special operations~~ SOF PR, refer to Appendix G, “Special Operations Forces Personnel Recovery,” and JPs, 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, and 3.05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.

1. Combat Search and Rescue Task Force

“The rescue armada in Vietnam was the ultimate team sport.”

Darrell Whitcomb, as quoted in:

Cheating Death: Combat ~~r~~Rescues in Vietnam and Laos, by George Marrett

a. **General.** The CSARTF is coordinated by and under the C2 of the JPRC; ~~but can be delegated and is normally delegated~~ to a PRCC. Several factors ~~may require influence~~ the formation of a CSARTF. Among them are the concentration of adversary weapons and troops; the adversary’s degree of integration with other defensive systems or C4I networks; the accuracy and timeliness of friendly intelligence data; and the number, location, and physical condition of the isolated personnel. A CSARTF is capable of locating and authenticating isolated personnel prior to committing recovery vehicles, protecting isolated personnel from adversary threats, providing force protection for itself, providing mission C2 and C4I systems support, and extracting isolated personnel and returning them to friendly control. CSARTFs can be dedicated and put on alert (most desirable) or designated and tasked when needed. A CSARTF is a cohesive ~~PR-rescue~~ effort consisting of dissimilar aircraft and/or other forces. The exact composition of a CSARTF varies with the threats en route to, from, and in the vicinity of the isolated personnel. A CSARTF can consist of a single recovery vehicle supported by other necessary aircraft to dozens of air, ground, or sea elements working in concert. Figure VI-1 depicts a notional CSARTF. A successful CSARTF depends on the effective integration of all assets with a well thought out recovery and communication plan. ~~CSARTFs normally are deliberately planned, but conceivably can be formed from available airborne assets in response to an immediate PR mission. PRTFs are normally formed from available assets in response to an immediate PR mission, but they may be deliberately planned.~~ Short-notice CSARTF operations are extremely dependent on the ability ~~of the AMC~~ to quickly and effectively marshal the required forces to effect a recovery. This paragraph outlines the critical aspects of each participant’s role during ~~CSARTF operations PR missions~~, and provides amplified guidance which may be especially beneficial to RESCORT and recovery vehicles en route to, within, and returning from the objective area.

b. Airborne Mission ~~Commander~~Coordinator

(1) **General.** Though capabilities may differ slightly among the joint force components, the primary role of any AMC is to serve as an ~~airborne~~ extension of the ~~PR mission coordinator or other properly designated agent of the executing organization~~ component commander or supported commander responsible for the PR mission. The desired AMC is an airborne platform ~~The AMC aircraft should be a multi-place aircraft~~ with the best combination of on-station time and organic communications package; ~~and the AMC~~ should be placed on ~~airborne~~ alert and positioned to




Figure VI-1. Combat Search and Rescue Task Force (Notional)

control likely missions. The AMC should have the prerogative to move the orbit location in response to operational situations. The AMC should be capable of coordinating multiple airborne assets ~~that may be executing diverse and often complex events~~. AMC crews should be trained in this role. The AMC mission is normally conducted at high altitude, but threat considerations dictate actual altitudes. The AMC mission requires radio LOS with the OSC and OTH (HF or SATCOM) communications with the PR mission coordinator.

(2) **Responsibilities and Functions.** The AMC platform is designated by the supported commander for PR through the JPRC or PRCC. The AMC coordinates mission activities between the OSC, other CSARTF elements, and the PR mission coordinator; monitors the status of all elements; requests additional assets as required; and ensures that recovery and supporting forces arrive at designated locations to accomplish the recovery mission. The AMC also ensures safety of flight of airborne CSARTF assets by providing altitude separation, airspace and ground deconfliction, environmental information, and monitoring fuel states. The AMC crew supports the recovery effort by providing navigation assistance and relaying isolated personnel intelligence and authentication data to appropriate C2 agencies and CSARTF elements. The AMC and crew also:

(a) Coordinates establishment of the recovery mission communications nets.

(b) Manages the flow of aircraft to and from the objective area.

(c) Relays isolated personnel intelligence and authentication data to other C2 agencies and CSARTF elements, as required.

(d) Coordinates refueling of CSARTF assets.

(e) Keeps the CSARTF elements and PR mission coordinator informed of all pertinent information such as threats, aborts, and EW information.

(f) Advises the PR mission coordinator/JAOC of mission support requirements.

(g) Coordinates the designation and use of appropriate ~~no fire, free fire, and restrictive fire areas in the objective area~~ fire support coordinating measures.

(h) Advises the supported commander for PR ~~mission coordinator~~ and ~~CSARTF~~ the combat rescue task force elements of mission progress, ~~threats, with pre-designated execution calls~~ and weather conditions or any other factors affecting mission progress.

(3) **AMC Mission Checklist.** A PR mission checklist for the AMC is provided in Annex A, “Airborne Mission ~~Commander-Coordinator~~ Checklist” to Appendix M, “Sample Checklists.”

c. **On-Scene Commander.** The OSC is the individual designated to control recovery efforts in the objective area. The responsibility of the OSC is to achieve SA and to gain and maintain situational superiority long enough to effect the recovery of the isolated personnel. ~~However, an~~ The OSC (e.g., is usually the RESCORT commander, forward air controller (airborne) (FAC(A)), or ground or maritime qualified individual.) The OSC is designated by the supported commander for PR through the JPRC or the AMC when the tactical situation warrants formation and use of a CSARTF. Initially, the OSC may be someone in the immediate vicinity (e.g., a wingman, a forward air controller, or ground or maritime forces) capable of providing on-scene coordination. The commander of the lead recovery vehicle may be designated the OSC if other appropriate platforms are not available. The OSC’s initial actions are to collect essential information ~~to gain SA (e.g., establish communications with, pinpoint the location of (i.e., objective area search), and authenticate the isolated personnel)~~ and to sanitize the objective area. Once communications have been established with the isolated personnel, the OSC should continue to monitor the isolated personnel’s radio frequency in case immediate actions are required to prevent capture. The OSC will have to balance the need for more accurate ~~essential~~ information with the possibility of compromising the safety of the isolated personnel. Communications on the isolated personnel’s radio frequency should be minimized in order to decrease an adversary’s ability to locate the isolated personnel via

1 radio transmissions. The OSC and the lead recovery vehicle commander should plan and
2 coordinate closely to select ingress and egress routes and objective area tactics ~~based on hostile~~
3 ~~activity, terrain, and the number of isolated personnel being recovered~~. All CSARTF participants
4 must contact the OSC before entering the objective area. An OSC checklist is located in Annex C,
5 “On-Scene Commander Checklist,” to Appendix M, “Sample Checklists.”
6
7

d. **Rescue Escort**

"We had pulled off the proverbial 'stage coach robbery' by holding Tchepone just long enough to get [the survivor] out."

George Marrett – Cheating Death: Combat Rescues in Vietnam and Laos

(1) **Capabilities.** The number and type of RESCORT aircraft may determine the success of a CSARTF operation. ~~Fixed- or rotary-wing~~ Aircraft assigned RESCORT responsibilities should be ~~fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft~~ capable of providing the recovery vehicles with reconnaissance, suppressive fire support, and, if possible, communications relay. RESCORT pilots should be specifically trained for CSARTF operations. When employed, the RESCORT and recovery vehicles of the CSARTF should operate under the mission control of an OSC at a predetermined, prebriefed point and time near the objective area. CSARTF operations at night and in high-risk situations require unique weapon system capabilities. Major differences in the lethality of threats to helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft affect situational superiority and should be assessed in the risk management analysis and carefully evaluated in the decision process that will include the assignment of RESCORT assets. RESCORT aircraft should have the ability to sweep an ingress route and rendezvous with the escorted asset in the event of a route change or other action. RESCORT aircraft should also be able to respond quickly to all threats en route to, from and in the vicinity of the helicopter landing zone (HLZ) and deliver accurate suppressive fire. Coverage should continue through egress until the recovery vehicles reach a friendly or permissive operational environment.

(2) **Responsibilities.** RESCORT tactics, routing, potential threat encounters, and countermeasures should be understood by all participants. On other than immediate response missions, CSARTF recovery element briefings (Annex D, "CSARTF Recovery Element Briefing Checklist" to Appendix M, "Sample Checklists") are mandatory and should include rendezvous points, communications, navigation points, number of helicopters, HLZ positions, and code words. Typical RESCORT responsibilities may include:

(a) Conducting route reconnaissance of the flight route and area reconnaissance of the objective area.

(b) Determining the level of adversary activity and suppressing surface threats to, from, and within the objective area.

(c) Assisting recovery helicopters in locating (i.e., objective area search) and authenticating isolated personnel.

(d) Functioning as the OSC when designated by the executing component commander, PR mission coordinator, or the AMC; and coordinating and controlling activities of supporting CSARTF elements in the objective area.

(3) **RESCORT Ordnance Delivery.** Recovery helicopters are vulnerable to threats along the route of flight and friendly fire in response to those threats. Strafe fans and bomb fragmentation patterns must be determined before employing ordnance near recovery helicopters. CSARTF members should coordinate engagement distances from the recovery helicopters. When recovery helicopters execute evasive maneuvers, RESCORT should maneuver to engage the threat. If practical, a RESCORT element should continue to escort the recovery helicopters during evasive maneuvers until they are clear of known threats. When the recovery force is out of the threat envelope, RESCORT should disengage and rendezvous with the recovery force.

(4) Several **RESCORT techniques** may be used depending on factors such as speed, altitude, distance, fuel, threat level, weather conditions, terrain, and natural illumination. These techniques are applied in an attached or detached RESCORT condition as described below. The




Figure VI-2. Attached and Detached Escort

1 advantages and disadvantages of attached and detached RESCORT are shown in Figure VI-2.

2
3 (a) **Attached RESCORT** allows continuous visual or radar contact with the
4 recovery helicopters.

5
6 (b) **Detached RESCORT** allows placement of the RESCORT aircraft ahead,
7 behind, or in proximity of the recovery helicopters. Detached RESCORT requires knowledge of
8 recovery helicopter ingress and egress routes and planned timing or position calls.

9
10 1. During a **route reconnaissance and/or sanitization and preemptive**
11 **sweep**, the RESCORT aircraft fly ahead of the recovery helicopters to detect and
12 suppress/neutralize threats along the ingress route, or redirect recovery helicopters to avoid
13 adversary activity.

14
15 2. **Trail RESCORT** employs RESCORT aircraft following the recovery
16 helicopters along the ingress and egress routes. The RESCORT aircraft maintain course position by
17 a series of turns at low altitude or orbits at high altitude. Low-altitude trail RESCORT should be
18 low enough to avoid detection and engagement while maintaining the advantage of surprise against
19 air and ground threats. In trail RESCORT, the recovery helicopters and RESCORT aircraft must
20 maintain SA to ensure adequate vertical and horizontal airspace deconfliction and weapons safety.
21 Trail RESCORT provides flexibility for escorting recovery helicopters already en route or executing
22 a immediate response scenario. The only requirement is that the RESCORT aircraft and recovery
23 helicopters know the initial or rendezvous point. An advantage of trail RESCORT is that the
24 recovery helicopters and RESCORT aircraft use common navigational checkpoints and route
25 information. A disadvantage is the RESCORT aircraft use the same route and may be more
26 vulnerable to air or surface engagement. If two or more recovery helicopter elements are spaced
27 five or more miles apart, the RESCORT aircraft can provide effective support to only the trailing
28 recovery helicopter element.

29
30 3. **Proximity RESCORT** is similar to trail RESCORT, with the exception that
31 the RESCORT aircraft do not fly the same routes as the recovery helicopters. By using prominent
32 navigation points, the RESCORT aircraft have the flexibility to maximize internal flight TTP, while
33 remaining sufficiently close to be responsive to the recovery helicopters. This provides for increased
34 survivability from surface and air engagement and a decreased probability of detection for both
35 groups while still providing quick reaction times. A disadvantage of proximity RESCORT is the
36 difficulty in acquiring the recovery helicopters between checkpoints. Air-to-air tactical air navigation
37 (TACAN), radar, or visual reference calls by the recovery helicopters can assist the RESCORT in
38 acquiring the recovery helicopter.

39
40 (5) **RESCORT by Fixed-Wing Aircraft.** The PR mission coordinator/AMC should
41 request fixed-wing RESCORT aircraft to suppress possible weapons fire near the isolated
42 personnel. If hostile fire is present, more aircraft may be required. Past experience has shown that
43 a FAC(A) can control one flight of four aircraft every ten minutes. Fixed-wing RESCORT, when

1 compared to rotary-wing RESCORT, are capable of more rapid searches, better ~~line-of-sight~~ LOS
2 for communications, a wider range of weapons effects, better weapons standoff capabilities, longer
3 range, increasingly robust night capabilities, and enhanced survivability against threats. However,
4 fixed-wing RESCORT also have a higher relative flight profile and airspeed making recovery
5 helicopter protection more difficult, and ~~reduced-reducing their~~ weapons delivery capability during
6 adverse weather. In addition, fixed-wing aircraft may not be as accurate as a rotary-wing in
7 locating isolated personnel.

8
9 (6) **RESCORT by Rotary-Wing Aircraft.** Armament, speed, range, and defensive
10 countermeasure systems are critical factors in the assignment of a RESCORT mission. Attack
11 helicopters are highly maneuverable, provide minimum detection, ~~and-substantial~~ suppressive fire
12 capability, and possess good objective area endurance. Their most critical limitation is airspeed.
13 Recovery helicopters may need an arbitrary airspeed limit to facilitate rotary-wing RESCORT.
14 Utility and transport helicopter airspeeds may be greatly reduced when configured with systems that
15 support RESCORT operations. Fully configured, the armed utility/transport helicopters may be
16 unable to maintain airspeed parity with recovery helicopters of the same type. When combined with
17 an attack helicopter as a RESCORT element, the armed utility/transport helicopter may have a
18 detrimental effect on total RESCORT capability. The advantages and disadvantages of rotary-wing
19 RESCORT are listed in Figure VI-3.

20
21 *For further information on helicopter RESCORT tactics, refer to AFTTP 3-1 Vol 24, Tactical*
22 *Employment, HH-60, (Secret).*

23
24 (7) **Hover Cover.** During the extraction phase or when the recovery helicopters execute
25 a mission hold, RESCORT procedures should be modified to provide maximum suppressive
26 coverage during this period of vulnerability. A critical consideration during any hover cover
27 operation is the potential for highlighting the RESCORT aircraft or the extraction zone. Therefore,
28 RESCORT aircraft should avoid premature entry into a hover cover pattern. Indirect hover fire
29 may be delivered from firing points obscured from the adversary. RESCORT aircraft may be
30 required to move frequently to other firing points to limit the effectiveness of adversary fires. Armed
31 helicopters providing hover cover can also provide substantial suppressive fire in the objective area.
32 Attack helicopters may best secure an HLZ by surveilling the area from a stationary position over
33 key terrain.

34
35 (8) **RESCORT Using Night Vision Devices (NVDs)** significantly increase night
36 mission performance at terrain flight altitudes. NVDs may be used to locate isolated personnel in
37 the objective area. A number of night vision goggle (NVG) versions are used by Service members,
38 but all provide a narrow, limited field of view. Similarly, the capabilities and compatibility of other
39 types of NVDs such as forward looking infrared (FLIR) vary widely, but all can enhance night
40 RESCORT operations when properly employed. PR mission planners must consider NVD
41 diversity and ensure that procedures for the use of NVDs (e.g., goggle/degoggle points, external
42 lighting) are established. These procedures should be executed at a planned point or time, and only




Figure VI-3. Rotary-Wing Rescue Escort

in permissive operational environments. If improperly briefed or executed, both mission safety and success may be jeopardized. Additional considerations are:

(a) Aircrew NVD proficiency, experience, and training.

(b) Use of FLIR to provide an improved capability for night hazard avoidance, checkpoint identification, HLZ identification, and threat detection.

(c) Use of a ground commander pointer or an air commander pointer laser to enhance CSARTF SA, threat response, and mutual support.

(d) Use of covert external lighting such as infrared (IR) position filters, search light filters, signaling lights, or chemical light sticks may facilitate ease of observation by wingmen or RESCORT. Various lighting schemes may aid in aircraft identification (e.g., aircraft configured with IR position lights indicate recovery helicopter, and aircraft with IR chemical light sticks indicate

1 RESCORT). In communication-restricted environments, the ability of a formation to communicate
2 with visual signals using aircraft and/or hand-held lighting becomes especially critical.

3
4 (e) Covert or limited visibility lighting may be used. On helicopters equipped with a
5 rotor headlight, the lighting may be used to establish visual contact, aircraft identification, or serve as
6 a signaling device.

7
8 e. **Rescue Combat Air Patrol.** RESCAP aircraft are counterair and EW aircraft assigned to
9 protect the CSARTF and isolated personnel from airborne threats. RESCAP forces should be
10 available before committing recovery forces if adversary air activity is forecast along the intended
11 flight route or in the objective area. RESCAP also can function as the OSC, when directed, and
12 they may assist in detecting and establishing communications with isolated personnel due to their
13 higher operating altitudes. Typical RESCAP tasks include the following:

14
15 (1) Maintaining patrol over and protecting isolated personnel until other elements of the
16 CSARTF arrive in the objective area.

17
18 (2) Assisting in locating isolated personnel.

19
20 (3) Assisting RESCORT in suppressing surface threats.

21
22 (4) Maintaining protection against and ensuring suppression of airborne threats to the
23 CSARTF.

24
25 (5) Functioning as OSC until other elements of the CSARTF arrive in the objective area.

26
27 f. **Recovery Force.** Surface, water, and air craft may serve as CSARTF recovery vehicles.
28 The primary purposes for multi-ship recovery vehicles are mutual support, mission flexibility, and
29 enhanced communications capabilities. For example, the wingman could conduct the recovery
30 should the lead abort.

31
32 (1) **Recovery Using Rotary-Wing Aircraft.** ~~Operational experience shows that~~
33 ~~helicopters with advanced avionics and navigation systems, such as the heavy lift assets normally~~
34 ~~employed by SOF, are excellent pathfinders for reduced visibility operations. Operational~~
35 ~~experience shows that helicopters with advanced avionics, navigational systems, and terrain~~
36 ~~avoidance/terrain following radar systems are excellent pathfinders.~~ Medium-lift assets (such as the
37 H-60 variants) generate the least amount of dust and debris in the landing phase, and reduce the
38 probability of detection in the objective area. Knowledge of PR aircraft capabilities and procedures
39 and improved interoperability between components can best be ensured through joint PR training
40 and exercises.

41
42 (2) **Recovery Using Ground Forces.** The same principles of C2, ~~and SA~~, and
43 situational superiority apply to ground forces as they do for air or maritime forces. Ground forces

1 may be used unilaterally or with air forces, and they may be from the same Service or joint. As
2 mentioned earlier, using forces that are not familiar with PR TTP and/or have not conducted
3 contingency PR planning briefings as part of their primary mission, creates risks associated with an
4 ad hoc mission. Commanders and Joint PR planners should provide guidance to ground forces
5 through the OPLAN/OPORD; and the JPRC and PRCCs should promulgate that guidance through
6 the PR CONOPS, ATO SPINS, mission orders, and command briefings. PR mission planners
7 should develop methods to relay authentication and location data to ground recovery forces.
8 Ground forces used for PR should be prepared to transmit information concerning isolated
9 personnel and/or the PR mission status to the component PRCC.

10

**THE RECOVERY OF JUMP 42
25 JANUARY 1991**

Early one morning during Desert Storm, as the bad weather lingered over the Kuwaiti battlefields, Captain Scott Walsh launched on the wing of Major Dan Peters out of their base at King Abdul Aziz Airbase, Saudi Arabia. Their first sortie took them to a large enemy column opposing the Marine 2nd Division. Recovering at the forward operating location at Tanjib, they refueled and rearmed their aircraft and took off again to fly another mission in support of their fellow Marines. Entering the target area, Walsh got separated from his flight lead. While staying below the clouds, he attempted to rejoin on another flight of Harriers. As he maneuvered, his aircraft was hit by a heat-seeking missile. The missile impacted the right rear exhaust and severely damaged the aircraft. Initially angered at having been hit, Walsh quickly surveyed the damage. "The blast blew a lot of the right flaps off, put several holes in the wing, and set fire to the fuel in the wing tanks," he remembered. The Fast FAC working with him, Combat 13, joined up on him to inspect his aircraft. He was not impressed with the flames streaking behind Walsh's aircraft and suggested that he eject.

Walsh quickly surveyed the savage ground battle raging below him and decided to stay with the aircraft as long as possible. He jettisoned all of his ordnance to lighten his aircraft. The Fast FAC suggested that he land at the Al Jabbar Airfield which was in the process of being liberated that morning. As the squadron intelligence officer, Scott knew that the airfield was scheduled to be seized that morning by the 1st Battalion of the 7th Marines which was part of Task Force Ripper. He concurred with the Fast FAC and set a course for the airfield. But as he prepared to land there, Captain Walsh realized that the airfield was not in fact, under friendly control. Additionally, his landing gear would not lower. He quickly considered making a vertical landing, but his nozzle control was not responding properly and the aircraft was barely controllable. All of these factors ruled out landing at Al Jabbar. Walsh shoved his throttle forward and over-flew that airfield. He would try to make it to friendly lines before ejecting. But as he turned to head south, his hydraulic system pressure slowly depleted and his flight controls froze. No longer able to control the aircraft, he was forced to eject. As the F-18 capped him from above, he floated to the ground in sight of forward elements of the task force. Immediately, the pilot in Combat 13 called the MTACC and reported that Jump 42 had been shot down and the pilot was alive on the ground. They quickly began to form a helicopter task force to get him out. Simultaneously, commanders in Task Force Ripper called their forward elements and directed that a patrol be sent out to recover the pilot.

Landing near an abandoned Iraqi bunker just west of the runways, Walsh oriented himself and quickly took shelter in an old trench. He took out his pistol and radio. Then he called the aircraft above to let them know that he was okay. When they acknowledged, he started moving south. Within a few minutes he encountered one of the Marine infantry teams who had been dispatched by the task force. They rescued him and took him back to the rear. There, he gave their intelligence section a quick briefing on what he had seen and then got on a helicopter which took him back to his base.

**SOURCE: MIXED BAG: Combat Search and Rescue
in Desert Storm (DRAFT) by Darrel D. Whitcomb**

~~*For specific guidance regarding PR in urban areas, refer to JP 306, Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations.*~~

(3) **Recovery Using Fixed-Wing Aircraft.** Circumstances may warrant using fixed-wing aircraft as the recovery vehicle. Fixed-wing aircraft are the method of choice when distance, cargo capacity, speed, or time are critical (e.g., movement of enemy-adversary forces to the crash site, critically injured personnel, mass casualty, altitude restrictions, etc.). The concept of employment would be similar to that of combat delivery aircraft conducting air-land operations. Airfields should be designated and surveyed by special tactics teams or other personnel qualified in HLZ preparation procedures. Fixed-wing aircraft provide greater range and speed, which are invaluable capabilities when transporting critically injured personnel over vast distances. PR planning should identify suitable locations to transload recovered personnel from rotary-wing to fixed-wing aircraft to take advantage of the speed differential.

SEARCH AND RESCUE AT VERY HIGH ALTITUDES

In the Spring of 2002, France, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan combined their resources to experiment with new ideas on SAR techniques in mountainous terrain. Known as “RESAL” (recherché et sauvetage aerolargue), the concept originated from a tri-partisan agreement concluded in March 2002. The intent of the agreement was to use the capabilities of each country to develop new operational expertise to complement the SAR and CSAR methods put in place for the Mirage 2000D aircraft that participated in operation “HERCULES.”

From 20020513-20020930, an inter-Service team of special operations and mountain rescue experts was based at Douchanbe, Tajikistan, which is less than 50 nm from the Mirage 2000D flight axis. The team consisted of 18 specialists, including one unit commander: eight helicopter-trained air paratroopers from CPA-10 (to include jumpmaster and communicator; two gendarmes from the high-mountain gendarmerie platoon; one doctor; and five Air Force special tactics troops, three of whom were certified for two-man parachute jumping. The designated zone of operation extended from

the extreme east point of the Uzbekistan border to the entrance of Afghanistan, forming a corridor 450 NM long and 14 NM wide.

The experiment was conducted using “C-130H” aircraft, as follows:

- ? The first phase involved locating the survivor, then dropping a “SATER”-type safety chain.
- ? In the second phase, special forces were given oxygen until two minutes before the jump. The jump itself was made without oxygen, to ensure more maneuverability. The first eight jumpers were in one-man chutes, followed by three jumpers in two-man chutes, accompanied by the doctor and the two gendarmes.
- ? During the third phase the “HERCULES” dropped medical equipment (oxygen, fibrillator, stretcher); mountaineering equipment; and, as necessary, additional weapons.
- ? Finally, an “MI-8” helicopter picked up the equipment and all members of the operation. It is capable of landing above 4500 m.

The drops were made between 1500-4500 m, with a landing precision of 50 m by 50 m in areas marked by adverse currents and strong ground-level winds. The missions were difficult, as the region is poorly controlled and geographically hostile. Nevertheless, the Air Force was able to verify the “RESAL” concept. It conducted 24 jumps in the space of several weeks some at less than 400 m above ground level), to include ten-hour marches at greater than 4000 m altitude.

SOURCE: Message From Joint Staff, Washington DC, 121558Z DEC 02

(4) Recovery Using Naval Vessels

(a) **General.** Naval vessels maintain a viable capability for recovery of isolated personnel, but have a large radar signature and are vulnerable to coastal defenses. The threat from coastal defenses may be degraded through naval surface fire support (NSFS), other suppressive fire assets, and the employment of special boat unit (SBU) craft. SBU craft launched OTH from other naval vessels and coordinated with other fixed- or rotary-wing assets provide an enhanced, low-radar signature capability. Additionally, some helicopters can insert SOF in rigid hull inflatable boats. In general, submarines have no means of self-protection while surfaced.

(b) **Search and Recovery Using Submarines.** Attack, nuclear (SSN), and dry deck shelter (DDS) submarines are the most effective submarine platforms. The principal advantage of the submarine is the capability to clandestinely position close to the adversary coastline. In permissive or lower threat environments, the submarine may elect to surface and

1 conduct the extraction with little external support.
2 SSNs have the ability to operate independently in
3 most anti-air warfare threat environments. SSNs
4 can also clandestinely insert special teams to
5 conduct overland PR missions in coastal areas.
6 Submarines have a limited capability to search large
7 areas compared to aerial search assets. However,
8 SSN search and terminal guidance can be
9 enhanced by use of the AN/ARS-6
10 (PLS/DALS/lightweight airborne recovery system
11 [LARS]) during deployment preparation. To effect
12 recoveries within a threat envelope, the SSN may
13 employ the “snag and tow” technique, or “lock-in
14 swimmers” through DDS. The “snag-and-tow”
15 consists of the isolated personnel catching or
16 “snagging” a line with the submarine’s periscope
17 and being towed beyond the threat envelope.
18 When clear of adversary threats, the submarine
19 surfaces to complete the extraction or position the
20 isolated personnel for transfer to a helicopter or
21 surface vessel. The DDS recovery may consist of
22 sea-air-land teams (SEALs) escorting the isolated
23 personnel into the DDS by means of the SEAL
24 delivery vehicle or surface swimmers. The
25 advantage of the DDS system is that the SSN is
26 not required to surface until after the isolated personnel have been recovered.



Subsurface resources may be tasked to conduct a personnel recovery mission when compatible with other mission requirements.

27
28 g. **Forward Air Controller (Airborne).** The FAC(A) can provide the CSARTF with
29 significant tactical advantages. Either a planned or diverted FAC(A) can locate and authenticate
30 isolated personnel prior to arrival of the CSARTF, and provide a current threat assessment near the
31 objective area. Initial on-scene coordination of the PR effort should-may be assumed by the
32 FAC(A) when no dedicated RESCORT, or other (i.e., wingman) assets are available, or until the
33 RESCORT arrives. The FAC(A) is trained ~~to direct ordnance against ground targets in terminal~~
34 attack control and can provide a link between the recovery vehicles and other threat suppression
35 assets. Fast-strike aircraft may require FAC(A) assistance to effectively support the recovery
36 force. FAC(A) requests or diversions should be considered to provide an OSC capability prior to
37 CSARTF or recovery force arrival, or when threats in the objective area require extensive
38 suppression.

39
40 h. **Support Aircraft.** Tankers, ~~airborne battlefield command and control center (ABCCC),~~
41 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
42 (JSTARS), EW/intelligence, and other aircraft provide vital support to the CSARTF. Availability of
43 support aircraft is often the difference between the success or failure of a PR operation. Fixed-



Component commanders should plan for and conduct personnel recovery operations using all capabilities available.

1 wing, tanker-capable, assets can play a critical role in extending the operational range of refuelable
2 helicopters. While refueling operations in a permissive environment are highly desirable, the depth
3 of the battlespace and the isolated personnel's location may require such operations be conducted
4 in an uncertain or hostile operational environment.

5
6 i. **Communications Plan.** An effective communication plan is an important part of a
7 successful CSARTF. A generic CSARTF communication plan should be developed for the
8 operational area and distributed through the ATO SPINS. All CSARTF assets should be secure
9 voice capable. Additionally, all CSARTF members should be familiar with mission chattermarks,
10 code words, and brevity information as it pertains to the CSARTF phases. See Figure VI-4.

11
12 j. **Interoperability.** Interoperability requirements ~~—the ability of systems, units, or forces to~~
13 ~~provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services~~
14 ~~so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together—~~are usually identified when PR
15 planning and operations involve forces from two or more joint force components. Since PR
16 missions normally require an urgent response, an understanding of potential interoperability
17 requirements is essential to successful and timely joint PR planning and execution. Interoperability is
18 essential to joint shipboard helicopter operations, communications, intelligence automated data
19 processing, fuel and refueling, and maps and charts.

20
21 (1) **Ship-Helicopter Interoperability** should be considered during PR operations in the
22 maritime and coastal environments. The extended range of some helicopters makes the use of




Figure VI-4. Sample Combat Search and Rescue Task Force Communications Plan

1 shipboard support facilities feasible in certain inland PR scenarios. Generally, US Coast Guard and
 2 Navy flight-deck-equipped vessels are capable of recovering, supporting, and launching US Army
 3 and US Air Force (USAF) helicopters operated by deck-landing qualified aircrews. Specific
 4 procedures and requirements for operating helicopters on flight-deck-equipped US Coast
 5 Guard and Navy vessels, to include hospital ships, are contained in JP 3-04.1, *Joint Tactics,*
 6 *Techniques, and Procedures for Shipboard Helicopter Operations*; NWP 3-04.1M, *Helicopter*
 7 *Operating Procedures for Air-Capable Ships*; [Naval Air Systems Command \(NAVAIR\)](#) 00-

80T-105, CV Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) Manual; NAVAIR 00-80T-106, LHA/LPH/LHD NATOPS Manual; and Commandant, United States Coast Guard Instruction (COMDTINST) M3710.2 (Series), Shipboard-Helicopter Operational Procedures Manual. Physical dimensions and flight-deck clearance information are contained in NAEC-ENG-7576, Shipboard Aviation Facilities Resume.

(2) **Communications Equipment.** Interoperability of communications equipment in PR operations is essential, particularly when a joint CSARTF is employed. Adequate, secure communications that support the timing and coordination necessary for successful PR operations becomes considerably more difficult as additional resources are added to the CSARTF. Depending upon the composition of the joint force, specific communications interoperability considerations should include the potential for PR-related air-to-air, surface-to-air, and/or surface-to-surface communications. Communications equipment that is not interoperable could preclude the effective usefulness of a joint CSARTF and may be a factor for assigning the PR mission to a single component as a mission-type order. Coalition PR will typically be challenged by communications interoperability issues.

(3) **TADILs** must be interoperable, otherwise the user is required to revert to voice systems, negating the TADIL advantage. TADIL network capacity must take into consideration the number and variance of terminals (US and NATO) in a geographic area, and the gateways must allow interoperability among new emerging gateways to/from other communications networks. Joint strategy is migrating toward DOD-standard TADILs, specifically the J-series, which includes Link 16 and the exchange of J-series messages over non-Joint Tactical Information Distribution System media, referred to as joint range extension. Note: Current USAF recovery force aircraft are not equipped with a TADIL. Link 16 will be implemented as the primary DOD TADIL network for processed C4I and applicable weapon systems information. For interoperability, J-series messages are the preferred format for BLOS TADIL exchanges. Recovery forces and PR C2 nodes also must have compatibility with the developing DOD standard for radios — the joint tactical radio system (JTRS); which is a high-capacity tactical radio used for LOS and BLOS voice, data, and video exchange. JTRS will improve interoperability because it facilitates multi-data link implementation and gateway capabilities, is software reprogrammable, and communicates with legacy and future radio waveforms.

(4) **Fuel and Refueling.** Interoperable fuel and refueling equipment must be considered during joint PR planning.

(a) Cross-tasking of PR assets, particularly helicopters, may result in unanticipated fuel requirements. ~~Some helicopters use more than one type of fuel. For example, Marine Corps CH 46s and Army CH 47s and OH 58s use JP 4, JP 5, or JP 8. Shipboard fuel safety restrictions can impact operations. As an example, fire safety requirements aboard Navy vessels preclude routine refueling of helicopters or other aircraft that have been fueled with fuels having a volatility higher than JP 5.~~

(b) Refueling interoperability requirements include both ground and aerial refueling considerations. Nozzles, fittings, and couplings vary among Service helicopters. Cross-tasking of helicopters for PR may also require cross-tasking of refueling support (ground and/or aerial) for these aircraft.

(5) **Maps and Charts.** Maps and charts play a key role in the planning and execution of PR operations. The necessity for PR planners, isolated personnel, and operators to use the same map and/or chart ~~series or sheet datum~~ is particularly crucial to a successful PR mission. With a search capability already limited by scarce resources and probably further debilitated by hostile capabilities and intent, it is essential that PR forces use the same reference points and same reference system (e.g., grid or latitude and longitude) for ingress, recovery, and egress. Timely and accurate coordination and use of supporting arms in PR are also facilitated by using the same map and/or chart series or sheet.

~~2. Nonconventional Assisted Recovery~~

~~a. **General.** NAR integrates the participation and contributions of the Department of Defense, OGAs, and indigenous or surrogate forces into military PR operations. NAR is planned and conducted by SOF and OGAs who are specially trained to develop a NAR infrastructure and interface with or employ indigenous or surrogate personnel. NAR performed solely by SOF is called UAR. The employment of recovery mechanisms (RMs) using indigenous or surrogate forces recruited, trained, supported, advised, or led by US forces provides additional operational flexibility due to their access and relative freedom of movement in uncertain, hostile, or denied areas. These forces can operate in areas where it may not be feasible to use PR forces. NAR forces generally deploy into their assigned areas prior to execution of a military operation and provide the JFC with coordinated PR capability for as long as they remain viable.~~

~~b. **Characteristics.** NAR operations differ from other military PR operations in the degree of political risk; operational techniques; relative independence from friendly support; dependence on detailed operational intelligence and OPSEC; the potential use of indigenous or surrogate forces; limited opportunity and resources; specialized training, equipment and capabilities; and longer planning timelines to develop, train, and equip recovery forces. NAR operations require specialized TTP executed by small, specially trained and configured organizations capable of independent operations where the use of other PR forces is inappropriate or infeasible.~~

~~c. **Specified Tasks.** NAR forces must be capable of conducting five specified tasks—**contact, authenticate, support** and **move**, and then **exfiltrate** isolated personnel back to friendly control. These tasks are primarily focused on the three of the five PR execution tasks, locate (contact, authenticate), support (support), and recover (move and exfiltrate). These tasks remain constant, regardless of the mission profile. The tasks are separate but may be conducted concurrently or sequentially. However, all tasks must be conducted to complete the mission.~~

~~(1) **Contact** involves all actions that lead to the positive control of isolated personnel. It consists of pre-designated actions taken by isolated personnel and NAR forces to facilitate their link up in hostile territory. Contact between isolated personnel and a recovery force requires comprehensive preplanning. Successful contact is the last event in a series of specific actions isolated personnel must initiate, and the entire sequence is based on the guidelines and policies coordinated by the JPRC. Once contact is established, tight control of the isolated personnel by the NAR force must be maintained throughout the operation to maintain OPSEC.~~

~~(2) **Authenticate**~~

~~(a) **Management.** The JFSOCC has authentication authority for NAR, which may be delegated to the UARCC Director. During NAR operations, the NAR force facilitates the process. The UARCC is the link between the JPRC and the NAR force. The JPRC forwards ISOPREP and EPA information to the UARCC. Only the minimum amount of information required to perform authentication (usually in the form of questions) is forwarded to the NAR force. Definitive authentication may be based on the information contained in the ATO SPINS, the ISOPREP card or EPA, detailed physical description, photo, fingerprint information, or any combination thereof.~~

~~(b) **Custody.** When feasible after taking custody of isolated personnel, the NAR force will initiate the authentication. Until authentication is complete, the individual is safeguarded, not only from the adversary, but also to ensure OPSEC of the NAR force. While the level of control exerted over isolated personnel will be much more stringent prior to authentication, it should be proportional to the situation. Sensory deprivation and physical restraints should be used only if the perceived level of risk is commensurate with these measures, and not as a matter of SOP. Once authentication is complete, the control measures may be relaxed, but control must be maintained until exfiltration is complete.~~

~~(3) **Support.** Support entails all actions taken to safeguard and monitor the physical and mental well-being of, and provide shelter, food, and clothing to, isolated personnel in the custody of a NAR force. Isolated personnel should be thoroughly briefed by the NAR force on procedures, restrictions, and re-contact plans. Direct interface between isolated personnel and the NAR recovery force should be limited to preserve the OPSEC and future viability of the NAR force.~~

~~(4) **Move.** The movement phase of NAR consists of all actions taken to transport isolated personnel from a contact point to an exfiltration site. Movement may include multiple legs, methods, and/or elements. It may involve transporting isolated personnel from a contact point to, or between, one or more elements of an infrastructure (safe site/holding area, crossover/handover site, NAR forces) and ultimately, to a final exfiltration site. To ensure the future viability of the NAR force and the safety of isolated personnel, OPSEC must be maintained throughout the movement phase. OPSEC procedures practiced by the NAR force will impact movement speed to the exfiltration point. There may be occasion when the NAR force that made initial contact cannot, for operational reason or other limitations, deliver the isolated personnel safely to friendly control. In~~

such cases, isolated personnel may be turned over to another NAR or recovery force to complete exfiltration or extraction. The Director, UARCC, is responsible for coordinating all handovers/crossovers of isolated personnel during NAR missions.

