Using CommonKADS to model the Air Campaign Planning process

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N.B. This document is still undergoing some revisions. A revised version will be produced by the end of February 1996. The revised version will contain at least the following changes:

- for those activities identified in the task knowledge of the expertise model, attributes will be specified;
- the missing repertory grid diagrams will have been added;
- the missing references will have been added;
- the COG hierarchies for Fielded Forces: Logistics will have been reorganized.

This document contains models of the Air Campaign Planning process, represented as diagrams and accompanying text. The purpose of these models is to help members of the ARPI community identify the relevance of their own work to particular parts of the ACP process, and to promote discussion about ARPI projects and about the ACP process itself. These diagrams are based on knowledge acquired from Doug Holmes and Joe Roberts of ISX, four members of Checkmate, and associated documents.

This document provides:

- an introduction to Air Campaign Planning;
- an introduction to the modelling technique used;
- models of the Air Campaign Planning process from various perspectives;
- description and discussion of the acquired knowledge.

1 Introduction to Air Campaign Planning

The knowledge acquisition effort which is described in this document focused on air campaign planning within a Joint Task Force (JTF). A JTF exists for one crisis (which usually implies one theater); however, there may be more than one JTF per theater. The JTF is under the control of the Joint Forces Commander (JFC).

The Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) is the functional commander responsible for the air operations within the overall campaign. The JFACC is appointed by the JFC and is usually the component commander contributing the greatest number of air assets to the JTF. The work of the JFACC and his staff is carried out in the Joint Air Operations Center (AOC).The JFACC reports to the Joint Forces Commander (JFC), who reports to the Commander in Chief (CINC) of the theater.

1.1 Plan Components

A Campaign Plan is a plan for all forces participating in a JTF and typically covers a 6 month period. Each functional component within the JTF will also have a specific campaign plan. The air campaign plan also covers a 6 month period. This is transformed into the Master Air Attack Plan (MAAP), from which the *Air Tasking Order* (ATO), or battle plan, is produced. The ATO takes 36 hours to produce and covers 24 hours. *Mission plans* are derived from the ATO; a mission plan constitutes the directions for a specific sortie. Pilots then develop an *engagement plan*, which specifies the maneuvers that will be used to execute the mission plan.

1.2 Preparation for planning

Once a crisis occurs, the CINC assesses the situation, selects a Course of Action (COA) and may decide to establish at JTF. Then a *warning order* is given, normally 3 days in advance of the commencement of operations. Operations are initiated by a further order from the CINC, known as the *operations order*.

When a crisis occurs and the CINC decides to take some action, the CINC will provide planning guidance to the JFC. The guidance is communicated to the component commanders (e.g. the JFACC) through the JFC. The component commanders will in turn communicate the guidance to their planners. Based on the guidance, the planning staff will take between 3 days and 1 week to build a plan that may be executed.

Although the guidance (at every level) is considered to be an order rather than a suggestion, negotiation does take place. If a commanding officer proposes certain objectives or goals that are unreasonable, then participants in the planning process have the responsibility for convincing the commanding officer to take a different approach. For example, the planners may want more time. But, to buy time in a crisis, something diplomatic has to be given up. The commanding officer may not be willing to make a diplomatic sacrifice. In some such situations, the commanding officer will enforce the initial guidance; in other cases, the initial guidance may be relaxed. However the Rules of Engagement (which are part of the initial guidance from the CinC) are never negotiable.

Initial planning steps include assessing the situation and organizing the planning staff. Assessing the situation involves identifying enemy COGs and air defenses as well as determining a method (strategy), goals and targets. A lot of knowledge about the theater is needed; typically the planning staff has been studying the theater for years. The types of information they know are whether the enemy has nuclear weapons, the nature of the crisis, and the history of the conflict. The planning staff have, and use, many maps with different perspectives of the theater.

When the planners cannot find required details, they will rely on contacts with people who have the information or can get the information. Typically these are intelligence people on the planning team. It's impossible to prove the accuracy of intelligence data, because INTEL (the intelligence group) must protect their sources; however, duplication of Intel effort between different branches, which is encouraged, may corroborate information or provide additional information. The planners may not get some needed information for 3 days, so they will make assumptions and move to the next step.

1.3 Planning

Throughout the planning process, air planners are searching for alternatives, vulnerabilities, consequences and contingencies. Planning consists of three stages:

- identifying and prioritizing air objectives;
- identifying and prioritizing task objectives;[1]
- identifying and prioritizing targets.

The planning is likely to be subdivided at some point, probably according to different phases of the conflict.

The planning team usually consists of 8 people, which is only sufficient to plan for one situation (the most likely case) and look very hard at one other alternative (probably the worst case). (Planning teams normally work 8-hour shifts; in a crisis, the planning team work overlapping 12-hour shifts). The planning staff hold 4-hourly meetings to discuss progress, obtain a consensus of opinion, and to make sure that there is a smooth transition between phases. The latter is very important, since it is imperative that friendly forces are not perceived by the enemy as being indecisive.

It's important to note that the planning process does not always continue until each stage is fully completed. Often, the planning staff may only be 75% finished with some activities when it is time to move on to the next stage. However, the dynamic environment makes it difficult to complete a stage without the situation having changed. The time spent on any one task depends on the situation.

In most cases, the JFACC will not want to be involved in the planning process except for a daily briefing to make sure that guidance has been communicated correctly. This lack of involvement from the JFACC is deliberate and is designed to foster openness and innovation. The air planning team does not normally communicate with other branches either, in order to enhance creativity, and to reduce the constraints of reconciling too many points of view.

2 Introduction to the modelling technique used

The modelling technique used to model the ACP process was based on the CommonKADS methodology for knowledge modelling. CommonKADS [Wielinga *et al*, 1992] [Breuker & van de Velde, 1994] is a collection of structured methods for building knowledge based systems, analogous to methods such as SSADM for software engineering. It was developed between 1983 and 1994 with funds from the European Community's ESPRIT program. CommonKADS views the development of a knowledge based system as a modelling activity, and so the heart of the method is the construction of a number of models which represent different views on problem solving behavior. A perspective is a view on a model or models, representing one aspect of the organization or behavior: for example, one perspective might model

[1]The term "task objective" is comparatively new; the term "Course of Action" may also be heard, describing the same objectives.

the activities which take place in an organization, while a different perspective may represent the structure of that organization. The recommended set of models is:

- An *organizational* model represents the processes, structure and resources within an organization;
- A *task* model shows the tasks carried out in the course of a particular process;
- An *agent* model represents the capabilities required of the agents who perform a process, and constraints on their performance;
- A *communication* model shows the communication required between agents during a process;
- An *expertise* model is a model of the expertise required to perform a particular task. This model is divided into three components:
  - declarative knowledge about the domain;
  - the inference processes required during problem solving;
  - a task structure specifying the hierarchical decomposition and ordering of the inference processes.
- A *design* model culminates in the design of a knowledge based system to perform all or part of the process under consideration.

This document provides CommonKADS models for the Air Campaign Planning process and its surrounding environment. The models which are included are:

- an (enriched version of) the organizational model, showing a number of different perspectives on a Joint Task Force.
- a task model, which has been enriched by using the IDEF3 process modelling technique [Lydiard, 1995] instead of CommonKADS' recommended diagram format. The IDEF3 technique represents more detail about the exact ordering of processes than CommonKADS' graphical technique; a full set of IDEF3 diagrams describing the whole Air Campaign Planning process can be found in Appendix B. An "asset perspective" is also included within the task model, to represents the various documents produced and resources used.
- a communication model. This model has been represented using the RAD (Role Activity Diagram) technique, which represents information more compactly than CommonKADS' diagram format for communication modelling.
- an expertise model of the processes involved in prioritizing air objectives. This expertise model consists of:

- domain models showing hierarchies of Centres of Gravity.
- inference structures showing the inference steps involved in prioritizing air objectives;
- simple task structures showing the processes involved in prioritizing air objectives

Simple task structures are also provided for the processes of producing and sequencing task objectives and prioritizing targets.

2.1 The CommonKADS Organizational Model

The stated aim of modelling the Air Campaign Planning (ACP) process was to perform a "task analysis" of the ACP process. However, after initial knowledge acquisition, it was felt that there was considerable benefit to be gained from producing an Organizational Model, showing the organization which surrounds ACP, before analysing the activities performed during the ACP process in detail.

The CommonKADS organizational model recommends examination of an organization from five major perspectives:

- the **activities**[2] of the organization;
- the **structure** of the organization;
- the **processes** in the organization;
- the **power/authority** in the organization;
- the **resources** in the organization.

Each perspective is represented by a single diagram, or by text. These five perspectives can be combined into cross-products which provide the most useful information. For example, the CommonKADS Organizational Model was used to model a Social Security department; a cross-product of activities and structure was produced which highlighted an area of inefficiency, because one of the activities (archiving) was being performed by three different divisions of the department [deHoog *et al*, 1993].

[2]CommonKADS actually calls these "functions" rather than "activities". However, for reasons which are explained in [Uschold *et al*, 1995], I have chosen to use the term "activities" throughout this document.

2.2 Enriching the CommonKADS Organizational Model for the ACP domain

The process of domain familiarization also suggested that some aspects of the organization surrounding ACP – in particular, power/authority relationships – would benefit from being represented in more detail than the CommonKADS Organizational Model currently supports. It was decided that the multi-perspective approach to organizational modelling would be maintained, but that the perspectives would be altered to permit the representation of rights of access to resources and information, and the representation of who was responsible for performing which activities[3]. The result was that a set of perspectives were developed based on three basic entities: *activities*, *agents* and *resources*. Figure 1 shows the perspectives which were used, and how they were combined.



Figure 1: Enriched organizational model: perspectives and cross-products

The **Dictionary** perspectives are simply sets of activities (or agents or resources) which are used as a basis for building the other perspectives. The **Network** perspectives show how entities of the same type relate to one another:

- Activities *precede* each other to produce a *process*;
- Agents *report to* each other and *belong to* departments to produce an *organizational structure*;

[3]This distinction was derived from the ORDIT project which is intended to support organizational requirements definition [Dobson & Strens, 1994].

- Resources have a particular *status*, and the existence of one or more resources with a certain status may constitute a *state of affairs*. For example, "Air Campaign Plan completed" might be a state of affairs; it would exist if the status of the **Master Air Attack Plan** was *endorsed* and the status of the **Air Tasking Order** was *endorsed*.

The **Cross Product** perspectives show how resources are produced, used, consumed or modified within the process (*Assets perspective*), what rights agents have to resources (*Rights perspective*), and the obligations and responsibilities to perform activities and to create states of affairs (*Responsibilities perspective*).

Further details on each perspective will be given in the next section.

2.3 The CommonKADS Task Model

Once the organizational model had been produced, a task model was produced which focused on the strategic planning of an Air Campaign Plan. The part of the process which was considered started with the CinC issuing policy and guidance to the JFACC for use within the planning process, and finished with the production of a Master Air Attack Plan (MAAP). This closely corresponds with those parts of the Air Campaign Planning process which are carried out by the planning staff at the JFACC's Air Operations Center.

The CommonKADS Task Model is a more detailed version of the process perspective of the organizational model. The process perspective of the organizational model is intended to represent the overall workflow and/or control flow of an organization's primary processes; the task model describes the activities which are executed in an organizational environment, with an emphasis on deciding which activities could be suitable candidates for computer software support [?]. The extra detail includes the inputs and outputs of these activities; the agents who can perform these activities; and any temporal restrictions on activities[4]. The results of the analysis are displayed in a diagram, showing dependencies between different activities, and (optionally) the roles of the agents who are expected to take on these activities.

In order to improve the quality of information which can be conveyed by the diagrams, the IDEF3 technique was used instead of CommonKADS' suggested diagram format. This technique represents the exact ordering of processes in more detail than the graphical format suggested by CommonKADS.

[4]The full list of activity attributes can be seen in the descriptions of activities given in the models themselves. The list is not entirely derived from CommonKADS; instead, it is derived from the AIAI Enterprise Ontology [?].

2.4 The CommonKADS Communication Model

The communication model represents all communication between different agents, as well as the content of the communication. This information can conveniently be represented in a single *role-activity* diagram, which shows which activities are carried out by which agents, and identifies points at which communication takes place. N.B. For implementation purposes, a more detailed model of communication will be required, showing which agent takes the initiative, the exact format of transactions, and any other key information (such as time-critical transactions).

2.5 The CommonKADS Expertise Model

The purpose of the task model is to identify activities which would benefit from support, particularly computerized support. It is common for some activities within a task model to be identified as *knowledge-based* activities; that is, activities which require significant expertise, experience or knowledge to enable them to be carried out well. The most appropriate technique for representing these activities in CommonKADS is to use the inference steps and tasks that form part of the CommonKADS Expertise Model.

The Expertise Model is a model of the expertise required to perform a particular activity. This model is divided into three components, each of which is represented by one or more diagrams:

- *domain knowledge:* declarative knowledge about the domain;
- *inference knowledge:* the inference steps performed during problem solving;
- *task knowledge:* control information, largely concerned with the ordering of inference steps.

An expertise model has been developed for the activity of **identifying and prioritizing air objectives**, which was considered to be a knowledge-based task which could benefit from computerized support. It may be beneficial to develop further expertise models in future, particularly for the activities of **produce and sequence task objectives** and **prioritize targets**. The reason that these two activities are suggested for expertise modelling is that initial knowledge acquisition suggests that the types of knowledge and processes required for these activities are basically similar to the knowledge and processes for **identify and prioritize air objectives**, which have already been modelled.

The Expertise Model is the most detailed of all the CommonKADS models. For more information on the Expertise Model, see Appendix D.

3 Organizational Model of the ACP process

3.1 Introduction

The diagrams in this section show the organization which supports air campaign planning, from a number of different perspectives.

3.2 Process Perspective

Figure 2 shows the activities which represent the overall workflow of Air Campaign Planning, and also shows how these activities link to form processes.



Figure 2: ACP Process Perspective

Key:		
	Solid link	the first activity *precedes* the second
	Dashed link	there is an *information flow* from the first activity to the second.

Description of activities:

Analysis of Situation (CinC) : This is sometimes called "crisis action planning". The Commander in Chief analyzes the political and military situation. This usually includes deciding on an approach to the problem; however, this is **not** the same as what is referred to below as a "course of action".

Form Joint Task Force : A joint task force is formed. This does not always take place, but it is usual. The CinC provides guidance to the new Joint Forces Commander (JFC). The guidance can take several forms including:

- Situation assessment of friendly and opposing forces
- Resources allocated
- Mission and Military Objectives

- Rules of Engagement
- Policies
- Political Issues
- Potential problems with weather
- Potential problems with crisis in other theaters

All of these types of guidance will change dynamically throughout the planning process as well as the execution of the plan.

Select Course of Action : The JFC selects a course of action for the US military forces to pursue. Possible courses of action might be ???

Delegate campaign planning : The task of campaign planning is delegated to the various Joint Force component commanders (e.g. the JFACC).

Prepare for Air Campaign planning : The planning team is set up and initial information is acquired or generated. This is described in more detail in the Task and Communication models.

Plan Air Campaign : The air campaign is planned. This is described in more detail in the Task, Communication and Expertise models.

Weaponize Target List : determine what weapons will be needed to damage or destroy particular targets, and therefore decide which types of aircraft should carry out the mission. This is done by calculating the Desired Mean Point of Impact (DMPI) and required munitions for each target. The DMPI specifies the best weapons for a target, the exact angle the target should be hit and the exact location that the target should be hit. This activity is carried out by the Ops group at the Air Operations Center (AOC).

Weaponeering is currently one of the most time-consuming parts of the whole planning process, taking around 10 hours to complete. The weaponeers use a system known as Rapid Air Action Planner (???) (RAAP) which suggests 5 possible options for resourcing a mission. RAAP can be time-constrained (i.e. forced to plan all missions within a particular time), but it cannot be resource-constrained (forced to plan missions using only certain aircraft). This means that the options suggested by RAAP may conflict with resource allocations explicitly required by senior officers, or resource allocations suggested by the CTEMS system. CTEMS takes the prioritized target list and suggests resources to attack these targets; it can be either time-constrained or resource-constrained, but not both. It has been suggested that the weaponeers could make use of the output of CTEMS as a starting point for weaponeering, but this is currently a subject of internal debate.

Schedule Target List : determine when each target should be attacked. This will depend on both the priority of the target and the availability of suitable aircraft. This is also carried out by the AOC Ops group. The result of this is the Air Tasking Order, which is the document which is passed to the Wings.

In the course of scheduling the air campaign plan, the Ops group sometimes find and report anomalies in the plan.