(5) ~~**Exfiltrate.** Exfiltration is the final movement of isolated personnel from uncertain or hostile territory to friendly control. Exfiltration will occur by the most secure means available, be it an exfiltration point serviced by a CSARTF, by clandestine aircraft or watercraft, by ground movement across an international border, or the passage of friendly lines.~~

d. ~~**Forces.** SOF, other DOD and government agencies, multinational, and indigenous or surrogate forces may provide NAR assets. Indigenous or surrogate forces include but are not limited to local nationals, guerrilla groups, resistance forces, third country nationals, or other clandestine organizations. These forces may be employed unilaterally or in combination.~~

(1) ~~**Guerrillas.** The use of guerrillas to recover isolated personnel may provide added operational flexibility. Depending on the size of the guerrilla groups and their territorial control, these groups may be free to operate more overtly and control or limit adversary activity in the group's base camp areas. For these reasons, isolated personnel do not pose as great a security threat to guerrilla groups as they do to SOF teams. Additionally, there may be less of a requirement to quickly exfiltrate isolated personnel from these groups. There are two types of guerrilla groups—sponsored and unsponsored.~~

(a) ~~**Sponsored** guerrilla groups may be supported, led, or advised by US or allied SOF elements. They may be recruited and trained by friendly forces or they may be dependent on allied countries. Because exfiltration of personnel and materiel may be a routine operation for these groups, isolated personnel may be more expeditiously returned to friendly territory through their assistance. Planners should ensure guerrilla groups can use the communications, contact, and authentication procedures, which have been established for the operational area.~~

(b) ~~**Un-sponsored** independent guerrilla groups may be comprised of mercenaries, dissidents, and outlaws. They may provide assistance to isolated personnel when it is in the group's perceived best interest, or through the convincing lure of a blood chit reward. PSYOP may be employed to convince such groups it is in their best interest to aid isolated personnel. Because it is unlikely that independent groups will have been trained in the same communications, contact, and authentication procedures as sponsored groups; planners trying to make use of such groups should be prepared to employ modified or alternate procedures. The use of unsponsored guerrilla groups to support recovery operations presents certain problems.~~

1. ~~Communications limitations between friendly forces and these guerrilla groups can increase the difficulty in arranging the recovery of isolated personnel, thereby extending the evasion period.~~

~~2. Under certain conditions the group may try to use isolated personnel to augment its forces. This situation presents problems because guerrilla groups may conduct operations in violation of US policy or international law. Under these conditions, isolated personnel are to resist guerrilla attempts to solicit their participation and, if forced to participate, avoid direct involvement or minimize the effects of such actions.~~

~~3. Such groups may perceive advantages in retaining isolated personnel for extended periods for use as a bargaining chip. Because independent guerrilla groups may perceive them as de facto representatives of the USG, isolated personnel should conduct themselves with the utmost discretion while in their control.~~

~~(2) **Clandestine organizations** are comprised mainly of indigenous personnel operating clandestinely or covertly in all or part of the operational area who are engaged in activities designed to change the political or military situation in their area of interest. These individuals may be political dissidents or minority groups that support resistance, revolution, or friendly intelligence activities by collecting, hiding, and forwarding materiel, information, and personnel.~~

~~(3) **Recovery Teams (RTs)** are designated US or US-directed forces, operating unilaterally or in concert with indigenous or surrogate forces, tasked to conduct NAR. RTs deploy into uncertain or hostile areas prior to military operations in support of the JFC's comprehensive PR plan. Once an RT has been emplaced, it may remain in the assigned operational area for an extended period of time to support future recoveries. RTs may operate unilaterally; with OGAs or other NAR, US, and multinational PR forces; or through indigenous or surrogate forces. RTs unilaterally conducting NAR missions must be prepared to interact with, receive from, crossover to, or develop a new RM. An **unconventional assisted recovery team (UART)** is a designated SOF unconventional warfare (UW) ground or maritime force conducting UAR/NAR operations either unilaterally or by the use of, or working with or through, indigenous or surrogate forces.~~

~~(4) **Recovery Mechanism.** A RM is an indigenous or surrogate infrastructure that is specifically developed, trained, and directed by US forces to perform NAR. RMs may operate with other US or multinational PR forces. Their use should always be considered and, whenever appropriate, incorporated into PR planning. With proper planning and support, RMs can be established in most environments.~~

~~(a) **Establishment Considerations.** The development and emplacement of a RM may take a substantial investment of time, money, and effort. RMs must be established before initiating military operations, or they likely will not be available to the JFC. No amount of last-minute command interest, or sudden infusion of resources, can expedite the process without seriously jeopardizing the RM's security. Constant support of RMs at certain minimal levels is ultimately more successful and less expensive than sudden, sporadic support.~~

~~(b) **Operations.** Due to the unique procedures employed in RM operations, OPSEC is critical not only to the RTs and the isolated personnel but to the continued survival of the~~

~~RM. When planning RM operations; all security, communications, intelligence, diplomatic, command, supply, transportation, fiscal, and legal procedures should be consistent with the goals of returning isolated personnel to friendly control while ensuring the continued survival of the RM.~~

~~(5) An **unconventional assisted recovery mechanism (UARM)** is a specifically developed infrastructure using SOF that may employ indigenous or surrogate persons recruited, trained, and advised by SOF to clandestinely or covertly contact, authenticate, support, move, and exfiltrate designated isolated personnel from hostile areas to friendly control. An UARM encompasses SOF activities related to the creation, coordination, supervision, C2, and employment of the UARM in support of combatant commands.~~

2. Non-Conventional Assisted Recovery

a. General. It is DOD policy to complement its personnel recovery capabilities with NAR to recover isolated personnel in those instances when the use of conventional recovery forces in adversary-held or hostile areas is neither feasible, acceptable, or is non-existent. NAR is PR conducted by SOF ~~unconventional~~ **warfare (UW)** ground and maritime forces, and OGAs who are specifically trained and directed to establish and operate indigenous or surrogate infrastructures for PR. NAR operations involve the employment of **recovery teams (RTs)** and **recovery mechanisms (RMs)**. NAR operations may be covert or clandestine. NAR requires pre-crisis deliberate planning, training and support to reduce risk by developing assets and credible capabilities. NAR capabilities are especially advantageous in areas where adversary air or ground threat prevents conventional recovery operations. In accordance with US Code Title 10, DODI 2310.6, USSOCOM Directive 525-21cc, FM 3-05.220, *Advanced Special Operations*, UAR is NAR conducted by SOF, specifically US Army Special Forces and US Navy SEALs. UAR is a subset and integral component of UW.

b. Characteristics. NAR requires specialized TTP executed by small, specially trained and configured organizations capable of independent operations. NAR operations differ from other military PR operations by:

(1) Potential use of indigenous or surrogate assets.

(2) Generally relies on a robust infrastructure developed by trained NAR forces.

(3) Planning and deployment of forces occurs pre-strike.

(4) Specialized training, equipment and capabilities to develop and employ indigenous UW infrastructure.

(5) Operational techniques, environment, and unorthodox approach.

(6) Higher degree of political risk.

(7) Dependence on detailed operational intelligence and OPSEC.

(8) Potential to operate independent from friendly support.

(9) Longer planning timelines to develop, train, and equip.

c. **Specified Tasks.** PR is an integral part of military operations. Combatant commanders are responsible for developing plans and requirements to report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate isolated personnel. NAR capabilities fully support and are integrated into the five execution tasks of PR.

(1) **Report.** NAR forces are typically employed in an operational area prior to an isolating event. They can personally witness the event, or can be made aware of the presence of an isolated person through the indigenous population. NAR forces report the occurrence of the event, or the presence of an isolated person, through established infrastructure and procedures to the UARCC.

(2) **Locate.** NAR forces may assist in locating an isolated person within the restrictions of their access, and population control measures. NAR forces can confirm the location of an isolated person by corroborating intelligence collected by national asset reporting, and can confirm the validity of GTAS, RAS, and other signals an isolated person may employ in conjunction with the CSAR SPINS.

(3) **Support.** NAR forces can support isolated personnel via pre-positioned caches prior to contact with a NAR recovery force. Once in the custody of a NAR force, NAR elements may provide food, shelter, security, medical care, and other forms of support to the isolated person.

(4) **Recover.** NAR forces can establish contact with isolated personnel, take them under positive control, authenticate their identity, and provide security and support to their basic needs. Furthermore, NAR forces can transport isolated personnel for transfer to another NAR force, or to a conventional recovery force for ultimate exfiltration to definitive US control.

(5) **Reintegration.** NAR subject matter experts from JPRA conduct operational debriefings of recovered personnel who may have come into contact with a NAR force. NAR debriefings are conducted to protect any sensitive information related to NAR operations and infrastructure.

d. Although NAR supports the five execution tasks of PR, the tactical execution of NAR focuses primarily on the recover task. NAR relies on the capability of NAR forces to conduct five specified tasks. These tasks remain constant, regardless of the mission profile. The tasks are separate but may be conducted concurrently or sequentially, however all tasks must be conducted to complete the mission. The five specified tasks of NAR/UAR are: contact, authenticate, support,

move, and exfiltrate isolated personnel to friendly control. Though these specified tasks remain constant, the TTP employed to accomplish them may be many and varied, allowing for a unit's or an individual's particular training strengths, equipment or employment criteria. During the recovery process, contingencies must be considered in the event the isolated person becomes separated from the recovery force. These contingencies will facilitate re-contact with the isolated person at a later time in accordance with the capabilities and limitations of the recovery force. During all phases of the recovery process, the should be isolated person briefed on pertinent procedures, restrictions, and re-contact plans while in the custody of the NAR recovery force.

(1) **Contact.** Contact entails all actions that lead to the positive control of isolated personnel. This may include locating the isolated personnel, use of technical and non-technical communications, and employment of various conventional and unconventional PR techniques and procedures. Locating isolated personnel is the most critical step in the process to return them to friendly control. The ability to rapidly and precisely locate isolated personnel requires the integrated and synchronized capabilities of all recovery assets from the national level to the component level.

(a) **Process.** NAR force TTP employed to locate isolated personnel must maximize and exploit the opportunities for success. TTP must be tailored to mission, enemy, terrain, and weather, time, troops available, and civilians considerations, NAR force training and equipment, and the applicable recovery considerations (availability of resources, capabilities and limitations, task organizing, recovery criteria, location and physical condition of the isolated person, access, time, movement, capacity, and risk assessment). A NAR force must be able to locate isolated personnel in all weather and light conditions, and in both rural and urban environments.

(b) **Guidelines.** When developing standards and guidelines for contact procedures, several factors should be considered. These include, but are not limited to, the type of terrain in the operational or recovery area (desert, jungle, urban, and other types of terrain), the equipment and evasion aids that may or may not be available to isolated personnel, and adversary capabilities (such as air superiority, reconnaissance or direction-finding capabilities). The JPRC coordinates and disseminates the theater-specific policies that will guide isolated personnel actions from the moment of isolation to actual contact with a recovery force. The JPRC should widely distribute these policies to ensure commanders, potential isolated personnel, recovery forces, and mission planners understand their respective roles in the operation. The entire sequence for contacting an isolated person is based on the guidelines and policies coordinated by the JPRC, and isolated personnel must initiate series of specific actions leading to successful contact.

(c) **Contact Considerations.** Whenever an individual is recovered with the assistance of a NAR force, the most critical aspect of the recovery is the moment the isolated person and the recovery force first meet. This period is very dangerous because it requires two parties, unknown to each other and located in hostile territory, to meet without being detected by either adversary forces or elements of the local population, and without compromising either party's security. Contact between isolated personnel and a recovery force requires comprehensive preplanning. The JPRC, assisted by component intelligence and operations specialists, must ensure

1 the appropriate contact procedures are developed and provided in the CSAR SPINS. The SPINS
2 impart detailed E+R procedures primarily for potential isolated personnel. The JFC must ensure
3 that joint force components are familiar and comply with CSAR SPINS procedures to preclude
4 placing recovery forces at great risk, and avoid significant recovery delays or capture of the isolated
5 person by adversary forces.

6
7 (d) **Intent.** All measures must be taken to keep the procedures for contact as
8 simple as possible, while still affording the requisite security measures essential to the protection of
9 both the NAR force and the isolated person. The isolated person must make a conscious decision
10 to deviate from his normal evasion routine in order to initiate actions that will signal his intent to
11 make contact with a NAR force. The isolated person is no longer evading from all unknown
12 persons; he is now looking for someone that will carry out a specific act indicating his intent to
13 assist. There are two basic scenarios for coordinating contact:

14
15 1. **Technical communications with isolated personnel.** The isolated person
16 has established technical communications (e.g. radio communications) with friendly forces. The
17 isolated person could receive contact instructions via radio from an outside source such as an
18 overhead AWACS or from the JPRC. The NAR force will be alerted to service a coordinated
19 contact point by the UARCC. All contact procedures are coordinated at the JPRC and UARCC
20 and then passed to both the isolated person and the NAR force. For instance, if an isolated person

1 is to make contact at a location known to a NAR force, the isolated person can be directed to that
2 location and make contact in accordance with the pre-arranged contact procedures received by
3 radio. The isolated person would know when to expect contact, and the NAR force would know
4 the isolated person is in place prior to initiating contact procedures. Technical communications with
5 the isolated person affords the UAR force greater flexibility, and greatly increases its ability to make
6 contact.

7
8 **2. Absence of technical communications with isolated personnel.** This
9 situation requires that the isolated person include potential contact procedures with a recovery force
10 without communications in his EPA. For instance, the isolated person could state in his EPA that he
11 will initiate signals that would assist a recovery force in finding his location and make contact. (e.g.
12 isolated person states in his EPA that he will put out a RAS, and will be located 100 yards due
13 north from that location). The isolated person must consider both day and night signals. The CSAR
14 SPINS serve as comprehensive guide as to what signals an isolated person should consider to
15 facilitate their recovery.

16
17 **(e) EPA Application.** The unit's PR coordinator is responsible for ensuring
18 potential isolated personnel provide a comprehensive EPA that complies with theater policies, plans,
19 orders, and SPINS. Isolated personnel should follow their EPA as closely as possible. Their
20 degree of adherence to, and skill in execution of EPA activities are crucial to successful contact and
21 recovery operations.

22
23 **(2) Authenticate.** As soon as tactically feasible, the NAR force will initiate the
24 authentication process to determine that the isolated person is in fact the person it has been tasked
25 to recover. "Authentication is the process whereby the identity of an isolated person is confirmed"
26 (JP 1-02).

27
28 **(a) Control.** After contact is established, control of the isolated person must be
29 maintained throughout the remainder of the operation. Once an isolated person has been located,
30 contacted, and taken into the custody of the NAR force, the individual must be authenticated. Until
31 the authentication is complete, the individual is safeguarded not only from the adversary, but also to
32 protect the operational security of the NAR force. While the level of control exerted over the
33 isolated person will be much more stringent prior to authentication, it should be proportional to the
34 situation. Sensory deprivation and physical restraints should be used only if the perceived level of
35 risk is commensurate with these measures, and not as a matter of SOP. Once the isolated person is
36 authenticated, the control measures exerted over him may be relaxed; but control must be
37 maintained throughout the isolated person's association with NAR forces. The isolated person
38 could be suffering a significant amount of physical, emotional, and mental stress; may be suffering
39 from some form of exposure and/or deprivation; and may have sustained injuries during or after the
40 isolating event. Thus, safeguarding isolated personnel also means protecting them from their own
41 impaired judgment and decision-making abilities.
42

1 **(b) Authentication Management.** Within a theater of operations, authentication is
2 managed by the JPRC. The JPRC establishes the thresholds for authentication. In the conduct of
3 NAR operations, the NAR force facilitates the process. The UARCC is the linkage between the
4 two. The JPRC forwards the isolated personnel's ISOPREP and EPA information to the UARCC.
5 Only the minimum amount of information required to perform authentication is forwarded to the
6 NAR force, usually in the form of questions. Definitive authentication may be based on the
7 information contained in the theater CSAR SPINS, isolated personnel's ISOPREP card or EPA,
8 detailed physical description, digital photo, fingerprint information, or any combination thereof. The
9 NAR force conveys to the UARCC the isolated person's responses to the authentication questions.
10 The JFSOCC has the authority to positively authenticate the identity of an isolated person under the
11 control of NAR forces, which he may delegate to the UARCC director. The UARCC confirms or
12 denies authentication. Since the NAR force or parts thereof may only have access to non-technical,
13 clandestine communications, the process of authentication of some isolated personnel may take days
14 or weeks. This potential time lag needs to be factored into the considerations for control and
15 support of the isolated individual.

16
17 **(3) Support.** Support includes all actions taken to provide sustainment to the isolated
18 person, and ensure his or her well being. The isolated person may not be in the best physical,
19 mental, or emotional condition upon making contact with the NAR force. The NAR force should
20 provide the greatest degree of support possible without compromising operational security. The
21 isolated person's direct interface with the NAR recovery force should be strictly limited to preserve
22 OPSEC and the future viability of the NAR infrastructure. Isolated personnel should be thoroughly
23 briefed by the NAR force on procedures, restrictions, and re-contact plans while in their custody.

24
25 **(a) Sustain.** When possible, the isolated person should be provided sufficient
26 nourishment, clothing, shelter, safeguarding, and medical care to restore and sustain their health and
27 physical condition. Evasion may have drained the isolated person of strength and energy that must
28 be restored prior to subsequent movement. The logistic support required to sustain a potentially
29 injured individual while waiting to move him, and during actual movement, without violating OPSEC,
30 will be one of the NAR recovery force's primary planning considerations.

31
32 **(b) Monitor/Assess.** Isolated personnel must be continually assessed and
33 monitored throughout the duration of the recovery process. It is important that the isolated person
34 not deteriorate physically or mentally. It may be beneficial to reassure them occasionally to help
35 maintain morale and focus on their successful return to friendly control.

36
37 **(4) Move.** The movement phase of the recovery process consists of all actions taken to
38 transport isolated personnel from a contact point to an exfiltration site. The movement may include
39 multiple legs, multiple methods, or multiple elements. Isolated personnel must be thoroughly briefed
40 by the NAR force regarding procedures, restrictions, and re-contact plans while in transit. To
41 ensure the future viability of the NAR force and the safety of the isolated person, OPSEC
42 procedures practiced by the NAR force will impact the speed at which the isolated person is moved
43 from place to place. The logistic austerity of both the environment and the NAR force, and the

distance over which the isolated person must be transported will also affect the movement process. There may be occasions when the recovery force that made the initial contact with the isolated person cannot, for operational reasons or other considerations, deliver the isolated person safely to friendly control. In such cases, the isolated person may be turned over to another NAR asset or to a conventional recovery force to complete the extraction from hostile territory. The UARCC is responsible for coordinating all handovers/crossovers of isolated personnel recovered by a NAR force.

(5) **Exfiltrate.** Exfiltration is the final action to remove isolated personnel from hostile territory to definitive USG control in a non-hostile environment. Exfiltration will occur by the most secure means available, be it an exfiltration point serviced by a CSARTF, by clandestine aircraft or watercraft, by ground movement crossing an international border, or through the passage of friendly lines.

e. **NAR Forces.** SOF and other DOD and USG agencies may provide NAR assets to contact, authenticate, move, support, and exfiltrate isolated personnel to friendly control. Forces may be employed to conduct unilateral NAR operations or may work in conjunction with RMs. These forces develop specific, detailed plans to complement or provide other PR capabilities. NAR forces primarily consist of:

(1) **US Army Special Forces (SF).** UW is the fundamental and foundational mission of SF. In the conduct of UAR, SF is normally tasked to service coordinated contact points within their assigned area of operation. SF may conduct UAR unilaterally, with indigenous/surrogate assets, or in conjunction with OGAs.

(2) **Navy Special Warfare Forces (NSWF).** NSWF are organized and trained to conduct UW operations primarily in maritime, littoral, and riverine environments. NSWF may conduct UAR unilaterally, with indigenous/surrogate assets, or in conjunction with OGAs. NSWF have the capability to exfiltrate isolated personnel by submarine or surface vessel.

(3) **Indigenous/Surrogate Personnel.** Indigenous or surrogate forces include, but are not limited to local nationals, guerrilla groups, resistance forces, third country nationals, or other clandestine organizations. The use of such forces recruited, trained, supported, advised or led by US SOF, UW forces, and OGAs may provide additional operational flexibility.

(4) **Recovery Team.** RTs are designated US or US-directed forces, that are specifically trained to operate unilaterally or in conjunction with indigenous or surrogate forces, and are tasked to contact, authenticate, support, move and exfiltrate isolated personnel. RTs deploy into uncertain or hostile areas prior to strike operations in support of the JFC's comprehensive PR plan. RTs may interoperate with other NAR forces, and other US or multinational PR capabilities. A designated SOF UW ground or maritime force tasked to act as a RT is known as an unconventional assisted recovery team (UART).

(5) **Recovery Mechanism.** A RM is a designated indigenous or surrogate infrastructure specifically developed, trained and directed by US forces to contact, authenticate, support, move, and exfiltrate designated isolated personnel from uncertain or hostile areas to friendly control. RMs may interoperate with other US or multinational PR capabilities. An unconventional assisted recovery mechanism (UARM) is an RM specifically developed, trained, coordinated, and advised by SOF UW ground and maritime forces to perform the specified tasks of NAR. UARMs may interoperate with other NAR forces, and other US or multinational capabilities. A UARM encompasses SOF activities related to the creation, coordination, supervision, C2, and employment of RMs in support of geographic combatant commands, and may include the use of an RT or a UART. A UART unilaterally conducting an UAR mission must be prepared to interact with, receive from, crossover to, or develop a new RM. Therefore the skill sets are the same as those utilized by an element working solely with an UARM.

(a) **Value of RMs.** RMs are valuable assets because they can support and supplement both conventional and unconventional recovery operations. Their potential value should always be considered and, whenever appropriate, incorporated into recovery planning. With proper planning and support, RMs can be established in almost any environment.

(b) **Establishment of RMs in Advance of Operations.** RMs should be created and maintained in advance of their potential need. The process of establishing viable RMs is long, hazardous, and expensive. No amount of last-minute command interest, or sudden infusion of resources, can expedite the process without seriously jeopardizing the security of the mechanism. Constant support of RMs at certain minimal levels is ultimately more successful and less expensive than sudden, sporadic support.

(c) **Special Procedures for RMs.** Successful RM operations require special procedures. RM operations cannot be conducted under the same principles as conventional military operations. When planning RM operations, all security, communications, intelligence, diplomatic, command, supply, transportation, fiscal, and legal procedures should be consistent with the goals of returning isolated personnel to friendly control, while ensuring the continued survival of the RM.

(6) **Resistance Force.** The use resistance forces to recover isolated personnel may provide added operational flexibility. Depending on the size of the resistance forces and their territorial control, they may be free to operate in a more overt manner, and can control or limit adversary activity in their operational area. For these reasons, isolated personnel do not pose as great a security threat to a resistance force as they do to SOF units. In addition, there may be less of a requirement to quickly exfiltrate isolated personnel from these groups.

(a) **Sponsored Guerrilla Groups.** US or multinational SF elements may support, lead, or advise sponsored guerrilla groups. Friendly forces may recruit and train guerrilla groups, or guerrilla groups may be dependent on allied countries. Because exfiltration of personnel and materiel may be a routine operation for these groups, isolated personnel may be more expeditiously returned to friendly control through their assistance. Planners should ensure guerrilla groups can

correctly use the communications, contact, and authentication procedures that have been established for the theater of operations. Isolated personnel who find themselves under the control of such guerrilla groups should comply with all reasonable instructions issued by the group.

(b) Clandestine Organizations. Clandestine organizations are comprised mainly of indigenous personnel operating clandestinely and/or covertly in the hostile territory. Clandestine organizations are engaged in activities designed to change the political or military situation in that territory. These organizations may be comprised of political dissidents or minority groups that support resistance, revolution, or friendly intelligence activities by collecting, hiding, and forwarding materiel, information, and isolated personnel.

SECTION B. REPORT

JFCs may be notified of a PR requirement through any portion of the joint or component force C2 structure (See Figure VI-5). The distress indicator may be detected by ~~none~~component multiple assets, such as AWACS, ~~or~~ SARSAT, and/or wingman and relayed directly to the JPRC, ~~which may cause causing~~ multiple reports of the same incident. Nevertheless, personnel should adhere to the procedures outlined below. Adversaries may employ counter PR techniques to lure assets to an ambush. Confirmation of actual reported PR events is essential to protect PR forces.

3. Distress Notification

a. Self-Reporting/Identification




Figure VI-5. Typical Personnel Recovery Incident Reporting Avenues

(1) **General.** The ideal method to validate an isolation event and convey accurate location and physical health data, is through self-reporting by the isolated person. All isolated personnel should attempt to report their situation as soon as feasible after isolation with consideration for blending in with the environment, ~~and~~ avoiding adversary threats, and compromising the security of the contact area. Isolated personnel should generally not display international distress signals or transmit blind distress calls unless briefed to do so or if forces in the immediate vicinity are known to be friendly.

(2) **Emergency Personal Locator Beacon (PLB).** The aircrew emergency PLB is a UHF transmitter designed to emit a timed transmission (10-minute cycle) on international guard frequency 243.0 ~~megahertz~~ (MHz) or 406 MHz. When properly configured, it activates automatically upon parachute deployment. Consideration should be given to disabling the automatic activation if flying over adversary territory. In an evasion situation, personnel should remove the PLB from the seat or survival kit and maintain it as an alternate signaling device. The PLB should only be used as briefed, as it is susceptible to adversary DF.

b. **Emergency Frequency Monitoring.** All ~~aircraft-assets~~ should monitor emergency frequencies and acknowledge, ~~or record~~ and relay distress transmissions, ~~if possible and receiving asset's location at time of receipt.~~

c. A **distress indicator** may be a MAYDAY call, failure to return from a mission, overdue contact, receipt of an emergency beacon/transponder transmission, sighting of aircraft or vessel going down, report of personnel being isolated by adversary activity, and/or receipt of a voice transmission from isolated personnel. **Any unit, agency, aircrew, ground personnel, or individual** first observing an isolation event (e.g., bailout, crash, or ditching or incomplete muster) or contacting isolated personnel should notify their component PRCC through appropriate channels.

d. **Notification Methods and Procedures.** The ATO SPINS dictate local notification methods and procedures. Generally, **isolated personnel** should attempt to establish radio contact with a wingman, escort aircraft, AWACS, JSTARS, ~~ABCCC~~, or any friendly force(s) in the area. Transmissions should be brief to avoid detection or localization by hostile forces.

(1) **In Flight.** Aircrews should provide **initial notification** before actual isolation, if possible. When aircrews detect significant aircraft problems, or when bailout, ejection, crash landing, or ditching appears imminent, they should (conditions permitting):

(a) Attempt to establish radio contact by calling "MAYDAY-MAYDAY-MAYDAY" on the frequency of last contact, an established common frequency, or the international emergency frequencies.

(b) When communication is established, transmit essential information that encompasses CALICS. These elements of information are necessary to establish an accurate location of the isolated personnel. If one or more elements are not known, the recovery forces may deduce the location from the other elements of information along with the search methods discussed in Section C, "Locate," below.

(2) **Communications Relay.** Any friendly force receiving information about distressed aircraft or isolated personnel should forward the details (by secure means if possible) to the nearest monitoring agency (e.g., ~~ABCCC~~, AWACS, E-2C, control and reporting center (CRC), JPRC). Extreme care should be taken to ensure the isolated personnel's situation is not compromised, and that relay transmissions do not interfere with distress calls.

(3) **Reporting/supporting aircrews** should remain in the area as conditions permit or until relieved by other aircraft. Do not circle directly over the isolated personnel. This may serve to mark the isolated personnel's position for hostile forces.

(a) Keep the parachute(s) in sight.

(b) Note the approximate ejection site and winds at altitude so that PR planners can compute the isolated personnel's probable landing position.

(c) Consider switching ~~IFF-identification, friend or foe~~ to EMERGENCY and transmitting "MAYDAY" on GUARD frequency. This technique should be carefully weighed against the probability of adversary detection.

(d) Provide communications relay and defensive cover if possible.

(e) Assume ~~OSC role, role of the OSC~~, as threat and mission allows, until properly relieved, or no longer able to sustain OSC role.

(f) Provide necessary updates, using CALICS, to include possible isolated personnel injuries, disposition and movement of hostile forces, terrain factors, and possible recovery sites.

4. Notification Responses

a. **Unit.** When notified of a subordinate element or individual's distress/isolation, the unit commander confirms the identity of the isolated personnel, notifies the parent PRCC of the incident, decides if immediate on-scene support is appropriate, designates an OSC accordingly, and forwards ISOPREP and EPA data as required. Unit commanders also need to report their present capability to conduct PR operations or the status of ongoing PR in support of their own operations. Chances of successful recovery are improved by acting quickly and using all immediately available resources. When immediate PR is not possible, available, or not approved by higher authority; the unit commander expeditiously requests PR assistance from the parent joint force component, using the most secure radio system available. Such requests should be followed by appropriate message traffic (e.g., SARIR, SARREQ).

b. **The component PRCC** assumes duties as the PR mission coordinator initially and reports the incident to the JPRC by the quickest and most secure means. (Such reports should be followed up using the applicable ~~USMTFs DMSs~~ or other electronic means as directed.). The component PRCC then initiates PR mission planning, determines the isolated personnel's location, notifies JPRC and the recovery force, receives an intelligence briefing on the threat surrounding the objective area (if known), tasks subordinate PR forces when authorized, and informs the JPRC if component recovery forces will attempt recovery. The component PRCC reports to the JPRC the present capabilities to conduct the PR mission and requests for PR support. The component PRCC will be the vital link between the OSC and joint PR support that may be available within or adjacent to the joint force. The component PRCC ~~also designates an ISOPREP control point and obtains ISOPREP data~~ and EPA data from the isolated personnel's unit, or retrieves the information from the PRMS database.

c. **The JPRC** forwards PR incident reports and information to higher authority as directed and alerts all forces operating in the area of the PR incident to report any evidence of isolated personnel. The JPRC also provides follow-up PR incident reports and information to higher

1 authority, adjacent JPRCs, and component PRCCs, as appropriate. Depending on the situation,
2 the JPRC also may:

3
4 (1) Notify JISE, JIC, and national-level intelligence agencies to initiate collection efforts to
5 refine the location of the isolated personnel and to assess the adversary threat in the objective area.

6
7 (2) Direct component(s) (parallel) plan as required.
8

9 *For further information on national PR support capabilities, refer to NSA and NRO*
10 *Information Memorandum, Personnel Recovery/Combat Search and Rescue Concept of*
11 *Operations for National SIGINT Support, (Secret). ~~For further information on intelligence~~*
12 *~~collection disciplines, refer to Appendix C, "Intelligence Disciplines," of JP 2-01, Joint~~*
13 *~~Intelligence Support to Military Operations, (Secret).~~*
14

15 (3) Coordinate JFC tasking of another component(s) (per the PR CONOPS) to execute
16 the PR mission when notified that a component is unable to do so or requires support.

17
18 (4) Coordinate with the components, as needed, for use of PR resources.

19
20 (5) Coordinate development of a CSARTF.

21
22 (6) Coordinate the use of SOF.

23
24 (7) Coordinate with the UARCC to alert RMs.
25

26 d. **PR Mission Coordinator.** After coordination with component PRCCs, the JPRC assigns
27 ~~a-the~~ PR mission coordinator role to a PRCC and provides all available data to the person or
28 organization so designated. The PR mission coordinator confirms and constantly updates CALICS
29 data and assists in planning the PR mission. Normally, component PRCCs represent the first line of
30 response for PR incidents. However, the JPRC may assume the role of PR mission coordinator
31 when any one of the following conditions apply:

32
33 (1) PRCCs are not established.

34
35 (2) The JPRC receives initial notification.

36
37 (3) The event is sufficiently complex to require response and/or tasking of more than one
38 component commanders.

39
40 (4) The mission is beyond the capability and/or availability of a single component.

41
42 (5) The PRCC providing the initial response requests additional assistance and that the
43 JPRC assume PR mission coordinator.

5. Locate

a. **General.** An accurate location is the most essential element of information in CALICS. Simply stated, isolated personnel can not be recovered if recovery forces do not know where to go. Furthermore, a successful recovery of isolated personnel depends on the degree of accuracy in, and reliability of, the location information. The most accurate location information is an electronic GPS transmission from the isolated personnel, followed in accuracy by voice communication, visual sighting, DF plot, and national collection assets. Other location information may require the employment of various search methods. As discussed, all the elements of information in CALICS can assist in obtaining SA and an accurate isolated personnel location. The process of evaluating information and improving/updating location information does not stop until isolated personnel enter the D&R-reintegration process. There are various search methods and the conduct of each one should be evaluated for the possible risks it creates to the ability of the isolated personnel to evade or survive (i.e., the search method may alert the adversary to the isolated personnel's political or military importance or may compromise their location) or OPSEC of the PR mission. Conversely, if an adversary has located and is moving to the isolated personnel, the risk of a highly visible PR mission may not be relevant and time becomes the critical factor. The risk of a search may be evaluated using the risk management techniques. Every effort should be made to employ UAVs, standoff platforms, and satellite systems before committing manned assets to conduct searches. The accuracy of the location information is inversely proportional to the risk of conducting the PR mission.

b. **Using Information Sources.** Each PR mission is unique, therefore innovative thinking and the use of established techniques will serve the PR force well. In addition to CALICS, adequate charts and available photos or imagery of the objective area, can assist in determining the isolated personnel's last known location, physical condition, direction of travel, and proximity to population centers, threats, or known recovery areas. EPA information, recorded contact information, the last known direction of travel and other pertinent information should be superimposed on a chart of the objective area to provide the search force with an isolated personnel movement pattern. Note natural boundaries and features such as hills, foliage, streams, or lakes that may enhance or restrict isolated personnel movement.

c. **Searches** include sensor and/or visual search methods that are specifically tailored for each PR incident. The operational environment, adversary activity, weather, time of day, and available resources all play an important role in selection of the search method and search area designation. Assets the JPRC should consider tasking to refine the isolated personnel's location include wingman, OSC, AWACS, E2C, ~~ABCCC~~, Rivet Joint, JSTARS, ~~COMPASS-CALL~~ Compass Call, ~~ground-control intercept~~ CRC, DF, FAC(A), intelligence, or other sensor and visual search means.

(1) **Sensor Searches** require an electronically permissive environment. Current radio systems are all subject to some degree of adversary jamming, deception, monitoring, or DF intrusion. Initial radio contact with isolated personnel usually occurs on an emergency (Guard)

frequency, but subsequent transmissions should be on a predesignated PR frequency. Standoff electronic support aircraft and satellites should be used for electronic search, if possible. The PR mission coordinator, in coordination with EW staff members, should determine an initial electronic search altitude and orbit location. Search aircrew should adjust the search altitude and location based on adversary acquisition radar capabilities against the minimum safe altitude commensurate with the aircraft's operating parameters. Electronic searches involving use of DF or homing equipment may be limited initially by the sending (i.e., emergency locator beacon) and receiving (i.e., homing adaptor) capabilities of isolated personnel and recovery forces and subsequently by adversary activity. ~~Faster moving DF capable aircraft should be used for electronic search only if the adversary's DF capabilities will not contribute to the capture of isolated personnel.~~ Search radars and DF or homing equipment may be used to conduct sensor searches. Search radars that may be available for PR missions include surface vessel radars, forward-looking airborne radars, and side-looking airborne radars. Some additional radio and electronic equipment limitations and capabilities are:

(a) **AN/PRC-90.** Because the adversary can intercept its signal, isolated personnel should limit radio transmissions and use code words until the recovery phase.

(b) **AN/PRC-112B.** AN/ARS-6 PLS interrogation of the AN/PRC-112B is limited by its LOS capability thereby presenting a major concern for helicopters operating in a threat environment at low altitudes. In addition, final authentication must still be ascertained to ensure the AN/PRC-112B operator is indeed friendly personnel.

(c) **AN/PRC-112B.** Each data burst transmission contains an eight element message that includes a radio identification number, most current GPS fix, datum in use, altitude, time of last GPS fix, time of data transmission, and last entered text message. PR mission coordinators should always check time of GPS fix against transmission time stamp and coordinates to ensure accuracy of information prior to relay to recovery forces.

(d) **AN/PRQ-7.** CSEL provides the JPRC, PRCC, and UARCC with the ability to positively identify, authenticate, and locate isolated personnel prior to employing recovery forces. Additionally, it allows the JPRC to pass information about the recovery mission back to isolated personnel.

See Chapter IV, "Products and Preparation, paragraph 3, "Isolated Personnel," for additional details of many of these radio systems.

(e) **ADF Equipment.** Caution should be used with this technique, as adversary forces also employ DF techniques to locate isolated personnel. Adversary DF and intelligence-gathering methods should be understood by all recovery mission participants prior to utilizing DF locating methods. Use of aircraft with high speed, accurate DF equipment, such as the ALD-9, will minimize required transmissions by the isolated personnel and reduce the probability of adversary detection.

1
2 (f) **SARSAT** and associated ground systems are capable of monitoring interference
3 signals and transmitters that malfunction on Guard frequencies. Malfunctioning transmitters could
4 adversely affect the location process or compromise unit or aircraft locations. JPRC users should
5 ensure that SARSAT visibility and availability schedules are published in the ATO SPINS. They
6 should also ensure that procedures are established to disseminate SARSAT visibility periods and
7 ground station data to PR and support agencies.
8

9 (2) **Visual Searches** using manned aircraft to conduct search patterns is not
10 recommended in other than permissive environments. However, reconnaissance flights are an
11 alternative when the isolated personnel's location has been somewhat refined. The PR mission
12 coordinator should be prepared to coordinate with appropriate elements of the JAOC for
13 reconnaissance flights over threat areas. Again, the decision process will assist the mission
14 coordinator in assessing threats, isolated personnel training, equipment capabilities, etc. to develop a
15 plan that has fully considered, to the extent possible under unique conditions, the risks and options
16 (e.g., day or night operations and passive or suppressive threat neutralization). Communications
17 plans and emission control procedures must be kept as simple and as streamlined as possible
18 without decreasing the SA of the search force.
19

20 (a) **Airborne Search.** Recovery planners may be able to define an air search
21 pattern if the operational environment allows. Otherwise, the only viable airborne search option
22 may be the use of unmanned or stand-off platforms. Searching along the isolated personnel's
23 intended flight or surface route, areas offering concealment, and prebriefed locations should be
24 considered. Search patterns should avoid major lines of communications, such as roads, railroads,
25 large rivers, or open valleys. These areas are normally frequented by people and often pose the
26 greatest threat to PR forces and isolated personnel. Combat reconnaissance assets and, in some
27 situations other aircraft, can conduct modified visual searches of specific areas in all operational
28 environments. However, their effectiveness is best if used once the search has been narrowed as
29 the evasion or concealment site of isolated personnel may be some distance from initial contact or
30 the point of loss. The airspace above oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, and coastal areas
31 (including AOAs) is considered part of the maritime environment. NVD- or FLIR-capable assets
32 are preferred for night searches.
33

SANDY MISSION

34
35
36 **On 1 September 1968, Lt. Col. William A. Jones III, commander of the 602nd**
37 **Special Operations Squadron at Nakhon Phanom, launched in an A-1H**
38 **Skyraider on a combat rescue mission. The Navy had retired the Skyraider**
39 **from combat service the previous April (although a few EA-1F Skyraiders**
40 **operated from carrier decks in the electronics role until December), but the**
41 **USAF continued to employ the prop-driven machine for the Sandy mission,**
42 **the perilous job of escorting helicopters on combat rescue missions. On**
43 **this day, with the call sign Sandy One, Bill Jones was flight leader and on-**
44 **scene commander of an attempt to rescue the crew of an F-4D Phantom,**

1 downed by AAA fire the previous day. Bill's wingman was Captain Paul A.
2 Meeks in Sandy Two.

3
4 Entering North Vietnam from Laos, Lt. Col. Jones heard Phantoms talking to
5 the downed pilot. The second crew member had apparently already been
6 captured. Though the downed pilot remained in voice contact, his exact
7 location was not clear. Bill Jones took his Skyraiders beneath clinging
8 overcast with rugged hills all around him, some with their peaks lost in the
9 gray murk. It was the most dangerous kind of flying, but Jones persisted,
10 trying to obtain visual references to match the survivor's voice description
11 of his location.

12
13 As Jones and Meeks turned toward the scene, an explosion shook Jones'
14 aircraft and the cockpit began to fill with smoke. He had been hit but the
15 tough, durable Skyraider was not ready to go down yet. The smoke cleared
16 and Jones flew a zigzag pattern that kept him free of criss-crossing AAA fire.

17
18 Bill Jones' mission now depended upon two factors: fuel and time. Jones in
19 the injured Sandy One led Meeks in Sandy Two beneath the overcast,
20 provoking enemy fire, still trying to pinpoint the survivor's exact position.
21 Finally, the downed pilot reported on voice radio that two Skyraiders were
22 directly over-head. While trolling for fire (Jones was so low that an AAA gun
23 was actually firing down at him from a slope) and taking damage, Lt. Col.
24 Jones had pinpointed the survivor.

25
26 The AAA emplacement was perilously close to the downed airman; it had to
27 be neutralized before a rescue could be attempted. Feeling that he had the
28 gun pinpointed and was in the best position for an attack, Jones brought the
29 A-1H Skyraider around in a turn so tight that its wings were vertical to the
30 ground. But then, as he opened up with 20-mm cannon fire and CBU-8
31 cluster bombs, more gunfire ripped into his Skyraider and pierced its thin
32 metal skin.

33
34 Jones now had a life-threatening problem. The rocket motor for the
35 Skyraider's ejection system, located behind Jones' head, had been ignited
36 by the AAA fire. Fire rushed back from the canopy. This time when smoke
37 crept up around Jones' clothing and obscured the instrument panel, it did
38 not clear up as before. The heat seared Jones' face and hands as flames
39 began to consume the Skyraider. He decided that there was no choice but
40 to bail out. So he climbed, leveled off over a clear area, and blew his
41 canopy.