Produce Mission Plan : The Wings (and/or???) the squadron leaders are responsible for planning how their mission(s) should be accomplished at the required time(s).

Fly mission : Once the aircraft are airborne, responsibility for the mission passes to the flight leaders. If changes to the ATO occur at this stage (e.g. a sudden change in weather), the Ops group at the Air Operations Center will communicate directly with the flight leader.

Evaluate Air Campaign : Once the mission is completed, the fliers are required to report their results to help in gauging the success of a mission. These results are collated and used as an input to further planning. Other feedback on the current situation is also obtained, including logistics assessment, assessment of readiness, identification of personnel and processing of intelligence reports. Explicitly, it includes obtaining various types of mission reports via Ops and Intel; these reports will include pilot reports, intelligence reports, and a Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA). The planners sometimes go out and obtain information, perhaps by calling an acquaintance in an operating squadron, because the "official" intelligence information can be slow in arriving.

The effect of feedback is to adjust the prioritization of task objectives and of targets. If new policy and guidance is received, the prioritization of air objectives may also change.

3.3 Structure Perspective

Figures 3 and 4 show two different aspects of the organizational structure surrounding the ACP process. Figure 3 shows the structure of the US Air Forces, from AFOR (Air Force Command) downwards; it also shows that AFOR is under the command of the JFACC. Figure 4 shows the structure of the Joint Forces Command, including the staff who produce the Air Campaign Plan and report to the JFACC, and the upper echelons from whom the JFACC receives instructions.

When viewing these diagrams, it should be borne in mind that different senior officers will choose to work in different ways; to be more precise, the CinC may alter the lines of authority or reporting requirements, in order to improve his liaison with

selected groups or individuals. This means that these diagrams, particularly the one reflecting the structure of a Joint Forces Command, may be adjusted according to the CinC's own preferences.



Figure 3: Structure of the US Air Forces

Key:	Dashed link	the department is a *department of* another department

Partial description:

Wings give missions to squadrons. There will be 3-4 **squadrons** in a wing, with 17-24 aircraft each. The personnel in a squadron will be divided into **flights**; there will be 3-4 flights, typically of 12 pilots each.

N.B. Once a mission is in progress, the term *flight* is used to apply to a subgroup of aircraft within the mission forces. A "mission flight" typically consists of 4 planes, which may be drawn from one or more "squadron flights". The Navy avoid this confusion by using the term *section* for a "mission flight".

3.4 States of Affairs

A State of Affairs indicates that one or more resources have reached a certain status which is important to the ACP process. Since most of the resources used by ACP



Figure 4: Structure of a typical Joint Task Force

Key:		
	Solid link	the first agent *reports to* the second
	Dashed link	the agent *belongs to* the department

planning are passive resources (e.g. documents), most of the important states of affairs will correspond to the completion of certain documents.

No states of affairs have yet been fully documented; however, the diagram of the Responsibilities perspective 3.7 below illustrates some possible states of affairs which might emerge as being important.

3.5 Assets Perspective

The Assets perspective (see Figure 5) takes the activities identified in the Process perspective, but instead of showing precedence relationships, it provides information regarding the resources which are produced, consumed, used or modified by the various activities. A diamond-shaped node in the diagram represents a *passive resource* (a document or file); ellipses represent *computer resources* (computer programs e.g. databases); rectangles represent a *human resource* (normally implying a source of knowledge); and rounded rectangles represent activities.

3.6 Rights Perspective

Very little knowledge has been acquired for the Rights perspective. However, this perspective is considered to be important because it represents the authority of various individuals or groups to view or to alter certain resources. By representing this authority, it becomes possible to frame discussions about the consequences of changing these rights.

An example of the consequences of changing rights can be drawn from Desert Storm [Thaler & Shlapak, 1995]. General Schwarzkopf, the CinC, not only briefed all Joint Force Commanders at meetings, he also sometimes gave out guidance or instructions to an individual Joint Force Commander by telephone or in private meetings. One such instruction, given to the JFACC, was that Iraqi units believed to be below 50% of full combat strength should no longer be targeted for air strikes. This instruction was not communicated to the land commanders, who were left to wonder why the Air Force had ceased to provide them with close air support; indeed, many did not find out about this instruction until after the war! It can be seen that the CinC decided to withdraw (or neglected to provide) the JFLCC's rights to view the instructions and guidance which the CinC was providing to the JFACC, and that the result was uncertainty and possible irritation within the ground forces. Of course, there may be advantages (e.g. in security) in General Schwarzkopf's approach; but it is important to have a framework for weighing the pros and cons of a particular decision.



Key:

Labelled link	the activity *produces/consumes/uses/modifies* the resource
Diamond	Passive resource
Rounded rectangle	Activity

Figure 5: ACP Assets Perspective



Key:	Solid link	the agent has a *right* to the resource

Figure 6: Rights Perspective

3.7 Responsibilities Perspective

The Responsibilities perspective shows which agents are responsible to which other agents for a state of affairs, and what obligations agents have as a result of their responsibilities. There is very little information available for the Responsibilities perspective at present; the diagram in Figure 7 illustrates the format which a diagram of the Responsibilities perspective would take.

4 Task model

The CommonKADS Task Model is a more detailed version of the process perspective of the organizational model. The process perspective of the organizational model is intended to represent the overall workflow and/or control flow of an organization's primary process; the task model describes the activities which are executed in an organizational environment at a greater level of detail. The extra detail includes detailed descriptions of input and output; the agents who perform and are responsible for these activities; and any temporal restrictions on activities.

The extra details which are supplied by the task model are intended to help in deciding which activities could be suitable candidates for computer software support [**?**]. The "repertory grid" knowledge acquisition technique (see appendix A) was used to acquire information which is particularly important when deciding which activties would benefit most from software support. The information acquired was:

- the experience required to perform an activity;
- the likelihood of a mistake when performing the activity;
- the seriousness of a mistake when performing the activity;
- the time required to perform an activity;

The diagrammatic form of the task model is the same as the form used for the process level of the organizational model.



Key:

Link with black circle	the first agent is **responsible** to the second for a state of affairs (which is indicated by the label on the link)
Link with white circle	the agent is **obliged** to perform the activity

Figure 7: Responsibilities Perspective

4.1 Task Model: Prepare for Air Campaign Planning

The task model for preparing for air campaign planning is shown in Figure 8.



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

Figure 8: Task Model: Prepare for Air Campaign planning

Description of activities:

Obtain policy and guidance from CinC : The JFACC must receive instructions, and guidance on military and political policy, before he can initiate the planning of an air campaign. These instructions are usually written by a J3 or a J5 on the JFC's staff.

The content of the guidance is likely to be at the level of *theater political objectives* and *theater military objectives*. These may include:

- a desired end state e.g. "Red forces should be driven out of Greyland"
- time and space boundaries e.g. "NBC facilities must be destroyed"

Attributes:

Predecessor : None (as far as Air Campaign Planning is concerned)

Successor : Assess Situation, Identify CinC objectives, Brainstorm possible Centers of Gravity

Component : None

Doer : This activity is done by the JFC, who then passes the information on to the JFACC and his staff. The JFC and the JFACC (and staff ???) may be in the same room when the CinC expresses his policy and guidance; however, even if this is the case, the JFC will always add his own input to the CinC's guidance. There may be documented guidance, but the most elaborate guidance will always be verbal.

Owner : The JFC is responsible for obtaining guidance from the CinC and passing it on to the JFACC and his staff (principally the Chief of Plans). However, if the Chief of Plans doesn't get adequate guidance, he will start asking for it, through appropriate channels. This often involves the planning staff in writing their own version of the guidance, and then presenting it to the JFC for correction (see "Identifying CinC objectives" below).

Interval : This activity is normally carried out simultaneously with the formation of a JTF. In the early phases of an operation, additional guidance is likely, on a daily basis.

In the later phases of an operation, the planning staff's interpretation of policy and guidance is endorsed by default – that is, if you don't hear anything, you're doing OK. The guidance should be reviewed by the planning staff at least once per day, to take account of possible changes. Changes may occur if the President makes new public statements; or if allies join or leave the coalition; or if the enemy sues for peace.

Duration : 5-15 minutes. The activity doesn't usually take very long, because the JFACC will probably have already spent time considering the situation, and the policy and guidance which is obtained is likely to confirm a previously formulated hypothesis. There's also little time spent on evaluation of whether to follow the CinC's policy; it's an order, so there is no option to decide whether to follow it or not.

Experience required : Medium.

Likelihood of a mistake : Medium. The overall policy is rarely misunderstood – and if it is misunderstood, the JFACC's understanding is corrected (often painfully!) at the next briefing of the JFC, which is normally in the afternoon of the first day of planning. However, ambiguous statements may be interpreted incorrectly (see "Identify CinC objectives" below).

Seriousness of a mistake : Fairly high. It is likely that an entire days' planning will be based on wrong assumptions, and is therefore likely to be wasted.

Pre-Condition : The decision to form a JTF; the designation of components (which will include the appointment of a JFACC); the provision of guidance by the National Command Authority and/or the CinC.

N.B. The JFC appoints the JFACC, with possible input from the CinC. There's a formula for appointment – the senior officer of the Air Force with the largest number of resources in the JTF normally becomes the JFACC. The JFACC will already have his own staff, but he'll typically augment that staff to suit his role as a JFACC.

Effect : The production of orders or directions, expressing the policy and guidance to be used by the planning staff.

Resource : There are formal documents (e.g. the commander's assessment) which are produced by (the JFC???), and which will contain some statements about policy and guidance. These tend to be used as reference documents, because the actual policy and guidance used is based on the written statements and on verbal elaborations.

Organize planning staff : The Chief of Plans draws together a planning staff. Ideally, the groups will be pairs, with one member of the Planning unit working with one member of the Intel unit. In practice, this rarely happens [Checkmate, personal communication, 30 Nov 1995].

Attributes:

Predecessor : None, as far as Air Campaign Planning is concerned

Successor : Decide on enemy's most likely course of action

Component : None

Duration : 5-15 minutes

Doer : The Chief of Plans – with strong input from the JFACC.

Owner : JFACC

Interval : Immediately after the preconditions are fulfilled, and definitely within a day of the initialization of a JTF. Checkmate say that this process is almost automatic; Doug Holmes suggested that some Chiefs of Plans might give more thought to this process than others. Once the organization has been established, there is usually no formal review; it only gets revised if the people on the job do poorly or if the Chief of Plans becomes aware of new information sources/resources.

In a long conflict, there's effectively an annual review because of annual cycling of personnel (which normally implies a new Chief of Plans).

Experience required : Fairly high.

Likelihood of mistake : Fairly low. Mistakes are considered to be rare, because Directors of Planning become fairly skilled at this job. Having said this, the repertory grid exercise was carried out when two of the staff members at Checkmate had just returned from an exercise on which the planning staff were badly organized.

Seriousness of mistake : Medium. A mistake here causes inefficiency; Checkmate pointed out that it takes time to overcome a faulty organization. However, faults in the organization quickly become apparent when deadlines approach, so they are normally corrected; indeed, they're often self-correcting. In addition, different styles of organization are capable of achieving the same result.

Pre-Condition : Guidance has been obtained from the CinC/JFC; a JTF has been formed; a Chief of Plans has been appointed.

Effect : Staff organized; assignment of responsibilities (for what ???); organizational structure

Resource : The planning staff are typically built up from a JFACC's existing staff, plus other officers who are known to the JFACC (or the Chief of Plans ???). The information structure for the staff is crucial; in times of genuine crisis, the amount of information available to planning staff will increase e.g. 9th AF don't have good access to national data in peacetime, but are likely to be given access to that data in wartime.

Decide on enemy's most likely course of action : The JFACC must decide on the enemy's most likely course of action. This requires background knowledge as well as a good assessment of the current situation. This decision is a refinement of the analysis performed when choosing a Course of Action. The selection of a Course of Action involves a great deal of wargaming. Ideally, multiple analyses of the enemy's courses of action (best case/ worst case/ most likely) should be performed, but this is not currently done.

Attributes:

Predecessor : Assess situation, Organize planning staff

Successor : Brainstorm possible centers of gravity. In fact, this activity is probably not essential for brainstorming to begin, but it will probably be required before brainstorming can be considered to be finished.

Component : None

Duration : 1-3 hours. Taking extra time is not judged to be worth the marginal improvement obtained.

Doer : The whole planning staff, plus associated Intel personnel. Typically the planners will take the lead in this because they are the ones who are used to thinking about intent. However, Intel staff need to be closely involved; if no Intel personnel are formally assigned to the planning staff, the planners ought to get 2 experienced and knowledgeable Intel officers in as part of the discussion

Owner : The planning staff – and hence, indirectly, the Chief of Plans and the JFACC. The key to determining ownership is to see what happens when staff disagree; in this case, the planners are more likely to use their own assessments of enemy course of action rather than the assessments of senior officers, as long as the plan addresses the senior officers' concerns.

Interval : This takes place fairly quickly - within a day of the whole situation starting up. It's revisited fairly often – maybe every other day – within the first 2 weeks of the conflict. Thereafter, it's only only revisited if a major event confirms or disproves it. Monitoring the accuracy of this assessment is more the responsibility of the Intel personnel on the planning staff than of the planners themselves.

Experience required : Fairly high.

Likelihood of mistake : Medium. The emphasis here is on making a decision which is "good enough". The assessment of the enemy's likely course of action could probably be made more accurate, but the marginal improvement is usually judged to be not worth the extra time required.

Seriousness of mistake : Very high. Despite the seriousness of mistakes on this activity, mistakes do happen; the beginning of Desert Storm is a good example, when few planners correctly predicted Saddam Hussein's dig-in-and-wait strategy. Fortunately, this strategy was less damaging than the one which had been predicted.

Effect : The output of this process is a hypothetical projection of the current sitution, focusing selection of important Centers of Gravity (both on the Red (enemy) side and also on the Blue (friendly) side of the conflict. The projection is typically represented as an assessment of enemy intent, usually in note form. If the activity is carried out by using Red and Blue teams (which is considered to be a good approach), a consensus on enemy intent tends to emerge within the planning staff.

It's a very important process; if you can predict the enemy's plans, you have a huge advantage.

Resource : The primary resource requirement for this activity is experienced staff. Other resources may include

- intelligence documents (eg current reports);

- news (which differs from open source documents because it's current);
- News about Grey (neutral) countries may be relevant;
- Background information, such as cultural information about the Red country, similar to that required by the "Assess Situation" activity.

Identify CinC objectives : The JFACC must identify CinC objectives (i.e. campaign objectives military objectives, political objectives, and maybe even national objectives) from the policy and guidance which he has received from higher echelons. It's actually possible that the JFACC might negotiate these objectives, though it's unlikely (unless explicitly invited) until the later stages of planning, when the JFACC may have a good case for the negotiation of objectives, based on analysis of centers of gravity and available resources.

The guidance may also include phrases such as "decisive air power", which are insufficiently specified for planning purposes. This activity may therefore involve feedback, in which the exact intent is determined by rephrasing the policy and guidance back to its author. Sometimes, the guidance given is so vague that the user of the guidance writes his own interpretation of the guidance, and then gives it to the senior officer for amendment.

Attributes:

Predecessor : Obtain policy and guidance from CinC/JFC

Successor : Brainstorm possible centers of gravity.

Component : None

Duration : 1-3 hours

Doer : In theory, the JFACC performs this task, and communicates the results to the Chief of Plans. In practice, however, the objectives are frequently ambiguous, or perhaps not even specified explicitly, so the planning staff must verify them; Checkmate say that, when they have acted as planning staff, they have never known a JFACC to provide them with a set of objectives which did not need further clarification. This is typically done by formatting a coherent set of objectives which are then presented to the JFACC by the Chief of Plans; the JFACC is invited to comment on whether these objectives accurately reflect his intended communication. The JFACC then (probably ???) briefs the JFC on the revised set of CinC objectives. This process is particularly common in the case where the JFACC does not explicitly specify objectives; but if he does, the planning staff still need to clarify and review the objectives for completeness. This "sceptical review" is an accepted part of the planning staff's function; indeed, it seems to lie at the heart of several of the processes carried out during air campaign planning.

Owner : Chief of Plans

Interval : This activity is done once, and only revisited if there is an explicit change (in what???)

Experience required : Fairly high.

Likelihood of mistake : Medium. There are many nuances in the language used which need to be understood, and the reader also requires a lot of previously acquired contextual information to understand the objectives fully.

Seriousness of mistake : Very high. If the objectives are not correctly identified at this stage, the JFC should (eventually) correct them, but not until planning effort has been wasted. If, however, the JFC or JFACC approves a set of objectives which are incorrect or ambiguous, it is possible that the mistakes will not be noticed for a long time, perhaps not until missions have been flown.