42
43 The ejection seat didn't work! Bill Jones was stunned with disbelief. He
44 reached for the secondary release and nothing happened! Thoughts of
45 home and family rushed through his mind as air rushing into his open cockpit
46 fanned the flames. His oxygen mask literally melted off, baring his full face to
47 the heat. Jones was being burned badly while trying to radio his position
48 and that of the downed airman - and hearing the screech in his earphones,

which occurs when a radio frequency is overloaded, several other pilots screaming at him to “bail out, now!”

Bill Jones continued maneuvering in a Skyraider which, by this time, should have disintegrated in a mid-air fireball. The North Vietnamese continued to stalk him with criss-crossing AAA fire, while their troops pressed relentlessly closer to the survivor. By now, Jones’ A-1H was engulfed in a dazzling halo of flames and was trailing a thick, acrid stream of smoke that swept back over the confined valley, a telltale lure for the AAA gunners.

In excruciating pain, choking, but with a functioning radio, Lt. Col. Jones struggled to transmit the location of the downed pilot and the AAA batteries. The familiar screeching, as the airwaves again were overloaded with pilots in the area as they shouted at Bill to get out of his burning Skyraider. Just when he thought he had broken through to pass the vital information to the rescue force, his transmitter gave off electrical smoke and died.

Somehow, with Meeks helping on his wing, (Jones could still receive), Lt. Col. Jones coaxed the mortally damaged A-1H back towards Nakon Phanom. His eyes were rapidly swelling from the burns when he set up a bad-weather approach to Nakhon Phanom. After he landed the “totaled” aircraft, the survivor still foremost in his mind, Bill Jones debriefed the mission from an ambulance stretcher, giving vital information which led later to a successful “save” of the downed F-4D pilot.

Few examples of greater persistence or downright bravery emerged from the entire American effort against North Vietnam. For his efforts on this mission, and extreme heroism under fire, Lt. Col. Bill Jones was awarded the Medal of Honor.

SOURCE: Dorr, Robert F., Air War-Hanoi, Blandford Press, 1988

(b) **Ground Search.** If terrain, vegetation, isolated personnel condition, or the threat makes an airborne search unfeasible; a ground search may be required. A secure communications capability with a deployed ground team is highly recommended. Recovery planners also should investigate the possibilities of using human intelligence assets in the area to locate isolated personnel and to determine their status (i.e., health, alive or dead, captured, evading, direction of movement).

(3) **Search Areas and Methods.** Electronic and visual searches may be conducted in inland, coastal, and maritime areas using the listed search area designation methods.

(a) **Inland Searches** normally involve some combination of surface and air assets although the search effort is likely to involve mostly aircraft. Repeated searches of the same area are almost always necessary in an inland PR incident.

1 **1. Grid Method.** Search areas may be designated by grids on local maps. All
2 search elements must have the same grid maps.

3
4 **2. Boundary Method.** An inland area that is bounded by prominent
5 geographic features can be described by stating those boundaries in sequence. For example: A-1
6 boundaries are Highway 15 to the south, Lake Merhaven to the west, Runslip River to the north,
7 and Bravado mountain range to the east.

8
9 **3. Corner Point Method.** An inland area (except circular areas) can be
10 described by stating in sequence the geographical features of each corner. For example: A-6
11 corners are the junction of Highways 15 and 26 to Red River bridge to north end Whitney Canal to
12 summit Eagle Mountain.

13
14 **4. Center Point Method.** The area can be described by giving the latitude and
15 longitude of the center point and the search radius, if circular, or the direction of the major axis and
16 applicable dimensions, if rectangular. For example: 23 15N 74 35W, 12 nm; or 23 15N 74 35W,
17 060 degrees true, 144 x 24 nm.

18
19 **5. Trackline Method.** The area may be described by stating the track and
20 width of the coverage. For example: C-2 trackline 24 06N 78 55W to 24 50N 75 46W, width 50
21 nm.

22
23 (b) **Coastal Searches** also normally involve some combination of surface and air
24 assets. As with inland searches, coastal searches almost always require repeated searches of the
25 same area. Coastal searches may be conducted using the search area designation methods
26 commonly used in maritime and inland searches. Subsequent searches will probably focus
27 exclusively on either maritime or inland area designation methods as more PR incident information
28 becomes available.

29
30 (c) **Maritime Searches** normally involve some combination of surface and air
31 assets.

32
33 **1. Boundary Method.** Describe any square or rectangular area oriented east-
34 west or north-south by stating the two latitudes and the two longitudes. For example: D-7
35 boundaries are 26N to 27N and 64W to 65W.

36
37 **2. Corner Point Method.** Describe any area (except circular area) by stating
38 in sequence the latitude and longitude of each corner. For example: E-7 corners are 23 15N 74
39 35W to 23 10N 73 25W to 22 20N 73 25W to 22 25N 74 25W to origin.

40
41 **3. Center Point Method.** Same as inland center point method.

42
43 **4. Trackline Method.** Same as inland trackline method.

1
2 *For further guidance on visual searches and search area designation methods, refer to United*
3 *States National Search and Rescue Supplement to the International Aeronautical and Maritime*
4 *Search and Rescue Manual.*

5
6 (4) **Objective Area Search.** Once in the objective area, it may be difficult to visually
7 obtain the isolated personnel's exact location. A visual search in the objective area can increase the
8 risk to the recovery force, other assets, and isolated personnel. A limited visual or electronic search
9 employing radio DF capability may be employed. Every effort should be made to minimize
10 highlighting recovery assets. The recovery force should be prepared to use the isolated personnel to
11 signal their location and if possible vector the recovery vehicle(s) to their selected extraction
12 location.

13
14 (a) A **terminal area search** is normally conducted by the OSC. Recovery vehicles
15 remain at a holding point with some RESCORT assets, if available, while the OSC locates and
16 authenticates isolated personnel. Extraction site location and ingress and/or egress routes will be
17 relayed to the recovery vehicles.

18 (b) **Electronic Search.** All recovery force participants should be prepared to
19 establish communications with isolated personnel. Radios should be preset to PR missions channel
20 frequencies. The PLS, DALs, and/or LARS should be properly tuned to the PRC-112 frequency
21 and discreet code. Unless a communications-out recovery is required and planned, a transmission
22 with the isolated personnel's call sign should be made when LOS communications are expected.
23 When communications are established, the recovery vehicle can be vectored to the precise
24 extraction location. The recovery force may be able to "home-in" on the isolated personnel's radio
25 transmission or receive an encrypted data burst transmission, if the equipment is available. If no
26 response is received (isolated personnel may be able to receive but not transmit) the recovery force
27 should continue to monitor and transmit on designated frequencies, or attempt contact with the
28 isolated personnel on other PR frequencies. Once contacted and authenticated, isolated personnel
29 should be asked to identify, within acceptable risks, their position via a pre-briefed reference point.

30 31 **6. Authenticate**

32
33 Because recovery forces are extremely vulnerable during recovery operations, isolated
34 personnel will not normally be recovered until their identity has been verified. Once the isolated
35 personnel have been contacted, the recovery force will most likely conduct authentication.
36 Immediately after contact, the recovery force will attempt to determine by observation that the
37 individual they have contacted is the one they have been sent to recover. Isolated personnel should
38 make no sudden movements that could be interpreted as hostile. If the recovery force doubts the
39 isolated personnel's identity, the recovery force will follow accepted detainee handling procedures
40 pending authentication or return to friendly territory. Effective authentication methods include use of
41 ISOPREP data, theater code words, and visual signals were discussed earlier. Theater level
42 authentication codes should be used during initial contact with isolated personnel. That should be
43 followed by front page ISOPREP information and lastly by back page ISOPREP information.
44

SECTION D. SUPPORT

7. Operational Support Techniques

a. **General.** There may be occasions when isolated personnel are in territory where immediate recovery will not be possible. In such situations, PR planners should develop means to provide assistance until recovery can be effected. The forces used to support the isolated personnel may be the same as, or a portion of, the ~~CSARTE~~ recovery force. The decision-making process is just as important here as during the location and recovery tasks to properly assess risks and successfully execute the support mission. There are several aspects of support.

b. Supplies

(1) **Caches** may be pre-positioned in adversary-controlled territory or in regions subject to being overrun by adversary forces, and their use should be considered in environments where extended evasion is projected. Evaders and ground recovery forces can use caches as sources of supplies, communications equipment, and other evasion aids. In denied areas, caches may be emplaced by unconventional assets before and/or after the outbreak of hostilities. Agencies and organizations that direct the establishment of caches to support potential evaders need to keep the JPRC advised of the status and locations of those caches.

(2) **Resupply Operations.** When there are no pre-positioned caches, it is possible to deliver resupply packages to isolated personnel by aircraft. To achieve acceptable risks for this type of operation, dedicated combat air patrol and localized suppression of adversary air defenses may be necessary.

c. **Direct Support.** ~~Some fixed-wing aircraft are capable of airdropping PJs and/or equipment to provide direct support to isolated personnel. USAF PJs are specifically trained to provide direct support to isolated personnel. They may be airdropped from any capable platform, or inserted via airland at an offset location to conduct a limited ground search, link-up, and recovery. PJs perform provide emergency trauma treatment, advanced life support, or and field medical care, field survival skills; and provide security and movement of isolated personnel protection and movement to safety,~~ friendly control, or a suitable extraction zone.

d. **Psychological Aid.** Communication with isolated personnel can provide positive reinforcement to offset the affects of emotional stress, fear or injuries.

8. Other Support Considerations

a. **Information Management.** The control of information is critical during a PR event therefore, PR procedures must include the release and control of information. The JPRC, PRCCs, and PAOs must collaborate to ensure information is released in a deliberate, controlled manner that

1 will not bring harm to isolated personnel. Consider the ramification of a well-meaning friend
2 immediately notifying the isolated person's family by cell phone. The family members probably will
3 request confirmation from authorities immediately, which may alert the media and, in turn, alert
4 adversarial forces in the objective area.

5
6 **b. Family Support.** Support to the family may be as important as the support to the isolated
7 person. As mentioned earlier, control of information is important and family members need to be
8 assisted in these procedures. In addition, the family will have their own emotional and psychological
9 needs that may require the assistance of family support groups or other professionals. Depending
10 on the length of the event, the family will also have financial and other benefit concerns. Family
11 counseling and media management become extremely important when isolated personnel are
12 captured or detained to protect them from exploitation or harm. Family support is normally the
13 responsibility of the Services' casualty assistance organizations and monitored by the theater PAO
14 and JPRA. At the request of the Services, JPRA can provide specialized family support teams to
15 train their casualty assistance personnel.

SECTION E. RECOVER

"Subject. Operation DESERT STORM Evasion and Escape Tips.

Combat search and rescue recovery may be executed by any of the following: helicopters with or without protective fighter aircraft; naval vessels with possible air cover; armored vehicle reconnaissance [sic]; infantry units as part of an advance. All of these methods may involve a surprise move by the recovery force to at least temporarily overwhelm the enemy with superior firepower in the vicinity of the evader(s). Such efforts usually require speed to prevent the enemy from increasing his strength. Evaders that can move may be able to improve their chances of being successfully recovered by conducting initial evasion travel to a suitable hole-up site, employing discreet communication and signaling procedures, and selecting a site for recovery that considers the potential enemy opposition in the area."

Message 021200ZFEB 91 from CENTAF/DO

"Our country will do everything in its power to rescue [our troops] or to bring them home safe and sound."

**Senator John McCain
April 18, 2003**

Recovery is accomplished with the return of isolated personnel to friendly control, with or without assistance, as the result of mission planning, operations, and individual actions on the part of commanders and staffs, recovery forces, and/or isolated personnel. Operational flexibility and multi-system redundancy are the primary factors in successful recovery. No single recovery system, force, or organization is suitable to all situations or can meet all requirements in any given situation. To cover all contingencies, a mix of conventional and ~~unconventional~~ nonconventional non-conventional recovery systems should be available for employment. Failure to establish alternative recovery systems or adapt standardized recovery systems to local conditions invites failure. The decision-making process, established early during planning and preparation, will greatly assist decision makers and PR mission coordinators to launch and execute a timely and successful recovery effort.

9. Extraction (Recovery Using Rotary-Wing Aircraft)

A variety of helicopter formation and extraction techniques and procedures exist within and between joint force components and subordinate units. Terrain, visibility, high-density altitude limitations, aircraft and component capabilities, and aircrew experience should be carefully considered when selecting these techniques and procedures. Recovery mission briefs should address flight integrity criteria, mission roles, and individual aircraft responsibilities. Recovery missions should be conducted with minimal radio transmissions; relaying safety of flight, threat, and critical mission data only when required.

~~b. The following are some general overland and overwater extraction techniques and procedures that have been developed, validated, and successfully employed in multi-ship day and night PR missions.~~

~~(1) Overland Extraction (Day)~~

~~(a) Lead Extraction~~

~~1. Primary Procedure. When the recovery vehicles (lead and wingman) are approximately two to four miles from the HLZ used for extraction of the isolated personnel, the wingman establishes separation of approximately one quarter mile. When the HLZ is in sight, the lead aircraft commences the approach and landing. On short final, the wingman passes off the right side of lead and enters a right hand orbit, permitting left side armament to engage targets outside of the orbit and visual contact with the lead aircraft on the ground. In the event the lead aircraft waves off or goes around, the wingman will be able to execute a landing for the extraction. When lead is ready to depart the HLZ, a "5 seconds out" call is transmitted and the wingman initiates departure along the briefed egress route to sweep the route for adversary forces and threat activity.~~

~~2. Alternate Procedure. The wingman takes spacing during the final approach to the HLZ and lands or hovers, either right or left determined by lead's call, in a position that affords a defensive cover with organic weapons based on terrain, threat, power, and weather. In the case of open desert or snow covered objective areas, the potential for a brown out or white-out condition during hover is likely. This may reduce visibility for both aircraft, thereby preventing threat engagement. The increased signature could also make the recovery vehicles' position visible to the adversary at a significantly increased distance.~~

~~(b) Wingman Extraction. An alternate method of executing a multi-ship extraction of isolated personnel is for the lead aircraft to assume the role of "pathfinder and/or gunship" and the wingman to serve as the extraction aircraft. At the point where the aircraft establish separation, the lead aircraft proceeds to the HLZ, conducts an overflight reconnaissance maneuver, and breaks right to establish its cover orbit. (1) If the HLZ is "cold," the wingman lands and executes the extraction. When the wingman is ready to depart the HLZ, a "5 seconds out" call is transmitted and the lead initiates departure along the briefed egress route to sweep the route for adversary forces and threat activity. (2) If the HLZ is "hot," lead breaks left, calls for flight egress and departs the area. The wingman terminates the approach profile, maneuvers to avoid the threat, and joins lead for egress.~~

~~(c) Hostile Activity Responses~~

~~1. If either aircraft takes hostile fire during the ingress, approach to landing, or on the egress route, an attempt should be made to disengage with minimum damage or loss. Initially, either or both aircraft may need to respond to the hostile fire source. After the initial evasive break, the recovery helicopters should disperse, using terrain masking techniques, and evade away from the threat. The first aircrew noticing adversary activity should call the activity type, approximate distance, and bearing from the engaged aircraft. Recovery helicopter gunners~~

1 must be thoroughly briefed on weapons conditions and the RESCORT location. Gunners should
2 not engage targets beyond the RESCORT aircraft due to the probability of placing the RESCORT
3 in a crossfire situation.

4
5 2. After departing the engagement envelope, the flight should proceed to a
6 predesignated reconstitution point. At this time, they need to determine if another attempt is
7 possible, an alternate extraction HLZ is necessary, or if supporting forces are required to suppress
8 the threat.

9
10 3. If the extracting aircraft are engaged during extraction, the cover aircraft
11 should maneuver to maximize the use of suppressive fire weapons. The extraction aircraft
12 determines if it is possible to continue the recovery, or if immediate departure is necessary.

13
14 **(2) Overland Extraction (Night with Sufficient Visibility).** When conducting night
15 operations with sufficient visibility (approximately 20 percent effective moon illumination with
16 NVDs) or in a marked HLZ, daytime procedures can generally be applied, but must be tempered
17 with crew and environmental factors (e.g., experience, weather, and terrain).

18
19 **(3) Overland Extraction (Night with Insufficient Visibility).** In the event that
20 weather, insufficient illumination, or featureless terrain significantly reduces night visibility, aircrews
21 should use procedures that minimize the operational degradation experienced. Formations should
22 be tighter, however, reduced separation between aircraft to maintain visual contact will provide less
23 maneuverability. Reduced visibility in the objective area will influence approach and landing
24 procedures, require extra vigilance by the aircrew, and make extraction more difficult. Recognition
25 of the extraction HLZ may be aided by the use of artificial illumination (e.g., flares) or isolated
26 personnel signaling devices. When directly over the extraction HLZ, lead should drop multiple IR
27 chemical light sticks. First pass landings are possible, but the overflight marking of the HLZ greatly
28 enhances visual cues and reduces the probability of a wave off.

29
30 **(4) Overwater Extraction.** Overwater PR missions may be conducted in contested
31 open ocean or within the coastal or inland waters of hostile territory. Recovery helicopters may be
32 forced to spend a greater amount of time at the extraction point to hoist isolated personnel aboard
33 the extraction helicopter. A swimmer or PJ may be deployed to assist in the extraction. Once the
34 swimmer has control of the isolated person, the swimmer hooks both of them to the rescue hoist
35 hook for extraction. Chemical lights provide excellent night hover visual cues. In case of an
36 extraction along a river or stream, the exposure to threats is slightly reduced due to the masking
37 effect of terrain features and vegetation. Overwater operations allow for early detection and
38 avoidance of adversary threats, but offer little protection from those threats. Multi-ship overwater
39 recoveries are similar to those overland with regard to locating isolated personnel and suppressing
40 adversary weapons. Component specific overwater recovery TTP are often influenced by
41 equipment and training constraints. These specific TTP should be addressed in PR plans for the
42 operation.

~~(5) Tactical military deception can be employed to protect the recovery vehicles and isolated personnel from detection or engagement in maritime or open water environments. Some deception planning considerations include route selection, false extractions, and deceptive emitters. Diversionary mission activity requires the deception aircraft to fly in a manner that draws possible surface threats away from the extraction aircraft. Meanwhile, the diversion aircraft maintains the ability to either defend itself or disengage the threat and depart the area. This also allows the deception aircraft to maintain a constant awareness for additional threats. Recovery planners/forces employing deception tactics must coordinate their specific intentions with other agencies or forces operating in the area to prevent fratricide.~~

~~For further guidance on deception techniques, refer to JP 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception.~~

10. Physical Custody

a. **Initial Actions and Authentication.** Recovered isolated personnel should be searched and secured pending confirmation of their identity. Any weapons will be confiscated. Recovered isolated personnel should be quiet, avoid resisting, and carefully follow all instructions to avoid compromising the security of the recovery force. If the recovered isolated personnel is incapable of answering or responding, the recovery force will follow accepted detainee handling procedures as described in existing ROE and operations procedures.

b. **Status.** The status of the recovered isolated personnel can change once their identity has been ascertained and the recovery force commander has evaluated the situation. The recovered isolated person(s) could be held as an unarmed detainee or made part of the recovery force. In either case, recovered isolated personnel should be briefed on what to expect during the remainder of the recovery operation.

c. **Transfer of Custody.** The recovery force should pass all pertinent information on, and possessions taken from, the recovered personnel to the receiving organization. Pertinent information includes authentication status, significant information passed by the recovered isolated personnel, and physical status. There may be occasions when the recovery force that made the initial contact with the recovered isolated personnel cannot, for operational reasons, deliver the individual safely to friendly territory. In such cases, the recovered isolated personnel may be handed over to another group ~~(e.g., guerrillas), to a UARM or another cell within the mechanism, or to a non-SOF PR~~ force to complete the extraction from hostile territory. The recovered isolated personnel should be kept informed (as much as possible). At no time will isolated personnel be abandoned. The recovered isolated personnel will be under positive control at all times by either the delivering force or the receiving force, according to prior arrangements made by the two forces. Cooperation, trust, and discipline by all are essential for mission success.

11. Isolated Personnel Actions During Recovery

1 a. **General.** Isolated personnel are an integral part of any recovery effort. Consequently,
2 they must perform their portion of each PR task successfully to aid their own recovery. During
3 recovery, isolated personnel should:

4
5 (1) Respond quickly and accurately to authentication procedures and requests for
6 ISOPREP information.

7
8 (2) Provide positional assistance to recovery forces to the greatest extent possible.

9
10 (3) Properly use all issued signaling devices and improvise signals, as needed, to improve
11 the chances of being sighted.

12
13 (4) Provide pertinent information about the dispersal of other group members, if
14 applicable.

15
16 (5) Inform recovery forces if operational developments require altering their EPA and
17 hence, the recovery plan.

18
19 (6) Be prepared to receive and follow instructions from the recovery force that require
20 EPA alterations to adapt to operational exigencies.

21
22 (7) Pay close attention to and explicitly follow instructions of recovery forces to the
23 maximum extent possible given the tactical situation (including adversary positions and medical
24 condition).

25
26 (8) Continue to communicate with inbound recovery forces, as required, to ensure their
27 identification and location is understood and retrieval is efficiently executed.

28
29 b. **Recovery by Helicopter or Tilt Rotor**

30
31 (1) **HLZ Selection.** Isolated personnel should reposition near an HLZ large enough to
32 accommodate at least one helicopter. The HLZ should provide concealment, be fairly level and free
33 of major obstacles (particularly high tension lines or telephone wires), and allow easy identification
34 by the aircrew. The use of chemical lights or other visual markings can aid in identification. If the
35 recovery helicopter cannot land, the isolated personnel will have to be hoisted aboard. Isolated
36 personnel should be aware that a hoist recovery greatly increases exposure and risk to the recovery
37 helicopter, and may adversely effect the timeliness of their recovery and may take longer.
38 Therefore, HLZ suitability must be determined as early in the recovery process as possible so that
39 this information can be passed to the recovery helicopter prior to entering the objective area.

40
41 (2) **Preparation for Recovery.** Isolated personnel should be prepared to use all
42 signaling devices in accordance with pre-mission briefing or PR force instructions. However, the
43 recovery force, or other element, may instruct the use of signaling devices and when to use them.

1 This is especially true of SOF recovery forces that have unique equipment and capabilities to locate
2 and recover isolated persons without the use of signaling devices.

3
4 (3) **Extraction.** Isolated personnel should turn away from the landing helicopter to avoid
5 flying debris and hold their position in sight of the cockpit or side door until signaled or instructed to
6 enter the helicopter.

7
8 c. **Recovery by Ground Forces.** Isolated personnel should follow their EPA until contacted
9 by ground forces. The isolated personnel should not make any threatening moves, assume a passive
10 position (e.g., drop to one knee) and explicitly follow the ground force instructions.

11 d. **Custody**

12
13 (1) **Initial Actions.** Once in the custody of the recovery force, recovered isolated
14 personnel can expect to be searched and secured pending confirmation of their identity. Any
15 weapons will be confiscated. Recovered isolated personnel should be quiet, avoid resisting, and
16 carefully follow all instructions to avoid compromising the security of the recovery force. If the
17 recovered isolated personnel is incapable of answering or responding, the recovery force will follow
18 accepted detainee handling procedures.

19
20 (2) **Status.** Recovered isolated personnel should understand that the recovery force
21 commander is the mission commander until the mission is complete. Recovered isolated personnel
22 should not ask operational questions. They must realize that being recovered does not necessarily
23 mean a quick extraction. The recovery force will do everything within its power to keep them
24 informed and return them to friendly control as quickly as possible.

25
26 (3) **Transfer of Custody.** There may be occasions when the recovery force that made
27 the initial contact with the recovered isolated personnel cannot, for operational reasons, deliver the
28 individual safely to friendly territory. In such cases, the recovered isolated personnel may be
29 handed over to another pre-designated group ~~(e.g., guerrillas), to a UARM or another cell within~~
30 ~~the mechanism, or to a non-SOF PR~~ force to complete the extraction from hostile territory. Should
31 this happen, it is important for recovered isolated personnel to realize that although the recovery
32 force commander may elect not to brief the details of the handover or crossover, the recovered
33 isolated personnel should do exactly as directed. Cooperation, trust, and discipline by all are
34 essential for mission success.

35
36 (4) **Conduct in an RM.** While in an RM, recovered isolated personnel should project a
37 favorable image of the US and its values, avoid acts that violate international law or discredit the
38 US, avoid expressing ideas that could be misconstrued as official US policy or popular American
39 attitudes, and refrain from making any agreements contrary to the interests of the US.

40
41 **SECTION F. DEBRIEF AND REINTEGRATE**
42

~~Today is a great day for the families, comrades, and loved ones of the seven MIAs who are now free. . . . It's a good way to start the morning, to be notified that seven of our fellow Americans are going to be home soon in the arms of their loved ones."~~

~~President George W. Bush,
April 13, 2003~~

~~"We feel like we won the lottery of life."~~

~~Chief Warrant Officer Two Ronald Young
Upon his return from Iraq, April 2003~~

~~12. General~~

~~—Debrief and Reintegrate (D&R) is a critical, straightforward task that allows the Department of Defense to gather necessary tactical and strategic SERE information while protecting the health and well-being of returned isolated personnel. Qualified SERE and intelligence debriefers who gather information from recovered isolated personnel and SERE psychologists who assist the recovered isolated personnel to decompress and reintegrate to their unit, family and society are key to the successful accomplishment this task.~~

~~13. Process~~

~~a. General. The combatant command's PR directive, the operation plan/OPORD, and PR CONOPS specify the required PR D&R teams and their composition and responsibilities. The JFC's PR D&R team chief will be responsible for the promulgation and execution of the D&R plan and the oversight of, and assistance to, component PR D&R teams. The JPRC should coordinate all joint requirements necessary to conduct D&R phase I and II (as described below). The scope and complexity of the process will vary depending on the classification of the recovered isolated personnel (i.e., survivors and evaders may require less debriefing and psychological attention than captives, detainees and POWs).~~

~~b. Debriefing. The debriefs are designed to obtain specific information regarding the experience of recovered isolated personnel. Intelligence and SERE debriefs may run separately or concurrently as dictated by mission circumstances, but must be coordinated with one another. If any debriefer determines, suspects, or has prior knowledge that the recovered isolated personnel have experienced an encounter with NAR, the briefing will stop until a JPRA NAR debriefer can properly debrief the recovered isolated personnel to protect sensitive information.~~

~~(1) Debrief team preparation. Intelligence and SERE debriefers should meet in advance to compare information requirements and deconflict interview questions to avoid duplication. All available information pertaining to the recovered isolated personnel should be obtained from the JPRC and reviewed when refining debrief checklists and developing questions. Visual aids such as maps and photographs should be available to assist the recovered isolated personnel in providing a chronicle of their experiences.~~

~~(2) **Sequence of events.** Debriefers should agree upon a sequence of events for interview sessions. Because SERE debriefing affords a measure of confidentiality that intelligence debriefing does not, the team must ensure that the recovered isolated personnel clearly understand the distinction between intelligence and SERE debrief sessions. If possible, intelligence and SERE debriefers will each attend the other's debrief sessions to monitor the information exchange and develop follow-up questions to be covered in subsequent sessions. A possible debriefing sequence of events is as follows:~~

~~(a) Recovered isolated personnel provide a narrative account of their experience while both debrief team components monitor and build an understanding of the incident.~~

~~(b) The Intelligence and SERE debriefs will take place in a sequence decided by the team chief. The sequence will be heavily influenced by the availability of debriefers and other limiting factors.~~

~~(d) Both debrief teams conduct follow-up interviews as required.~~

~~(3) **Intelligence Debrief.** The intelligence debrief should occur as soon as possible pending the approval of medical personnel caring for the recovered isolated personnel.~~

~~(a) The intelligence debrief seeks specific time sensitive and perishable information related to the tactical circumstances leading to the isolating event and, if applicable, the eventual capture, the presence of other isolated friendly personnel, the physical and security characteristics of the detention facilities, observed adversary tactics, force disposition, equipment, or other information of value to ongoing operations. Information collected helps the intelligence community update its overall evaluation of the detaining or adversary organization, as well as determining the extent of possible compromise of US information, methods, and/or materials.~~

~~(b) Intelligence gained during the debrief is quickly reported via established dissemination channels in accordance with standard intelligence reporting procedures. Intelligence reports include only information that is relevant to operational requirements, and contain no derogatory information or direct references to the identity of the source. All information collected is assigned proper security classification based on its content prior to dissemination to appropriate intelligence community recipients.~~

~~(4) **SERE debrief.** To ensure full disclosure of information in the interest of obtaining maximum value from lessons learned, SERE debrief information is privileged by law as detailed in paragraph 5b below. The SERE debrief focuses on the isolation experience in an effort to evaluate the adequacy and usefulness of:~~

~~(a) SERE preparation to include operational guidance, training, and education.~~

~~(b) SERE products that were provided to include evasion aids, radios, and survival equipment.~~

~~(c) The PR processes that either assisted or hindered their isolation. These processes will include the efforts made to locate, support, and recover the isolated personnel.~~

~~c. **Reintegrate.** This task is primarily focused on the decompression of the recovered isolated personnel and is monitored or conducted by a SERE psychologist certified by JPRA. Decompression is a critical element that can prevent psychological damage to the recovered isolated personnel and the loss of accuracy in recalling critical intelligence and operational information. The SERE psychologist:~~

~~(1) Provides an explanation of the D&R procedures to include the behavioral assessment.~~

~~(2) Conducts a behavioral assessment and addresses critical elements of capture, detention/captivity, long term evasion, and liberation in terms of their impact on the adjustment of recovered isolated personnel.~~

~~(3) Monitors and coordinates all aspects of the D&R task, to ensure the health and stamina of recovered isolated personnel are maintained.~~

~~(4) Provides the behavioral assessment of the recovered isolated personnel to the D&R team leader who makes the recommendation on disposition (i.e., return to duty or continue to next phase) to the component commander.~~

~~d. **Phases.** D&R is normally conducted in three phases, the first two are directed by the geographic combatant commander in coordination with the Services, and the final phase is conducted by the Services in CONUS. Phase I encompasses the process of transporting the recovered isolated person to a safe area to conduct initial debriefing and reintegration. Phase I will end with the recovered isolated personnel being returned to duty or recommended for Phase II. Phase II encompasses the transition from Phase I to a theater treatment and process facility and further SERE and intelligence debriefings and/or decompression treatment. Phase II will end with the recovered isolated personnel being released to duty or recommended for Phase III.~~

~~(1) **Phase I** is a component responsibility and managed by the PRCC. All isolated personnel must undergo phase I. Based on the D&R team chief's recommendation and theater guidance, the component commander should have the authority to reintegrate isolated personnel to their DOD duties or transfer them to the next phase. Phase I can begin as soon as the recovered isolated personnel are in the care of the component's D&R team and must be accomplished as soon as possible. The D&R team chief will determine the most appropriate place and means to accomplish Phase I. Based on the combatant commander's guidance, and component requirements, Phase I will normally consist of:~~

~~(a) Immediate medical attention.~~

~~(b) An intelligence debrief to collect any appropriate tactical/perishable intelligence and/or any appropriate isolated personnel identification and status information.~~

~~(c) Information debriefs necessary to collect perishable SERE information and determine whether recovered isolated personnel can be returned to duty or require additional time for decompression and medical treatment. Questions will be composed to ascertain the following:~~

~~1. Name, rank, serial number, organization, and health and physical condition.~~

~~2. Recovery details such as location, date, time, and method.~~

~~3. Did isolated personnel make contact with a RM? If yes, the recovered isolated personnel will be advised not to disclose details of this information except to a specific NAR representative.~~

~~4. Were isolated personnel held captive or detained at anytime?~~

~~5. Other information that will give the SERE psychologist anecdotal or defined evidence that further decompression may be needed.~~

~~(d) The component D&R team chief recommends the disposition of the recovered isolated personnel to the component. If the recovered isolated personnel can be returned to duty, they will remain under the auspices of the parent command. If the recovered isolated person was a POW, Geneva Conventions prohibit reintroduction to duty in that theater of war. If it is determined that additional time is required for debriefing and decompression, the recovered isolated personnel will be recommended for phase II repatriation and all records, to include the personnel processing file (PPF) (see para 5a(2) below) will be transferred to the designated phase II D&R team chief.~~

~~(2) Phase II will be conducted at the theater designated facility where the recovered isolated personnel will receive more structured SERE and intelligence debriefings and the decompression process will begin in earnest. Phase II should be managed by the JPRC and executed by the geographic combatant commander's designated joint D&R team. The theater D&R team should have Service component representation to keep component commanders informed on the status of their recovered isolate personnel.~~

~~(a) The D&R team chief will ensure coordination with other members of the geographic combatant commander's staff who are involved in the administrative processing of the recovered isolated personnel or require proprietary debriefings (or they may be part of the team). The D&R team chief will be charged with prioritizing and monitoring, in coordination with the SERE psychologist, all D&R and other repatriation processes to prevent confusing the recovered isolated personnel or damaging their mental health.~~

~~(b) An inherent, and critical part of the repatriation process are the decompression protocols. The long-term successful reintegration of recovered isolated personnel into military and social/civil environments is directly affected by proper decompression. Protocols have been established to maximize the benefit of decompression and, at the very least under “normal” conditions, require a minimum of 72 hours to be effective. Deviating from established protocols can have a severe impact and, under certain circumstances, create permanent psychological trauma to the recovered isolated personnel. From past detention incidents, this trauma has manifested itself in recovered isolated personnel separating themselves from military Service, having dysfunctional family relationships, and, in severe cases, committing suicide.~~

~~(c) Phase II is where reintegration with family members may begin initially with contact by telephone. Rarely is there any benefit for family members to travel to Phase II locations. In fact, until decompression/debriefing is complete, the primary concern of recovered isolated personnel is the objective assessment of how they conducted themselves while isolated—they have a need to know the answer to “did I conduct myself well and with honor?”~~

~~(d) The D&R team chief determines the completion of phase II and recommends the disposition of the recovered isolated personnel to the respective component commander or geographic combatant commander. The decision is made to either return the recovered isolated personnel to their DOD duties or transfer them into phase III where the recovered isolated personnel will come under the control of their respective Service in CONUS. The geographic combatant commander, JPRC, and respective PRCCs will be informed on all decisions.~~

~~(e) If the recovered isolated personnel are returned to duty, the geographic combatant commander’s D&R team chief will transfer the PPF and other records as directed by the JPRC. If the recovered isolated personnel are recommended for Phase III, the PPF and records will be controlled as directed by the D&R team chief and accompany the recovered isolated personnel.~~

~~(3) **Phase III.** Phase III begins with the transition of the recovered isolated personnel to a Service designated CONUS location. A designated personal escort, PA representative, physician, chaplain, and SERE psychologist normally will accompany the recovered isolated personnel. Phase III does not have a prescribed time limit and depends on coordinated needs of the Service, SERE and intelligence debriefers, and the SERE Psychologist.~~

~~(4) **Process Flexibility.** Though conducted by phase, the critical tasks within each phase are not necessarily conducted sequentially or on a rigid time schedule. Latitude and flexibility remain with the component commander to accomplish D&R within the context of ongoing military operations.~~

~~*“This morning our family joins America in rejoicing over the news of the safe return of seven brave heroes to U.S. military custody in Iraq. . . . This is certainly an*~~

answer to our prayers and — we're certain — the prayers of literally millions of other concerned citizens."

**Family of PFC Jessica Lynch,
April 12, 2003**

14. Challenges During Debriefing and Reintegration

a. ~~The greatest challenge~~ during D&R is when well-intended actions are implemented without understanding their full ramifications. These actions may impact the reintegration of recovered isolated personnel into a healthy family, social, and professional life. The following are some of the common ways that senior executives have negatively impacted the repatriation and reintegration process while trying to be helpful.

(1) ~~Overwhelming the recovered isolated personnel with a show of support.~~ Regardless of how well they preformed during isolation, all recovered isolated personnel are in a mild state of shock when they return and need time to regroup. Parades, bands, media events, ceremonies, and celebrations have their place but not during the early stages of D&R. These types of activities serve to increase the state of shock of recovered isolated personnel and usually end up overwhelming them and complicating the reintegration process.

(2) ~~Awarding medals too early.~~ Expediting medal processing is not recommended as it takes time for recovered isolated personnel to work through the intensity of their emotional reactions to the isolating event. Medals that are given while recovered isolated personnel are still struggling with intense emotional reactions complicates the D&R process and in many cases isolates/alienates recovered isolated personnel from unit members.

(3) ~~White House and command presentations/visits.~~ Attempts to honor recovered isolated personnel with high level visits serve necessary political purposes but are not in the best interest of the recovered isolated personnel if conducted during the early stages of D&R. Recovered isolated personnel will remember these events as positive if they are conducted at the proper time and in accordance with the wishes of the recovered isolated personnel. Brief telephone calls may be appropriate during early stages if coordinated with the D&R team.

(4) ~~Transporting families to Phase I and Phase II locations.~~ Families are an essential part of reintegration. Introducing families too early not only complicates the reintegration process but it is harmful to long term family relationships. Recovered isolated personnel try to protect families from the horrors of their ordeal while family members tend to overwhelm recovered isolated personnel and do not allow them time to decompress. Recovered isolated personnel should be allowed to make telephone contact with families during the early stages of the repatriation process. Family reunions are more appropriate when the D&R process is nearing completion or when recovered isolated personnel return to CONUS.

15. Follow-Up

~~—SERE psychologists will follow up with recovered isolated personnel, as needed, for at least one year. All POWs are eligible for follow up medical and psychological services at the Robert Mitchell Center for Repatriated POW Studies. Intelligence organizations may require follow up contact with recovered isolated personnel to pursue additional intelligence requirements, particularly to support investigations of unresolved POW/MIA incidents.~~

16. Legal and Administrative

a. Initial Control

~~(1) **Administration.** The command gaining initial control of recovered isolated personnel will ensure that an escort is assigned until the designated D&R team assumes control of the recovered isolated personnel. Thereafter, recovered isolated personnel normally will complete a nondisclosure agreement, debrief statement, and promise of confidentiality per Appendix N, “Debrief and Reintegrate Administration.”~~

~~(2) **PPF.** The D&R team chief should coordinate with the designated component commander to obtain each recovered isolated person’s PPF from the appropriate Service. This file will be used during the entire D&R task as a debrief document and will be disseminated to the Service and JPRA once reintegration has been completed. If the D&R task is accomplished prior to receiving the PPF, the PPF will be included in the final disposition of debrief documents.~~

~~*For further guidance on the minimum requirement for a PPF, refer to DODI 2310.4, Repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel.*~~

~~(3) **Initial Recovery Report.** This report will be transmitted as soon as possible to the returned isolated person’s parent Service, with copies to JPRA, the combatant command J3, and the recovered isolated personnel’s commander. Along with critical recovered isolated personnel data, the report will include an assessment of potential support required, a road map for D&R activities, and a repatriation team chief recommendation to return the individual to duty or proceed to Phase II. The report will be classified per Secretary of the Joint Staff Info Memo 15-92, “Security Classification of DOD POW/MIA information,” dated 27 February 1992, and will request disposition instructions from the individual’s parent Service.~~

~~**b. Debriefs.** All debriefs shall be focused, timely, and will last only as long as the recovered isolated personnel are able to mentally and physically continue. Typically, information obtained in the SERE and intelligence debriefings is immediately disseminated. The verbatim text/transcription of debriefings is statutorily protected, classified, and is not releasable. JPRA is required to analyze raw debrief material, summarize it, and provide synopses of lessons learned to all DOD organizations that have a need to know. All SERE debriefs shall be obtained under an expressed written promise of confidentiality. SERE debriefs shall be treated as privileged information under~~

1 | ~~the provisions of Title 10 USC 1506(d)(1) (reference (b)), are property of the Department of~~
2 | ~~Defense, and shall not be released to the public. DD Form 2810, "Promise of Confidentiality,"~~
3 | ~~found in Annex C, "Sample Promise of Confidentiality," to Appendix N, "Debrief and Reintegrate~~
4 | ~~Administration," shall be used to inform the recovered isolated personnel that debriefs will remain~~
5 | ~~confidential to the extent authorized by law.~~
6 |
7 |

SECTION F. REINTEGRATION

"Today is a great day for the families, comrades, and loved ones of the seven MIAs who are now free. . . . It's a good way to start the morning, to be notified that seven of our fellow Americans are going to be home soon in the arms of their loved ones."