Pre-Condition : Policy and guidance has been obtained from the JFC;

Effect : This activity produces a clear understanding of the CinC's objectives. A clear understanding of these objectives is crucial, since they form the starting point for the planning of an air campaign.

Resource : Resources used for this activity include:

- Policy and guidance from the JFC;
- news (CNN, general context);
- Public statements from the President. Doug Holmes commented here that, when he was flying missions in the fluid political situation of Vietnam, he would try to conform his actions to the President's public statements;
- News interviews with CinC or JFC;
- Any available information source!

Assess situation : Assess the military (and political) situation, using background information and local knowledge. This updates the planning assumptions that went into the selecting of a Course of Action (see figure 2). The updating of these assumptions includes the validation of constraints and restraints, and of the political situation.

This activity is fundamentally a problem definition – looking at the situation assessment produced when determining a course of action, and trying to identify and correct any weaknesses with this assessment. The factors considered will include:

- Political situation;

- environment (geographical, cultural, meteorological, topological constraints on action);
- alliances (friends, enemies, neutrals);
- others ???

This activity probably requires some projection of possible events (e.g. what if we do nothing? what if we do something?) to determine the likely future situation.

The situation assessment provides planning and evaluation context, which is referenced all the time as things change in the real world. This context is used as a frame of reference for communications. Note that the primary use of this frame of reference is to foster communication between the JFACC and the staff who are directly responsible to him; the frame of reference is probably only fully understood by the planners, the JFACC, and the other personnel in the Air Operations Center. It may filter further upwards through the planning hierarchy so that it supports the President's picture of events, but it isn't understood by individual pilots.

There is not much lateral communication (between different components of the JTF), which is unfortunate, as failure to agree a common situation assessment between different components can cause a lot of problems. The AOC planning meetings will be attended by the Liaison Elements from the other components, but they don't formally report back to their own component commanders. In addition, there is no guarantee that the JFC will agree with a component commander's assessment of the situation; taking Desert Storm as an example, the JFC considered the Republican Guard to be an important center of gravity for the Red forces, whereas the JFLCC did not consider them to be particularly important.

Attributes:

Predecessor : can be concurrent with **Obtain policy and guidance from CinC/JFC**

Successor : Decide on enemy's most likely course of action

Component : None

Duration : 1-3 hours

Doer : JFACC (perhaps in conjunction with the JFC and/or the planning staff, if appointed)

Owner : Chief of plans (or JFACC)

Interval : See **Obtain policy and guidance**. However, the situation assessment always gets enriched over time.

Experience required : Fairly high.

Likelihood of mistake : Medium.

Seriousness of mistake : Very high.

Pre-Condition :

- Policy and guidance, when available;
- availability of the documents named in Resources below;
- Staff with experience relevant to the situation;
- maps

Effect : The output of this activity is a set of informal notes and situation maps. There is a portion in the formal campaign plan document which is intended for recording the situation assessment, but it's unlikely to be written up at this point.

Resource : This activity uses intelligence documents, open source documents (such as the CIA World Fact Book, and maps), results of air surveillance missions, personal experience & training, and CinC's policy and guidance.

Brainstorm possible centres of gravity :

Attributes:

Predecessor : Identify CinC objectives

Successor :

Component :

Doer : Planners

Owner : Chief of Plans ???

Interval : This is typically carried out as soon as the CinC's objectives are understood.

Duration : 1-3 hours

Experience required : No information available

Likelihood of mistake : No information available

Seriousness of mistake : No information available

Pre-Condition : Higher level centers of gravity have been identified in the CinC's objectives

Effect : Generates a list of possible centers of gravity

Resource : CinC objectives, pre-defined hierarchy of centers of gravity (this may be wholly or partially implicit in the planners' experience)

Subdivide the planning problem : The production of the Air Campaign Plan is subdivided to allow the planners to focus on different aspects of the problem. The subdivision will use one or more of the following criteria:

- Chronological phase of the conflict. This is the most popular way of subdividing the planning problem. The first phase almost always has priority, because phase 1 of a plan is used to gain control of the crisis, stabilize the situation and set up for the next phases.
- Classes of air objectives (air superiority, interdiction, reconnaissance, etc.);
- Centers of gravity;
- Logistics/personnel/operations/etc;
- Geographical area.

It would be helpful to use a further subdivision, in which the best case scenario, worst case scenario, and most likely scenario were examined independently. However, this would require breaking down the planning team into smaller groups, which is usually infeasible due to lack of personnel.

The planning team will also establish metrics for evaluation of the effectiveness of a phase; the metrics may include cost, logistics, intelligence reports (from the JFACC's intelligence staff, commonly known as INTEL), and resources.

Attributes:

Predecessor : Identify and prioritize air objectives

Successor : Produce and sequence task objectives

Component : None

Doer : Chief of Plans

Owner : Chief of Plans

Interval : This activity (usually???) takes place after air objectives have been identified and prioritized.

Duration : 5-15 minutes

Experience required : Medium

Likelihood of mistake : Fairly low

Seriousness of mistake : Medium

Pre-Condition : If the problem is subdivided according to air objectives, then air objectives must be defined.

Effect : The effect of this activity is to speed up certain aspects of the planning, or to plan certain aspects more thoroughly.

Resource : Air objectives

4.2 Task Model: Plan Air Campaign

The task model for planning an air campaign is shown in Figure 9.



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

Figure 9: Task Model: Plan Air Campaign

Description of activities:

Identify and prioritize air objectives : Given a list of CinC objectives, and a set of possible centers of gravity, the planners must devise air objectives which, when achieved, will fulfil all of the CinC objectives.

Attributes:

Predecessor : Brainstorm centers of gravity

Successor : Subdivide the planning problem, Brief JFC

Component : Several; see section **??**.

Doer : Planners

Owner : Chief of Plans

Interval : The identification and prioritization of air objectives usually occupies a significant proportion of the first day of the planning cycle.

Duration : 3 hours - 1 day

Experience required : Very high.

Likelihood of mistake : Fairly high

Seriousness of mistake : Medium.

Experience required : Very high. Identifying and prioritizing air objectives is a more difficult activity than doing the same for task objectives; prioritizing targets is the easiest task of the three, though the difference is not great. There isn't much experience available concerning mistakes in these activities.

Pre-Condition : CinC objectives and possible centers of gravity must be available.

Effect : A prioritized list of air objectives is produced. This list is used by the JFACC to brief the JFC; the briefing will also identify the justification for selection and prioritization of the air objectives. This justification should be heavily, or even totally, based on the CinC objectives.

Resource : CinC objectives, hierarchy of centers of gravity

Brief JFC : The JFC is briefed by the JFACC every day; this usually means that the first day's briefing covers the identification and prioritization of air objectives, while the second day's briefing covers the task objectives. The JFACC explains the objectives and the current state of the campaign plan. The JFC is likely to provide feedback, saying that the plan has been prepared incorrectly, or that there are further instructions which the planners need to take into account. These instructions might include extra CinC objectives (e.g. "the President says don't attack within 50 miles of the enemy capital city"), or they may be concerned with interaction with the other forces in the JTF (e.g. "coordinate better with land forces", "deconflict your plan with SOF"). Deconfliction of plans is handled by the Ops group.

Attributes:

Predecessor : Identify air objectives OR Produce task objectives

Successor : None

Component : Several; see section **??**.

Doer : Planners

Owner : Chief of Plans

Interval : Once per day, usually in the afternoon

Duration : 30 minutes - 1 hour; occasionally up to 2 hours

Likelihood of mistake : Fairly low.

Seriousness of mistake : Fairly low; the JFC will correct mistakes

Experience required : Fairly high. This is a complex activity, perhaps surprisingly so. Doug Holmes hinted at the underlying complexity when he stated that this activity required a lot of evaluation "because there's a lot of tradeoffs in what you say and what you do".

Pre-Condition : Some or all of the appropriate objectives have been produced

Effect : Further CinC objectives may be generated, and/or deconfliction requirements may be highlighted.

Resource : CinC objectives, hierarchy of centers of gravity

Produce and sequence task objectives : This activity is similar in principle to the identification and prioritization of air objectives; it requires identifying task objectives to fulfil each air objective, instead of identifying air objectives to fulfil each CinC objective. However, it is typically much less time-consuming than identifying air objectives. This may be because it is a somewhat simpler activity than identifying and prioritizing air objectives.