President George W. Bush,
April 13, 2003

"We feel like we won the lottery of life."

Chief Warrant Officer Two Ronald Young
Upon his return from Iraq, April 2003

12. General

Reintegration is a critical, straightforward task that allows the Department of Defense to gather necessary tactical and strategic SERE information while protecting the health and well-being of returned isolated personnel. Qualified SERE and intelligence debriefers who gather information from recovered isolated personnel and SERE psychologists who assist the recovered isolated personnel to decompress and reintegrate to their unit, family and society are key to the successful accomplishment this task.

13. Process

a. General. The combatant command's PR directive, the OPLAN/OPORD, and PR SOPs specify the required PR reintegration teams and their composition and responsibilities (see Chapter V, "Planning"). The JFC's PR reintegration team chief will be responsible for the promulgation and execution of the reintegration plan and the oversight of, and assistance to, component reintegration teams. The JFC's reintegration team chief should coordinate all joint requirements necessary to conduct reintegration phase I and II, and to transition to phase III when necessary (as described below). The scope and complexity of the process will vary depending on the classification of the recovered isolated personnel (i.e., survivors and evaders may require less debriefing and psychological attention than captives, detainees, and POWs).

b. Debriefing. The debriefs are designed to obtain specific information regarding the experience of recovered isolated personnel. SERE and intelligence debriefs may run separately or concurrently as dictated by mission circumstances, but must be coordinated with one another. The SERE debrief must be allowed to follow accepted protocols as established by JPRA, *SERE Debriefing Guide*, to produce verbal and visual recordings that are essential to the JPRA SERE analysis and development of lessons learned. If any debriefer determines, suspects, or has prior knowledge that the recovered isolated personnel have experienced an encounter with NAR, the briefing will stop until a qualified NAR debriefer, as determined by the debrief team chief, can properly debrief the recovered isolated personnel to protect sensitive information. The trained debriefer will also stop the debrief process if they observe UCMJ concerns.

(1) **Debrief Team.** The debrief team chief will be an experienced SERE debriefer certified by JPRA. The team should be a minimum of two personnel, the chief and the necessary number of JPRA certified SERE debriefers. The ideal ratio of debriefers to debriefees is one-to-one. It is difficult for a debriefer to track and encourage the story of more than one debriefee, especially if the debriefees experienced the same event together. The JPRA may provide a team chief or SERE psychologist if required to maintain oversight of the debrief process.

(2) **Debrief Team Preparation.** Intelligence and SERE debriefers should meet in advance to compare information requirements and deconflict interview questions to avoid duplication. All available information pertaining to the recovered isolated personnel should be obtained from the JPRC and reviewed when refining debrief checklists and developing questions. Visual aids such as maps and photographs should be available to assist the recovered isolated personnel in providing a chronicle of their experiences.

(3) **Sequence of Events.** Debriefers should agree upon a sequence of events for interview sessions. Because SERE debriefing affords a measure of confidentiality that intelligence debriefing does not, the team must ensure that the recovered isolated personnel clearly understand the distinction between intelligence and SERE debrief sessions. If possible, intelligence and SERE debriefers will each attend the other's debrief sessions to monitor the information exchange and develop follow-up questions to be covered in subsequent sessions. The intelligence and SERE debriefs will take place in a sequence decided by the debrief team chief. The sequence will be heavily influenced by the availability of debriefers and other limiting factors. A possible debriefing sequence of events is as follows:

(a) Recovered isolated personnel provide a narrative account of their experience while both debrief team components monitor and build an understanding of the incident.

(b) The SERE debriefer, in collaboration with the debrief team chief and SERE psychologist, asks a series of structured questions during sessions that are orchestrated for duration and attendees. The structured questions are designed to illicit the most accurate details from the debriefee based on their story and other information available.

(c) Both debrief teams conduct follow-up interviews as required.

(d) The SERE psychologist assists the debriefer and interacts with the recovered isolated personnel as they feel necessary.

(e) In all cases the SERE debrief team chief ensures all SERE debrief recordings and other pertinent information is immediately forwarded to JPRA for processing.

(4) **Intelligence Debrief.** The intelligence debrief should occur as soon as possible pending the approval of medical personnel caring for the recovered isolated personnel.

(a) The intelligence debrief seeks specific time-sensitive and perishable information related to the tactical circumstances leading to the isolating event and, if applicable, the eventual capture, the presence of other isolated friendly personnel, the physical and security characteristics of the detention facilities, observed adversary tactics, force disposition, equipment, or other information of value to ongoing operations. Information collected helps the intelligence community update its overall evaluation of the detaining or adversary organization, as well as determining the extent of possible compromise of US information, methods, and/or materials.

(b) Intelligence gained during the debrief is quickly reported via established dissemination channels in accordance with standard intelligence reporting procedures. Intelligence reports include only information that is relevant to operational requirements, and contain no derogatory information or direct references to the identity of the source. All information collected is assigned proper security classification based on its content prior to dissemination to appropriate intelligence community recipients.

(5) **SERE Debrief.** To ensure full disclosure of information in the interest of obtaining maximum value from lessons learned, SERE debrief information is privileged by law as detailed in paragraph 15b below. The SERE debrief focuses on the isolation experience in an effort to evaluate the adequacy and usefulness of:

(a) SERE preparation to include operational guidance, training, and education.

(b) SERE products that were provided to include evasion aids, radios, and survival equipment.

(c) The PR processes that either assisted or hindered their isolation. These processes will include the efforts made to locate, support, and recover the isolated personnel.

c. SERE Psychologist. The SERE psychologist is certified by JPRA and is primarily focused on the decompression of the recovered isolated personnel. Decompression is a critical element that can prevent psychological damage to the recovered isolated personnel and the loss of accuracy in recalling critical intelligence and operational information. The SERE psychologist:

(1) Provides an explanation of the reintegration procedures to include the behavioral assessment.

(2) Conducts a behavioral assessment and addresses critical elements of capture, detention/captivity, long term evasion, and liberation in terms of their impact on the adjustment of recovered isolated personnel.

(3) Monitors and coordinates all aspects of the reintegration task, to ensure the health and stamina of recovered isolated personnel are maintained.

(4) Provides the behavioral assessment of the recovered isolated personnel to the reintegration team leader who makes the recommendation on disposition (i.e., return to duty or continue to next phase) to the component commander.

d. **Phases.** Reintegration is normally conducted in three phases, the first two are directed by the geographic combatant commander in coordination with the Services, and the final phase is conducted by the Services in CONUS. The JPRC, PRCCs and the reintegration team chief determine the location(s) of phase I and II, the composition of the phase I team and the transition process from phase I to phase II. Phase I encompasses the process of transporting the recovered isolated person to a safe area to conduct initial debriefing and reintegration. Phase I will end with the recovered isolated personnel being returned to duty or recommended for Phase II. Phase II encompasses the transition from Phase I to a theater treatment and process facility and further SERE and intelligence debriefings and decompression. Phase II will end with the recovered isolated personnel being released to duty or recommended for Phase III.

(1) **Phase I.** All recovered isolated personnel must undergo phase I. Based on the reintegration team chief's recommendation and theater guidance, the component commander should have the authority to reintegrate isolated personnel to their DOD duties or transfer them to the next phase. Phase I begins as soon as the recovered isolated personnel are in the care of the phase I team and must be accomplished as soon as possible. The JPRC, in coordination with the PRCCs and the reintegration team chief, will determine the most appropriate place and means to accomplish Phase I. Based on the combatant commander's guidance, and component requirements, Phase I will normally consist of:

(a) Immediate medical attention.

(b) An intelligence debrief to collect any appropriate tactical/perishable intelligence and/or any appropriate isolated personnel identification and status information.

(c) Information debriefs necessary to collect perishable SERE information and determine whether recovered isolated personnel can be returned to duty or require additional time for decompression and medical treatment. Questions will be composed to ascertain the following:

1. Name, rank, serial number, organization, and health and physical condition.

2. Recovery details such as location, date, time, and method.

3. Did isolated personnel make contact with a RM? If yes, the recovered isolated personnel will be advised not to disclose details of this information except to a specific NAR representative.

4. Were isolated personnel held captive or detained at anytime?

1
2 5. Other information that will give the SERE psychologist anecdotal or defined
3 evidence that further decompression may be needed.
4

5 (d) The phase one team chief recommends the disposition of the recovered isolated
6 personnel to the component. If the recovered isolated personnel can be returned to duty, they will
7 remain under the auspices of the parent command. If the recovered isolated person was a POW,
8 Geneva Conventions prohibit reintroduction to duty in that theater of war. If it is determined that
9 additional time is required for debriefing and decompression, the recovered isolated personnel will
10 be recommended for phase II repatriation and all records, to include the personnel processing file
11 (PPF) (see para 5a(2) below) will be transferred to the designated phase II reintegration team chief.
12

13 (2) **Phase II** will be conducted at the theater designated facility where the recovered
14 isolated personnel will receive more structured SERE and intelligence debriefings and the
15 decompression process will begin in earnest. Phase II is executed by the geographic combatant
16 commander's designated reintegration team chief.
17

18 (a) The reintegration team chief will ensure coordination with other members of the
19 geographic combatant commander's staff who are involved in the administrative processing of the
20 recovered isolated personnel or require proprietary debriefings (or they may be part of the team).
21 The reintegration team chief will be charged with prioritizing and monitoring, in coordination with the
22 SERE psychologist, all reintegration processes to prevent confusing, or adversely affecting the
23 mental, physical health of, the recovered isolated personnel.
24

25 (b) An inherent and critical part of the reintegration process is the decompression
26 protocols. The long-term successful reintegration of recovered isolated personnel into military and
27 social/civil environments is directly affected by proper decompression. Protocols have been
28 established to maximize the benefit of decompression and, at the very least under "normal"
29 conditions, require a minimum of 72 hours to be effective. Deviating from established protocols can
30 have a severe impact and, under certain circumstances, create permanent psychological trauma to
31 the recovered isolated personnel. From past detention incidents, this trauma has manifested itself in
32 recovered isolated personnel separating themselves from military Service, having dysfunctional
33 family relationships, and, in severe cases, committing suicide.
34

35 (c) Phase II is where reintegration with family members may begin initially with
36 contact by telephone. Rarely is there any benefit for family members to travel to Phase II locations.
37 In fact, until decompression/debriefing is complete, the primary concern of recovered isolated
38 personnel is the objective assessment of how they conducted themselves while isolated — they have
39 a need to know the answer to "did I conduct myself well and with honor?"
40

41 (d) The reintegration team chief determines the completion of phase II and
42 recommends the disposition of the recovered isolated personnel to the respective component
43 commander or geographic combatant commander. The decision is made to either return the

recovered isolated personnel to their DOD duties or transfer them into phase III where the recovered isolated personnel will come under the control of their respective Service in CONUS. The geographic combatant commander, JPRC, and respective PRCCs will be informed on all decisions.

(e) If the recovered isolated personnel are returned to duty, the geographic combatant commander's reintegration team chief will transfer the PPF and other records as directed in theater guidance. If the recovered isolated personnel are recommended for Phase III, the PPF and other records will be positively controlled by the reintegration team chief until properly transferred to the phase III team chief or JPRA.

(3) **Phase III.** Phase III begins with the transition of recovered isolated personnel to the phase III team of the appropriate Service. A phase three team representative will meet the recovered isolated personnel at the phase II location. A designated personal escort, PA representative, physician, chaplain, and SERE psychologist normally will accompany the recovered isolated personnel. Phase III details are described in DODI 2310.4, *Reparation of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel*. Phase III does not have a prescribed time limit and depends on coordinated needs of the Service, SERE and intelligence debriefers, and the SERE psychologist.

(4) **Process Flexibility.** Though conducted by phase, the critical tasks within each phase are not necessarily conducted sequentially or on a rigid time schedule. Latitude and flexibility remain with the Service and Service component commander to accomplish reintegration within the context of ongoing military operations.

"This morning our family joins America in rejoicing over the news of the safe return of seven brave heroes to U.S. military custody in Iraq. . . . This is certainly an answer to our prayers and — we're certain — the prayers of literally millions of other concerned citizens."

**Family of PFC Jessica Lynch,
April 12, 2003**

14. Challenges During Reintegration

The greatest challenge during reintegration is when well-intended actions are implemented without understanding their full ramifications. These actions may impact the reintegration of recovered isolated personnel into a healthy family, social, and professional life. The following are some of the common ways that senior executives have negatively impacted the repatriation and reintegration process while trying to be helpful.

a. Overwhelming the recovered isolated personnel with a show of support. Regardless of how well they preformed during isolation, all recovered isolated personnel are in a mild state of shock when they return and need time to regroup. Parades, bands, media events, ceremonies, and

celebrations have their place but not during the early stages of reintegration. These types of activities serve to increase the state of shock of recovered isolated personnel and usually end up overwhelming them and complicating the reintegration process.

b. Awarding medals too early. Expediting medal processing is not recommended as it takes time for recovered isolated personnel to work through the intensity of their emotional reactions to the isolating event. Medals that are given while recovered isolated personnel are still struggling with intense emotional reactions complicate the reintegration process and in many cases isolates/alienates recovered isolated personnel from unit members.

c. White House and command presentations/visits. Attempts to honor recovered isolated personnel with high level visits serve necessary political purposes but are not in the best interest of the recovered isolated personnel if conducted during the early stages of reintegration. Recovered isolated personnel will remember these events as positive if they are conducted at the proper time and in accordance with the wishes of the recovered isolated personnel. Brief telephone calls may be appropriate during early stages if coordinated with the reintegration team.

d. Transporting families to Phase II locations. Families are an essential part of reintegration. Introducing families too early not only complicates the reintegration process but it is harmful to long-term family relationships. Recovered isolated personnel try to protect families from the horrors of their ordeal while family members tend to overwhelm recovered isolated personnel and do not allow them time to decompress. Recovered isolated personnel should be allowed to make telephone contact with families during the early stages of the repatriation process. Family reunions are more appropriate when the reintegration process is nearing completion or when recovered isolated personnel return to CONUS.

15. Follow-Up

SERE psychologists will follow-up with recovered isolated personnel, as needed, for at least one year. All POWs are eligible for follow-up medical and psychological services at the Robert Mitchell Center for Repatriated POW Studies. Intelligence organizations may require follow-up contact with recovered isolated personnel to pursue additional intelligence requirements, particularly to support investigations of unresolved POW/MIA incidents.

16. Legal and Administrative

a. Initial Control

(1) **Administration.** The command gaining initial control of recovered isolated personnel will ensure that an escort is assigned until the designated reintegration team assumes control of the recovered isolated personnel. Thereafter, recovered isolated personnel normally will complete a nondisclosure agreement, debrief statement, and promise of confidentiality per Appendix N, "Reintegration Administration."

(2) PPF. The reintegration team chief should coordinate with the designated component commander to obtain each recovered isolated person's PPF from the appropriate Service or PRCC. This file will be used during the entire reintegration task as a debrief document and will be disseminated to the Service and JPRA once reintegration has been completed. If the reintegration task is accomplished prior to receiving the PPF, the PPF will be included in the final disposition of debrief documents.

For further guidance on the minimum requirement for a PPF, refer to DODI 2310.4, Repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel.

(3) Initial Recovery Report. This report will be transmitted by the JPRC as soon as possible to the returned isolated person's parent Service, with copies to the theater reintegration team chief, JPRA, the appropriate JOC, and the recovered isolated personnel's commander. Along with critical recovered isolated personnel data, the report will include an assessment of potential support required, a road map for reintegration activities, and a reintegration team chief recommendation to return the individual to duty or proceed to Phase II.

b. Debriefs. All debriefs shall be focused, timely, and will last only as long as the recovered isolated personnel are able to mentally and physically continue. Typically, information obtained in the SERE and intelligence debriefings is immediately disseminated. The verbatim text/transcription of debriefings is statutorily protected and is not releasable until approved by the Commander, JPRA. JPRA is required to analyze raw debrief material, summarize it, and provide synopses of lessons learned to all DOD organizations that have a need to know. All SERE debriefs shall be obtained under an expressed written promise of confidentiality. SERE debriefs shall be treated as privileged information under the provisions of Title 10 USC 1506(d)(1) (reference (b)), are property of the Department of Defense, and shall not be released to the public. DD Form 2810, "Promise of Confidentiality," found in Annex C, "Sample Promise of Confidentiality," to Appendix N, "Reintegration Administration," shall be used to inform the recovered isolated personnel that debriefs will remain confidential to the extent authorized by law.

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APPENDIX A

MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL SEARCH AND RESCUE

1. General

a. ~~Civil SAR~~ Search and rescue of the civilian population in an emergency is carried out as a ~~national~~ humanitarian and legal obligation under the overall arrangements and principles described in the National Search and Rescue Plan (NSP). The Department of Defense, as a signatory to the NSP, contributes to the national and international goal of using all available resources for civil SAR. Military support of civil SAR is carried out on a not-to-interfere basis with primary military missions. There are a number of civil SAR-related treaties to which the United States is a party. In most cases, either the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) or the International Maritime Organization (IMO) sponsors the treaties.

b. It is US policy, under the NSP, to use all available resources to carry out national civil SAR responsibilities. These include Federal civil and military resources, state and local resources, private and volunteer resources, and resources available through international cooperative efforts, as appropriate. In accordance with international procedures, planning and coordination of civil SAR operations are normally carried out under the oversight of an internationally recognized ~~rescue~~ ~~coordination center (RCC)~~. Plans to provide civil SAR services worldwide are developed for civil aeronautical and maritime civil SAR by the ICAO and IMO, respectively. The US civil SAR system is an integral part of the ICAO-IMO global system. ~~Presently, two DOD RCCs have been designated to function as RCCs for civil SAR. These are RCC Elmendorf AFB, AK, and RCC Langley AFB, VA. The US Coast Guard currently operates the other US civil SAR RCCs. These arrangements, however, are not intended to prevent appropriate use of all available resources for civil SAR, including use of services that any DOD PRCC can provide, as long as such use does not have the effect of, and is not intended to, displace part of the global civil SAR system. DOD support of civil SAR is predicated on a non-interference basis with primary military missions in accordance with the NSP and DOD policy.~~

c. ~~Types of Missions~~ Civil SAR Services

(1) Civil SAR includes aeronautical, maritime, and land SAR. It does not include:

(a) Air ambulance services which did not result from a rescue or recovery operation.

~~(b) Assistance in cases of civil disturbance, insurrection or other emergencies which endanger life or property or disrupt the usual process of government.~~

(b) Rescues from space (although rescue of persons returned from space can be included).

(c) Military operations, such as CSAR or other types of PR to remove military or civilian personnel from harm's way.

(d) Salvage operations.

(e) Overall response to natural or manmade disasters or terrorist incidents.

(f) Typical disaster response operations such as locating and rescuing victims trapped in collapsed structures or other assistance provided under the scope of the Federal Response Plan (FRP).

(2) In cases where the President declares a **'major disaster,'** a number of possible national mechanisms are activated to assist state and local governments in the alleviation of the suffering and damage resulting from a major disaster or emergency. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), of the Department of Homeland Security, becomes the lead response agency in such cases as provided in the FRP. The Department of Defense is signatory to the FRP. The circumstances that exist before and after a disaster declaration may involve civil SAR operations carried out under the NSP, and may even involve mass rescue operations as discussed below. When a presidential declaration authorizes actions in relation to the FRP, provisions of the FRP supplement rather than replace those of the NSP. Civil SAR continues to be carried out in accordance with this publication and other applicable guidance. However, civil SAR activities will need to be coordinated with FEMA and take into account other aspects of the disaster response operations.

(3) **Mass rescue operations** (MROs) are civil SAR operations demanding a substantial surge in response capabilities. MROs are defined as civil SAR services characterized by the need for immediate assistance to large numbers of persons in distress, such that the capabilities normally available to local civil SAR authorities are inadequate. Examples of events that could result in the need for MROs include severe weather incidents (e.g., hurricanes, floods, tornadoes, etc.), earthquakes, avalanches, volcanic eruptions, and hazardous material incidents. Such events have potential to quickly and overwhelmingly exceed the rescue capabilities of other Federal, state, local, and volunteer entities. Combatant commanders shall ensure that appropriate plans and preparations are in place to be able to effectively conduct or support MROs when tasked.

2. Responsibilities

a. **Civil Authorities.** The US Coast Guard is the lead Federal agency for matters relating to civil SAR. The NSP describes the federal responsibilities of its signatory agencies and sets forth general principles of civil SAR in a manner valuable to personnel at both the command and unit operating levels. Military personnel who have tasks to carry out related to civil SAR should take time to become familiar with the NSP.

b. **Military Authorities.** The Department of Defense has certain ~~primary~~ civil SAR responsibilities over land areas of the United States, and ~~the Department of Defense has~~ certain support responsibilities within US SAR ~~regions and overseas~~ geographic divisions. These responsibilities are also detailed in the NSP.

3. Procedures

a. There are two key civil SAR documents that military personnel should understand and apply as appropriate. They are the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (IAMSAR), and the US supplement to the IAMSAR, the *National Search and Rescue Supplement (NSS)*. IAMSAR is jointly published by ICAO and IMO and adopted for the United States by the NSP. The National Search and Rescue Committee, which oversees implementation of the NSS and of which the Department of Defense is a member (DPMO is the DOD representative on the National Search and Rescue Committee and the Chair for the DOD SAR Working Group), developed the NSS and is responsible for its content. Together, the three-volume IAMSAR Manual and the NSS provide extensive information for personnel who may be responsible for civil SAR management, civil SAR planning and coordination, and civil SAR operations involving use of ships, aircraft, or other craft or persons on scene. The NSP and NSS are available to DOD personnel from the ~~CJCS-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff~~ Joint Electronic Library Web site. The IAMSAR is a copyrighted publication to which typical restrictions apply regarding reproduction, etc. Combatant commands should use the Publication Section of ICAO in Montreal, Canada, as their primary source for obtaining copies of IAMSAR. A secondary source for this publication is the Publication Section of IMO in London, UK. Electronic access to IAMSAR also may be found on the USCG Web site at www.uscg.mil. Follow the links under "Search & Rescue." Other pertinent civil SAR references also are found on this site.

~~b. Civil SAR shares similarities with other missions carried out by the military. It involves similar C2, communications, procedures, equipment, and terminology. However, the differences are also substantial. Civil SAR is a non-military mission based upon long-standing international principles and practices. Because civil SAR is not inherently a military mission and is based upon worldwide civil standards, its organization and procedures are substantially different from standard military procedures. Also, the applicable terminology is different, or the same terminology has different meanings. Therefore, training military forces for the civil SAR mission will mitigate the important potential risks and mistakes arising from the inappropriate application of military standards or the ignorance of SAR methods while performing SAR duties and working with civil SAR authorities. Military forces supporting civil SAR should be aware that significant terminology and procedural differences exist between the DOD and civil SAR system. Familiarity with civil SAR terminology and procedures will enhance interoperability.~~

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APPENDIX B

US ARMY PERSONNEL RECOVERY

~~1. General~~

~~—US Army units routinely link up with isolated forces and personnel during operations. Link-ups should not detract from a unit's primary mission or objective.~~

1. Responsibilities

a. Army commanders establish and maintain PRCCs in Army operation centers. These cells plan, coordinate, and control PR operations within the Army or joint force land component (if so designated) operational area. They coordinate with other component PRCCs to facilitate joint force PR operations. They also provide mutual support to other Service and functional components to the greatest extent possible. Coordination includes requesting and receiving PR assets or units, providing forces or units, and other actions required for recovering isolated personnel during joint operations.

b. The commander of a deployed Army force is responsible for unit PR and for recovery operations within ~~their~~ his or her operational area. Army commanders ensure deploying forces have recovery capabilities required by the combatant commander's ~~operation plan~~ OPLAN. Combatant commanders may elect not to require Army forces to have a recovery capability after considering other Service capabilities and operational constraints. The JFC tasks the Army component commander for JPRC augmentation in the ~~operation plan~~ OPLAN prior to force deployment.

c. During deployment and mission planning, subordinate unit commanders coordinate PR support with Army PRCCs to ensure required assets are available in the joint force. This will also facilitate prompt Army participation in joint PR efforts.

d. Army component commanders will ensure personnel assigned to PRCCs receive instruction and are trained on joint PR operations. Units conduct PR continuation training during unit and joint exercises.

e. The commander of deployed Army forces ensures HRI personnel are trained and familiar with tactics employed by PR forces during recovery operations. HRI personnel may include aviation and watercraft crews, and long-range surveillance units (LRSUs) personnel.

2. Command Relationships

a. **Component.** ~~Army component commanders exercise C2 through operations centers and staffs using policies, SOPs, and orders.~~ Within their operation centers, PRCCs plan and control PR missions within the assigned operational area. To ensure unity of command, unless otherwise

1 directed by the JFC, all forces conducting PR operations within an Army component commander
2 operational area should be under the OPCON or TACON of the commander.

3 **b. Joint**

4
5 (1) ~~Joint force land component commanders (JFLCCs) exercise C2 through operations~~
6 ~~centers and staffs using policies, SOPs, and orders. Within their operation centers, PRCCs plan~~
7 ~~and control PR missions within the assigned operational area.~~ To ensure unity of command, unless
8 otherwise directed by the JFC, all forces conducting PR operations within a JFLCC's operational
9 area should be under the OPCON or TACON of the ~~commander~~ JFLCC.

10
11 (2) Execution of the PR mission is decentralized and conducted at the lowest possible
12 level, and normally executed by battalions and controlled by brigades in an Army division or corps.
13 All PR incidents must be reported to the PRCC and JPRC as soon as possible following the initial
14 report of a PR incident.

15
16 (3) Initial control of a hasty PR mission rests with the on-site commander. If a hasty
17 recovery is not feasible, responsibility for the PR mission reverts to the commander of the unit in that
18 specific operational area.

19
20 **3. Capabilities and Limitations**

21
22 a. **General.** No PR-dedicated units or aircraft exist in the Army; however, the Army may
23 conduct PR on a limited basis with Army maneuver units, including aviation, medical evacuation
24 (MEDEVAC) units, and watercraft units. Army units tasked to conduct a deliberate PR mission
25 require time to task organize, gather equipment, and rehearse for the mission. Army units
26 conducting hasty PR utilize resources available and execute the mission as a hasty link-up operation.
27 Army mission planning and rehearsal aids, such as simulators, can serve as useful planning and
28 rehearsal tools. ~~The Army Space Support Team's Mission Planning and Rehearsal Simulator is also~~
29 ~~a nondedicated Army system that has a direct application and utility in PR operations.~~ The Army's
30 capabilities and limitation to accomplish the five PR execution tasks, ~~focusing on mobility and SA,~~
31 are as follows.

32
33 b. **Report.** Communication assets.

34
35 c. **Locate.** Sensor and other search assets that locate and authenticate isolated personnel.

36
37 d. **Support.** Includes isolated personnel, family, and media.

38
39 e. **Recover**

40
41 (1) **Maneuver Units.** Infantry, armor, aviation, cavalry, and LRSUs are normally not
42 tasked to provide standby coverage for potential PR missions, however, the use of these maneuver
43 units and their equipment to evacuate downed aircrews should be considered. Using ground assets

1 maybe the preferred method after evaluating local adversary air defenses and routes to and from
2 isolated personnel. Certainly ground assets should be considered when friendly forces are within
3 range of both the isolated personnel and the appropriate medical facilities. JPRC and Army PRCC
4 members should know the status and location of Army maneuver units that are available to assist or
5 conduct recovery missions.

6
7 (a) **Light infantry and LRSUs** may assist in the recovery of isolated personnel by
8 infiltration, link-up, and escort to friendly control in a high-threat environment. The JPRC should be
9 cognizant of the limited availability of LRSUs and request this assistance through the appropriate
10 commander. Because LRSUs are corps and division assets, the JPRC requests PR support from
11 them through the Army component PRCC. The PRCC will then coordinate with the appropriate
12 corps or division headquarters.

13
14 (b) **Mechanized infantry, armor, and cavalry units** are capable of recovering
15 personnel in higher-threat environments. They are highly survivable and can provide armored
16 protection to isolated personnel during recovery.

17
18 (c) **Aviation units** are capable of rapidly recovering isolated personnel over
19 extended distances, however, they are not as survivable as other maneuver units in higher threat
20 environments. Aviation units can task organize similar to a CSARTF but they do not possess the
21 same capabilities.

22
23 **25 FEBRUARY 1991**
24 **IRAQ**

25
26 **“Loss of an AH-64. This aircraft was assigned to the 1st/227th Attack**
27 **Helicopter Battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division. While covering the initial**
28 **attack of the Division into the tri-border area, helicopters of the battalion**
29 **came in contact with enemy forces. In the melee, the aircraft was hit by a**
30 **SAM and crashed. The Apache hit the ground hard. But the crew of Captain**
31 **Mike Klingele, the C Company commander, and CW4 Butler was able to**
32 **escape the aircraft. Enemy forces increased their fire. Immediately the**
33 **second aircraft in the flight landed near the wreckage. Both pilots sprinted**
34 **to it. They were wearing special harnesses that had attachments that could**
35 **be safely connected to the under-wings of the Apache for immediate**
36 **extraction. Quickly snapping in, they signaled for the pilot to lift them out of**
37 **danger. With the two men securely attached, the Apache lifted them out to a**
38 **safer area where they transferred to an OH-58C.”**

39
40 **SOURCE: MIXED BAG: Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm (Draft)**
41 **by Darrel D. Whitcomb**

42
43 (2) **MEDEVAC units** operations are not PR and are normally not tracked by the Army
44 component PRCC or the JPRC. If the operation consists solely of evacuating wounded
45 crewmembers from a crash site in friendly territory, air ambulances retain the protection accorded to

1 them under the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. MEDEVAC flights over adversary-
2 occupied territory may constitute loss of protection afforded by the Geneva Convention. Using
3 MEDEVAC aircraft for PR may require removal of all vestiges of its medical aircraft status, such as
4 the distinctive emblem of the Red Cross, for the duration of the PR mission. The final decision to
5 remove distinctive medical markings lies with the MEDEVAC unit commander and should follow
6 the established ROE. If distinctive markings are removed, a MEDEVAC aircraft cannot operate as
7 a medical aircraft under the protections established in the law of war. MEDEVAC helicopters
8 provide numerous capabilities vital to PR missions. Specifically, MEDEVAC aircraft are equipped
9 with high performance rescue hoists, jungle penetrators, medical equipment, and trained medical
10 personnel to provide en route medical care. Many MEDEVAC units have homing navigation
11 equipment designed to locate downed aircrew survival radios.

12
13 (3) **Watercraft units** are multi-mission resources that can be considered potential
14 resources for PR missions. Army watercraft may be the asset of choice after analyzing adversary
15 capabilities, mission requirements, and forces available. The Army uses watercraft primarily for
16 resupply, logistics, over-the-shore operations, and other troop support in littoral areas and inland
17 waterways. Army vessels normally operate in lower threat maritime environments within the
18 protection of other military forces. They have limited weaponry (self-defense) and combat
19 survivability. PR missions performed by Army watercraft in a combat environment should be limited
20 to their operational area.

21
22 f. ~~Debriefing and Reintegration.~~ ~~Capabilities~~ The Army has the capability to establish
23 facilities and execute procedures for ~~D&R-reintegration~~ phases I and II.

24 25 4. Concept of Operations

26
27 a. **Planning.** Army units can be widely dispersed and may operate independently for
28 extended periods of time. The fluid nature of these operations requires commanders to plan and
29 conduct link-up operations with isolated forces or personnel on a routine basis. This includes the
30 rescue of downed aircrews or isolated reconnaissance teams. These missions will require a unique
31 combination of individual and unit training, equipment, and tactics.

32
33 (1) Recovery of isolated personnel should be expedited. Immediate recovery is the most
34 feasible in friendly territory or before an adversary has an opportunity to react. Before a hasty
35 recovery is initiated however, the on-scene or local commander should evaluate the overall mission,
36 tactical situation, and the potential cost in equipment and personnel. ~~Of particular concern is the~~
37 ~~emotion that develops when a unit member is isolated or injured. Commanders must not execute~~
38 ~~PR missions without considering the risks.~~ If PR operations are well planned, coordinated, and
39 rehearsed; ground forces can normally execute their mission and a recovery simultaneously without
40 incurring needless risk.

41
42 (2) The mission, adversary, terrain and weather, troops and support available, and time
43 available will influence the tactics and resources utilized by Army commanders to plan ~~for link-up~~

~~and/or~~ PR missions. Commanders task units to conduct PR missions based on the unit capabilities, mission, and threat. The mission may be conducted as a raid, a link-up, or even a movement to contact. Based on time available Army units conduct or assist PR missions using two methods — deliberate and hasty.

b. Execution

(1) **Deliberate PR Missions.** The Army component commander may be tasked by the JFC to conduct a PR mission, which is normally received and executed by a brigade. Normally, operational planning and C2 for the PR mission will remain with the brigade headquarters. The JFC should provide additional assets (e.g., AWACS, JSTARS, close air support [CAS], RESCAP) to the brigade for deliberate recovery missions. Brigades consider reconnaissance and security when developing a PR plan. Link-up and PR operations are rehearsed as a combined arms operation by subordinate brigade elements.

(2) **Hasty PR Missions.** When an Army operation is already planned or being conducted in the vicinity of isolated personnel, the executing unit may be tasked to conduct the recovery upon the conclusion of the mission or during the mission. For example, while conducting a zone reconnaissance, a scout platoon could be tasked to recover an Air Force pilot that was shot down providing CAS to a nearby tank company. The scout platoon leader is told the pilot is not injured and is given the pilot's location and other required information. The platoon continues the mission, while the closest scout section is directed to locate and pickup the downed pilot.

5. Education and Training

a. **General.** There are many aspects to PR training. HRI personnel require initial SERE instruction and continuation training to ensure they react properly when isolated. Personnel working in PRCCs require joint PR instruction and training to ensure they properly integrate their efforts with the joint force plans, requirements, and control. Potential recovery forces also require training on PR missions.

b. Commanders and ~~s~~Staffs

(1) Personnel assigned in PRCCs ~~must-should~~ complete an advanced PR coordination course provided by JPRA, and should complete Joint Professional Military Education Phase II ~~offered at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, VA.~~ PRCC personnel should also conduct continuation training during unit collective training and joint training exercises.

(2) The National Search and Rescue School hosted by the USCG and staffed by the USCG and US Air Force provides maritime, inland, and SAR planning and coordination training for USCG, DOD personnel, and allies. A USCG correspondence course is also available that covers basic SAR plotting and planning.

1 (3) The Transportation School, Fort Eustis, VA, conducts SAR familiarization training for
2 the Marine Warrant Officers Advance Course.

3
4 c. **Recovery Forces.** Units that anticipate being the recovery force should have personnel
5 attend, at a minimum, an introductory PR coordination course provided by JPRA. Also, these units
6 should conduct continuation training on recovery operations during unit collective training exercises.
7 | This requirement is identified in the combatant commander's ~~operation plans~~ OPLANs that are
8 staffed with the Department of the Army and other force providers.

9
10 d. **Isolated Personnel**

11
12 (1) Unit commanders with HRI personnel ensure individuals and units receive and
13 conduct PR training. This may include instruction on the CoC, SERE, or related individual and
14 collective training. PR exercises, coupled with individual practice, normally validate a unit's PR
15 capability.

16
17 | (2) The US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School teaches SERE
18 level C at Fort Bragg, NC, to all qualified soldiers. Army Aviators receive SERE level B training
19 during the initial entry rotary-wing course at Fort Rucker, AL.

APPENDIX C

US NAVY PERSONNEL RECOVERY

23 January 1991
Wolf 01

"This F-16 from the 614 TFS was the lead aircraft in a flight of four fragg'd for an interdiction target near Kuwait City. Immediately after it dropped its bombs the aircraft burst into flames. The pilot, Major Jon Ball, was able to glide over the Persian Gulf before ejecting. The orbiting AWACS monitored his "Mayday" call and notified the JRCC who tasked the mission to the U.S. Navy. The Navy RCC launched an SH-60, call sign Spade 50, from HSL-44. It was stationed aboard the USS Nicholas on combat recovery duty in the northern Gulf area."

MIXED BAG: Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm (DRAFT)
Darrel D. Whitcomb

1. General

Navy units are tasked and trained to execute the full spectrum of PR missions including CSAR. Navy CSAR includes all previous CSAR requirements but places increased emphasis on integrating rescue planning and coordination into planning and execution of all strike operations.

2. Responsibilities

a. The senior member (usually the officer in tactical command (OTC)) of any deployed unit or group of units is directly responsible for conducting unit PR operations. In most cases, the carrier ~~battle-strike~~ group (~~CVBGCSG~~) commander will be the OTC. To ensure effective and expeditious execution of CSAR missions, the OTC will establish a rescue coordination team (RCT) as described in Naval Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-03.4, *Naval Strike and Air Warfare*, publication. The RCT is the Navy's functional equivalent of a component PRCC. The RCT is the planning and operations nucleus responsible to the strike warfare commander for conduct and execution of all CSAR operations. RCT responsibilities include planning, coordination, control, and recovery of downed aircrews in combat operations.

b. The carrier air wing is responsible for providing assistance in planning and executing all CSAR missions through the RCT. Additionally, the air wing commander will ensure that trained crews and aircraft are available to meet potential CSAR mission requirements. The carrier intelligence center is the central clearing point and storage center for intelligence specific to the CSAR mission. The carrier intelligence center is also directly responsible for information pertaining to planning and executing all CSAR operations.

c. The senior member of the RCT should function as the CSAR mission controller, or Navy ~~component controller as appropriate, for specific recovery operations on behalf of the OTC. The~~

1 senior member appointed by the strike warfare commander is directly responsible to the strike
2 warfare commander for the conduct and execution of CSAR missions.

3
4 **d. Amphibious Operations.** During an amphibious operation, the commander, amphibious
5 task force (CATF), is responsible for CSAR in the AOA. CSAR planning is coordinated with the
6 commander, landing force (CLF).

7
8 (1) The CLF is not structured to support landing force (LF) CSAR requirements.
9 Consequently, the CATF should provide CSAR assets or request CSAR support from the JPRC.

10
11 (2) If a ~~CVBG-CSG~~ is in support of the amphibious operation and not under the
12 OPCON of the CATF, the CATF should coordinate with the ~~CVBG-CSG~~ commander to ensure
13 clarity of CSAR responsibilities.

14
15 (3) Once C2 of the LF has been passed ashore, the CLF is responsible to the CATF for
16 CSAR in the land portion of the AOA until the amphibious operation is terminated.

17 18 **3. Command Relationships**

19 20 **a. Component**

21
22 (1) Figure C-1 shows the Navy's CSAR command relationships.

23
24 (2) The Navy component commander should relinquish TACON of forces capable of
25 CSAR as directed by the JFC to a JFC-designated component commander or the JPRC when
26 these forces are committed to a joint PR operation.

27 28 **b. Joint**

29 30 **4. Capabilities and Limitations**

31
32 **a. General.** Determination of assets employed in a CSAR role is affected by the operational
33 area and the threat. Types of assets and capabilities available to the OTC to execute the five PR
34 execution tasks, ~~focusing on mobility and SA,~~ are describe below.

35
36 **b. Report.** Communications assets.

37
38 **c. Locate.** Sensor and other search assets that locate and authenticate isolated personnel.

39
40 **d. Support.** Includes isolated personnel, family, and media.

41
42 **e. Recover**




Figure C-1. Navy Combat Search and Rescue Command and Control

(1) Helicopters

(a) **Direct Recovery.** The types of organic platforms available to the OTC include helicopters of varying size and capability. Only specific helicopter communities are trained and equipped to operate in hostile overland environments.

1. Organic battle group CSAR assets consist of selected CSAR-trained crews within each carrier-based helicopter antisubmarine warfare squadron (HS). Squadrons equipped with HH-60H helicopters are trained to conduct day and night CSAR and naval special warfare (NSW) operations in a hostile environment against small arms and IR missiles. HH-60H crews are specially trained in terrain flight, flying in hostile environments, NVGs, and NSW support. Combat radius permitting, ingress and egress circumnavigation routes using terrain masking, when combined with suppression of adversary air defenses, facilitate operations in medium-threat levels. Other than the HH-60H helicopter used by helicopter combat support (HCS) and HS squadrons, Navy helicopters lack most survivability features essential to battlefield operations (e.g., radar warning receivers, defensive countermeasures, airframe armor or ballistic tolerance, and internal geonavigational systems).

2. HCS 4 and 5 are Naval Reserve units whose primary missions are CSAR and NSW. Each has full-time active duty and Selected Reserve personnel assigned. Each has sufficient numbers of active duty personnel to allow them to deploy some of their assets on short notice while Selected Reserve personnel are activated to deploy more assets if needed. Augmentation with Selected Reserve assets can prove to be a significant force multiplier, and they can be forward deployed at a sea or shore site.

3. If there are no designated joint CSAR assets, organic assets within the aircraft of a ~~CVBG-CSG~~ are prioritized as follows:

a. Embarked HS.

b. Embarked helicopter anti-submarine warfare squadron light, light airborne multipurpose system detachments (overwater only).

c. Other helicopter assets (overwater only).

4. CSAR assets external to the ~~CVBG-CSG~~ should be planned for, coordinated, and requested as part of the initial strike planning activities. Requests for support are forwarded via the ~~chain of command~~ PRCC. Requests for reserve forces should be coordinated with the ~~Chief of Naval Operations~~ via the Maritime Component Commander (MCC).

5. Helicopters capable of performing night rescues overwater are the SH-3H, SH-60B/F, HH-60H, and MH-60S.

(b) **Insert and/or Extract Recovery Force.** If a direct airborne recovery is not feasible, helicopters and crews may be used within their threat-level capability in a support role for NSW CSAR operations. Based upon such factors as the size of the recovery force, helicopter range, and threat assessment, helicopters may insert and/or extract recovery forces.

(2) **Special Operations Forces.** Because of their inherent capabilities, SOF can provide a viable contingency recovery option. Planners should carefully analyze the threat so that the recovery force is not unduly exposed to the adversary.

(a) **NSW Forces.** In general, NSW strike and rescue forces use SEALs, various non-organic air assets, and/or organic surface craft, including high-speed SO craft, rigid hull inflatable boats, combat rubber raiding craft, riverine craft, and subsurface craft. These personnel and assets can be pre-positioned aboard or in the vicinity of a carrier conducting strike operations, with an amphibious ready group, onboard a submarine for clandestine insertion and recovery, or at other locations in close proximity to the area where rescue operations may be required. These forces are organized to:

1. Facilitate contact, authentication, security, medical treatment, movement, and exfiltration for recovery of isolated personnel in high-threat areas.

2. Clandestinely recover evaders to safeguard the integrity of designated evasion areas.

3. Coordinate NSFS or CAS in support of NSW recovery efforts.

4. Collect data for intelligence support of ongoing or future operations.

(b) **Other SOF.** Based upon the availability of other US or friendly SOF and depending upon the situation and compatibility of forces, SOF other than NSW forces may be employed in support of Navy CSAR operations.

(3) Surface and Subsurface

(a) **Direct Recovery.** The Navy uses surface ships and submarines to recover isolated personnel in an open water environment.

(b) **Insert and/or Extract Recovery Force.** Surface and subsurface platforms may be used to support CSAR operations in the event neither direct airborne recovery nor airborne insertion and/or extraction of the recovery force is feasible. Based upon such factors as the size of the recovery force, OTH navigation requirements, and threat assessment; surface and subsurface platforms may insert and/or extract the recovery force. Submarines, because of their ability to clandestinely insert and extract recovery force personnel, are particularly valuable for situations in which local surface and/or air superiority is not assured.

(4) **Other Forces.** The following forces are best suited to support the recovery task as described.

(a) **Tactical Aircraft.** Typical air assets available within a ~~CVBG-CSG~~ include fixed-wing attack and fighter aircraft; helicopters; surveillance, electronic countermeasures, and command, control, and communications aircraft; and a few tactical aerial refueling aircraft. Also, land-based maritime patrol and reconnaissance ~~aircraft~~ (MPR) aircraft may be operating in direct support of a ~~CVBG-CSG~~. MPR aircraft include the P-3 and EP-3. Long endurance, multiple sensors, and extensive communications capability make the P-3 an ideal overwater search platform. Considerations for using tactical aircraft in a CSAR mission, in order of importance, are as follows:

1. **Fuel Considerations and Time on Station.** Tactical aircraft are heavily dependent upon proximity of the carrier to isolated personnel location and/or availability of in-flight refueling assets. Because of endurance limitations, it would be feasible to provide a RESCORT during the last phase of a CSAR pickup (i.e., from initial point to pickup to initial point).

1 **2. Existing Threat Level.** Standardized tactics for fixed-wing RESCORT are
2 based upon flight operations in a low-threat environment. Under medium-threat conditions,
3 RESCORT tactics, including threat-suppression tactics, if considered at all, should be thoroughly
4 briefed to all CSAR mission participants and will vary based upon location and type of existing
5 threat.

6 **3. Night and Threat Level Capabilities.** For night CSAR operations
7 necessitated by elevated threat levels, fixed-wing support assets employing NVDs and/or radar
8 terrain avoidance systems should be used. Such equipment will greatly enhance the ability of the
9 OSC and RESCORT assets to accomplish location and sanitation responsibilities, simultaneously
10 decreasing their detectability to both adversary troop and air defense forces.

11
12 **4. Support Ordnance.** Ordnance requirements depend upon threat weapon
13 systems. For any threat level, use of advanced weapon systems for increased standoff and pinpoint
14 delivery would enhance the suppression of adversary capabilities and minimize aircraft exposure.

15
16 **5. Weather.** Weather minimums differ for individual elements of the CSARTF,
17 and will not always be sufficient to conduct a CSAR mission. Each mission should have planned
18 and briefed minimum weather criteria based on the current threat, terrain, and requirements for
19 mission accomplishment. Should the situation require flying RESCORT in limited airspace and/or
20 adverse weather, extreme vigilance and precision are paramount. The OTC, through the RCT,
21 makes the ultimate go/no-go mission decision.

22
23 **(b) Surface Assets.** Ships may be tasked with providing NSFS, lifeguard
24 functions, on-deck refueling, helicopter in-flight refueling (HIFR), and emergency landing decks.

25
26 **f. Debriefing and Reintegration.** Capabilities to establish facilities and execute procedures
27 for D&R-reintegration phases I and II.

28 29 **5. Concept of Operations**

30
31 **a. General.** CSAR forces may employ any one of a variety of procedures to recover isolated
32 personnel. The situation and threat will dictate the specific TTP employed. Personnel in nontactical,
33 permissive environments can expect to be recovered using SAR procedures. Independent
34 helicopter operations in conjunction with NSW are an additional option. Recovery methods
35 employed in hostile environments may vary considerably. Plans should be flexible to ensure efficient
36 employment of available resources with respect to the specific level of threat. The OTC should
37 establish a basis for go/no-go criteria under conditions and circumstances in which the OTC is
38 willing to risk additional assets to conduct CSAR.

39 40 **b. Planning**

41

(1) Planning for the CSAR mission begins during predeployment training. A complete CSAR posture should be developed using an orderly and logical planning process. Planners should apply the following three criteria to each phase of CSAR planning:

(a) Theater or subordinate joint force PR guidance or CONOPS.

(b) Strike planning and associated rescue contingencies.

(c) Final rescue mission planning.

(2) The PRCC and the RCT should formulate an inventory of both organic and external resources available to the battle group. This inventory should include all aviation and non-aviation resources, their respective capabilities and limitations, proper request channels, and estimated time needed from requests to availability on station.

(3) Planning for a CSAR mission requires specialized intelligence. In preplanning and predeployment phases, the PRCC and the RCT and carrier intelligence center are responsible for acquiring applicable intelligence publications and developing a database for CSAR mission planning.

(4) The CSAR mission often involves coordinated operations using both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. Because of differences in flight regimes, aircraft-unique threats should be carefully evaluated by the PRCC and the RCT to determine the appropriate rescue vehicle to be used or requested. The threat will vary with weapon systems as well as the employment doctrine and tactics of the adversary.

c. Execution. ~~Modern battlefield air defense systems severely limit the feasibility of “Vietnam-type” quick reaction recoveries of a downed aircrew. The rapid recovery of personnel at sea or in coastal areas, however, may be feasible as a result of the CVBG’s ability to suppress these defenses effectively in small areas for short periods. The modern battlefield relies heavily on air supremacy and immediate reaction for targeting. In a time sensitive environment, PR missions will be allocated resources for an immediate recovery if a location is known and valid. In the sea or coastal area, the MCC should have forces that can feasibly execute a rapid PR and be able to suppress adversary defenses effectively in small areas for short periods.~~ Recovery of personnel inland requires extensive planning to circumvent air defense and surface threats, localize and authenticate isolated personnel, and coordinate support forces such as tactical aircraft, NSFS, shore-based artillery and ground forces, and SOF. Options include the following:

(1) Clandestine or supported helicopter recoveries.

(2) Direct or supported surface recoveries.

(3) Direct or clandestine subsurface recoveries.

(4) SOF recoveries.

6. Education and Training

a. Commanders and ~~s~~Staffs

(1) An integral part of CSAR training is training given to air wing intelligence personnel. The Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC) at ~~NAS~~ Naval Air Station Fallon, NV, provides classroom and mission planning training to air wing intelligence officers responsible for coordinating the intelligence requirements of the RCT and CSARTF and integrates them into each CSAR rehearsal conducted with their particular air wing.

(2) Naval forces commanders, component commanders, and fleet commanders need a working knowledge of the PR architecture from both the naval and joint perspective. MCC PR planners and RCC staffs should be manned by personnel who have completed joint PR training.

b. **Recovery Forces.** Currently, a minimum of five crews within each HS squadron are trained in threat awareness and avoidance, terrain flight, CSAR tactics, NVG flight, and the preparation of ISOPREPs and EPAs during predeployment training. Additionally, the NSAWC provides detailed integrated CSAR training that includes all tactical air, fixed-wing airborne early warning, HS, MPR, and intelligence communities as well as the specific NSW and HCS unit that may be part of later battle group operations. This training attains a CSAR capability up to medium threat as defined in NTTP 3-03.4, *Naval Strike and Air Warfare*, but achieves an overall air wing CSAR capability up to and including the high-threat environment when using the NSW forces.

c. **Isolated Personnel.** ~~An integral part of CSAR training is training given to HRI personnel. Actual aircrews are trained and participate as the downed aviators in each of these evolutions. An integral part of successful PR recovery missions is a well trained isolated person. Appropriate level CoC and SERE training is necessary for all 'at risk of isolation or capture.' Follow-on training should include at-risk-of-isolation personnel participating as survivors during exercises.~~

APPENDIX D

US MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL RECOVERY

1. General

The Marine Corps views PR as an implicit requirement in all combat operations. Marine Corps forces perform self-supporting recovery operations and external PR support through a concept known as tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP). Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) do not train to conduct extended visual searches, particularly in a medium- or high-air threat environment. The TRAP mission differs from CSAR in that it usually does not involve extended visual search procedures using aircraft to locate isolated personnel. The TRAP concept emphasizes detailed planning and the use of assigned and briefed aircrew for the specific purpose of the recovery of personnel and/or aircraft when the tactical situation precludes SAR assets from responding and when survivors and their locations have been confirmed.

2. Responsibilities

a. US Marine Corps forces deploying to ~~a theater of operations~~ an operational area should be prepared to conduct self-supporting PR operations.

b. The MAGTF commander is responsible for the conduct of TRAP operations involving his forces. The MAGTF commander should also be prepared to provide augmentation personnel to the JPRC and component PRCC, if established, as required and directed by higher authority.

c. The MAGTF commander should ensure that all MAGTF personnel committed to a hostile environment are familiar with tactics employed by PR forces during recovery operations.

d. The MAGTF commander should provide mutual support to PR operations of other joint force components to the greatest extent possible.

e. MAGTF subordinate commanders should ensure that their personnel are familiar with evasion and PR tactics and are capable of meeting individual responsibilities.

3. Command Relationships

a. **Component.** For military operations, Marine forces are formed into MAGTFs under a single commander. MAGTFs are task organizations consisting of command, aviation, ground, and combat service support elements. The MAGTF is a self-sufficient, integrated, air-ground combined arms force organized for combat. TRAP is a MAGTF mission. As such, all elements of the MAGTF may participate in the TRAP mission.

(1) The MAGTF commander should retain OPCON of assigned forces in order to take advantage of the unique and balanced combined arms capability of the force.

(2) When MAGTF assets deploy in advance of the main body, a MAGTF forward command element (FCE) should be established. OPCON remains with the MAGTF commander and is exercised by the MAGTF's FCE.

(3) The MAGTF commander may be tasked with supporting other component PR efforts. When tasked to support these efforts, the MAGTF commander, as a supporting commander, ~~may relinquish TACON of those forces designated by the MAGTF commander to support the PR operations of the supported component commander~~ may transfer the forces designated by the MAGTF commander to the supported component commander. The command relationship (normally TACON) will be specified in the governing directive.

b. Joint

4. Capabilities and Limitations

a. **General.** The following ~~are the~~ highlight some capabilities and limitations, ~~focused on mobility and SA, to accomplish the five PR execution tasks.~~

b. **Report.** Communication assets.

c. **Locate.** Sensor and other search assets that locate and authenticate isolated personnel.

d. **Support.** Includes ~~is~~ isolated personnel, family, and media.

e. **Recover**

(1) **Command Element.** The command element (CE) is the MAGTF headquarters and is composed of the commander; the commander's staff; and a surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence (SRI) capability. The commander is responsible for the C2 and coordination of all MAGTF elements, including assigning tasks and providing the direction needed to accomplish the TRAP mission. The CE can provide information and intelligence to develop adversary, terrain, and weather databases to be used to plan and execute a TRAP mission. SRI resources have a capability to perform clandestine extracts.

(2) Aviation Combat Element

(a) Although assault support normally will be the main supporting function executed for the aviation combat element portion of TRAP, all six functions of Marine aviation may be applied in the mission. Antiair warfare assets (RESCAP) may be needed to ensure freedom of action for the recovery force (airborne or surfaceborne); offensive air support may provide deep air support and CAS; RESCORT may be required to ensure safe passage; and EW assets may be

employed to support the TRAP mission. Two functions that will always be used are air reconnaissance and control of aircraft and missiles. Air reconnaissance should provide continuous observation of the pickup area.

(b) US Marine Corps assault transport helicopters are not specifically configured for PR with the extra armor and defensive armament required. Such configuration would reduce the troop and cargo carrying capacity of the aircraft.

(3) **Ground Combat Element (GCE).** The traditional role of the GCE in TRAP has been to provide various types and sizes of teams to provide security at the pickup site. The GCE can be tasked to conduct the TRAP mission by surface means to include rigid raiding craft, light armored vehicles, or organic forces to conduct clandestine extracts. Fire support assets of the GCE may be tasked to support the TRAP mission.

(4) The **Combat Service Support Element** may be tasked to provide a variety of support, including medical, HLZ (helicopter support teams, slings), explosive ordnance disposal, engineer, and other selected service support (e.g., supply; water; petroleum, oil, and lubricants; utilities).

f. **Debriefing and Reintegration.** Capabilities to establish facilities and execute procedures for D&R-reintegration phases I and II.

5. Concept of Operations

a. **General.** TRAP should not supersede assigned mission objectives and resource requirements, but in a typical situation should be accorded a priority level of importance. The prerequisites for conducting a TRAP mission are as follows:

(1) There should be reasonable certainty that isolated personnel are alive.

(2) The location of the personnel, equipment, or aircraft must be known.

b. Planning

(1) It is critical that as much TRAP mission planning as possible be done before deployment of the MAGTF to minimize confusion at the time of mission execution. Such planning comprises three phases:

(a) Analysis of theater PR guidance or CONOPS.

(b) Assault contingency planning.

(c) Final TRAP mission planning.




Figure D-1. Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel Decision Matrix

(2) The MAGTF CONOPS for TRAP missions should include possible scenarios and geographic areas in establishing basic policy. The concept should also describe the conditions under which other resources external to the MAGTF will be requested. The concept should include a specific decision matrix that will assist in determining basic go/no-go criteria. Figure D-1 is a typical TRAP decision matrix.

(3) There is no standard TRAP mission because each tactical situation is unique. The key to success is proper attention to the planning process. A simple, concise CONOPS that accurately reflects theater policy, a thorough contingency TRAP plan for each assault, and rapid final planning after each initial loss report will greatly reduce uncertainty and confusion during the recovery mission.

c. **Execution.** In many cases, isolated personnel will be in a no-go sector. In this situation, other resources may be requested or a clandestine recovery may be employed. In some situations,

1 isolated personnel will have to evade to a viable recovery area. The ultimate goal of a TRAP is to
2 affect the expeditious return of personnel, equipment, and/or aircraft without further loss of friendly
3 forces.
4

5 (1) **Immediate Recovery.** The ideal time to execute a TRAP mission is immediately
6 after the incident occurs. Immediate recovery is most desirable because friendly forces may still be
7 in the area, adversary forces may not have had an opportunity to react, and required medical
8 treatment can be rendered quickly. Immediate recovery efforts must be tempered by considering
9 the effects that an immediate recovery would have on assigned mission accomplishment. Some
10 threat levels will permit a quick reaction effort to conduct a successful recovery.
11

12 (2) **Delayed Recovery.** In many instances a delayed recovery may be necessary
13 because of assigned mission requirements or the adversary threat.
14

15 (a) Upon completion of an assigned mission, TRAP-capable resources may then be
16 directed to plan and conduct the delayed recovery.
17

18 (b) In the face of an overwhelming adversary threat, isolated personnel may be
19 directed to evade to a viable recovery area.
20

21 **6. Education and Training**

22 a. **Commanders and sStaffs**

23
24
25 b. **Recovery Forces.** MAGTF units train for TRAP missions as part of their overall training.
26 TRAP is viewed as an important category of assault support. Assault support and attack aircrews
27 maintain a high level of proficiency by including TRAP and PR in applicable training events.
28

29 c. **Isolated Personnel.** During the predeployment program period, Marines are taught skills
30 that are directly related to TRAP, including evasion and recovery TTP, night operations, and rapid
31 planning.
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APPENDIX E

US COAST GUARD PERSONNEL RECOVERY

1. General

All USCG cutters, aircraft, and boats are multimission vessels that can be considered potential CSAR resources. USCG cutters range from high and medium endurance cutters, which can operate offshore for extended periods of time, to coastal patrol and utility boats capable of operating in coastal and local waters for short durations. USCG aircraft include HC-130 and HU-25 fixed-wing aircraft capable of extended long-range CSAR, HH-65 helicopters for short-duration local CSAR operations, and HH-60J helicopters for medium-range CSAR.

2. Responsibilities

a. The Commander, USCG Pacific Area, is responsible to the Commander, US Pacific Command, and the Commander, USCG Atlantic Area is responsible to the Commanders, US Northern Command and US Southern Command for overall coordination of maritime SAR within their respective operational areas. As SAR coordinators, the USCG area commanders are specifically charged to establish and operate RCCs for these ~~two~~-three unified commands. In wartime, all existing USCG operations centers will continue to function at their present location and retain their RCC capability and function.

b. The USCG provides personnel who can augment up to five deployable JPRCs or PRCCs operating outside the continental United States. USCG area commanders are responsible to the fleet commanders.

c. Contingencies may require establishment of additional JPRCs or PRCCs that would be augmented by PR-qualified USCG and DOD personnel. These needs may be addressed to the Commandant, USCG, who will then identify the resources required to operate the requested JPRCs/PRCCs.

d. The JFC may request additional USCG resources for PR operations from the Commandant, USCG, via all appropriate echelons of command.

3. Command Relationships

a. **Peacetime.** USCG wartime tasking is divided into two categories: normal peacetime USCG functions and responsibilities, and naval military functions as tasked by the Chief of Naval Operations in the *Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan*. The Commandant, USCG, as the Chief of a Service, controls the administrative, managerial, and technical aspects of all USCG functions. Operationally, in wartime, the Commandant should continue to exercise control over continuing specialized USCG functions, including normal peacetime responsibilities.

1
2 **b. Wartime**

3 (1) For military functions, however, the commands of the USCG area commanders and
4 Commander, USCG Activities, Europe, are the highest echelon of USCG commands that have an
5 operational relationship with the Navy. Thus, these commanders report to the appropriate Navy
6 component commander and normally exercise OPCON over USCG forces conducting military
7 functions.
8

9 (2) When the USCG operates as part of the Navy; upon declaration of war or when the
10 President so directs in accordance with Title 14, USC 3; the Commandant, USCG, is responsible
11 to the Secretary of the Navy for the continued performance of those missions and tasks assigned by
12 statute. The Commandant also reports to the Chief of Naval Operations for the organization,
13 training, and readiness of those elements assigned to the Navy. When a maritime defense zone
14 (MDZ) is activated, all USCG operational functions are subordinate to it. The Commander, USCG
15 Atlantic, and Commander, USCG Pacific, become MDZ commanders and are directly subordinate
16 to the respective fleet commanders for coastal defense. A typical USCG PR C2 arrangement is
17 shown in Figure E-1.
18

19 (3) USCG unit and organization commanders should relinquish TACON of forces
20 capable of PR as directed by the JFC to a JFC-designated component commander or the JPRC
21 when these forces are committed to a joint PR operation.
22

23 **4. Capabilities and Limitations**
24

25 a. **General.** The following are the capabilities and limitations, focused on mobility and SA, to
26 accomplish the five PR execution tasks.
27

28 **b. Ship-Helicopter Compatibility**
29

30 (1) Procedures and requirements for operating helicopters on flight-deck-equipped
31 USCG cutters are contained in COMDTINST M3710.2 (Series), *Shipboard-Helicopter*
32 *Operational Procedures Manual*, and NWP 3-04.1M, *Shipboard Helicopter Operating*
33 *Procedures*. In general, for a non-USCG helicopter to operate from a USCG cutter, current
34 directives require “favorable” conditions such as no more than two degrees pitch and four degrees
35 roll of the vessel (unless otherwise determined by dynamic interface trials); and adequate clearance
36 from vessel structures for the aircraft to land and take off from the flight deck. The pilot of the
37 helicopter should be shipboard qualified in accordance with parent Service or component directives.
38 Physical dimensions and flight-deck clearance measurement information is contained in NAEC-
39 ENG-7576, *Shipboard Aviation Facilities Resume*.
40

41 (2) Use of USCG helicopters on non-USCG ships and non-USCG helicopters on USCG
42 cutters is authorized for those combinations shown to be acceptable in NAEC-ENG-7576,
43 *Shipboard Aviation Facilities Resume*. Generally, for both situations, the provisions of

- 1 subparagraph 6a apply. Additionally, for operations on vessels not covered by NAEC-ENG-
- 2 7576, *Shipboard Aviation Facilities Resume*, sufficient vessel deck strength and a buffer distance
- 3 of at least 10 feet between rotor blades and obstructions above 24 inches in height are mandatory.
- 4 Requests for waivers and situations not covered in NAEC-ENG-7576, *Shipboard*

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Figure E-1

1 *Aviation Facilities Resume*, should be addressed to the Chief of Law Enforcement and Defense
2 Operations, US Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, DC. Time-critical requests for waivers
3 should be forwarded through the cutter or aircraft commander.

4
5 (3) Aviation-capable USCG cutters can provide varying degrees of navigation and
6 communications support, depending on the class of ship. These cutters also carry a supply of JP-5
7 and have the capability of filtering and testing fuel for water and particulate matter as well as HIFR.
8 Some cutters have hangars but require a rotor blade folding capability for helicopters to be
9 hangared. External electrical power is also available for engine starting and maintenance.
10 Specifications for these systems are expanded on in NAEC-ENG-7576, *Shipboard Aviation*
11 *Facilities Resume*.

12
13 c. **Report.** Communication assets.

14
15 d. **Locate.** The USCG's computer-assisted search planning model is a valuable asset in
16 search planning for extended, open-ocean searches. Access to the model is available through
17 USCG PRCCs.

18
19 e. **Support.** Includes isolated personnel, family, and media.

20
21 f. **Recover.** The RESCAP and RESCORT capabilities of USCG aircraft are extremely
22 limited. "Intercept and escort" missions in a low-threat environment will be the upper limit of
23 RESCORT capability for USCG aircraft, which have no weaponry and very limited combat
24 survivability. The services provided to the escorted resources will be generally the same as in a
25 peacetime intercept and escort of a distressed aircraft; specifically, communications and navigation
26 services, potential rescue or aerial delivery of survival equipment, and vectoring of resources
27 capable of accomplishing recovery.

28
29 g. ~~**Debriefing and Reintegration.**~~ Capabilities to establish facilities and execute procedures
30 for ~~D&R-reintegration~~ phases I and II.

31 32 **5. Concept of Operations**

33 34 a. **Planning**

35
36 (1) The PR role of the USCG will be an extension of its peacetime mission. The USCG
37 participates in deliberate planning.

38
39 (2) During wartime, it is prudent to plan for PR as early in the planning phase as possible.
40 Although all operation plans and orders contain a PR appendix, a PR plan of action and resources
41 are frequently not identified before they are needed or placed on standby for PR operations. This
42 CONOPS assumes tasking before the mission begins and that the JPRC will be located to facilitate
43 timely planning input and coordination and/or control of all USCG CSAR operations by the JPRC.

1
2

1 **b. Execution**

2
3 (1) USCG cutters, boats, and aircraft normally operate in a maritime environment that will
4 remain predominantly a low-threat environment or within the protection of other military forces.
5 Some USCG resources have a very limited defensive capability; most have no offensive weaponry.
6 Offensive capability or increased defensive capability may not be required for many USCG PR
7 taskings. Some cutters have the capability to operate in medium- to high-threat scenarios. A
8 primary mission for the USCG during peacetime is SAR planning and coordination. USCG
9 personnel are well suited to perform in this capacity during joint operations. USCG cutters and
10 fixed-wing aircraft are equipped and their crews are trained for, and regularly perform, OSC duties.
11 USCG resources are ideal for low-threat, precautionary PR missions such as duckbutts.
12

13 (2) USCG units are accustomed to multiple missions in a single sortie or to changing
14 missions in mid-sortie. For example, a buoy tender whose primary function is the maintenance of
15 navigation aids may be diverted from that function to perform any higher priority mission. During
16 peacetime, this multi-mission concept provides for the diversion of resources to the highest priority
17 mission from a relatively low level in the organizational structure. In a combat situation, however,
18 mission priorities should be established clearly and tasking orders should define clearly the type of
19 response desired (i.e., when directed or as directed, or automatically in accordance with prescribed
20 mission priority). Cutters assigned to perform surveillance and interdiction patrols could also be an
21 immediate PR resource. Thus, the multi-mission concept becomes a force multiplier. A USCG
22 cutter, given the latitude of automatic response, will respond to a PR incident and complete it
23 without further guidance.
24

25 (3) Large USCG cutters are fully capable of operating as part of a Navy task force.
26 USCG aircraft can readily operate from non-USCG shore-based facilities, military or civilian.
27 Several similarly Coast Guard classed patrol boats (WPBs) can be deployed, using a squadron
28 concept, with additional spare parts and a small cadre of support personnel. Tasking can then be
29 handled through a squadron commander. These squadrons can be sea-based as an independent
30 force or part of a Navy task force.
31

32 (a) USCG small boats (less than 65 feet in length) are normally shore-based and are
33 designed to operate in the coastal environment. Although they could be deployed aboard ships
34 similar to the squadron concept mentioned above for WPBs, these boats are not designed for open-
35 ocean operations.
36

37 (b) Some types of USCG helicopters can be deployed with USCG cutters and/or
38 Navy ships, subject to restrictions described in COMDTINST M3710.1 (Series), *Air Operations*
39 *Manual*; COMDTINST M3710.2 (Series), *Shipboard-Helicopter Operational Procedures*
40 *Manual*; and NAEC-ENG-7576, *Shipboard Aviation Facilities Resume*. Normally, the ship
41 commander will task deployed helicopters.
42
43

1 **6. Education and Training**

2
3 a. **General.** The USCG SAR Program Manager (~~office symbol G-NRS~~) is assigned to the
4 Office of Navigation Safety and Waterway Services (~~G-N~~) in USCG Headquarters, Washington,
5 DC. The SAR Program Manager is responsible for defining the curriculum for all SAR training in
6 the USCG.

7
8 b. **Commanders and sStaffs.** The USCG hosts the National SAR School and, with the US
9 Air Force, jointly staffs it. The school provides maritime, inland, and SOF planning and
10 coordination training for USCG, DOD, and foreign students. The school does not teach PR in any
11 detail. A USCG correspondence course for basic SAR plotting and planning is available from the
12 USCG Institute in Oklahoma City, OK.

13
14 c. **Recovery Forces**

15
16 d. **Isolated Personnel**

APPENDIX F

US AIR FORCE PERSONNEL RECOVERY

1. General

Dedicated USAF recovery assets include HH-60G helicopters; HC-130P/N and a limited number of Air National Guard ANG-MC-130P fixed-wing aircraft; PRCC controllers, CROs/PJs, SAR duty officer (SARDOs), PRDOs, and SAR liaison officers PR LNOs. Dedicated forces mobilized for deployment as part of the Air Expeditionary Wings are ~~selected and~~ tailored based upon the scope of the conflict. Rescue aircraft and aircrews are made available to the PRCC for daily tasking as necessary. With proper coordination, other USAF resources such as ~~Combat Air Forces (CAF) fighters and C2 aircraft fighters, C2, ISR, and tanker aircraft~~ can augment and enhance the capability of primary USAF rescue assets as part of a CSARTF.

2. Responsibilities

a. Parent major commands (MAJCOMs) are responsible for organizing, training, equipping, sustaining, and providing operationally ready forces for CSAR operations. ~~Air-Combat Command~~ Air Force Special Operations Command, as the proponent for all ~~CAF-Air Force~~ rescue forces, is the lead agent for the other MAJCOMs.

b. Commander, Air Force Forces conducts CSAR operations in support of Air Force forces. Paragraph 3a describes how this commander exercises OPCON of CSAR forces.

3. Command Relationships

a. Component

(1) The **Air Force component commander (AFCC)** normally exercises OPCON of assigned Air Force CSAR forces through the respective wing, group, and squadron commanders. The AFCC coordinates all rescues through the PRCC. A typical CSAR C2 arrangement with its associated control and operations centers is shown in Figure F-1 and Figure F-2.

(2) **PR Mission Controllers** are employed to coordinate CSAR for the AFCC. Normally the PRCC will operate out of the JPRC but may stand alone or embedded into another organization as directed by AFCC. A PRCC director will oversee all operations of the PRCC and report directly to the AFCC. The controllers work directly for the Director. The PR mission controllers normally function in the PRCC at the AOC level or as determined by the AFCC. Controllers also may augment a JPRC, providing Air Force representation when required. PR mission controllers are CSAR air operations officers and C2 specialists and technicians. PR mission controller duties include the following:




Figure F-1. Air Force Command and Control for Personnel Recovery

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


Figure F-2. Joint Personnel Recovery Center Organization

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JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY CENTER ORGANIZATION	
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
BCD	Battlefield Coordination Detachment
CAS	Close Air Support
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JAG	Joint Advocate General
JAOC	Joint Air Operations Center
JFACC	Joint Force Air Component Commander
JPRC	Joint Personnel Receiving Center
LHO	Liaison Officer
MARLO	Marine Liaison Officer
NLO	Naval Liaison Officer
PR	Personnel Recovery
PRCC	Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell
SERE	Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape
SOLE	Special Operations Liaison Element

Figure F-2. Joint Personnel Recovery Center Organization (cont'd)

- (a) Prioritizing all reports of downed aircraft and other isolated/distressed personnel.
- (b) Maintaining a repository for mission-critical data.
- (c) Dispatching Air Force component rescue forces as directed or required.
- (d) Requesting collateral Service support to effect rescues.

(3) AFCC as the JFACC and Supported Commander for Joint PR. When the JFC designates the AFCC as the supported commander for Joint PR, the Air Force PRCC will normally be designated as the JPRC. Additionally, if the AFCC is also designated as the JFACC, the Air Force RCC will function both as the Air PRCC and the JPRC. The PRCC chief may be designated as the JPRC director, or a qualified officer with more seniority may be designated as the JPRC director. When the Air Force/Air PRCC also functions as the JPRC, coordination of PR missions employing JFACC assets should be integrated with the Combat Operations Division. However, the JPRC director must still be given requisite authority delegated directly from the JFACC to fulfill his joint PR responsibilities. This includes DIRLAUTH and coordination with all

1 pertinent components and agencies, and consultation with the JFACC as necessary on joint PR
2 matters. Figure F-2 depicts JPRC organization and coordination under these circumstances.

3
4 b. **Joint.** The AFCC should relinquish TACON of forces capable of CSAR as directed by
5 the JFC to a JFC-designated component commander ~~or to the JPRC~~ when these forces are
6 committed to a joint PR operation.

7 8 **4. Capabilities and Limitations**

9
10 a. **General.** The Air Force equips and organizes rescue forces for rapid deployment.
11 Dedicated rescue forces can deploy with organic maintenance and certain logistic support which
12 contributes to their mobility, flexibility, and responsiveness. Rotary-wing aircraft are normally
13 airlifted for deployment. Fixed-wing aircraft can self-deploy fully combat configured. Maintenance
14 and support personnel and associated equipment require airlift support or surface transportation for
15 deployment. CRO/PJ/SERE units maintain deployment unit type codes, both as an independent
16 unit, or integrated with aircraft. Operations exceeding 30 days require follow-on personnel and
17 equipment. The following ~~are the highlight some~~ capabilities and limitations, ~~focused on mobility and~~
18 ~~SA, to accomplish the five PR execution tasks.~~

19
20 b. **Report.** Communication assets.

21
22 c. **Locate**

23
24 (1) In some scenarios, specially trained RESCORT/OSC/RMC (call sign SANDY) may
25 be dedicated to the CSAR mission. A SANDY is a qualified, may be dedicated, (usually A-10)
26 pilot trained in search procedures, authentication techniques, and helicopter support tactics. In the
27 absence of SANDYs, FAC(A)s can make an immediate effort to locate, authenticate, and assist
28 isolated personnel until CSAR resources are dedicated.

29
30 (2) The concept of “combat search” associated with Air Force CSAR is limited in scope.
31 Traditional Air Force CSAR forces can conduct effective search operations only in a permissive
32 environment. Tactical aircraft with GPS navigation and sensor cueing information can conduct
33 search operations in a medium to high threat environment in certain situations. The vulnerability of
34 rescue resources in a threat environment precludes combat search operations. Air Force rescue
35 efforts will be almost totally dedicated to extracting isolated personnel from previously identified
36 geographic positions.

37
38 (3) Regardless of the threat level, friendly forces first must locate and then authenticate
39 isolated personnel before initiating combat rescue operations. Several methods exist to determine
40 location, such as theater sensor surveillance and C2 aircraft (e.g., TR-1, U-2, AWACS, JSTARS,
41 ABCCC RIVET JOINT, SENIOR SCOUT, GLOBAL HAWK, PREDATOR), global satellites,
42 wingman reports, and ~~battlefield radar control posts and centers~~ CRCs.

d. **Support.** Includes ~~I~~isolated personnel, family, and media.

e. **Recover.** Dedicated USAF recovery assets include HH-60G helicopters, HC-130P/N and a limited number of ANG MC-130P fixed-wing aircraft, PRCC controllers, PJs, SAR duty officers, CROs, and SAR liaison officers. Dedicated forces mobilized for deployment are selected and tailored based upon the scope of the conflict. Rescue aircraft and aircrews are made available to the PRCC for daily tasking as necessary. With proper coordination, other USAF resources such as Combat Air Forces (CAF) fighters and C2 aircraft can augment and enhance the capability of primary USAF rescue assets.

(1) The HH-60G PAVE HAWK helicopter is the primary USAF rescue platform. Mission tasks of the HH-60G may include formation or single-ship, day or night, marginal weather, low-level operations in hostile territory, and deployment of PJs. ~~Radio silence, deceptive course changes, and preplanned avoidance of adversary radar, adversary air defenses, and populated areas enhance mission success.~~ The HH-60G has IR countermeasures, passive radar warning systems to avoid detection by radar-directed air defenses and flare and chaff dispensers.

(2) HC-130 and MC-130P ~~(Air National Guard only)~~ aircraft are used for air refueling helicopters, inserting PJs by parachute, and serving as limited AMC platforms.

(3) The JFC also may direct augmenting CAF forces to conduct RESCORT, extended search operations (including overwater), air superiority and CAS operations (fighters and/or gunships), C2 operations (AWACS, JSTARS, ~~ABCCC~~), and other missions capable of supporting PR operations.

(4) **USAF Pararescue Forces.** PJs ~~are perform as~~ aircrew and special tactics members surface operations teams highly trained in emergency medical and harsh environment survival techniques. PJs will normally conduct the final on-scene authentication prior to extraction of isolated personnel. Employment is from either rotary- or fixed-wing assets. Employment from rotary-wing aircraft is by landing or alternate insertion or extraction methods, such as hoist or fast rope. Employment from fixed-wing aircraft will ~~normally be by parachute~~ be via airdrop or airland and may include ~~deployment with~~ deployable watercraft land or water transportation. PJs maintain scuba qualification. Certain rescue missions may require short duration PJ ground operations to perform life-saving medical treatment, ~~or~~ to protect the survivor from a harsh environment, or to gain valuable time on-scene when recovery platforms are delayed. These operations may be mounted or dismounted and will be dictated by environmental and tactical considerations.

For further information on pararescue tactics, refer to AFTTP 3-1 Vol 8, Tactical Employment of Pararescue/Combat Rescue Officer/SERE, (Secret).

(5) **CAF Assets and Capabilities.** CAF provide RESCORT, RESCAP, limited AMC support, and other support to the rescue effort. Specific mission profiles and procedures are found in the aircraft volumes of Multi-Command Manual 3-1.

(a) **RESCORT.** In some scenarios, SANDYs may be dedicated to the CSAR mission. The lead SANDY is the OSC for CSAR missions. SANDY aircraft can suppress or mark targets for other supporting aircraft to allow the rescue helicopters to operate in areas with more sophisticated or consolidated threats. SANDY ordnance loads are tailored to the CSAR mission. The AOC, JAOC, or allied tactical operations center coordinates SANDY missions.

(b) **RESCAP.** Dedicated fighters and precision guided missile-capable bombers may be assigned RESCAP support to CSAR missions. The AMC coordinates these aircraft through the ~~ABCCC~~, AWACS, JSTARS, JPRC, or PRCC.

(6) **Command and Control Operations.** AWACS is the primary AMC platform. JSTARS, ~~ABCCC~~, FAC(A)s, and the HC-130 can perform limited functions as the AMC until properly relieved. In the absence of SANDYs, FAC(A)s can make an immediate effort to locate, authenticate, and assist isolated personnel until CSAR resources are dedicated. The FAC(A) may be able to coordinate immediate recovery through the supported Army ground commander's helicopter units.

(7) **Fighters and Bombers.** Fighters with air-to-surface ordnance and bombers with precision guided weapons capability, such as Joint Direct Attack Munitions, can be diverted to the CSAR effort to provide additional threat suppression. Such support is coordinated through C2 elements.

f. **~~Debriefing and~~ Reintegration.** Capabilities to establish facilities and execute procedures for ~~D&R~~ reintegration phases I and II.

5. Concept of Operations

a. Planning

(1) Because of the volume of taskings expected during a major conflict, CSAR forces will most likely employ single-ship, night, low-level, terrain masking tactics. A typical scenario may include:

(a) Planning the mission in detail.

(b) Launching the recovery vehicle.

(c) Refueling at a forward operating location or forward area under night and low-level conditions to exploit darkness and terrain masking for the pickup.

(d) Executing the pickup by landing or using the rescue hoist. Landing is the preferred method, especially when extracting several isolated personnel.

(e) Egressing, while exploiting terrain and darkness, as on the ingress.

(f) Accomplishing minimum-light, communications-out air refueling, as required.

(g) Recovering at a suitable friendly base.