Attributes:

Predecessor : Subdivide the planning problem,

Successor : Brief JFC, Produce Prioritized Target List

Component : Several; see Figure 18

Doer : Planners

Owner : Chief of Plans

Interval : The identification, prioritization and sequencing of task objectives usually occupies half of the second day of the planning cycle.

Duration : 1-3 hours

Experience required : Fairly high

Likelihood of mistake : Medium

Seriousness of mistake : Fairly high

Pre-Condition : Air objectives and a hierarchy of centers of gravity are available.

Effect : A sequenced list of task objectives is produced. The sequencing is related to the priority of air objectives, except where some air objectives require certain pre-conditions (e.g. disruption of early warning systems). This list is used by the JFACC to brief the JFC; the briefing should also identify the justification for selection and prioritization of the task objectives.

Resource : CinC objectives, hierarchy of centers of gravity

Produce Prioritized Target List : This activity requires selecting targets to fulfil each task objective. It is simpler than the identification and prioritization of air objectives, and probably simpler than identifying task objectives; however, there are so many targets (typically hundreds) that it takes almost as much time as identifying air objectives.

Attributes:

Predecessor : Produce and sequence task objectives

Successor : Issue target list

Component : Several; see Figure **??**

Doer : Planners

Owner : Chief of Plans

Interval : The identification and prioritization of targets usually occupies the remainder of the second day of the planning cycle.

Duration : 3 hours - 1 day

Likelihood of mistake : Fairly high

Seriousness of mistake : Medium

Experience required : Fairly high

Pre-Condition : Task objectives and information about possible targets are available.

Effect : A sequenced list of targets is produced. The sequencing is due both to prioritization **and** to the necessary precedence of certain activities (such as disrupting key radar installations). The distinction between the two reasons for sequencing is not explicitly recorded, but probably should be.

Resource : Task objectives, information about possible targets and associated defenses

Issue target list : At this point, the target list is sent away for initial resource allocation & feasibility checking by the CTEMS package. CTEMS identifies if there are suitable resources available to strike the suggested targets.

If there is a shortage of munitions for carrying out air operations, this will be taken into account in the planning process, with the most limited munitions being allocated to the most important operations. This allocation may be decided by the JFACC, who issues guidance to the planners that certain munitions are reserved for certain operations, or it may be considered by the planners, based on "their experience".

There may be occasions where a target which is identified as worthy of attacking by air could be targeted by Army helicopters or SOF forces with equal or greater efficiency. In such cases, there will first be informal liaison between the AOC planners and the appropriate land forces to determine if it's feasible for the land forces to take on the operation; if so, the JFACC will include a request for these forces in his briefing for the JFC.

Interaction with land forces gives the relevant land forces rights to view the Master Air Attack plan, for the sake of deconfliction of operations.

Attributes:

Predecessor : Identify prioritized target list

Successor : None (as far as Air Campaign Planning is concerned)

Component : None

Doer : Planners

Owner : Chief of Plans

Interval : This happens at the end of the planning cycle

Duration : 5-15 minutes

Experience required : Medium

Likelihood of mistake : Fairly high

Seriousness of mistake : Medium

Pre-Condition : The planners have completed a prioritized target list

Effect : The sequenced list of targets is sent to the Joint Targetting Board, who will discuss it and alter it to produce a Joint Board (???) Integrated Target List. This modified target list is then incorporated into the Master Air Attack Plan (MAAP), which is passed to the Ops group for weaponeering and scheduling.

Resource : Task objectives, information about possible targets and associated defenses

4.3 Task Model: Prepare for Air Campaign Planning: Assets Perspective

The assets perspective for preparing for air campaign planning is shown in Figure 10. It shows the activities identified in the Task Model, along with the resources which are produced, used, modified and consumed by these activities.



Key:

Labelled link	the activity *produces/consumes/uses/modifies* the resource
Diamond	Passive resource
Rectangle	Human Resource
Rounded rectangle	Activity

Figure 10: ACP Assets Perspective: Prepare for ACP planning

Partial description:

Air Objectives Briefing contains:

- An interpretation of the situation assessment;
- A list of identified enemy Centres of Gravity, with justification for that list;
- A list of air objectives, with justification for each. The justification typically takes one of three forms: "it's obvious", "conventional wisdom says to do this", or a specific justification;

- A rationale for the prioritization of air objectives.

In practical terms, the prioritization of air objectives correlates closely with the sequencing (temporal ordering) or air objectives.

Situation Assessment is usually comparatively short in its written form; perhaps a paragraph in a document, or the first 2 slides in a briefing. The format varies between different operational theaters; in some cases, this assessment will be incorporated into the formal air campaign plan.

Campaign Objectives and Military Objectives do not usually appear in a document these days; instead, they appear in the Objectives Viewer of ACPT (the Air Campaign Planning Tool). However, a slot for these objectives appears in formal campaign planning templates, so if ACPT did not exist, a document describing these objectives would be produced.

Projection of current situation : This is typically represented in note form, although it would be advantageous if it were made more formal.

Description of enemy Centers of Gravity : These are defined within ACPT. ACPT makes use of 2 input forms:

1. A hierarchy of Centers of Gravity, such as the one outlined in Appendix C.5;
2. The ACPT Rationale editor, where statements of the following form are made:

   (The plan includes an) *air objective* FOR *centre of gravity* BECAUSE OF *documents* (cut-and-pasted)

Sometimes the ACPT Rationale Editor is not used, since it is considered to be implicit in the ACPT Objectives Editor.

N.B. The analysis of actual objectives outlined in appendix C.1 suggests that an optional constraint on objectives – geographical, temporal or categorical – may also be required.

Prioritized Air Objectives List : A list of the air objectives defined, with associated priorities. Not all formal ACPs include this list, although Doug Holmes said that if he were a JFACC, he'd want this list on a daily basis.

Chosen subdivisions exist in ACPT.

4.4 Task Model: Plan Air Campaign: Assets Perspective

The assets perspective for preparing for air campaign planning is shown in Figure 10. It shows the activities identified in the Task Model, along with the resources which are produced, used, modified and consumed by these activities.



Key:

Labelled link	the activity *produces/consumes/uses/modifies* the resource
Diamond	Passive resource
Ellipse	Computer Resource
Rounded rectangle	Activity

Figure 11: ACP Assets Perspective: Plan Air Campaign

5 Communication Model

The CommonKADS communication model shows where communication takes place, and what the content of that communication is. In this document, the communication model has been represented using a Role-Activity Diagram (RAD) [**?**]. The communication model is shown in Figure 12.

The purpose behind role activity modelling is to look beyond the activities which make up a process to the roles reponsible for carrying out those activities. This form of modelling has two effects. The first effect is in providing support to the individual role actors by being clear about their roles, and in identifying with whom they are required to interact at each stage of the process in order to complete their role. The second effect is in identifying inefficiencies in the process itself.

One indication of inefficiency within a process is the presence of a large number of interactions between roles. In general interactions involve the transfer of information between roles in some way. Verbal transfer involves personal contact between the role actors, and thus in finding convenient times for meetings, telephone conversations etc which can delay the passage of the information between the roles concerned. Transferring information via textual means requires an efficient transfer mechanism and the motivation of the receiving role to act on that information within a reasonable time. Delays within a process are particularly prevalent where more than two roles are involved, or where the role actors are separated geographically.

The following diagrams present a high-level model of some of the roles and activities occurring within the ACP process. The model is uncomplicated. It shows a certain amount of interaction between the JFACC and the Plans and Ops role. However it is thought that this is unlikely to cause a problem within the the ACP process as the role actors are all contained within the Air Operations Centre. Indeed they are usually situated within the same room, and within shouting distance of each other. It is possible that some of the roles indirectly influencing the production of the ACP but outside the scope of this model, such as interaction between the JFC and all his Component Commanders, and interactions between the Component Commanders themselves, may be more likely to be the cause of inefficiencies and bottlenecks. However this type of role interaction will be dependant on the battle situation and the personalities of the Commanders involved.

N.B. The authors apologise for the quality of this figure, which has been scanned from a hard copy due to a problem in saving PostScript files. A better version of this diagram will be available in the week beginning 19 February 1996.

The notation used in order to produce the communication model is given in the accompanying table.[5]

[5]This notation is based on that described in STRIM, a method for business process re-engineering developed by Praxis Systems plc.

STRIM consists of 2 phases:

- the informal fact-gathering phase consisting of role activity diagrams (RADs) for modelling the process, and more traditional entity-relationship-attribute diagrams for modelling the data.
- a formal descriptive phase consisting of a textual language SPML.

The diagrams have been produced using the RADitor software system.



Figure 12: Communication Model

Role Activity Model Notation	
Attribute	Icon and Definition
process	a set of roles, the overall activity that is taking place
role	shown as a shaded block. Primary structuring concept. A role is a a sequence of activities performed by a single person or a department.
activity	The details of how the activity is carried out are unimportant. The activity is performed by the role actor which may be a person or computer or combination of the two. The role may exist whilst the actor changes, and one actor may perform more than one role. A number of types of activity exist:
actions	shown as a square. These are performed by a role in isolation.
interactions	shown as an action in one role box connected by horizontal lines to an action in one or more other role boxes. Interactions indicate that more than one role is involved in carrying out an action. Information may be passed passed between roles during an interaction.
start role	shown as a pentagon, causes another role to be created
external events	generally ignored but if needed shown as an action with a line arrow going into the left hand side.
state	shown as a circle and used to indicate the start or end of a branch in the actions carried out within a single role, or used as a go-to referring back to an earlier activity within the role.
refinements	indicate that some activities are alternatives or can be carried out concurrently. Refinements start and finish with a state and are of two types:
part refinement	shown as two triangles, apex upwards, indicating concurrency
case refinement	shown as two circles and indicating alternatives



Table 1: Notation for Role Activity Diagram

6 Expertise Model

The CommonKADS Expertise Model is divided into three sections:

- diagrams representing domain knowledge (concepts, objects, relationships);
- diagram(s) representing inference knowledge (the types of steps which may be taken to solve a problem, and the types of knowledge which are used by these steps);
- diagram(s) representing task knowledge (control and ordering information regarding these steps).

There are three activities within the Task Model for ACP which can usefully be modelled using the CommonKADS Expertise Model; they are the prioritizing of air objectives, the prioritizing of task objectives, and the prioritizing of targets. It turns out that these three tasks require very similar chains of inference. The task knowledge is displayed in diagrams which use the same format as the CommonKADS Task Model; the inference knowledge uses CommonKADS' standard format for representing inference knowledge, with inference steps which can be mapped directly to activities in the task knowledge; and the domain knowledge uses CommonKADS' standard format to represent a detailed hierarchy of centers of gravity, which are the major source of input to the creation of air objectives, task objectives, and targets.

The inference structures supply information about interactions between activities and resources. There is therefore no need for an explicit Asset perspective to accompany the diagrams in the Expertise Model.

6.1 Prioritizing Air Objectives

6.1.1 Task Knowledge

Description of activities:

Description of activities:

N.B. The attributes of activities are not provided in this shortened document, but can be found in the larger document.

Identify enemy Centers of Gravity : This activity is carried out by each planning team. Their task is to analyze the enemy's military forces, infrastructure, leadership, population and economy to look for limitations and vulnerabilities. The planning staff will use intelligence documents and books for details. The planners then use this analysis to identify key points in enemy territory which, if damaged or destroyed, would seriously disrupt the enemy's intended



Key:

Solid link	the first activity *precedes* the second
Dashed link	there is an *information flow* from the first activity to the second.

Figure 13: Task Structure: Identify and Prioritize Air Objectives

or actual undesirable operations. These key points are known as *Centers of Gravity*. For example, the planners might consider the command and control of enemy troops to be a possible weak point. Some troops are trained to not think on their own so loss of command and control would result in immediate chaos. In this situation, enemy command and control centres would be considered to be centers of gravity.

Identify air objectives : This activity is carried out by each planning team. Their task is to identify objectives for the air forces to achieve. These objectives should be chosen to fulfil all the CinC's objectives. Typical air objectives might be "gain air superiority" or "carry out interdiction operations".

Planners usually take a breadth-first approach to the identification of objectives.

Identify own Centers of Gravity : This is an activity which is currently performed to a lesser level of detail than the identification of enemy CoGs (see appendix C.5), probably because of time restrictions.

Prioritize Air Objectives : This requires decisions about which air objectives are the most important. The key factor in this decision is the priority of the CinC objective(s) which are fulfilled by this air objective. However, a

number of factors make this a complex task: the time delay between missions taking place and the enemy's capabilities being affected; the multiple calls on air power (e.g. requests from the land forces for close air support); and any importance or priority attached to the centers of gravity themselves (e.g. enemy weapons of mass desctruction).

Brief JFACC and **Obtain feedback from JFACC on Air Objectives**: The JFACC is briefed every day, usually at a set time. On the first day of planning, he will be briefed on the chosen list of air objectives, with justifications for prioritization. He will give feedback on his opinion of the air objectives, especially their relevance to the campaign objectives and military objectives; he may also give specific instructions for modifications, based on his knowledge of operations which the Director of Planning is not aware of.

6.1.2 Inference Knowledge

See Figures 14 through to 16.

6.1.3 Domain Knowledge

Domain knowledge for this activity has been acquired by analyzing a list of CinC objectives, air objectives and task objectives which was provided by Checkmate. This list can be found in appendix C.1.

The domain knowledge for identifying and prioritizing air objectives consists of three major concepts:

- Centers of gravity (e.g. **national roadways**);
- Goals for particular centers of gravity (e.g. **Disrupt** or **Destroy** a CoG);
- Constraints limiting the goals, such as time constraints (e.g. Destroy the bridge **before noon tomorrow**) or geographical constraints (e.g. Disrupt all radar sites **within 100km of the capital city**). Other types of constraints include categorical constraints (e.g. differentiating weapons of mass destruction from other weapons).

Centers of gravity: The centers of gravity which were acquired have been structured into a hierarchy, which is sufficiently detailed that it needs to be spread over several diagrams (Figures 32 to 43 in appendix C.5). An example is shown in Figure 17.

The key observations which lead to this hierarchical structuring were:

- Many centers of gravity appear to be decomposable into a lower level of abstraction. For example, **national roadways** can be decomposed into **nodes**,



Figure 14: Inference Structure: Identify and Prioritize Air Objectives (top level)



Figure 15: Inference Structure: Select goal (expansion of *select-3*)



Figure 16: Inference Structure: Calculating priority (expansion of *calculate-5*)



Figure 17: Centers of Gravity related to Transportation
The blank boxes are place-holders in parts of the hierarchy which ought to be expanded in order to produced a fully detailed five-level hierarchy of CoGs.

choke points and **segments**; similarly, **choke points** can be decomposed into **bridges** and **tunnels**.

- In many cases, centers of gravity at the same level of abstraction have a similar decomposition. For example, both **national roadways** and **national railways** are sub-CoGs of **transportation**, so they are at the same level of abstraction; and both of them decompose into **nodes**, **choke points** and **segments**. The reason for the similar decomposition is that both national roadways and national railways are networks. The power of this observation becomes clear when it is applied to other types of network, such as the electrical network; these, too, have nodes (e.g. power stations), choke points (e.g. certain transformers) and segments (e.g. overhead power lines).

From analysis of the objectives, it becomes clear that different levels of abstraction (usually) map to different types of objective. CoGs at the third level of the hierarchy are typically specified within a CinC objective (e.g. "Disrupt flow of military equipment on **national roadways**"); CoGs at the fourth level of the hierarchy are typically specified within air objectives (e.g. "Deny use of key **choke points** on the roads"); and CoGs at the fifth level of the hierarchy are typically specified within task objectives (e.g. "Destroy **bridges** on roads between the capital and the southern border"). Targets should be considered as the sixth level of the hierarchy, although it is not feasible to display them in this document.

The top level decomposition of the hierarchy is based on Col. Warden's "5 rings" [Warden, 1989], which are 5 different categories of center of gravity which should be considered in any analysis of centers of gravity. These 5 categories are:

- Leadership;
- Key production;
- National infrastructure;
- National population;
- Fielded forces.

The second level of decomposition was designed to support adequate categorization of the lower levels.

A key component of the hierarchies which contributes to the goal of identifying all relevant centers of gravity is the identification of *intra-hierarchy links*. These show where a center of gravity in a different hierarchy is relevant to a center of gravity in this hierarchy. The name of the related hierarchy is displayed in the bottom half of the CoG node. For example, Figure 36 on page 85 which shows centers of gravity related to communication, includes "Couriers" as a center of

gravity. Since communication by courier is dependent on a good transportation network, an intra-hierarchy link to "Transportation" is shown as the decomposition of the "Couriers" center of gravity.

Goals: A number of the goals which have been derived from the objectives are shown below. The full table can be found in table 4 on page 96.