(2) ~~The employment of Air Force resources depends upon the JFC's concept of apportionment. The Air Force has several systems with rescue capability (i.e., MH-53J and HH-60G). Apportionment of these resources is based upon the relative priority of theater objectives. Currently, the most capable recovery vehicles for operating in a threat environment are Air Force Special Operations Command's (AFSOC's) MH-53J and CAF's HH-60G. Furthermore, HH-60G aircraft modified with the self-protection system are the most capable/survivable recovery vehicles. Forces capable of defeating or neutralizing threats (i.e., fighters and fighter bombers and AC-130 gunships) are controlled by various joint force components. The ability of the component PRCC and the JPRC to assemble an appropriate recovery package and coordinate a successful recovery operation depends, to a great extent, on the JFC's explicit direction for lower echelon support of joint PR.~~ The employment of Air Force resources depends upon the JFC's concept of apportionment. The Air Force has several systems with rescue capability. Apportionment of these resources is based upon the relative priority of theater objectives. Currently two of the most capable recovery vehicles for operating in a threat environment are Air Force Special Operations Command's MH-53Js and HH-60Gs. These recovery assets and forces may be capable of supporting recovery efforts by neutralizing threats (i.e., fighters, bombers and rotary/fixed wing gunships etc.) are controlled by different joint force components. The Combat Recovery weapon system (CRO/PJ/SERE assets) supports all five PR critical tasks and offers capabilities across the full range of environments. The ability of the component PRCC and the JPRC to assemble an appropriate recovery package and coordinate a successful recovery operation depend, to a great extent, on the JFC's explicit direction for lower echelon support of joint PR.

(3) Because the threat determines the required tactics, personnel, and equipment; thorough mission planning, interfaced with real-time threat information and C2 coordination, is essential. Specific information necessary for premission planning and the launch decision includes, but is not limited to, intelligence, threat, weather, terrain, the objective, codes and authentication, safe passage corridors, and air refueling points. Direct communication with the JPRC or multinational PRC, component PRCCs, AOCs, and wing operations centers is therefore essential. This direct communication becomes even more important if augmentation of additional air resources such as RESCAP or the formation of a CSARTF becomes necessary.

(4) ~~Another important factor is the threat.~~ Dedicated USAF recovery vehicles capable of operating in a low- to medium-threat environment may function successfully in an area generally categorized as high-threat if an extensively planned mission routing masks the operation. On the other hand, in a high-threat environment, even use of the most capable SOF resource most likely will result in an unsuccessful recovery if extensive planning is not done. As in all military actions, commanders must tailor forces to the threat in the objective area as well as the ingress and egress

routing. Tailored responses may vary greatly, and commanders should consider not only the capabilities of dedicated CSAR forces, but the capabilities of other available resources.

b. Execution

(1) Although all Air Force resources have the inherent capability to support CSAR operations, certain USAF forces are specifically dedicated to a primary mission of CSAR. Specially configured helicopters are the desired and standard recovery vehicle. Dedicated USAF CSAR forces can conduct rescue operations in both permissive and hostile environments. These resources are generally restricted to operating in a low- to medium-threat environment using threat avoidance procedures. When threat avoidance is not feasible, augmenting forces, such as specially trained RESCORT and RESCAP forces, are required for successful CSAR operations.

(2) The Air Force integrates its efforts into the host nation's PR operations. In light of the probable joint nature of future conflicts, the Air Force also considers the PR capabilities of other components during mission planning. In relatively low-threat environments, resources may respond to rescue taskings with a minimum amount of mission planning. Missions into medium-threat environments require detailed mission planning and accurate intelligence before execution. When rescue units require augmentation by air cover, air refueling, or CAS, they must coordinate closely with the other forces to properly integrate this effort. The JFC can direct precautionary PR coverage (within a limited geographic area) in advance of a major operation when significant combat losses are anticipated.

6. Training

a. Commanders and ~~s~~Staffs

b. Rescue Forces

(1) **Aircrews.** All crew members receive CSAR initial or qualification training. CAF (fighter) aircrews are trained to respond to CSAR as their aircraft capabilities permit. A limited number of A-10 pilots are specially trained (as SANDYs) and some airborne forward air controllers (FACs) receive CSAR training.

(2) **USAF Pararescue Forces.** The Air Force draws candidates for pararescue forces from enlisted basic training and existing Service personnel requesting special duty. Pararescue candidates attend a series of schools for indoctrination, static-line parachuting, scuba, basic survival, water survival, underwater egress, and basic medical training. Once basic qualification is complete, PJs receive:

(a) Combat emergency medical training.

(b) Special mission training (aerial night vision scanning and gunnery) in their unit.

(c) Free-fall parachute training.

(d) Advanced military tactical training.

(e) Foreign weapons and desert operations training.

(f) Refresher medical and pararescue team leader training.

c. **Isolated Personnel.** All crew members receive combat survival training and helicopter pilots, flight engineers, and PJs receive underwater egress training before receiving CSAR initial or qualification training. All CAF aircrews receive unit-sponsored and conducted SERE and water survival training. If they become isolated personnel, they are prepared to assist rescue forces. ~~Training is unit-sponsored and conducted.~~

APPENDIX G

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES PERSONNEL RECOVERY

1. General

SOF provide JFCs with an extremely flexible force. As a result, SOF may be tasked to perform missions for which they are either the best suited among available forces or the only force available; but are not necessarily organized, trained, or equipped to conduct. ~~For SOF, these are termed SOF collateral activities.~~ SOF are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct their ~~principal missions~~ core tasks. ~~SOF collateral activities are not another list of missions that SOF normally train to conduct, but rather activities that may be conducted based upon SOF's inherent capabilities to conduct their principal missions. The intent in listing them is to inform commanders and staffs that SOF have some capability to meet requirements in these mission areas. CSAR is a SOF collateral activity. CSAR is an activity that may be conducted based upon SOF's inherent capabilities to conduct core tasks.~~ CSAR is one method of operations that fall within PR. Each joint force component is responsible for performing CSAR in support of its own operations. As such, SOF regularly perform CSAR functions in support of their own operations. When specifically tasked, SOF may perform CSAR for other members of the joint force. It is important for commanders to be aware, however, that unlike some other joint force components, SOF does not have dedicated CSAR forces. Since CSAR taskings often involve forces being placed on alert status awaiting mission execution orders, such taskings would be at the expense of SOF's ability to conduct its principal missions. Therefore, SOF's greatest utility to PR is in the conduct of SOF recovery operations and UARs.

2. Responsibilities.

3. Command Relationships

a. Component

b. **Joint.** JFSOCCs normally establish a PRCC and an UARCC to coordinate PR operations. The functions of a PRCC for SOF are resident in the operations center of the senior SOF element of a joint force, either a JFSOCC or a joint special operations task force (JSOTF). The JFSOCC's operations center is the focal point for coordination between the JPRC and the JFSOCC/JSOTF. Also resident in the JFSOCC's operations center is the UARCC. The UARCC is the focal point for all UAR operations.

4. Capabilities and Limitations

a. **CSAR.** SOF possess unique capabilities that ~~compliment~~ complement the JFC's ability to conduct PR across the range of military operations. Two of SOF's missions — direct action (DA) and unconventional warfare (UW) — encompass activities that provide the JFC unique capabilities to accomplish PR operations. Of the five PR execution tasks, SOF primarily offer JFCs a unique

capability to conduct support and recover. The following ~~are the~~ highlight some capabilities and limitations, ~~focused on mobility and SA, to accomplish the five PR execution tasks.~~

b. **Report.** Communications.

c. **Locate.** Sensor or other capabilities to search, locate, and authenticate.

d. **Support.** Includes ~~is~~ isolated personnel, family, and media.

e. **Recover**

f. ~~Debriefing and~~ **Reintegration.** Capabilities to establish facilities and execute procedures for ~~D&R~~ reintegration phases I and II.

5. Concept of Operations

a. Planning

(1) **SOF Recovery Operations.** DA operations are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by SOF ~~or SO-capable~~ units to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel. One of the activities that fall within the DA mission area is SOF recovery operations. These are operations to locate, recover, and restore personnel or material held captive, isolated, or threatened in areas sensitive, denied, or contested to friendly control. SO recovery missions are often characterized by detailed planning, rehearsal, and thorough intelligence analysis. These operations may employ unconventional tactics, techniques, clandestine search, indigenous assistance, and the frequent use of ~~ground combat elements~~ GCEs. SOF recovery operations offer an additional capability to conduct the specific PR task of recovery. Historical examples of SOF recovery operations would be the Son Tay Raid in Vietnam, Operation EAGLE CLAW (the Iranian hostage rescue mission), and the rescue of Kurt Muse in Operation JUST CAUSE.

(2) **UAR.** UW consists of a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. One of the activities that fall within the UW mission area is UAR. These operations consist of UW forces establishing and operating UARMs and UARTs. UAR operations are designed to seek out, contact, authenticate, and support military and other selected personnel as they move from an adversary-held, hostile, or sensitive area to areas under friendly control; avoid capture if unable to return to an area of friendly control; and, if captured, escape.

(a) **UARMs** consist of a designated infrastructure in adversary-held or hostile area that is trained and directed to contact, authenticate, support, move, and exfiltrate US military or

1 other designated personnel to friendly control through established indigenous or surrogate networks
2 operating in a clandestine or covert manner. SOF may be involved in their creation, coordination,
3 supervision, and C2 either in support of combatant commanders, or as directed by the President of
4 the United States or the Secretary of Defense. UARMs may, or may not, involve using an UART.

5
6 (b) A **UART** is a designated SOF recovery team that is trained and equipped to
7 operate for a specified period in an overt, covert, or clandestine manner in adversary-held or hostile
8 areas normally in support of UARM, to contact, authenticate, support, move, and exfiltrate US
9 military and other designated personnel to friendly control. UARTs are sometimes focused on
10 providing recovery support to a designated recovery area to provide the JFC recovery options
11 where the employment of other PR assets is either infeasible or unacceptable. These operations
12 may be conducted as stand-alone missions or may complement the operations of an RM.

13
14 (c) UAR operations offer the JFC unique capabilities to accomplish the specific PR
15 execution tasks of support and recovery. Historical examples of UAR operations would be the
16 efforts of the UARMs of the French underground in WWII to support and return downed allied
17 pilots to friendly control.

18
19 **b. Execution**

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21 **6. Training**

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23 **a. Commanders and sStaffs**

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25 **b. Rescue Forces**

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27 **c. Isolated Personnel**
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APPENDIX H

BLOOD CHIT PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION

1. General

The following procedures have been established for the administration of the Department of Defense Blood Chit Program. JPRA is the DOD OPR for blood chit policy and for authorizing the production, distribution, and use of blood chits.

2. Program Administration

a. JPRA will maintain a master control record for all blood chits.

b. Each organization where blood chits are received, held in custody, and issued will maintain strict accountability by serial number.

c. Units will maintain a record of the blood chit serial number issued to each individual. An individual may be assigned a specific blood chit for the duration of his assignment to a unit; however, to assure positive control, the chit will only be issued before combat missions and deployments to high-threat areas and will be collected immediately after completion of missions.

d. The combatant commander will appoint a theater blood chit program manager or coordinator. This manager will maintain records reflecting which blood chits, by number, have been issued to component organizations. A copy of the initial inventory must be forwarded to JPRA. The program manager needs to establish procedures within the theater to maintain positive control of chits, including annual inventories.

e. The program manager must provide JPRA an annual inventory in December of each year reflecting which components have been issued blood chits, by blood chit number. Additional inventories should also occur at organizations possessing blood chits whenever there is a change of program manager or custodian; however, inventory results need not be forwarded unless a discrepancy is noted.

f. The loss or theft of blood chits is subject to appropriate investigation as would any controlled item. The report of loss or theft (specifying the blood chit serial number(s)), along with a report of investigation and a determination or reason for the loss or theft will be forwarded to the theater program manager and to JPRA as soon as possible after the loss or theft is discovered.

3. Reporting

a. Upon notification that an individual possessing a blood chit is isolated in hostile territory, the theater program manager will immediately forward to JPRA and DPMO the individual's name,

rank, Social Security number-~~(SSN)~~, organization, location where missing, date missing, and blood chit number. This information will help in processing potential future claims against the government on a particular chit and will provide basic record data on individuals who may subsequently become POWs.

b. Any individual who has made use of their blood chit and has received assistance must report the circumstances of the incident upon their return to US control. This information may be provided as part of a mission/evasion debrief in accordance with existing plans. A copy of the individual's debrief, along with the blood chit, must be forwarded to Headquarters JPRA, as soon as practicable. These operationally used blood chits will not be reissued but will become part of JPRA's permanent case files. The organization or organizations responsible for control of the blood chit will be simultaneously relieved of accountability for the particular blood chit.

4. Claims for Compensation

~~DPMO-Commander JPRA~~ will establish compensation limitations and will provide or appoint an individual in-theater as their representative to adjudicate all claims, in coordination with JPRA, as required. USG organizations to whom claims are presented will forward a report detailing the claim to the adjudicator, info-~~DPMO JPRA~~, which will determine the amount and nature of the compensation and provide funds to the organization to satisfy the claim.

5. Program Classification Guidance

a. All aspects of the DOD Blood Chit Program are unclassified.

b. Although blood chits are unclassified, they are controlled and accountable items.

c. Inventories and reports of the loss or theft of blood chits are ~~UNCLASSIFIED, unclassified~~, unless other factors in connection with the inventory or loss or theft require security classification.

~~d. Any operational use of a blood chit with an indigenous person is a highly sensitive act. This use may be highly classified and should only be disclosed to the theater JPRC and JPRA. Any operational use of a blood chit with an indigenous person is a highly sensitive act. Although the operational use of the blood chit is unclassified, the circumstances surrounding contact with an indigenous person may reveal classified tactics or methods, as well as compromise the identity of the indigenous person and their family in the future. Consult JPRA and other appropriate security classification guidance when reporting blood chit event information.~~

APPENDIX J
EVASION

1	Annex	A	Legal Aspects of Evasion
2		B	Evasion Strategies
3		C	Signaling Techniques and Procedures
4		D	Evasion Plan of a Action
5		E	Imminent Capture
6		F	Instructions for Isolated Personnel Report
7			
8			

EVASION

1. General

Evasion is the process whereby ~~individuals who are isolated in hostile or unfriendly territory~~ personnel avoid capture with the goal of successfully returning to areas under friendly control. ~~The following discussion of evasion is no substitute for the training required to acquire the appropriate SERE skills.~~ This appendix will provide commanders and staffs an overview of, and an appreciation for, the various skills a trained evader may possess thereby enhancing the planning for and execution of PR. Evasion techniques and procedures, as well as the evader's legal status, vary among the types military operations.

2. Types of Military Operations

a. **Military Operations During Peacetime.** There may be occasions when individuals will become isolated in a friendly or neutral foreign country as the result of an aircraft mishap, inadvertent border incursion, or similar circumstance. In such situations, the individuals' goals should be to return to friendly control openly and as soon as possible. Individuals isolated under these circumstances should approach local authorities and request assistance in returning to friendly control or, if possible, openly approach a US embassy or consulate or a representative of a friendly government. On the other hand, evasion may be the proper course of action when an individual accidentally and unintentionally becomes isolated in a foreign country that is unfriendly to the United States, in an area where there is no effective local government, or when there is reason to believe that the local population would mistreat the individual. Whenever "covered persons" operate in or near such areas during peacetime, combatant commanders should ensure that appropriate PR plans have been developed, HRI personnel have been properly trained and briefed, and that recovery forces are prepared to execute the plans when appropriate.

b. ~~Military operations other than war (MOOTW).~~ include many types of military operations as described in JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. These types of military operations may include the risk that participating individuals could become isolated in uncertain or hostile operational environments and be forced to evade. The nature of the operation will dictate the time available for mission planning; pre-mission reconnaissance and survey of potential evasion routes, contact points, and recovery sites; and pre-mission stocking of caches. Such advance preparations, when possible, permit confident predictions about conditions at locations where individuals might become isolated. Detailed PR plans can be based on these assumptions. Several types of MOOTW are addressed below, but other types may result from varying crisis situations.

(1) **Support to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency.** Isolated personnel are faced with contrasting concerns depending on whether the United States is supporting an insurgency or a counterinsurgency. For example, individuals whose mission is to support an insurgent movement

can expect to receive assistance in areas controlled by the insurgents or where the local populace is sympathetic to the movement. They should avoid government forces, government controlled areas, and areas where the population supports the government in power. Evaders can also anticipate that any recovery effort will most likely be conducted in a clandestine manner. On the other hand, personnel isolated while providing support to a counterinsurgency are faced with a completely different scenario. In a counterinsurgency, evaders should move to government-controlled areas, seek out government forces, and expect recovery by a force operating in a more overt manner. Because each situation has unique requirements, HRI personnel involved in either of these scenarios should be fully briefed prior to the onset of operations on the TTP and resources that will be used to effect their recovery.

(2) **Combating Terrorism.** Isolated personnel who were participating in counterterrorism activities are faced with a dilemma similar to that for insurgencies. The key variables in this situation are the location where the action has occurred and where the individual is evading (e.g., is the country where the individual is evading supportive or hostile to the US presence and action?). Evasion, even in a country where the government supports the US action, can be dangerous because the evasion area could be populated by elements supporting the terrorist group.

(3) **Peacekeeping Operations.** Although a prerequisite for the establishment of a peacekeeping force is the consent, cooperation, and support of the parties to the dispute (a negotiated truce), the peacekeeping force is often required to deal with extreme tension and violence. Such conditions could lead to a situation where members of the peacekeeping force find themselves in an evasion situation. Once again, the territory where the evasion takes place and the controlling power's political attitude toward the United States will influence evader actions. Members of the peacekeeping force should be well briefed on the current political climate, on the attitudes of the parties to the dispute, and proper evasion guidance that includes various possible evasion scenarios. In addition, planning for quick-response recovery operations should always precede the initial deployment of the force.

(4) **Other MOOTW.** Certain crisis avoidance or ~~crisis-management-consequence-~~management situations may require the use of military force to enforce or support diplomatic initiatives, respond to emergencies, or protect US citizens. Detailed PR plans should be developed for these operations to the extent allowed by the crisis situation.

c. War

(1) **General.** Evasion may be severely restricted by the large number of adversary forces along the FLOT, by combat operations, and by the possibility that adversary forces may possess sophisticated NVDs and various sensors. Evaders along the FLOT should concentrate on hiding and surviving. After the battle has passed over, the evader should try to link-up with other friendly forces without surprising friendly patrols. ~~They should attract friendly attention from behind a rock or some other bulletproof object, preferably with a white flag or locally developed visual or verbal recognition signal.~~ Isolated personnel should make no fast or threatening moves and allow

1 themselves to be captured. Once contact is made, authentication procedures will identify personnel
2 as bona fide US isolated personnel.

3 (2) **Weapons of Mass Destruction.** Planning should include procedures and
4 responsibilities to ensure HRI personnel are provided the training and equipment to survive in a
5 post-chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) environment.
6 The evader should be trained to employ individual CBRNE recognition and avoidance techniques.

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX J

LEGAL ASPECTS OF EVASION

1. During War

a. Under established international law (The Geneva Conventions, 12 August 1949, Articles 91-94), during an international armed conflict, members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict that are in the process of evading adversary capture are considered lawful combatants. If captured by the adversary, such persons are entitled to POW status. This legal status conveys certain rights under international law to the captured combatant including immunity for warlike acts committed prior to capture. Once captured, immunity for all but pre-capture warlike acts ceases to exist. POWs are therefore subject to the same laws and criminal procedures as the detaining party's own armed forces for post capture illegal acts. Therefore, although escape is legal under international law, a recaptured escaper can be charged with crimes committed while attempting to escape, such as theft, assault, and murder. However, only minor disciplinary punishment may be exerted by the detaining power for the act of escape itself.

b. It is important to stress the distinction that is made between an evader and a POW escaper. This distinction is significant because unlike an evader, an escaper does not enjoy combatant




Figure J-A-1. Evader Versus Escaper

1 immunity for his warlike acts (See Figure J-A-1). Unless an escaper makes it back safely to his
2 own forces or those of an ally, he can be charged and convicted by the detaining party for serious
3 crimes he may have committed in attempting to make good an escape. Offenses committed by
4 POWs with the sole intention of facilitating their escape that do not entail any violence against life or
5 limb, such as offenses against public property, theft without intention of self-enrichment, the drawing
6 up or use of false papers, or the wearing of civilian clothing; shall occasion disciplinary punishment
7 only. An escape is deemed successful once the escaper has been repatriated. Repatriation occurs
8 once the escaper has rejoined their, or an ally's, armed forces; or the escaper has left the territory of
9 the detaining power or its ally. If the escape is successful, the escaper cannot then be punished for
10 crimes committed during the escape. However, if later recaptured after ~~D&R~~ reintegration, there is
11 a real possibility that the detaining power will ignore this concept and attempt to punish the escaper.
12 Because of this, a successful escaper should be immediately removed from the theater of
13 operations.

14
15 (1) Under international law, an evader may commit acts of violence against legitimate
16 military targets without being liable for prosecution by the adversary for violation of the local criminal
17 laws. This entitlement does not extend to a POW escaper. An escaper is no longer privileged to
18 commit hostile acts and may be charged under the laws of the detaining power for certain acts
19 committed against the military or civilian population while escaping or avoiding recapture. The
20 critical difference is the fact of capture. In the first instance, the individual is considered an evader
21 and a lawful combatant and is therefore protected from domestic law by international law; in the
22 second instance, the escaper is subject to the detaining power's domestic laws for post-capture
23 offenses.

24
25 (2) Another distinction is made in the disposition of isolated personnel and escapers who
26 find their way into a neutral country. If an evader crosses into a neutral country's territory and is
27 captured, the evader should demand treatment in accordance with the Geneva Conventions.
28 However, a neutral party to an international armed conflict is actually required to hold the evader
29 until the cessation of hostilities. To return the evader would be to support the sending force and
30 neutrality would be lost. Therefore, the evader should attempt to successfully return to friendly lines
31 as if in a hostile party's territory but should not, to the extent possible, do anything that would be
32 considered criminal in the United States. There is no immunity for warlike acts in neutral countries.
33 A neutral power that receives escaped POWs will leave them at liberty. If it allows them to remain
34 in its territory, it may assign them a place of residence.

35
36 c. The Law of Armed Conflict places certain restrictions on an evader, but it also provides
37 isolated personnel with a certain latitude in what is considered acceptable conduct. This is
38 particularly true in the case of disguises.

39
40 (1) **Wearing of Adversary Uniforms.** It is a violation of international law to "make
41 improper use of " the uniform of the adversary. Persons captured while fighting in the adversary's
42 uniforms have traditionally been subject to criminal prosecution and possible execution for war
43 crimes and espionage. It is, however, still permissible for military personnel isolated in hostile

1 territory to use adversary uniforms to evade capture, as long as no other military operations are
2 conducted while so attired. Persons who use the adversary's flag, uniform, insignia, markings, or
3 emblems solely for evasion are not lawfully subject to disciplinary punishment on that account, as
4 long as they do not attack the adversary, gather military information, or engage in similar operations.
5 However, wearing an adversary uniform is extremely dangerous because it could result in the
6 mistaken but likely treatment of the evader as a spy.

7
8 (2) **Wearing of Civilian Clothing.** Wearing civilian clothes during escape or evasion in
9 and of itself is not a violation of international law. However, failure to wear distinctive military
10 insignia recognizable from a distance will, if the evader is captured, give the detaining power a strong
11 argument that the captured Service member is not entitled to POW status and combatant immunity
12 for re-capture offenses. Unless an evader clearly holds himself out as a combatant, the capturing
13 party may refuse to provide the protections provided to combatants. Therefore, an evader should
14 only wear civilian clothes where the wear of civilian clothes is essential to evading capture. Even if
15 the evader decides to wear civilian clothes, he should consider keeping his military ID card and ID
16 tags. ~~The ID card doubles as a Geneva Convention ID card identifying the holder as one entitled to~~
17 ~~Geneva Convention protections and should be sanitized prior to employment to ensure it only~~
18 ~~displays essential information (e.g., no unit/ship stickers). The Common Access Card (CAC) does~~
19 ~~not double as a Geneva convention card and measures should be taken to ensure the CAC is not~~
20 ~~carried into combat so exploitation cannot occur during captivity.~~ It is a violation of international
21 law to kill, injure, or capture the adversary by feigning civilian status, sickness or wounds, or by
22 falsely indicating an intent to surrender or negotiate. For example, it would be unlawful to feign
23 surrender and attack the adversary when they come forward to take you prisoner. However, it is
24 permissible for military personnel isolated in hostile territory to feign civilian status while evading,
25 though they should avoid combatant or espionage activities while dressed as civilians. Isolated
26 personnel who feign civilian status solely for evasion are not lawfully subject to disciplinary
27 punishment on that account if captured. In practice, of course, it may be difficult for a military
28 member to establish this if apprehended in civilian clothing. From a practical standpoint, all potential
29 and actual isolated personnel may at some time consider the possibility of trying to disguise
30 themselves by putting on civilian attire in the expectation of passing as natives. At best, that is
31 extremely dangerous. Where the evader's race is different from that of people indigenous to the
32 area, the procedure should be adopted only if there is no other alternative. Disguises in these
33 circumstances are likely to be effective only in low light conditions or at long ranges. Even in an
34 area where racial dissimilarities would not betray the evader, the mannerisms of walking, eating, and
35 even smoking, plus unfamiliarity with the language, would more than likely bring on suspicion,
36 leading to investigation and capture.

37
38 (3) **Disguises.** Under certain circumstances, the adoption of varying degrees of disguise
39 may be logical, appropriate, and required. For instance, if the population density is such that
40 movement in uniform is not possible, the evader may be required to adopt some sort of disguise to
41 transit the area. Likewise, if contact with an indigenous assistance group has been established, the
42 evader may be required to disguise himself to facilitate movement within an RM. In these instances,
43 the judgment of the assistance group should be respected. In so doing, isolated personnel need to

1 understand that in the event of capture they will likely be treated exactly like members of the
2 assistance group, unless they can convince their captors that they are lawful combatants. If the
3 isolated personnel' assistants have decided to disguise them in civilian clothing, they should retain at
4 least some of their uniform (e.g., ID tags, US Armed Forces/Geneva Conventions ID Card, blood
5 chit) to use as proof of status in the event of capture.

6
7 (4) **Misuse of the Red Cross and Other Protected Emblems.** Protected emblems
8 may not be used as disguises for purposes of escape or evasion in armed conflict. Only bona fide
9 medical personnel, chaplains, and relief agency personnel may wear these emblems during armed
10 conflict. Misuse of these protected emblems could result in extremely adverse effects on the
11 organizations and personnel they represent.

12 13 **2. During Military Operations Other Than War**

14
15 a. **General.** Legal considerations for evasion during MOOTW differ from those during war,
16 because, as a general rule, the Geneva Conventions and other international laws regarding warfare
17 only regulate international armed conflict and not purely internal armed conflicts. Since most
18 MOOTW involve conflicts of a non-international nature or situations where the parties to the
19 conflict are not nation states, the national domestic laws of the country in which the MOOTW is
20 taking place continue to apply.

21
22 b. POW status and combatant immunity are international law concepts. This means that a
23 participant in MOOTW, upon capture, is not technically entitled to POW status and the detaining
24 party is not required to provide pre-capture immunity for warlike acts. Therefore, if captured, an
25 evader in MOOTW faces the possibility of prosecution for his warlike acts, including, murder,
26 mayhem, destruction and theft of property, etc. This is usually not a problem because MOOTW
27 generally tend to support the host nation. It is also likely that the host nation will be a party to ~~status~~
28 ~~of forces~~ ~~agreements~~ SOFAs or will have entered into other international agreements prior to the
29 operation, which will provide immunity.

30
31 c. If the MOOTW is sponsored by the United Nations, the participants may be entitled to
32 "expert on mission" status, and must be returned to the UN upon capture.

33
34 d. If the MOOTW is not permissive and in support of the host nation, the MOOTW is
35 generally going to be an international armed conflict and all the above listed rules apply. However, if
36 the evader is captured by an insurgent group, opposed to the host nation, or if captured where there
37 is no functioning host nation and the fighting is between warlike clans, an evader cannot expect any
38 protection under the law as a practical matter. **Insurgent groups and non-state actors are not**
39 **bound by international agreements.** Although insurgents are subject to criminal prosecution by
40 the host nation, this may have little real impact on their willingness to provide protections to captured
41 isolated personnel.

1 e. Although as a technical matter, evaders are not legally entitled to POW status upon capture
2 during MOOTW, they should demand to be treated as a POW upon capture and be provided with
3 all of the protections accorded POW²s during international armed conflict. Many legal scholars and
4 some international courts have now stated that even though international laws do not technically
5 apply in purely internal armed conflicts, as a matter of customary international law they should and
6 do apply. If the capturing party is sensitive to the current trends in international law, it will provide
7 POW protections even where POW status does not exist as a matter of law.
8
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ANNEX B TO APPENDIX J

EVASION STRATEGIES

1. Short Term Evasion

a. **Static FLOT.** Evasion along the FLOT is always difficult, especially along a relatively static FLOT. ~~Under these conditions, adversary and friendly forces can be expected to be densely arrayed, be well camouflaged, and have expansive fields of fire.~~ Assistance may be close at hand and within radio range. ~~The sources of assistance may be air cover by fighter and attack fixed-wing aircraft, attack and transport helicopters, and ground forces.~~ If evaders near the FLOT feel sure that friendly forces are moving in their direction, they should seek concealment and allow friendly forces to overrun their position. ~~Attempts to penetrate the FLOT should be avoided.~~ Evaders can expect to face stiff opposition from both sides. Authentication procedures may assist them to safely make contact in or around the FLOT and when approached by friendly forces. Evaders may also be able to move away from the FLOT and contact friendly reconnaissance elements.

b. **Advancing FLOT.** Evaders in front of advancing friendly units should immediately take cover and wait for the friendly units to overrun their position. In these situations, the evader's primary goal is to seek protection from friendly and adversary fire while trying to avoid capture. In some cases, the evader may be able to assist the friendly forces by reporting on key adversary elements. Evaders should not engage the adversary unless they have been appropriately trained and equipped and the probability of success outweighs the risks involved.

c. **Retreating FLOT.** Attempting to catch up with retreating friendly units dangerously exposes the evader. Evaders between opposing forces should immediately take cover and wait for adversary units to pass over their position. After most adversary units have moved on, evaders should try to link up with other isolated friendly elements and return to friendly forces.

2. Extended Evasion

a. **General Considerations.** Distance from friendly forces may have no bearing on the duration of evasion. An evader isolated one mile behind adversary lines may require many days for concealment and traveling and many miles to walk around the flanks of strong adversary forces to friendly lines or a place that will allow a safe recovery.

(1) Do not become discouraged. The will to survive, survival skills, and equipment, coupled with an ability to withstand hardships and overcome obstacles, are essential to staying alive and successfully evading.

(2) Value clothing and equipment. Items such as shoes, clothing, and supplies are not likely to be replenished behind the lines, therefore, maintenance may be vital to survival.

1 (3) Focus on the situation and the EPA, develop a physical and mental pace and be
2 methodical. The entire journey to friendly or neutral areas may require living off of the land and
3 traveling on foot.

4
5 (4) Patience and knowledge of the adversary's population controls and internal security
6 measures such as patrols, travel restrictions, security checkpoints, rationing, etc., may be key to a
7 successful evasion.

8
9 (5) Understand that delay of a recovery effort is likely due to recovery force capabilities,
10 threats, or environmental conditions.

11
12 **b. Modification to the evader's EPA** will be dictated by the situation, however, changes
13 should be considered carefully, since recovery forces expect execution, as promulgated. For
14 example:

15
16 (1) Travel plans may change due to restrictions such as curfews, checkpoints, and
17 roadblocks.

18
19 (2) Unanticipated local customs may need to be imitated to avoid being conspicuous.
20

21 **c. Equipment.** The evader may be forced to decide what equipment to keep and how and
22 where to dispose of the remainder (pre-planning and training will facilitate the correct decisions).
23 Evaders should presume that the isolation event has been observed by the adversary. The
24 important thing is to avoid capture, even if it means leaving the scene of initial isolation and leaving
25 valuable equipment behind.

26
27 **d. Assistance From the Local Population.** Under some circumstances, especially when
28 seriously injured in such areas as the Arctic or desert, it may become necessary to seek assistance
29 from local people in order to survive. However, this should be done only as a last resort. Even
30 when evaders do not require emergency assistance and are doing everything possible to avoid
31 contact with local people, unplanned contacts may occur. All such contacts are very risky; but if
32 handled properly, they could result in life saving-assistance during evasion. Assistance will normally
33 fall into one of the following:

34
35 (1) Contact with **opportunists** may occur when an individual or a group of people seek
36 financial or political gain by assisting or apprehending an American evader. The blood chit may be
37 useful in this situation.

38
39 (2) **Accidental** contact occurs when a local person and an evader accidentally encounter
40 one another. Neither is comfortable with the situation and both are apprehensive about the
41 outcome. Pre-mission study of the local people may make the evader aware of local attitudes
42 toward Americans and provide some guidance as to how to communicate. A pointee-talkie or
43 blood chit may also assist in communication and soliciting aid. This aid may range from the local

1 person not sounding an alarm, to providing directions, survival assistance or information, to the best-
2 case scenario where the evader is returned to friendly control. Generally speaking, the best course
3 of action for an evader subsequent to accidental contact is to clear the contact area as covertly as
4 possible since the inclinations and resources of the local person are unknown.

5
6 (3) Evaders in danger of dying because of environmental extremes or injuries may elect to
7 seek an **act of mercy** from an individual in the local populace. This contact is very dangerous and
8 may result in death or capture. The blood chit may be useful in communicating and convincing an
9 individual to engage in an act of mercy. See Appendix L, “Classified Planning Supplement”
10 (published separately) for recommended contact procedures.

11
12 e. **Evasion in an Urban Area.** The likelihood of being isolated in an urban area is increasing.
13 With so few available HLZs and the high vulnerability of recovery vehicles or forces in any given
14 urban area, it is very likely that isolated personnel will need to evade or fight, if necessary, some
15 distance to get to a feasible recovery site or friendly forces. Generally, successful evasion in an
16 urban area requires an in-depth knowledge of the local area and attitude of the populace, and a
17 detailed map/diagram of the urban area. Isolated personnel should leave urban areas as quickly as
18 possible.

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ANNEX C TO APPENDIX J

SIGNALING TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

1. General

a. The most important action the evader can take to assist in their recovery is to periodically provide evidence to friendly forces that ~~they are~~ he/she is alive and still evading capture. This action can be best accomplished by effective signaling. The evader can indicate ~~their~~ his/her location to overhead assets via ground-to-air signals in accordance with the individual's EPA and ATO SPINS.

b. Evaders who are trained in various SERE tactics and techniques can decrease the risks to themselves and the recovery force by being able to:

(1) Overcome restrictions or limitations to signaling due to the capabilities of the signaling device, terrain, weather, medical status, and adversary activity.

(2) Use improvised signals to improve their chances of being sighted.

(3) Select signaling sites that enhance the signal. The signal site should also have natural or manufactured material readily available for immediate use.

(4) Employ appropriate actions to avoid disclosing their position to the adversary while signaling (i.e., use the terrain to mask radio transmissions from the adversary).

c. The evader should be prepared to set out two types of signals: a ~~recovery activation signal~~ (RAS) and/or a load signal. Further, the evader should be equipped with various forms of signaling devices, particularly those designed for use in low-light with NVDs.

2. RAS and Load Signals

a. A **RAS** is a pre-coordinated signal from an evader to a receiving or observing source that indicates "I am here, start the recovery planning." They are initiated per the ATO SPINS, ~~or~~ PR CONOPS, or EPA.

b. A **load signal** indicates the evader is positioned and prepared to make direct contact with recovery forces. Emplacing a load signal for ground forces must be a coordinated action. If technical communications exists, the evader should emplace the prescribed signal as directed. Without technical communications, ground forces must adapt to any signals articulated by the EPA of the evader. Load signals are generally offset from the actual contact site. Preferably they are constructed of indigenous materials and easily recognizable to a witting recovery force, but innocuous to the casual observer.

For a detailed discussion of RAS and load signals refer to Appendix L, "Classified Planning Supplement," (published separately).

3. Visual Signals

a. **Ground-to-air signals** such as flares, smoke generators, and signal mirrors can assist recovery forces in the objective area to determine the evader's exact location. Signal mirrors and flares are useful in the process of identifying and locating the evader.

b. **Fireflies** are IR light emitting diodes, powered by a 9-volt battery. They are two types — non-programmable and programmable. The programmable model has a unique coding system which allows the user to program a constant light emission or regulate the rate and number of flashes, up to four seconds long, to be programmed into the unit. The advantage of the programmable model is the ability to code many beacons with different rates of flash, enabling any one to be distinguished from a group. Either system is an accurate method of personal identification, landing strip marking, cache marking, vehicle tagging, etc.

c. **Glint Tape** is a very sensitive IR reflecting cloth that is lightweight, durable, and very reliable. It can usually be viewed with passive NVDs and is highly visible to active IR equipment. It is very useful as an emergency night signaling device for the evader (e.g., a one-inch square piece of tape is visible to AC-130 aircrews).

d. **Signal mirrors** can sweep the horizon to attract aircraft during daylight or during moonlit nights for NVD detection. They should only be used on authenticated targets and covered when not in use.

4. Additional Signaling Methods

a. **Improvised** (e.g., Morse code) or **manufactured** signals (e.g., ~~PRC-112A/B~~**PRC-112AB** codes, PRC-112B data bursts) may be used to attract recovery forces to a general location.

b. **Strobe lights**, with infrared or colored shields, and pyrotechnic signals should be used only as prebriefed or requested by recovery forces.

c. **Sea marker dye** may be used during daylight in open seas, streams, rivers, or to color snow.

d. **Manmade or Natural ~~m~~Materials**. Parachute panels, signal tarpaulins, space blankets, and other manmade or natural materials set in specific patterns and configurations may provide excellent visual signals.

5. Contact Procedures

a. Once the evader has been contacted, the recovery force will most likely conduct authentication in a progressive manner. Immediately after contact, the recovery force will attempt to determine by observation that the individual they have contacted is the one they have been sent to recover. The evader should make no sudden movements that could be interpreted as

1 hostile. If the recovery force doubts the evader's identity, the evader will be moved as a
2 "captive" to a more secure area for continued authentication.
3

4 b. Definitive authentication will be based on the information contained in the ISOPREP,
5 including the four-digit authentication number, personal authentication statements, and
6 fingerprint information. Additional information may be used, such as footprint and/or dental
7 information. If the evader is unable to respond to questioning or cannot be fingerprinted, the
8 recovery force will follow accepted detainee handling procedures pending authentication or
9 return to friendly territory.
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ANNEX D TO APPENDIX J

EVASION PLAN OF ACTION

1. Minimum Information

a. **General.** Individuals completing EPAs should not use the statement “PER ATO SPINS” as substitute information. Such a statement fails to provide recovery forces with the information required and provides no concrete data with which to plan a recovery operation. EPAs should contain the minimum information outlined below. Inclusion of this prescribed information into one document or an electronic database, i.e., PRMS, enhances operational effectiveness and precludes the possibility that critical information might not be available in a time-sensitive situation. EPAs must be classified to at least the level of the ~~operation-plan~~OPLAN/OPORD for the mission they support. Paragraphs must be individually classified to the appropriate level.

b. Identification

(1) Name and rank (for each crew or team member).

(2) Mission number, aircraft or team call sign or identifier, crew or team position, type aircraft, call sign suffix, other.

c. Planned Route of Flight, Travel, and/or Delta Points on File

(1) If not on file, the route points must be described in the EPA for the ingress, target area, and egress.

(2) Describe inflight emergency plans for each leg of the mission.

d. Immediate Evasion Actions and/or Intentions for the First 48 Hours, Uninjured

(1) Hide near aircraft or parachute landing site or area of separation from team (distance and heading).

(2) Evade alone or link-up with crew or team (rally points).

(3) Travel plans (distance, duration or time, speed, and other such details).

(4) Intended actions and/or length of stay at initial hiding location.

e. Immediate Evasion Actions and/or Intentions, If Injured

(1) Provide hiding intentions if injured.

(2) Provide evasion intentions if injured.

(3) Provide travel intentions if injured.

(4) Provide intended actions at hiding locations if injured.

f. Extended Evasion Actions and/or Intentions After 48 Hours

(1) Destination (recovery area, mountain range, coast, border, FLOT).

(2) Travel routes, plans, and/or techniques (either written and/or sketched).

(3) Actions and/or intentions at potential contact or recovery locations.

(4) Recovery/contact point signals, signs, and/or procedures (written out and/or sketched).

(5) Back-up plans, if any, for the above.

2. Supplementary Information

a. **General.** The following information should be completed with assistance from appropriate communications and/or signal, intelligence, SERE, and life support personnel as needed; and attached to the EPA.

b. Communications and Authentication

(1) Word, number, color and/or letter of the day, month, or quarter; bona fides; SARDOT; SARNEG; duress code word; other (as applicable).

(2) Available communications and signaling devices: type and quantity of radios, programmed frequencies, PLS code, encryption code, quantity of batteries, type and quantity of flares, beacons, mirrors, strobe lights, other.

(3) Primary communication schedule, procedures, and/or frequencies (initial/extended contact procedures).

(4) Back-up communication schedule, procedures, and/or frequencies.

c. Other Useful Information

(1) SERE training completed.

1
2 (2) Weapons and ammunition carried.

3
4 (3) Personal evasion kit items.

5
6 (4) Listing of issued signaling, survival, and evasion kit items.

7
8 (5) Mission evasion preparation checklist.

9
10 (6) Signature of reviewing official.

11
12 (7) Clothing and shoe sizes.

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ANNEX E TO APPENDIX J

IMMINENT CAPTURE

1 1. Members of the Armed Forces may never surrender voluntarily. Even when isolated and no
2 longer able to inflict casualties on the adversary or otherwise defend themselves, it is their duty to
3 evade capture and rejoin the nearest friendly force. Surrender is the willful act of members of the
4 Armed Forces turning themselves over to adversary forces when not required by utmost necessity
5 or extremity. Surrender is always dishonorable and never allowed. When there is no chance for
6 meaningful resistance, evasion is impossible, and further fighting would lead to their death with no
7 significant loss to the adversary, members of Armed Forces should view themselves as “captured”
8 against their will versus a circumstance that is seen as voluntarily “surrendering.” They must
9 remember that the capture was dictated by the futility of the situation and overwhelming adversary
10 strengths. In this case, capture is not dishonorable.

11
12 2. There are many potential actions that could assist the “about to be captured” evader.
13 Preparation activities should be performed clandestinely to not draw the adversary’s attention.
14 Even when the situation looks insurmountable, the adversary could make a mistake and miss finding
15 an evader, even one that is not well hidden. This is a situation where maintaining patience and
16 flexibility may result in continued freedom — not panicking is critical. The individual weapon the
17 evader has is for self-defense not for starting a new front in the war. Possible steps to consider
18 when capture looks imminent include:

19
20 a. Communicate with friendly forces or broadcast in the blind, for as long as possible, your
21 situation, health, and if applicable, status of other members of your team or crew if known; and
22 inform them of possible capture. Theater procedures normally will dictate the disposition of radio,
23 GPS, and other signaling and communication devices.

24
25 b. Sanitize for any information that you may have such as knee boards, authentication
26 books/tables, cryptological items, marked maps, survival radios, GPS, pocket litter, etc.

27
28 c. Note the time and your location for future reference.

29
30 d. Consume all the water and food available.

31
32 e. Scatter small survival/medical items within the clothing. These items may make it through a
33 search. Initial searches concentrate on weapons, maps, watches, and wallets.

34
35 f. Disable your weapon(s).

36
37 *For further information regarding SERE planning considerations and actions for isolated*
38 *personnel while detained or captured, refer to Appendix L, “Classified Planning*
39 *Supplement,” (published separately)*

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ANNEX F TO APPENDIX J

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ISOLATED PERSONNEL REPORT

1. Completion

a. **General.** ISOPREP data may be typed on DD Form 1833 or automated in PRMS. If personnel choose to hand write the ISOPREP, they must print clearly, legibly, and distinctly. Complete items in ink except for items 3, 13, 14, 20-23, and 24, which are completed in pencil. If possible, prepare a digital ISOPREP as well. Refer to sample ISOPREP form in Figures J-F-1 and J-F-2 regarding the following directions.

b. Items 1 through 13, self explanatory.

c. Item 14, enter a four-digit number that can be easily remembered. This number should not be in the individual's military records or be public information. The number should not be sequential (1234, 9876, etc), have repeated numbers (7777, 2299, etc), or have zeros.

d. Item 15, self-explanatory.

e. Items 16 through 18, to be completed by JPRC or PRCC personnel.

f. Item 19, Spare. Theater JPRC or equivalent generally designates usage of this block, (i.e., PRC-112 PLS code, blood chit number, etc.).

g. Items 20 through 23 require declarative statements, not questions and answers. They should involve personal details that are easily remembered and not subject to change. Details of friends, relatives (other than immediate family), pets, vehicles, vacations, and other such details would be appropriate (e.g., "My first car was a blue, 4-door, 1979 Trans Am."). Avoid references to dates, ages, or other information from the individual's military records or public information. Recovery forces will be able to derive several questions from each statement to authenticate the individual. Some simple guidelines are listed below:

(1) Do not invent stories that may not be remembered during an actual recovery due to the stress of the situation.

(2) Do not use memories subject to change, (i.e., My favorite ice cream is..., My current dog is..., etc.).

(3) Do not use slang or jargon that may not be understood by the recovery forces. If the recovery force cannot understand the statement, they cannot formulate a question.

CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN)			
ISOLATED PERSONNEL REPORT (ISOPREP) <i>(See Privacy Act Statement on reverse before completing this form)</i>		1. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	
CLASSIFIED BY: AFR 64-3, AR 525-90 NWP 19-2 DECLASSIFY ON: OADR		INSTRUCTIONS Items 1 through 15 and 20 through 23 are to be completed by Applicant. Items 16 through 19 and Item 24 are to be completed by RCC Personnel. All items are to be filled in INK; however, use a PENCIL for items 3, 13, 14, and 20 through 24.	
2. SSN		3. RANK/GRADE	
4. BRANCH OF SERVICE	5. NATIONALITY	6. DATE OF BIRTH (YYMMDD)	7. OBVIOUS MARKS (Scar, Birthmark, Mole)
8. BLOOD GROUP	9. HEIGHT	10. COLOR OF EYES	11. COLOR OF HAIR
12. DATE PREPARED (YYMMDD)	13. DATE REVIEWED (YYMMDD) AND CURRENT ASSIGNMENT	14. AUTHENTICATOR NO.	
15. SIGNATURE			
16. DATE MISSING (YYMMDD)	17. LOSS POSITION	18. PRIORITY (Holds vital information requiring priority rescue) <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	19. SPARE
----- Fold here -----			
PERSONAL AUTHENTICATION STATEMENTS			
20.		21.	
22.		23.	
24. ADDITIONAL DATA			
DD FORM 1833 PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE 84 FEB			
CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN)			

Figure J-F-1. Isolated Personnel Report (Front)

1 (4) Avoid referencing information that is public knowledge or can be found in the
 2 individual's military records.

3
 4 (5) Avoid using culturally sensitive information.
 5
 6

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AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C. Sections 133, 3012, 5031 and 8012; EO 9397.
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE(S): It is essential to the combat search and rescue effort for the protection of search and rescue forces from enemy entrapment. The social security number is used to ensure positive identification.
ROUTINE USE(S): It will be completed by each aircrew member who may be subject to action in or over hostile territory. It contains personal information that may be used to ensure positive identification. After the aircrew member has completed the form it will be classified "CONFIDENTIAL."
DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY: The information is necessary since it affects the entire search and rescue mission and effect on individual of not providing information could be loss of crew status.

LEFT HAND	CODE	PRINT CODE	CODE	RIGHT HAND
1. LITTLE FINGER		Arch	KK	10. LITTLE FINGER
		Tented Arch	LL	
		Finger Loop	MM	
		Thumb Loop	NN	
		Whorl	OO	
2. RING		Finger Missing	PP	9. RING
		Finger Mutilated	QQ	
		Question/Uncertain	YY	
----- Fold here -----				
3. MIDDLE		PHOTOGRAPH (Front View)		8. MIDDLE
4. INDEX				7. INDEX
		PHOTOGRAPH (Profile View)		
5. THUMB				6. THUMB

DD FORM 1833, 84 FEB (REVERSE)

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1985-468-962/35042

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Figure J-F-2. Isolated Personnel Report (Back)

1 (6) Avoid using information that would cause embarrassment if disclosed.

2
3 h. Item 24, “Additional Data,” as a minimum provide SERE/CoC training courses and year
4 attended, known medical conditions (e.g., allergies, medication), and other information as directed
5 for local use, or as stated in theater guidance.

6
7 i. Fingerprints and appropriate codes will be recorded in blocks 1 through 10 on the reverse
8 of DD Form 1833. Fingerprinting will only be accomplished by qualified personnel such as Service
9 law enforcement agencies, office of special investigations, or other trained personnel. When the
10 JPRC assumes responsibility for the recovery of an individual by unconventional means, the JPRC
11 will ensure that the individual’s fingerprints are on his or her ISOPREP. Fingerprints need not be
12 coded before forwarding ISOPREPs to JPRCs. Combatant commanders will establish procedures
13 to ensure that fingerprints are properly taken to facilitate subsequent coding.

14
15 j. Provide current front and side view photographs of the individual in the appropriate uniform
16 without headgear. Provide digital photographs when using a digital ISOPREP.

17 18 **2. Maintenance and Control**

19
20 a. Classify CONFIDENTIAL once filled in.

21
22 b. Unit intelligence, SERE, PR, or operations personnel will archive two ISOPREP cards per
23 individual at the lowest possible level to ensure cards can be readily accessed and reviewed. During
24 military operations, ISOPREPs should be stored with, or in close proximity to, the individual’s EPA.
25 Unit commanders also may want to maintain an electronic database, i.e., PRMS, to facilitate
26 immediate transmission of ISOPREP data to the parent component PRCC or JPRC.

27
28 c. The individual must review their ISOPREP at least every six months during peacetime, and
29 prior to each mission during military operations.

30
31 d. The individual must never carry ISOPREP cards or the information with them on a mission.
32 Individuals en route to a deployment location may transport ISOPREPs as part of a classified
33 courier package only if this package is stored at a staging location prior to entering the tactical area
34 of operations.

35
36 e. Theater or joint force PR plans will establish guidelines for ISOPREP data transfer
37 timeliness and methods. ISOPREP data may be released to coalition recovery forces with
38 authorization. The JFC operations staff routinely requests authorization from the combatant
39 commander Foreign Disclosure Office.

40
41 f. Unit commanders should establish and periodically exercise procedures to ensure that
42 accurate ISOPREP data can be immediately provided through secure means. They should also

1 ensure that the parent component PRCC and the JPRC have been provided 24-hour contact
2 procedures to obtain ISOPREP information.

3
4 g. ~~All subordinate or attached unit personnel should be familiar with ISOPREP procedures.~~
5 ISOPREPs that have been used in successful personnel recovery operations should be revised to
6 remove any authentication data that may have been compromised. ISOPREPs that have not been
7 subjected to operational use shall be destroyed when the individual is no longer assigned to duties
8 which require a personnel recovery authentication means.

9
10 h. Upon notification that recovery operations have been unsuccessful or terminated, the
11 ISOPREP will be stored within the appropriate mission folder at the PRCC. The JPRC will
12 disseminate copies of the ISOPREP and other pertinent information to the theater PR/OPR and
13 JPRA for permanent archiving. The authentication information on the ISOPREP card remains
14 classified CONFIDENTIAL until the individual has been officially accounted for and it is
15 determined that no future authentication need exists.

16
17 i. ~~If death has been verified, do not destroy the ISOPREP. A directed investigation may~~
18 ~~require ISOPREP data to assist in identifying the remains of the victim. The physical description~~
19 ~~information contained on the ISOPREP will be declassified by the parent unit and accountability~~
20 ~~transferred to a senior member of the investigation team or board. The sensitive personal~~
21 ~~information contained within the declarative statements on the ISOPREP is not necessary for~~
22 ~~physical identification and will remain classified CONFIDENTIAL. If death has been verified, do~~
23 ~~not destroy the ISOPREP. The ISOPREP shall be declassified by the parent unit and~~
24 ~~accountability transferred to a senior member of the investigation board. Upon declassification, the~~
25 ~~ISOPREP shall be afforded protection under the Privacy and Missing Persons Acts and retained for~~
26 ~~archival purposes.~~

27
28 j. ISOPREP originals should ~~only~~ be forwarded to JPRA for ~~those~~ personnel declared to be in
29 the following categories: MIA, POW, detained, hostage, killed in action-body not recovered, killed
30 in action-body recovered, and died in captivity. The ISOPREP will become an official document in
31 their identification file.

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APPENDIX K

SAMPLE AIR TASKING ORDER SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

1. **General SPINS.** SPINS which are appropriate to all participants in an exercise or joint operation are published at the beginning of an operation and remain applicable for the duration of the exercise or operation. Additional information concerning interpretation of the ATO is found in USMTE ATOCONF DMS ATO Confirmation.

2. **Mission SPINS.** If required, SPINS appropriate to a specific mission (e.g., reconnaissance, PR, FAC) will be published. For example, the SPINS for PR operations will normally contain orbit points, low-level routes, radio frequencies, tactical reference points, and other specific information.

3. **Daily Mission Tasking Order.** This is a daily listing by mission of air activity tasked and/or fraggd in support of an exercise or operation. The daily order is normally published the day prior to the mission tasking contained in it. For PR operations, the daily tasking order will indicate both primary (e.g., HH-60, HC-130) and support (e.g., A-10) resources. PR support forces will be listed by unit. JPRC controllers and/or SARDOs-PRDOs must be familiar with the format and content of the ATO. The following is an example of a typical PR daily mission tasking order (fragmentary order).

```
*****
*
AIRTASK/PACKAGE/1A//
TASKUNIT/66ARS/KLSV/MINIGUNS FLARES CHAFF//
MSNDAT/AF0100/1A/JOLLY 01/HH60G/GSAR/15M/-/-/21277//
MSNLOC/301200Z/302359Z/NELLIS/ALT:020/1234/CAHOKIA//
TGTLOC/302210Z/302220Z/BAT 21/PILOT/3620N11508W/1234/PRC112 CHANNEL
ALPHA//
RECDATA//
CONTROL/AMC/KING 24/COPPER 23/CHERRY 10/SAHARA/JRCC ON COPPER 10//
REFUEL/KING 09/160/PINK/030/302143Z/4.5/252.8/123.1//
```

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4. Access to ATO information may be limited to a paper copy of the entire document, or available electronically to all JPRC personnel in the ~~contingency theater automated planning system (CTAPS)~~ theater battle management control systems (TBMCS), or the automated deep operations coordination system. If ~~CTAPS-TBMCS~~ is not available, and the JPRC has computers with word processing programs installed, you may be able to sort the ATO using FRAGWORKS or computer-assisted force management system programs. The search or find function available in the

Appendix K

word processing program can then speed the access of callsigns and associated information as well as locating and printing JPRC specific information. The following is an example of the information used.

*

[day of week] [month] [date], [year]

CALLSIGN	# TP AC	TASKUNIT	MSN T TOT	TFT	LOCATION
ADDER 31	1 MC-130E	AFSOC	GSOF 120200Z	130159Z	KTO
BERETTA 11	2 A-10A	354TFW	GCAS 121500Z	130259Z	
TBA					
BERETTA 11	2 A-10A	354TFW	GCAS 120300Z	121459Z	
TBA					
KAYO 01	2F-15	53TFS	GDCA 120200Z	130159Z	AL
KHARJ					
					AB
KAYO 03	2F-15	53TFS	GDCA 120200Z	130159Z	AL
KHARJ					
					AB
LIGHTNING					
014	F-15	RSAF3FW	GDCA 120200Z	130159Z	
EASTERN					
					SECTOR
					QRA
MOCCASIN 01	1 MH-53	AFSOC	GSOF 120200Z	130159Z	
KFIA					
RESCUE 74	1 212	RSAF2FW	GSAR 120200Z	130159Z	
WESTERN					
					SECTOR\
					TBA
RESCUE 75	1 212	RSAF-KFAA	GSAR 120200Z	130159Z	
TBA					
SALVAGE 66	2 KS-3A	C68	GAAR 120200Z	130159Z	
TBD					
SANDY 15	2 A-10A	354TFW	GSAR 120300Z	121500Z	
TBA					
SAR 77	1 212	RSAF5FW	GSAR 120200Z	130159	
SOUTHERN					
					SECTOR

Sample Air Tasking Order Special Instructions

1	SAR 70	1 212	RSAF3FW	GSAR	120200Z	130159Z
2	EASTERN					
3						SECTOR\
4						TBA
5	SAR 76	1 212	RSAF7FW	GSAR	120200Z	130159Z
6	NORTH					
7						WEST
8						SECTOR
9	SHOGUN 21	2F-14	C68	CAP	120900Z	121030Z
10	CONNOR-					
11						EARL CAP
12	SHOGUN 23	2F-18	C68	CA	120900Z	121030Z
13	CONNOR-					
14						EARL CAP
15	SHOGUN 31	2F-14	C68	CAP	121030Z	121200Z
16	CONNOR-					
17						EARL CAP

*

5. Personnel Recovery Special Instructions Template. The following template provides a standardized format for information used to complete the theater's daily and monthly SPINS, which support an ~~operation plan~~OPLAN/OPORD. Some sections remained current for a month, while others are changed weekly and daily. The information contained in each item would be determined by theater requirements, to include NAR and coalition forces considerations.

a. PR General Information

- (1) JPRC.
- (2) Pre-mission Preparation.
- (3) Brevity Codes.
- (4) SARDOTs.
- (5) SARNEG.
- (6) Duress Word.
- (7) PR Word, Number, and Letter of the Week.

b. Communication/Navigation Procedures

(1) PR Communications Plan.

(2) Navigation Waypoints.

c. Isolated Personnel

(1) Initial Actions.

(2) Immediate Actions for Isolated Personnel/Survivors on the Ground.

(3) Radio Communications.

d. Extended Evasion

(1) No-Radio Procedures.

e. Recovery Phase Procedures

(1) General.

(2) Signaling Devices.

f. Recovery Force Mission Details

(1) General.

(2) Navigation.

(3) Air-to-Air TACAN.

(4) Mission Execution Checklist.

(5) PRC-112B Interrogation Procedures.

(6) JSTARS Route Screening and Threat Warning.

g. Combat Search and Rescue

(1) Rescue Mission Execution Checklist.

(2) CSAR 11-Line Checklist.

(3) OSC's Checklist.

- 1
- 2 (4) AMC Immediate Action Checklist.
- 3
- 4 (5) AMC Changeover Procedure.
- 5
- 6 (6) Coalition Force Member ID Card Formats (if any).
- 7
- 8 (7) Clamshell Medical Report.
- 9
- 10 (8) HOOK Radio Canned Databurst Messages.
- 11
- 12 (9) Abbreviations and Acronyms.
- 13
- 14
- 15

APPENDIX L
CLASSIFIED PLANNING SUPPLEMENT
(Published Separately)

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APPENDIX M

SAMPLE CHECKLISTS

- | | | | |
|---|-------|---|--|
| 1 | Annex | A | Joint Personnel Recovery <u>Force</u> Mission Planning Checklist |
| 2 | | B | Airborne Mission Commander <u>Coordinator</u> Checklist |
| 3 | | C | On-Scene Commander Checklist |
| 4 | | D | Combat Search and Rescue Task Force Recovery Element |
| 5 | | | Briefing Checklist |
| 6 | | | |
| 7 | | | |
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ANNEX A TO APPENDIX M
JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY **FORCE** MISSION PLANNING CHECKLIST

1 _____I. DTG NOTIFIED:_____

2

3 _____II. PRE-MISSION:

4

5 _____A. RECORD EVENT ON APPROPRIATE INCIDENT FORM

6

7 _____B. PLOT ISOLATED PERSONNEL LOCATION ON SITUATION MAP

8

9 _____C. DETERMINE PR PLAN OF ACTION

10

11 _____D. COMPLETE PR WORKSHEET:

12

13 _____1. OBTAIN CURRENT INTEL BRIEF

14

15 _____2. OBTAIN ISOPREP, AUTHENTICATION DATA, AND EPA

16

17 _____3. DETERMINE THREAT LEVEL

18

19 _____4. OBTAIN WEATHER BRIEF

20

21 _____5. STUDY TERRAIN/OBTAIN SEA CONDITIONS

22

23 _____6. DETERMINE SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

24

25 _____7. DETERMINE NBC CONTAMINATION

26

27 _____8. DETERMINE MEDICAL STATUS

28

29 _____9. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

30

31 _____E. COMPLETE PR PLANNING

32

33 _____1. PR PLAN (FORCES, TIMING, LOCATIONS)

34

35 _____2. COMM PLAN/FLIGHT FOLLOWING INCLUDING

36 BACKUPS

37

38 _____3. RECOVERY FORCES INFORMED

39

- 1 _____4. SUPPORT FORCES REQUESTED (AS REQUESTED)
2
3 _____5. ON-SCENE COMMANDER APPOINTED/NOTIFIED
4
5 _____F. COORDINATION COMPLETE WITH ALL PR FORCES
6
7 _____III. MISSION EXECUTION/LAUNCH PROGRESS
8
9 _____A. MONITOR MISSION PROGRESS
10
11 _____1. START TIMES
12
13 _____2. KEEP COMPONENT PRCC/JPRC ADVISED OF ACTIONS
14
15 _____3. ARRIVAL TIMES AT SCENE
16
17 _____B. ARRANGE FOR TRANSPORT OF INJURED (AS REQUIRED)
18
19 _____C. OBTAIN ADDITIONAL PR FORCES/SUPPORT (AS REQUIRED)
20
21 _____D. COMPLETE REPORTS (AS REQUIRED)
22
23 _____IV. CLOSING ACTIONS:
24
25 _____A. RESCUE PERSONNEL DEBRIEFED
26
27 _____B. INTEL DEBRIEFED (AS REQUIRED)
28
29 _____C. COMPONENT PRCC/JPRC NOTIFIED OF MISSION RESULTS
30
31 _____D. RECOVERED PERSONNEL INDOCTRINATED INTO THE DEBRIEF
32 AND REINTEGRATION PROCESS; STATUS CONFIRMED
33
34 _____E. MISSION FILE COMPLETED, LOG UPDATED, SARSIT MESSAGE
35 TRANSMITTED
36
37 _____F. MISSION FILE FORWARDED TO JPRC AND/OR JPRA,
38 ACCORDINGLY
39
40
41

ANNEX B TO APPENDIX M
AIRBORNE MISSION ~~COMMANDER-COORDINATOR~~ CHECKLIST

PR INFORMATION

PR A: _____ PR B: _____

PR PRIMARY: _____ PR SECONDARY: _____

PR BULLSEYE: _____ ELEVATION: _____

PR CODE WORD: _____ NUMBER: _____ LETTER: _____

CHECKLIST

1. DOWNED A/C: NOTIFIED BY: _____ TIME: _____

2. NOTIFY PRCC/JPRC. RELAY FOLLOWING INFORMATION AS AVAILABLE:

A. C/S OF DOWNED A/C:

B. TYPE A/C/SOULS ON BOARD/# CHUTES:

C. LOCATION OF SURVIVOR(S)/QUALIFIER (GPS, ESTIMATED, LAST KNOWN, GROUND, WATER):

D. PHYSICAL STATUS OF SURVIVOR(S):

E. OSC C/S/FUEL STATE/LOAD OUT:

F. AUTHENTICATION STATUS:

G. CAUSE OF LOSS/TIME/NOTIFIED BY:

H. WEATHER/TERRAIN:

I. THREATS (GROUND/AIR):

J. ASSETS AVAIL IN AREA:

K. RECOMMENDED SPIDER ROUTE:

1 3. DESIGNATE OSC (AIR-TO-GROUND ORDNANCE AVAILABILITY PREFERRED), IF
2 REQUIRED BY THE TACTICAL SITUATION). SWITCH TO PR PRIMARY AND
3 SURVIVOR'S FREQ.

4 4. REQUEST ALERT OR SUPPORT FORCES IF REQUIRED.
5

6 5. ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS WITH CSARTF ON PR PRIMARY. CONTROL
7 RADIO DISCIPLINE.
8

9 OSC: NUMBER/TYPE A/C: STATION:

10
11 FAC (A): NUMBER/TYPE A/C: STATION:

12
13 RESCORT: NUMBER/TYPE A/C: STATION:

14
15 RESCAP: NUMBER/TYPE A/C: STATION:

16
17 SEAD: NUMBER/TYPE A/C: STATION:

18
19 CAS: NUMBER/TYPE A/C: STATION:

20
21 HELO: NUMBER/TYPE A/C: STATION:

22
23 ELINT: NUMBER/TYPE A/C: STATION:

24
25 TANKER: NUMBER/TYPE A/C: STATION:
26
27
28

ANNEX C TO APPENDIX M ON-SCENE COMMANDER CHECKLIST

1.____ AUTHENTICATION

a.____ Authenticate.

b.____ Number of isolated personnel.

c.____ Establish order of communication.

d.____ Determine injuries.

e.____ Determine isolated personnel intentions.

f.____ Determine adversary activity.

g.____ Check all assets on station time, ordnance, and other relevant factors.

2.____ LOCATION

a.____ Attempt location via electronic means (PRC-112, GPS and/or chart position passed over radio by survivor, high-speed DF).

b.____ Determine signal devices.

c.____ Request general terrain description.

d.____ Request isolated personnel give vectors to their position.

e.____ Locate isolated personnel position within 1 nm.

3.____ SANITIZATION

a.____ Neutralize threats detrimental to rescue.

b.____ Note all other adversary positions.

c.____ Determine ingress and egress routes.

4.____ RECOVERY

1 | a.____ Brief helicopter-recovery vehicle and remainder of CSARTF on:

- 2
- 3 (1) Number and condition of isolated personnel.
- 4 (2) Distance to isolated personnel from initial point.
- 5
- 6 (3) Describe terrain.
- 7
- 8 (4) Isolated personnel location.
- 9
- 10 (5) Elevation of recovery area.
- 11
- 12 (6) Wind speed and direction.
- 13
- 14 (7) Describe isolated personnel signal devices.
- 15
- 16 (8) Known or suspected adversary activity.
- 17
- 18 (9) Describe ingress and egress routes.
- 19
- 20 (10) Emergency safe landing area.
- 21

22 b.____ Direct isolated personnel to:

- 23
- 24 (1) Prepare signaling devices for use and/or ignition, but use only as prebriefed or when
- 25 directed by authenticated rescue forces.
- 26
- 27 (2) Call threatening adversary positions.
- 28
- 29 (3) Vector helicopter if necessary.
- 30
- 31 (4) Approach the helicopter only when directed and follow instructions.
- 32
- 33
- 34

ANNEX D TO APPENDIX M
COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE TASK FORCE
RECOVERY ELEMENT BRIEFING CHECKLIST

Items 1a through 2a are required to be briefed to the recovery element prior to CSAR mission execution. All other information should be provided as applicable.

1. _____ ISOLATED PERSONNEL INFORMATION

a. _____ Tactical Call Sign(s)

b. _____ Number of isolated personnel

c. _____ Location(s) (latitude/longitude, grid, range/bearing to/from SARDOT)

d. _____ Condition/injuries: Walking? YES NO UNKNOWN

e. _____ Equipment (communications/signal)

f. _____ Authentication complete? NO/YES When _____METHOD:

2. _____ RECOVERY AREA INFORMATION

a. _____ Threats (air/ground/missile)

b. _____ Elevation _____(Nearest 1,000 feet, mean sea level)

c. _____ General terrain description

3. _____ RESCORT PLAN

a. _____ Initial point

b. _____

(1) _____ Ingress

(2) _____ Egress

c. _____ Ordnance

d. _____ RESCORT tactics

1
2

Combat Search and Rescue Task Force Recovery Element Briefing Checklist

1 4.____ RECOVERY VEHICLE PLAN

2

3 a.____ Rescue tactics

4

5 b.____ Communications/signaling procedures

6

7 5.____ Refueling Plan

8

9 a.____ Fixed-wing assets

10

11 b.____ Rotary-wing assets

12

13 6.____ ADDITIONAL ITEMS/QUESTIONS

14

15

16

APPENDIX N

~~DEBRIEF AND REINTEGRATE~~ REINTEGRATION ADMINISTRATION

1	Annex A	Security Nondisclosure Agreement
2	B	Debrief Statement
3	C	Sample Promise of Confidentiality
4	D	Data Required by the 1974 Privacy Act
5		
6		

REINTEGRATION ADMINISTRATION

1. Administrative Processing of DOD Personnel Who Have Returned to Friendly Control

a. **General.** In accordance with guidelines delineated in DODI 2310.4, *Repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel*, the following procedures are established for the administrative processing of DOD individuals who are recovered from isolated territory.

b. The unit or organization that initially receives a member of the Department of Defense who has returned from isolation, captivity, or MIA status is expected to:

(1) Provide care, custody, and safeguards for recovered isolated personnel, including all required physical and mental health care and protection from idle curiosity.

(2) Confirm the identity of recovered isolated personnel and receive necessary disposition instructions by contacting the:

(a) Service component or unit of assignment.

(b) JPRC.

(c) JPRA.

(3) If the individual's identity cannot be confirmed, provide care, custody, and security controls and request appropriate instructions from the JPRC or nearest counterintelligence agency.

c. Before any debrief or questioning, recovered isolated personnel will be asked if any assistance was received during evasion or if the recovered isolated personnel have any knowledge of any sensitive or covert recovery plans, procedures, organizations, programs or equipment. If the recovered isolated personnel indicate that to be the case, they will be directed to complete a security nondisclosure agreement (see Annex A). The individual will then be advised to cooperate with intelligence debriefers for tactical intelligence, but will be directed not to discuss sensitive or covert PR information with anyone except a specific representative identified by the JPRC director in coordination with JPRA. The fact that recovered isolated personnel had access to certain classified programs may, in itself, be classified, and that fact will be treated as such when directed by the JPRC director.

d. If the debriefer suspects recovered isolated personnel of an offense under the UCMJ, the debriefer will seek the advice of the staff judge advocate.

1 e. Recovered isolated personnel will be notified that they may not publish or disclose the
2 details of their experience while isolated or evading without prior approval through official DOD PA
3 procedures. The debrief statement (Annex B) will be used to certify that recovered isolated
4 personnel have been notified of this requirement.

5
6 f. The unit or organization that initially receive recovered isolated personnel and theater
7 intelligence collection agencies may debrief recovered isolated personnel for tactical intelligence.
8 During this debrief, recovered isolated personnel will not be debriefed about sensitive or covert PR
9 plans, procedures, organizations, programs, or equipment unless coordinated and approved by
10 JPRA. Results of these debriefs must be included in the PPF and forwarded to subsequent
11 debriefing teams if the returnee continues to Phase II Repatriation.

12
13 g. JPRA will determine if the recovered isolated personnel's exposure to sensitive information
14 warrants a subsequent special debrief or assignment restrictions. JPRA will notify the recovered
15 isolated personnel's parent Service, if such action is required, to institute appropriate assignment
16 restrictions.

17
18 h. The combatant command's PR/OPR will establish appropriate command procedures to
19 ensure recovered isolated personnel under its control are debriefed by qualified personnel. The
20 purpose of the debriefs is to capture tactical and operational level intelligence, assist the recovered
21 isolated person in their decompression, and determine the effectiveness of theater PR concepts,
22 plans, operations, tactics, procedures, techniques, security, and training. The conduct of special
23 debriefs is restricted to personnel identified by JPRA. The results of these debriefs and any
24 associated operational after-action reports will be forwarded to JPRA, who will:

25
26 (1) Evaluate the debriefs and reports to determine worldwide trends.

27
28 (2) Disseminate associated briefings, reports, and analyses to DIA, Service SERE
29 schools, and theater PR resources or organizations.

30
31 (3) Determine the validity of existing theater policy, doctrine, and procedures and
32 recommend changes as required.

33
34 (4) Maintain historical files of the debriefs, reports, and analyses.

35
36 i. Once the debrief has been completed and properly classified, the following instruction will be
37 marked on the front:

38
39 CONTENTS ARE CLASSIFIED BY _____ IN ACCORDANCE WITH
40 EXECUTIVE ORDER 12958. DECLASSIFY ON: _____. IF DECLASSIFIED,
41 THIS INFORMATION MUST BE REVIEWED TO ENSURE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF
42 DOD DIRECTIVE 5400.7, DOD DIRECTIVE 5400.11, AND DOD REGULATION 5400.7R
43 ARE MET BEFORE PUBLIC RELEASE IS MADE.

1
2 Place the title and name of the classifying authority on the “CLASSIFIED BY” line. The
3 “DECLASSIFY ON” line should be marked with a date of declassification (not more than ten years
4 from the classification date) or, if exempted from declassification, the applicable exemption
5 category, per Section 1.6.d. of Executive Order 12958.

6
7 | **2. Administrative Processing of Non-DOD or Non-US Personnel**
8

9 It is conceivable that the Department of Defense could be tasked to recover non-DOD and/or
10 non-US personnel. In such cases, the recovered individuals will be treated in accordance with
11 paragraphs 1b and c of this appendix, will be requested to complete a security nondisclosure
12 agreement (Annex A), and will be requested to cooperate with intelligence debriefers for tactical
13 intelligence, but will be directed not to discuss sensitive or covert PR information with anyone
14 except a specific representative identified by the JPRC and approved by JPRA.
15
16
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ANNEX A TO APPENDIX N
SECURITY NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT

1 1. I, _____, understand that the information concerning covert or
2 sensitive evasion and recovery plans, procedures, organizations, programs, and equipment belongs
3 to the United States Government. I understand that disclosure of this information is punishable
4 under title 18, United States Code, section 798 "Disclosure of Classified Information," as amended.

5
6 2. I do solemnly swear/affirm that I will never divulge, publish, or reveal by word, conduct, or by
7 any other means such classified information or knowledge, except in the performance of my official
8 duties and as specifically authorized by the Secretary of Defense.

9
10 3. I understand that no change in my assignment or employment will relieve me of my obligation
11 under this agreement and that the provisions of the agreement will remain binding upon me even
12 after termination of my service with the United States Government.

13
14 4. I take this obligation of my own free will, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

15
16 WITNESS _____ SIGNED _____
17 NAME _____ NAME _____
18 SSN _____ SSN _____
19 RANK/GRADE _____ RANK/GRADE _____
20 ORGANIZATION _____ ORGANIZATION _____
21 POSITION _____ POSITION _____
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ANNEX B TO APPENDIX N
DEBRIEF STATEMENT

1. The undersigned representative of the United States Government certifies that:

a. The United States will ensure that the information provided by recovered isolated personnel will not be declassified, downgraded, or released to the public without Department of Defense approval.

b. The United States reserves the right to prosecute recovered isolated personnel for any offenses they may have committed under the UCMJ.

2. The undersigned acknowledges that:

a. Information concerning experience of recovered isolated personnel, while isolated, evading or missing in action, whether debriefed to US representatives or not, remains the property of the US Government even after recovered isolated personnel separate from government service, and information may not be published or released to the public in any form without the prior written approval of the Secretary of Defense.

b. Cooperation during this debrief does not exempt recovered isolated personnel from possible prosecution or adverse administrative action for any offenses they may have committed under the UCMJ. (AUTHORITY: Title 5, United States Code, sections 552b.(a),(1),(6),(7),(A); title 18, United States Code, section 794 and 798; DOD 5200.1R, Paragraphs C10.1.6.)

Government Representative:

Recovered isolated personnel:

Signature_____

Signature_____

Name_____

Name_____

Rank & Service_____

Rank & Service_____

SSN_____

SSN_____

Organization_____

Organization_____

Date_____

Location_____

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ANNEX C TO APPENDIX N
SAMPLE PROMISE OF CONFIDENTIALITY

1

PROMISE OF CONFIDENTIALITY (10 United States Code Section 1506(d))
<p>It is in the interest of the United States that missing persons who are returned to the control of the United States provide the fullest possible disclosure of information during their absence.</p> <p>To ensure this fullest possible disclosure, the Secretary of the armed service to which you belong or for whom you are employed promises to withhold from disclosure your debriefing report or any part thereof as privileged information.</p> <p>If your debriefing report contains non-derogatory information about the status and whereabouts of someone else who remains a missing person (either named or unnamed), then you should know that the Secretary of your armed force will prepare an extract of that non-derogatory information. You will have an opportunity to review the extract. Thereafter, the extract will be placed in the file of each missing person whom you name in your debriefing report. However, the extract will protect your identity. The information in the extract will be made reasonably accessible to the missing persons' primary next of kin, members of the immediate family, and any person previously designated by the missing person to receive information about his or her whereabouts and status. The reason we do this is to provide as much information as possible to those who are trying to locate and recover missing persons and to let the missing persons' loved ones know as much as we can lawfully tell them.</p>
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
<p>AUTHORITY: Chapter 78, Title 10 U.S.C., and E.O. 9397.</p> <p>PRINCIPAL PURPOSE(S): To aid in personnel recovery, SERE (survival, evasion, resistance, and escape) training, operational planning, verification of Geneva Conventions by captors, and reintegration of returning personnel.</p> <p>ROUTINE USE(S): Information may be provided to the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and the National Security Council to facilitate interagency cooperation on personnel recovery issues.</p> <p>DISCLOSURE: Voluntary; however, failure to furnish requested information may impede DOD efforts to assist you in the reintegration process.</p>

2

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1

RECOVERED ISOLATED PERSONNEL		
1. SIGNATURE		
/SIGNED/		
2. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)		
DOE, JOHN E.		
3. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	4. RANK/GRADE	5. SERVICE
123-45-6789	1LT/O-2	US ARMY
6. ORGANIZATION OR UNIT		
Operational Detachment A-21, 15th Special Forces Group (Airborne)		
7. LOCATION OF DEBRIEFING		
Fort Hood, Texas		

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ANNEX D TO APPENDIX N
DATA REQUIRED BY THE 1974 PRIVACY ACT

1 Per Title 5 USC 552a, the following data will accompany the security nondisclosure agreement
2 and debrief statement illustrated in Annexes A and B to this appendix.

3
4 1. AUTHORITY: Title 18, United States Code, sections 794 and 798; and title 44, United States
5 Code, section 3102, and Executive Order 9397.

6
7 2. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To maintain a record of those individuals who have been exposed to
8 covert or sensitive evasion and recovery procedures, organizations, and/or equipment through the
9 use of their name and/or social security number.

10
11 3. ROUTINE USES: The social security number is to be used to identify the individual. The
12 information is to be retained strictly within the program.

13
14 4. MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE: Information is disclosed on a voluntary
15 basis, but withholding information will render it impossible to grant an individual access to or
16 participation in the program.

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APPENDIX O

REFERENCES

~~The following references were reviewed and considered during the development of this publication.~~ The development of JP 3-50 is based upon the following primary references.

1. DOD Directives, Memorandums, and Publications

- a. DODD 2310.2, *Personnel Recovery* ~~(PR)~~.
- b. DODI 1300.21, *Code of Conduct (CoC) Training and Education*.
- c. DODI 1300.XX, *Isolated Personnel Training for Department of Defense Civilian and Contractor Employees*.
- d. DODI 2310.3, *Personnel Recovery Response Cell (PRRC) Procedures*.
- e. DODI 2310.4, *Repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel*.
- e. DODI 2310.5, *Accounting for Missing Persons*.
- f. DODI 2310.6, *Non-Conventional Assisted Recovery in the Department of Defense*.
- g. Director Joint Staff, Memorandum-1103-92, *DOD US POW/MIA Program*.
- h. NSA/NRO Information Memorandum, *Personnel Recovery Concept of Operations for National Intelligence Support*, (Secret).

2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions/Manuals

- a. CJCSI 3150.25A, *Joint Lessons Learned Program*.
- b. CJCSI 3270.01A, *Personnel Recovery Within the Department of Defense*, (Secret).
- c. CJCSM 3122.03A CH1, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II*: ~~(Planning Formats and Guidance)~~.
- d. CJCSM 3500.04C, *Universal Joint Task List* (UJTL).

3. Joint Publications

- 1 a. JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*.
2
3 b. JP 1-01, *Joint Doctrine Development System*.
4 c. JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.
5
6 d. JP 2-0, ~~Joint~~ *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*.
7
8 e. JP 2-01, *Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations*.
9
10 f. JP 2-01.2, *Joint Doctrine, and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for*
11 *Counterintelligence Support to Operations*.
12
13 g. JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*.
14
15 h. JP 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*.
16
17 i. JP 3-04.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Shipboard Helicopter*
18 *Operations*.
19
20 j. JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*.
21
22 l. JP 3-09, *Doctrine for Joint Fire Support*.
23
24 m. JP 3-16, Joint *Doctrine for Multinational Operations*.
25
26 n. JP 3-30, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*.
27
28 o. JP 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities.
29
30 ~~o. JP 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue~~
31
32 ~~p. JP 3-50.21, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Combat Search and~~
33 ~~Rescue.~~
34
35 ~~q. JP 3-50.3, Joint Doctrine for Evasion and Recovery.~~
36
37 p. JP 3-52, *Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone*.
38
39 **4. Multi-Service Publications**
40
41 FM ~~3-25.773-50.3~~/MCRP 3-02H/NWP 3-50.3/AFTTP(I) 3-2.26, Multiservice
42 Procedures for *Survival, Evasion, and Recovery*.
43

5. US Navy Publications

- a. Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3130.7, *Naval Aviation Strike Rescue Program*.
- b. NAVAIR 00-80T-105, *CV NATOPS Manual*.
- c. NAVAIR 00-80T-106, *LHA/LPH/LHD NATOPS Manual*.
- d. NWP 1, *Strategic Concepts of the US Navy*.
- e. NWP 3-04.1M, *Shipboard Helicopter Operating Procedures*.
- f. NWP 3-22.5, *SARTAC*.
- g. NWP 3-50.2, *Navy Search and Rescue (SAR) Manual*.
- h. NWP 3-50.22, *Combat Search and Rescue Manual Navy Supplement*.
- i. NWP 3-50.4, *Joint Recovery Operations*.
- j. NWP 5-01, *Naval Operational Planning*.
- k. NWP 6-00, *Command and Control*, (Confidential).
- l. NSAWC *Strike TACMEMO*.
- m. US Navy *CVW TACMEMO*.

6. US Air Force Publications

- a. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force*.
- b. AFDD 2-1, *Air Warfare*.
- c. AFDD 2-1.6, *Combat Search and Rescue*.
- d. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 13-208, *Rescue Coordination Center Combat Search Aand Rescue Operating Procedures*.
- e. AFI 14-105, *Unit Intelligence Mission and Responsibilities*.

1 ~~f. AFM 2-1, *Tactical Air Operations—Counter Air, Close Air Support, and Air*~~
2 ~~*Interdiction.*~~

3
4 ~~g. AFM 64-2, *National Search and Rescue Manual.*~~

5
6 f. AFTTP 3-1, *Mission Employment Tactics.*

7
8 **7. US Army Publications**
9

10 a. FM 90-18, *Multi-Service Procedures for Combat Search and Rescue.*

11 b. FM 1-100, *Army Aviation Operations.*

12
13 c. FM 1-108, *Doctrine for Army Special Operations Aviation Forces.*

14
15 d. FM 1-111, *Aviation Brigade.*

16
17 e. FM 1-113, *Utility and Cargo Helicopter Operations.*

18
19 f. FM 1-564, *Shipboard Operations.*

20
21 g. FM 8-10-6, *Medical Evacuation in a Theater of Operations, Tactics, Techniques, and*
22 *Procedures.*

23
24 h. FM 100-5, *Operations.*

25
26 i. FM 100-18, *Space Support to Army Operations.*

27
28 **8. US Marine Corps Publications**
29

30 a. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-16.2, *Tactics, Techniques and*
31 *Procedures for Fire Support Coordination.*

32
33 b. MCWP 3-2, *Aviation Operations.*

34
35 c. MCWP 3-23, *Offensive Air Support.*

36
37 d. MCWP 3-23.1, *Close Air Support.*

38
39 e. MCWP 3-25, *Control of Aircraft and Missiles.*

40
41 **9. US Coast Guard Publications**
42

- 1 a. COMDTINST M16130.2, *US Coast Guard Addendum to National Search and Rescue*
2 *Manual*.
- 3
- 4 b. COMDTINST M3710.1 (Series), *Air Operations Manual*.
- 5
- 6 c. COMDTINST M3710.2 (Series), *Shipboard-Helicopter Operational Procedures*
7 *Manual*.
- 8
- 9

10. Allied Publications

- a. Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-10(C), *Search and Rescue*.
- b. ATP-33, *Tactical Air Doctrine*.
- c. ATP-40, *Doctrine and Procedures for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone*.
- d. ATP-62 (draft), *Combat Search and Rescue*.

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APPENDIX P

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is USJFCOM. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-50.2, 26 January 1996, *Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue*; JP 3-50.21, 23 March 1998, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Combat Search and Rescue*; and JP 3-50.3, 6 September 1996, *Joint Doctrine for Evasion and Recovery*.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JPRA FT BELVOIR VA//J71//

INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7), JEDD, 7000 Joint Staff, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000, with info copies to the USJFCOM JWFC.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE NUMBER	COPY NUMBER	DATE OF CHANGE	DATE ENTERED	POSTED BY	REMARKS
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b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 15 November 1999, *Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands*.

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Coast Guard: Commandant Coast Guard (G-OPD), US Coast Guard
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8 d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted.
9 However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in
10 accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, *Information Security Program*.
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GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

1	AAA	antiaircraft artillery
2	ABCCC	airborne battlefield command and control center
3	ADF	automatic direction finding
4	ADP	automated data processing
5	AFCC	Air Force component commander
6	AFDD	Air Force doctrine document
7	AFI	Air Force instruction
8	AFSOC	Air Force Special Operations Command
9	AFTTP	Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
10	AMC	airborne mission commander <u>coordinator</u>
11	AOA	amphibious objective area
12	AOC	air <u>& space</u> operations center
13	AOR	area of responsibility
14	<u>ATO</u>	<u>air tasking order</u>
15	ATP	Allied tactical publication
16	AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
17		
18	<u>BLOS</u>	<u>beyond line of sight</u>
19		
20	C2	command and control
21	C2PC	command and control personnel computer
22	C4	command, control, communications, and computers
23	C4I	command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
24	CAC	common access card
25	CAF	Combat Air Forces
26	CALICS	communication, authentication, location, intentions, condition,
27		and situation
28	CAS	close air support
29	CATF	commander, amphibious task force
30	CBRNE	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield
31		explosives
32	CE	command element
33	<u>CIA</u>	<u>Central Intelligence Agency</u>
34	<u>CJCSI</u>	<u>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction</u>
35	<u>CJCSM</u>	<u>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual</u>
36	CLF	commander, landing force
37	<u>CMP</u>	<u>common operating environment message processor</u>
38	CoC	Code of Conduct
39	COLISEUM	community on-line intelligence system for end- <u>u</u> ers and

Glossary

1		managers
2	COMDTINST	Commandant (US Coast Guard) Instruction
3	CONOPS	concept of operations
4	CONUS	continental United States
5	<u>COSPAS</u>	<u>cosmicheskaya sistyema poiska avariynch sudov-space</u>
6	<u>CRC</u>	<u>control and reporting center (USAF)</u>
7	<u>CRO</u>	<u>combat rescue officer</u>
8	CSAR	combat search and rescue
9	CSARTF	combat search and rescue task force
10	<u>CSEL</u>	<u>combat survivor evader locator</u>
11	<u>CSG</u>	<u>carrier strike group</u>
12	<u>CTAPS</u>	<u>contingency theater automated planning system</u>
13	<u>CVBG</u>	<u>carrier battle group</u>
14		
15	<u>D&R</u>	<u>Debrief and Reintegrate</u>
16	DA	direct action
17	<u>DALS</u>	<u>downed aviator locator system</u>
18	DB	data burst
19	<u>DDS</u>	<u>dry deck shelter</u>
20	DF	direction finding
21	DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
22	DIRLAUTH	direct liaison authorized
23	<u>DMS</u>	<u>defense message system</u>
24	DOD	Department of Defense
25	<u>DODD</u>	<u>Department of Defense directive</u>
26	<u>DODI</u>	<u>Department of Defense instruction</u>
27	DPMO	Defense Prisoner of War (POW)/Missing Personnel (MP) Office
28	<u>DSN</u>	<u>Defense Switched Network</u>
29		
30	E&R	evasion and recovery
31	<u>EA</u>	<u>electronic attack</u>
32	EAI	Executive Agent Instruction
33	<u>ELINT</u>	<u>electronic intelligence</u>
34	ELT	emergency locator transmitter
35	EP	electronic protection
36	EPA	evasion plan of action
37	EPIRB	emergency position-indicating radio beacon
38	<u>EVC</u>	<u>evasion chart</u>
39	EW	electronic warfare
40		
41	FAC	forward air controller
42	FAC(A)	forward air controller (airborne)
43	FAX	facsimile

1	FCE	forward command element
2	FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
3	FLIR	forward-looking infrared
4	FLOT	forward line of own troops
5	FM	field manual
6	FRAGORD	fragmentary order
7	FRP	Federal R esponse P lan (USG)
8		
9	GCE	ground combat element (MAGTF)
10	GPS	global positioning system
11		
12	HCS	helicopter combat support (Navy)
13	HF	high frequency
14	HIFR	helicopter in-flight refueling
15	HLZ	helicopter landing zone
16	HRI	high-risk-of-isolation
17	HS	helicopter antisubmarine warfare squadron (Navy)
18	HUMINT	human intelligence
19		
20	IAMSAR	International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue
21		M anual
22	IBS	integrated broadcast service
23	ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
24	ID	identification
25	IFF	identification, friend or foe
26	IMINT	imagery intelligence
27	IMO	International Maritime Organization
28	IO	information operations
29	IR	infrared
30	ISOPREP	isolated personnel report
31	ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
32		
33	J-2	joint command intelligence directorate
34	J-3	joint command operations directorate
35	J4	joint command logistics directorate
36	J5	joint command plans and policy directorate
37	J-6	joint command, control, communications and computer systems
38		directorate
39	JAOC	joint air operations center
40	JDISS	joint deployable intelligence support system
41	JFACC	joint force air component commander
42	JFC	joint force commander
43	JFLCC	joint force land component commander

Glossary

1	JFSOC	joint force special operations component
2	JFSOCC	joint force special operations component commander
3	JIC	joint intelligence center
4	JISE	joint intelligence support element
5	JOA	joint operations area
6	JOC	joint operations center
7	JOG	joint operations graphic
8	JOPEs	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
9	JP	joint publication
10	JPRA	Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
11	JPRC	joint personnel recovery center
12	JPRF	joint personnel recovery force
13	JPRSP	joint personnel recovery support product
14	JSOTF	joint special operations task force
15	JSRC	joint search and rescue center
16	JSTARS	j oint s urveillance, t arget a ttack r adar s ystem
17	JTF	joint task force
18	JTRS	joint tactical radio system
19	JWICS	Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System
20		
21	LAN	local area network
22	LARS	lightweight airborne recovery system
23	LF	landing force
24	LNO	liaison officer
25	LOS	line of sight
26	LRSU	long-range surveillance unit
27		
28	MAGTF	Marine air-ground task force
29	MAJCOM	major command (Army/Air Force USAF)
30	MASINT	measurement and signature intelligence
31	MCC	maritime component commander
32	MCRP	Marine Corps reference publication
33	MDZ	maritime defense zone
34	MEDEVAC	medical evacuation
35	MHz	megahertz
36	MIA	missing in action
37	MIL-STD	military standard
38	MOOTW	military operations other than war
39	MPA	Missing Persons Act
40	MPR	maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft (Navy)
41	MRO	mass rescue operations
42	MTT	mobile training team
43		

1	NAR	nonconventional assisted recovery
2	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
3	NAVAIR	Naval Air System Command
4	<u>NGA</u>	<u>National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency</u>
5	<u>NGO</u>	<u>nongovernmental organization</u>
6	<u>NIMA</u>	<u>National Imagery and Mapping Agency</u>
7	<u>NIST</u>	<u>national intelligence support team</u>
8	nm	nautical mile
9	<u>NMJIC</u>	<u>National Military Joint Intelligence Center</u>
10	NORDO	no radio
11	NRO	National Reconnaissance Office
12	NRT	near real time
13	NSA	National Security Agency
14	<u>NSAWC</u>	<u>Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center</u>
15	NSFS	naval surface fire support
16	NSP	N ational S earch and R escue P lan
17	NSS	National Search and Rescue Supplement
18	NSW	naval special warfare
19	NSWF	Naval Special Warfare Forces
20	NTTP	naval tactics, techniques, and procedures
21	NVD	night vision device
22	NVG	night vision goggle(s)
23	NWP	Naval Warfare publication
24		
25	OGA	other government agency
26	OJT	on-the-job training
27	OPCON	operational control
28	<u>OPLAN</u>	<u>operation plan</u>
29	OPORD	operation order
30	<u>OPR</u>	<u>Office of Primary Responsibility</u>
31	OPSEC	operations security
32	OSC	on-scene commander
33	OTC	officer in tactical command (Navy)
34	<u>OTH</u>	<u>over the horizon</u>
35		
36	PA	public affairs
37	PAO	public affairs office
38	PIR	priority information requirement
39	PJ	pararescue personnel jumper
40	PLB	personal locator beacon
41	PLS	personal locator system
42	POC	point of contact
43	POW	prisoner of war

Glossary

1	<u>PPF</u>	<u>personnel processing file</u>
2	PR	personnel recovery
3	<u>PRC</u>	<u>People's Republic of China</u>
4	PRCC	personnel recovery coordination cell
5	PRCC	personnel recovery coordination center
6	PRDO	personnel recovery duty officer
7	<u>PRMS</u>	<u>personnel recovery mission software</u>
8	PR/OPR	Personnel Recovery Office of Primary Responsibility
9	PRST	personnel recovery support team
10	PRTF	personnel recovery task force
11	PSYOP	psychological operations
12	<u>QRP</u>	<u>quick response posture</u>
13		
14	<u>RAS</u>	<u>recovery activation signal</u>
15	RCC	rescue coordination center
16	RCT	rescue coordination team (Navy)
17	RESCAP	rescue combat air patrol
18	RESCORT	rescue escort
19	RF	radio frequency
20	<u>RFI</u>	<u>request for information</u>
21	RM	recovery mechanism
22	RMC	rescue mission commander
23	<u>ROE</u>	<u>rules of engagement</u>
24	RT	recovery team
25		
26	SA	situational awareness
27	SADL	situational awareness data link
28	SAFE	selected area for evasion
29	SAID	selected area for evasion (SAFE) area intelligence description
30	SAR	search and rescue
31	SARDO	search and rescue duty officer
32	SARDOT	search and rescue dot
33	SARIR	search and rescue incident report
34	SARNEG	search and rescue numeric encryption grid
35	SARREQ	search and rescue request
36	SARSAT	search and rescue satellite-aided tracking
37	SARSIT	search and rescue situation summary report
38	SATCOM	satellite communications
39	<u>SBU</u>	<u>special boat unit</u>
40	SCI	sensitive compartmented information
41	SEAL	sea-air-land team
42	SERE	survival, evasion, resistance, and escape
43	SF	special forces

1	SIGINT	signals intelligence
2	SIPRNET	SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
3	SO	special operations
4	<u>SOC</u>	<u>special operations command</u>
5	SOF	special operations forces
6	SOFA	status-of-forces agreement
7	SOP	standing operating procedure
8	SPINS	special instructions
9	SRI	surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence (Marine Corps)
10	SSN	nuclear submarine, Social Security number
11		
12	TACAN	tactical air navigation
13	TACON	tactical control
14	<u>TADIL</u>	tactical digital information link
15	<u>TBMCS</u>	<u>theater battle management core system</u>
16	TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
17	TRAP	tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (Marine Corps)
18	TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
19		
20	UAR	unconventional assisted recovery
21	UARCC	unconventional assisted recovery coordination center
22	UARM	unconventional assisted recovery mechanism
23	UART	unconventional assisted recovery team
24	UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
25	UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
26	<u>UHF</u>	<u>ultrahigh frequency</u>
27	USAF	United States Air Force
28	USC	United States Code
29	USCG	United States Coast Guard
30	USG	United States Government
31	<u>USJFCOM</u>	<u>United States Joint Forces Command</u>
32	<u>USMTF</u>	<u>United States message text format</u>
33	USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
34	UW	unconventional warfare
35		
36	<u>VHF</u>	<u>very high frequency</u>
37		
38	WAN	wide-area network
39	WPB	<u>Coast Guard</u> patrol boat (Coast Guard)
40		
41		

PART II ? TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

act of mercy. In evasion and personnel recovery operations, assistance rendered to evaders by an individual or elements of the local population who sympathize or empathize with the evaders' cause or plight. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

airborne mission commander. The commander who serves as an airborne extension of the personnel recovery mission coordinator to manage requirements for the combat search and rescue task force by monitoring the status of all its elements, requesting additional assets when needed, and ensuring the recovery and supporting forces arrive at their designated areas to accomplish the personnel recovery mission. Also called AMC. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

all-source intelligence. 1. Intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate all sources of information, including, most frequently, human resources intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence, and open source data, in the production of finished intelligence. 2. In intelligence collection, a phrase that indicates that in the satisfaction of intelligence requirements, all collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting systems and resources are identified for possible use and those most capable are tasked. (JP 1-02)

assistance mechanism. None. (Upon approval of this ~~publication revision~~, this term and its definition will be removed from JP 1-02.)

assisted recovery. None. (Upon approval of this ~~publication revision~~, this term and its definition will be removed from JP 1-02.)

authentication. 1. A security measure designed to protect a communications system against acceptance of a fraudulent transmission or simulation by establishing the validity of a transmission, message, or originator. 2. A means of identifying individuals and verifying their eligibility to receive specific categories of information. 3. Evidence by proper signature or seal that a document is genuine and official. 4. In personnel recovery missions, the process whereby the identity of an evader is confirmed. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

blood chit. A small sheet of material depicting an American flag and a statement in several languages to the effect that anyone assisting the bearer to safety will be rewarded. (JP 1-02)

bona fides. Good faith. In evasion and personnel recovery operations, the use of verbal or visual communication by individuals who are unknown to one another to establish their authenticity,

sincerity, honesty, and truthfulness. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

cache. A source of subsistence and supplies, typically containing items such as food, water, medical items, and/or communications equipment, packaged to prevent damage from exposure and hidden in isolated locations by such methods as burial, concealment, and/or submersion, to support evaders. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

~~**capable recovery forces.** Forces not specifically organized, trained, or equipped to perform personnel recovery; but have a recognized ability to perform some elements of personnel recovery. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)~~

civil search and rescue. A national system that fulfills the United States search and rescue requirements as a party to the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, the Convention on International Civil Aviation, the Safety of Life at Sea Convention, and other international treaties and agreements as framed in the National Search and Rescue Plan. (Upon approval of this ~~publication revision~~, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

combat air patrol. An aircraft patrol provided over an objective area, the force protected, the critical area of a combat zone, or in an air defense area, for the purpose of intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft before they reach their targets. Also called CAP. (JP 1-02)

combat search and rescue. A specific task performed by ~~rescue-recovery~~ forces to effect the recovery of isolated personnel during war or military operations other than war. Also called CSAR. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

combat search and rescue task force. All forces committed to a specific combat search and rescue operation to search for, locate, identify, and recover isolated d personnel during war or military operations other than war. This includes those elements assigned to provide command and control and protect the recovery vehicle(s) from adversary ~~air or ground~~ attack. Also called CSARTF. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

combat survival. Those measures to be taken by Service personnel when involuntarily separated from friendly forces in combat, including procedures relating to individual survival, evasion, escape, and conduct after capture. (JP 1-02)

contact point. 1. In land warfare, a point on the terrain, easily identifiable, where two or more units are required to make contact. 2. In air operations, the position at which a mission leader makes radio contact with an air control agency. 3. (DOD only) In personnel recovery, a

location where an evader can establish contact with recovery forces. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

contact procedure. Those predesignated actions taken by evaders and recovery forces that permit link-up between the two parties in hostile territory and facilitate the return of evaders to friendly control. (JP 1-02)

conventional recovery operation. None. (Upon approval of this ~~publication revision~~, this term and its definition will be removed from JP 1-02.)

coordinating authority. A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (JP 1-02)

~~**decompression.** In personnel recovery, the process of normalizing physiological and behavioral adjustments that recovered isolated personnel have made to cope with an isolating event. Decompression allows recovered isolated personnel time and support necessary to transition from the demands of isolation to the safety and security of return to US control and the repatriation process. A state of relief from pressure; a return to normalcy after a stressful period or situation.~~ (Upon approval of this ~~publication revision~~, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

~~**dedicated recovery forces.** Forces assigned the mission of, and organized, trained, and equipped to perform, personnel recovery. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)~~

designated recovery forces. Personnel recovery-capable forces that can be tasked to conduct personnel recovery missions, although their primary mission and function may not be personnel recovery. (Upon approval of this ~~publication revision~~, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

direct action. Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by special operations forces or special operations-capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel. In the conduct of these operations, special operations forces or special operations-capable units may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace mines and other munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or

maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; conduct independent sabotage; and conduct anti-ship operations. Also called DA. (JP 1-02)

distressed persons. Individuals ~~that~~ who require search and rescue assistance to remove them from life-threatening or isolating circumstances in a permissive environment. (Upon approval of this ~~publication revision~~, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

ditching. Controlled landing of a distressed aircraft on water. (JP 1-02)

duckbutt. An aircraft assigned to perform precautionary search and rescue or personnel recovery missions, support deployment of ~~single-engine~~ aircraft, or meet other specialized situations. The aircraft can perform a secondary role as navigation aid to passing aircraft. The aircraft normally will be electronically equipped to provide radar tracking, homing, and steering, and gives position and weather reports as required. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

electronic warfare. Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also called EW. The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. a. electronic attack. That division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires. Also called EA. EA includes: 1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception, and 2) employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams). b. electronic protection. That division of electronic warfare involving passive and active means taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. Also called EP. c. electronic warfare support. That division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning and conduct of future operations. Thus, electronic warfare support provides information required for decisions involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing. Also called ES. Electronic warfare support data can be used to produce signals intelligence, provide targeting for electronic or destructive attack, and produce measurement and signature intelligence. (JP 1-02)

emergency locator beacon. A generic term for all radio beacons used for emergency locating purposes. (JP 1-02)

escaper. Any person who has been physically captured by the enemy and succeeds in getting free. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term “escapee” and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

escape route. ~~None. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be removed from JP 1-02.)~~

evader. Any isolated person who is eluding capture. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

evasion. The process whereby isolated personnel avoid capture with the goal of successfully returning to areas under friendly control. ~~(Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)~~

evasion aid. ~~In evasion and personnel recovery operations, any piece of information or equipment designed to assist an individual in evading capture. Evasion aids include, but are not limited to, blood chits, pointee-talkees, evasion charts, barter items, and equipment designed to complement issued survival equipment. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)~~

evasion and escape. ~~None. (Upon approval of this publication revision, this term and its definition will be removed from JP 1-02.)~~

evasion and escape intelligence. ~~None. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be removed from JP 1-02.)~~

evasion and escape net. ~~None. (Upon approval of this publication revision, this term and its definition will be removed from JP 1-02.)~~

evasion and escape route. ~~None. (Upon approval of this publication revision, this term and its definition will be removed from JP 1-02.)~~

evasion and recovery. ~~None. (Upon approval of this publication revision, this term and its definition will be removed from JP 1-02.)~~

evasion chart. Special map or chart designed as an evasion aid. Also called EVC. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

evasion plan of action. A course of action, developed prior to executing a combat mission, that is intended to improve a potential evader's chances of successful evasion and recovery by providing recovery forces with an additional source of information that can increase the predictability of the evader's action and movement. Also called EPA. (JP 1-02)

forward arming and refueling point. A temporary facility — organized, equipped, and deployed by an aviation commander, and normally located in the main battle area closer to the area where operations are being conducted than the aviation unit's combat service area — to provide fuel and ammunition necessary for the employment of aviation maneuver units in combat. The forward arming and refueling point permits combat aircraft to rapidly refuel and rearm simultaneously. Also called FARP. (JP 1-02)

forward line of own troops. A line that indicates the most forward positions of friendly forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time. The forward line of own troops (FLOT) normally identifies the forward location of covering and screening forces. The FLOT may be at, beyond, or short of the forward edge of the battle area. An enemy FLOT indicates the forward-most position of hostile forces. Also called FLOT. (JP 1-02)

go/no-go. The condition or state of operability of a component or system; “go,” functioning properly; or “no-go,” not functioning properly. Alternatively, a critical point at which a decision to proceed or not must be made. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

handover/crossover. In evasion and personnel recovery operations, the transfer of evaders between two recovery forces. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

helicopter landing zone. A specified ground area for landing assault helicopters to embark or disembark troops and/or cargo. A landing zone may contain one or more landing sites. Also called HLZ. (JP 1-02)

high-risk-of-isolation personnel. Personnel whose position or assignment makes them particularly vulnerable to being isolated, captured, and exploited by adversary forces, terrorists, or unfriendly governments. Also called HRI. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term “high risk-of-capture personnel” and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

homing. The technique whereby a mobile station directs itself, or is directed, towards a source of primary or reflected energy, or to a specified point. (JP 1-02)

homing adaptor. A device which, when used with an aircraft radio receiver, produces aural and/or visual signals which indicate the direction of a transmitting radio station with respect to the heading of the aircraft. ~~(Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.~~ This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)

initial reception point. Any secure area or facility under friendly control where initial reception of recovered isolated personnel can safely take place. This point is ideally associated with a medical treatment facility and can safeguard recovered isolated personnel and debrief and reintegrate team members for up to 48 hours. (Upon approval of this ~~publication revision~~, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

isolated personnel. ~~US military, DOD civilians, or DOD contractor personnel in support of a military operation that have become separated from their unit or organization in an uncertain or hostile environment or denied area requiring them to survive, evade, resist, or escape.~~ US military, DOD civilians, and DOD contractor personnel (and others designated by the President or Secretary of Defense) who are separated (as an individual or group) from their unit while participating in a US sponsored military activity or mission and are or maybe in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist, or escape. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

isolated personnel report. A Department of Defense Form (DD 1833) containing information designed to facilitate the identification and authentication of an evader by a recovery force. Also called ISOPREP. (JP 1-02)

joint air operations center. A jointly staffed facility established for planning, directing, and executing joint air operations in support of the joint force commander's operation or campaign objectives. Also called JAOC. (JP 1-02)

joint combat search and rescue operation. A combat search and rescue operation in support of a component's military operations that has exceeded the combat search and rescue capabilities of that component and requires the efforts of two or more components of the joint force. Normally, the operation is conducted by the joint force commander or a component commander that has been designated by joint force commander tasking. (JP 1-02)

joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFACC. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

joint operations center. A jointly manned facility of a joint force commander's headquarters established for planning, monitoring, and guiding the execution of the commander's decisions. Also called JOC. (JP 1-02)

joint personnel recovery. Personnel recovery performed by an appropriately equipped force employing joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term “joint combat search and rescue operation” and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

joint personnel recovery center. The primary joint force organization responsible for planning and coordinating personnel recovery for military operations within the assigned operational area. Also called JPRC. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term “joint search and rescue center” and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

~~**joint personnel recovery center director.** The designated representative with overall responsibility for operation of the joint personnel recovery center. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)~~

joint personnel recovery support product. The basic personnel recovery reference document that provides planners, intelligence analysts, and high-risk-of-isolation personnel with intelligence on a particular country or region. Also called JPRSP. (Upon approval of this publication revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

~~**lifeguard-submarine.**~~ A submarine employed for personnel recovery in an area which cannot be adequately covered by air or surface recovery forces because of adversary opposition, distance from friendly bases, or other reasons. It is stationed near the objective and sometimes along the route to be flown by the strike aircraft. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term “lifeguard submarine” and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

load signal. In personnel recovery, a visual signal displayed in a covert manner to indicate the presence of an individual or object at a given location. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

maritime environment. The oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including the littorals. (JP 1-02)

mission type order. 1. Order issued to a lower unit that includes the accomplishment of the total mission assigned to the higher headquarters. 2. Order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished. (JP 1-02)

1 **non-conventional assisted recovery.** Personnel recovery ~~performed by~~ conducted by special
2 operations forces unconventional warfare ground and maritime forces and ~~or~~ other government
3 agencies ~~that-who~~ are specifically ~~organized, trained, and equipped~~ trained and directed to
4 establish and operate indigenous or surrogate infrastructures for personnel recovery. ~~to~~
5 ~~recover isolated personnel using uniquely developed recovery mechanisms.~~ Also called NAR.
6 (Upon approval of this ~~publication revision~~, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-
7 02.)
8

9 **on-scene commander.** 1. The person designated to coordinate the personnel recovery efforts in
10 the objective area. 2. Federal officer designated to direct federal crisis and consequence
11 management efforts at the scene of a terrorist or weapons of mass destruction incident. Also
12 called OSC. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing
13 term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)
14

15 **operational control.** Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at
16 or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant
17 command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are
18 transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander
19 will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by
20 the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of
21 command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces,
22 assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to
23 accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of
24 military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the
25 command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate
26 organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders
27 and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides
28 full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander
29 in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and
30 of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline,
31 internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02)
32

33 **opportune personnel recovery.** ~~Unplanned personnel recovery performed by military forces,~~
34 ~~indigenous persons, or others not specifically organized, trained, or equipped for personnel~~
35 ~~recovery, but which, due to proximity and/or availability, and willingness to assist, are able to~~
36 ~~assist in the recovery of isolated personnel.~~ A survivor-initiated, indigenous-assisted recovery,
37 whereby an isolated person takes advantage of an opportunity to enlist the aid of indigenous
38 personnel in finding their way back to friendly forces. (Upon approval of this ~~publication~~
39 ~~revision~~, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)
40

41 **orbit point.** A geographically or electronically defined location used in stationing aircraft in flight
42 during tactical operations when a predetermined pattern is not established. (JP 1-02)
43

pararescue team. Specially trained personnel qualified to penetrate to the site of an incident by land, sea, or air; provide medical and survival aid; and recover isolated personnel or distressed persons. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

personnel locator system. The personnel locator system (PLS) provides rough range and bearing to isolated personnel by integrating the survival radio (if equipped with a PLS transponder) with an airborne AN/ARS-6 (V) avionics system. The PRC-112 (V) family of survival radios are equipped with a PLS transponder. Also called PLS. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

personnel locator system code. Six digit number programmed into the survival radio and used by properly equipped recovery forces to covertly locate the evader. Also called PLS code. (Upon approval of this ~~publication revision~~, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

personnel recovery. The sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to effect the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. The sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to effect the recovery and debrief and reintegration of US military, DOD civilians, and DOD contractor personnel who are isolated or missing while participating in a US-sponsored military activity or mission. Also called PR. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

personnel recovery-capable forces. Forces that are not necessarily organized, trained, or equipped for personnel recovery, but have a recognized ability to perform some elements of personnel recovery. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term “CSAR-capable assets” and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

personnel recovery controller. The designated representative of a joint force component commander who is responsible for coordinating and controlling that component’s personnel recovery forces. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term “component search and rescue controller” and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

personnel recovery coordination cell. The primary joint force component organization responsible for coordinating and controlling component personnel recovery missions. Also called PRCC. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term “rescue coordination center” and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

personnel recovery-dedicated forces. These forces organized, trained, and equipped for personnel recovery and identified by their component commander to the joint force commander as the primary forces to form a combat search and rescue task force in the conduct of personnel recovery operations. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its

1 definition will modify the existing term “CSAR-dedicated assets” and its definition and will be
2 included in JP 1-02.)

3
4 ~~**personnel recovery mission coordinator.** The organization or person within that organization~~
5 ~~selected to direct and coordinate support for a specific personnel recovery mission. Also~~
6 ~~called PR mission coordinator. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will~~
7 ~~modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)~~
8

9 **pointee-talkee.** A language aid containing selected phrases in English opposite a translation in a
10 foreign language. It is used by pointing to appropriate phrases. (JP 1-02)

11
12 **precautionary personnel recovery forces.** Dedicated or capable personnel recovery forces that
13 are pre-positioned near areas where personnel recovery incidents are likely to occur. (Upon
14 approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term “precautionary
15 search and rescue/combat search and rescue” and its definition and will be included in JP 1-
16 02.)

17
18 ~~**recovered isolated personnel.** Isolated personnel who are returned to DOD control by escape,~~
19 ~~release, rescue, or other means. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and its definition~~
20 ~~will be included in JP 1-02.)~~
21

22 **recovery.** 1. In air (aviation) operations, that phase of a mission which involves the return of an
23 aircraft to a land base or platform afloat. 2. The retrieval of a mine from the location where
24 emplaced. 3. Actions taken to recover and return isolated personnel to friendly control. 4.
25 Actions taken to extricate damaged or disabled equipment for return to friendly control or
26 repair at another location. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will
27 modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)
28

29 **recovery activation signal.** In personnel recovery, a precoordinated signal from an evader to a
30 receiving or observing source that indicates “I am here, start the recovery planning.” Also
31 called RAS. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing
32 term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)
33

34 **recovery force.** An organization consisting of personnel and equipment with a mission of seeking
35 out evaders, contacting them, and returning them to friendly control. (Upon approval of this
36 revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be
37 included in JP 1-02.)
38

39 ~~**recovery mechanism.** A specifically developed infrastructure, that may interface with, or employ,~~
40 ~~indigenous or surrogate persons, used by special operations forces or other government~~
41 ~~agencies to perform to perform NAR. that uses US forces and may employ indigenous or~~
42 ~~surrogate persons recruited, trained, and directed by US forces to clandestinely or covertly~~
43 ~~contact, authenticate, support, move, and exfiltrate designated isolated personnel from hostile~~

~~areas to friendly control.~~—Designated indigenous or surrogate infrastructure that is specifically developed, trained, and directed by US forces to contact, authenticate, support, move, and exfiltrate designated isolated personnel from uncertain or hostile areas back to friendly control. Recovery mechanisms may interoperate with other US or multinational personnel recovery capabilities. Also called RM. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

recovery operations. Operations conducted to locate, identify, recover, and return isolated personnel, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security. (JP 1-02)

recovery site. An area from which an evader or an escaper can be recovered. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

recovery team. ~~Designated US or US-directed forces performing NAR unilaterally, or in conjunction with indigenous or surrogate forces.~~—Designated US or US-directed forces, that are specifically trained to operate unilaterally or in conjunction with indigenous or surrogate forces, and are tasked to contact, authenticate, support, move and exfiltrate isolated personnel. Recovery teams may interoperate with other nonconventional assisted recovery forces, and other US or multinational personnel recovery capabilities. Also called RT. (Upon approval of this ~~publication revision~~, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

recovery vehicle. The vehicle ~~(aircraft, maritime, or land),~~ on which isolated personnel are boarded and transported from the recovery site. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

rescue combat air patrol. An aircraft patrol provided over an objective area for the purpose of intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft. Its primary mission is to protect the combat search and rescue task force during personnel recovery operations. Also called RESCAP. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

SANDY. Callsign for a pilot specially trained in recovery procedures, aircrew survival and authentication techniques, and helicopter support tactics. (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)

search and rescue. The use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, specialized rescue teams and equipment to search for and rescue distressed persons on land or at sea in a permissive environment. Also called SAR. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

1 **search and rescue dot.** Predesignated specific location, ~~used by~~relative to which isolated
2 personnel ~~to~~ provide their position to recovery forces in an covert manner. Also called
3 SARDOT. (~~Upon approval of this publication, this term and its definition will be included in JP~~
4 ~~1-02. This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and cannot~~
5 ~~be referenced outside this publication.~~)

6
7 **search and rescue numeric encryption grid.** Predesignated ten-letter word without repeated
8 letters used exclusively by recovery forces or isolated personnel to encrypt numerical data such
9 as position, time, headings, etc., in a covert manner. Also called SARNEG. (~~Upon approval~~
10 ~~of this publication, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02. This term and its~~
11 ~~definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and cannot be referenced outside~~
12 ~~this publication.~~)

13
14 **selected area for evasion.** A designated area in hostile territory that offers evaders or escapees a
15 reasonable chance of avoiding capture and of surviving until they can be evacuated. Also
16 called SAFE. (~~When legacy products are superseded or cancelled, this term and its definition~~
17 ~~will be removed from JP 1-02)~~

18
19 **selected area for evasion area intelligence description.** In evasion and recovery operations,
20 an in-depth, all-source evasion study designed to assist the recovery of military personnel from
21 a selected area for evasion under hostile conditions. Also called SAID. (~~When legacy~~
22 ~~products are superseded or cancelled, this term and its definition will be removed from JP 1-~~
23 ~~02)~~

24 **special operations forces.** Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services
25 designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to
26 conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. (JP 1-02)

27
28 **survival, evasion, resistance, and escape.** All actions performed by isolated personnel to
29 facilitate return to friendly control. Also called SERE. (~~Upon approval of this publication~~
30 ~~revision~~, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

31
32 **tactical control.** Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military
33 capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and
34 control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish
35 missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control
36 may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command.
37 When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the
38 gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces
39 must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for
40 controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within
41 the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02)

1 **tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel.** A US Marine Corps term describing a mission
2 performed by an assigned and briefed aircrew for the specific purpose of the recovery of
3 personnel, equipment, and/or aircraft when the tactical situation precludes search and rescue
4 (SAR) assets from responding and when survivors and their location have been confirmed.
5 Also called TRAP. (~~This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this pub~~
6 ~~and cannot be referenced outside this publication.~~Upon approval of this revision, this term and
7 its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

8
9 **terrestrial environment.** The Earth's land area, including its manmade and natural surface and
10 sub-surface features, and its interfaces and interactions with the atmosphere and the oceans.
11 (JP 1-02)

12
13 ~~**theater transition point.** Any secure area or facility in the combatant commander's area of~~
14 ~~responsibility that is under friendly control, and where recovered isolated personnel~~
15 ~~decompression and debriefing and reintegration can take place. Ideally, this area is out of sight~~
16 ~~and sound of the battlefield and in the vicinity of an aerial port of debarkation/embarkation,~~
17 ~~offering a stable environment for up to five days for repatriation activities. (Upon approval of~~
18 ~~this publication, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)~~

19
20 **unassisted personnel recovery.** Personnel recovery performed by the independent efforts of
21 isolated personnel ~~survival, evasion, resistance, and escape skills;~~ culminating in a return to
22 friendly control. (Upon approval of this ~~publication~~revision, this term and its definition will be
23 included in JP 1-02.)

24
25 **unconventional assisted recovery.** ~~Nonconventional assisted recovery conducted by special~~
26 ~~operations forces.~~Nonconventional assisted recovery conducted by special operations forces
27 (SOF). As a subset of unconventional warfare, SOF can conduct unconventional assisted
28 recovery unilaterally, in conjunction with indigenous or surrogate personnel, or in conjunction
29 with other government agencies employing compartmented tactics, techniques, and procedures.
30 Also called UAR. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the
31 existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

32
33 **unconventional assisted recovery coordination center.** ~~An element established by the joint~~
34 ~~force special operations component commander and staffed by supervisory personnel and~~
35 ~~tactical planners to manage and coordinate nonconventional assisted recovery operations within~~
36 ~~the joint force commander's operational area.~~A compartmented special operations forces
37 facility staffed on a continuous basis by supervisory personnel and tactical planners to
38 coordinate, synchronize, and de-conflict nonconventional assisted recovery operations within
39 the operational area assigned to the joint force commander. The joint force special operations
40 component commander establishes the unconventional assisted recovery coordination center to
41 manage existing nonconventional assisted recovery capability. Also called UARCC. (Upon
42 approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its
43 definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

1
2 **unconventional assisted recovery mechanism.** A recovery mechanism developed and managed
3 by special operations forces. Also called UARM. (Upon approval of this revision, this term
4 and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

5 **unconventional assisted recovery team.** ~~A recovery team composed of special operations~~
6 ~~forces.—A designated special operations forces unconventional warfare ground or maritime~~
7 ~~force capable of conducting unconventional assisted recovery unilaterally, or with indigenous or~~
8 ~~surrogate forces.~~ Also called UART. (Upon approval of this ~~publication revision~~, this term
9 and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

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11 **unconventional recovery operation.** None. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and its
12 definition will be removed from JP 1-02.)
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