Goal	Definition
Leadership	
Disrupt	Temporarily reduce effectiveness
Degrade	Permanently reduce effectiveness
Isolate	Reduce effectiveness to zero until further notice
Destroy	Permanently reduce effectiveness to zero
Key production	
Disrupt	Temporarily reduce production
Attrit	Permanently reduce production
Destroy	Permanently stop production
Infrastructure	
Disrupt	Reduce the flow
Interrupt	Temporarily stop the flow
Deny use	Stop the flow until further notice

Table 2: Goals, ordered by effect

Constraints: Many CinC objectives and Air objectives, and some task objectives, have associated constraints. These constraints may be:

- geographical (e.g. "Destroy SAMs **beyond 100km of the DMZ**");
- temporal (e.g. "Sustain (Blue) forces **for a minimum of 45 days**");
- categorical (e.g. "Deny use of national roadways for the transport of **military equipment**");
- capability (e.g. "Deploy (Blue) forces **capable of deterring YOC aggression**").

A list of most of the identified constraints was prepared[6]. A selection of identified constraints is shown in table 3. The full list can be seen in tables C.10 and 6 on page 99.

[6]Those which were deemed to be linked to high level centers of gravity were eliminated.

Geographical	
US citizens	in the region
US forces	in the region
YOC aggression	against B/G
YOC forces	north of Desired Area
Temporal	
YOC economic centers	to slow the flow of military resources i.e. until the flow of military resources is sufficiently slow
Categorical	
YOC political control YOC military control	YOC armed forces
YOC political control YOC military control electricity petroleum products national television systems national radio systems national computer systems	YOC population
national roadways national railways national waterways	Transport of military equipment
national roadways national railways national waterways	Transport of goods

Table 3: Constraints: CinC Objectives Level

6.2 Prioritizing Task Objectives

6.2.1 Task Knowledge

One of the main discoveries from this modelling exercise has been that the processes involved in producing prioritized air objectives, producing prioritized task objectives and producing a prioritized target list are very similar. The task structure for producing and sequencing task objectives, which is shown in Figure 18, and the task structure for identifying and prioritizing targets (Figure 20), can be seen to be similar to the task structure for identifying and prioritizing air objectives (Figure 13).



Key:

Solid link	the first activity *precedes* the second
Dashed link	there is an *information flow* from the first activity to the second.

Figure 18: Task Structure: Produce and Sequence Task Objectives

Description of activities:

Identify enemy Centers of Gravity for review purposes : Although the air objectives have already been designed to target enemy Centers of Gravity, it's helpful to review the Centers of Gravity at this stage of planning.

Identify task objectives (for each Air Objective) : Identifying task objectives for the air force to achieve consists of choosing task objectives which

provide the maximum fulfilment of the air objectives, based on the air objectives chosen and on identified enemy Centres of Gravity.

For example, if "disrupt command and control" had been specified as an Air Objective, possible task objectives might include:

- attack command posts
- attack lines of communication
- jam radios
- kill men by attacking barracks
- isolate men
- isolate roads
- destroy communication centers

Prioritize task objectives is largely based on the prioritization of corresponding air objectives, although there may be other influences if certain task objectives can fulfil more than one air objective.

Finally review and unify lists of tasks occurs at a meeting, to bring together all the task objectives in a single list and to ensure that all air objectives are addressed by task objectives.

Brief JFACC and **Obtain feedback from JFACC on Task Objectives**: The JFACC's second briefing normally describes both identified task objectives and identified targets, since the identification of task objectives is a relatively quick activity. However, significant feedback may well be produced, enough for the planning staff to require a third day of planning to iteratively refine the lists of objectives and targets to meet the JFACC's requirements.

6.2.2 Inference knowledge

At present, the only information available which resembles inference knowledge for the activity of producing and sequencing task objectives is the "assets perspective" diagram shown in Figure 19

6.2.3 Domain Knowledge

See section 6.1.3.



Key:

Labelled link	the activity *produces/consumes/uses/modifies* the resource
Diamond	Passive resource
Ellipse	Computer Resource
Rounded rectangle	Activity

Figure 19: ACP Assets Perspective: Prioritize Task Objectives



Key:

Solid link	the first activity *precedes* the second
Dashed link	there is an *information flow* from the first activity to the second.

Figure 20: Task Structure: Produce Prioritized Target List

6.3 Prioritizing Targets

6.3.1 Task Knowledge

Identify enemy Centers of Gravity : Although the air objectives have already been designed to target enemy Centers of Gravity, it's helpful to review the Centers of Gravity at this stage of planning. No information has yet been acquired on any special features of Centers of Gravity which are specific to target identification.

Identify targets : Identifying targets consists of choosing targets which provide the maximum fulfilment of the task objectives, based on the task objectives chosen and on identified enemy Centres of Gravity.

Prioritize targets should largely be based on the prioritization of corresponding task objectives. In practice, the planners spend a lot of time discussing the list of targets and moving certain targets up or down the prioritization; this action effectively incorporates the review and unification of the target list.

Analyze feasibility of plan is a computerized process. The format of the output is not yet known.

Brief JFACC and **Obtain feedback from JFACC on Targets**: see description of **Obtain feedback from JFACC on Task Objectives** above.

6.3.2 Inference knowledge

At present, the only information available which resembles inference knowledge for the activity of producing a prioritized target list is the "assets perspective" diagram shown in Figure 21

6.3.3 Domain Knowledge

See section 6.1.3.



Figure 15: Prioritize Targets: Assets Perspective

Key:

Labelled link	the activity *produces/consumes/uses/modifies* the resource
Diamond	Passive resource
Ellipse	Computer Resource
Rounded rectangle	Activity

N.B. The asset database is not connected to any activity because it is not currently used by the planners.

Figure 21: Prioritize Targets: Assets Perspective

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A Knowledge acquisition using repertory grids

A.1 Repertory Grids

The repertory grid technique for knowledge acquisition [?] is derived from the personal construct theory of George Kelly [Hinkle, 1970]. A grid is drawn with each activity forming a separate column in the grid.[7] The rows are labelled with attributes against which each activity can be classified on a 1-5 scale. Four of these attributes were provided from past experience; two more, "Analytic vs Synthetic" and "Evaluation required" were elicited[8] from Doug Holmes, who was the first expert with whom this technique was used. Each expert was then asked to fill in the grid with numbers between 1 and 5, representing their opinion of the values of various attributes. For example, Figure 22 shows that, in Checkmate's opinion, identifying campaign objectives and military objectives takes very little time (1 = Short), but requires considerable experience (4 = Fairly Much). There is much useful information to be gained from this technique, by:

- obtaining and recording a complete set of information for each attribute of each activity;
- comparing grids between different experts to identify consensus and conflict [?];
- statistical analysis of the scores provided (see section A.1.4);
- recording the 'asides' which the expert mentions as he is completing the grid.

A.1.1 Criteria used to fill in the grid

Ideally, each expert should be questioned on the criteria he has used for filling in the repertory grid. However, the grids completed by Checkmate were filled in remotely, so this questioning has not been performed. Doug Holmes filled in his grid interactively (i.e. with the knowledge engineer present and occasionally prompting for information), and his comments about the criteria which he used for assigning values to attributes, gathered from the "aside" comments which he made, are given below:

[7] The repertory grid technique is normally used for acquiring attributes and values of concepts. In this case, the concepts are replaced by activities, in order to ascertain some important information about these activities.

[8] These attributes were elicited using the *triadic elicitation* technique; choosing three domain items at random and asking the expert to specify any attribute on which one of the three items differs from the other two.

	Plan Air Campaign	Obtain policy and guidance from CinC/JFC	Organize planning staff	Assess Situation	Identify campaign objectives and military objectives	Subdivide the planning problem	Decide on enemys most likely course of action	Review enemy course of action	Communicate plan to subordinate	Brief CJTF	Produce prioritized air objectives	Produce prioritized task objectives	Produce prioritized target list
1 = Little 5 = Much	Experience required	3	4	4	4	3	4	4	3	4	5	4	4
1 = Trivial 5 = Very serious	Seriousness of mistake	4	3	5	5	3	5	4	4	4	4	4	4
1 = Rare 5 = Frequent	Likelihood of mistake	3	2	3	3	2	3	2	3	2	3	3	3
1 = Short 5 = Long	Time required	2	2	4	4	2	4	3	2	2	4	4	3
1 = Analytic 5 = Synthetic	Analytic vs Synthetic	4	4	3	3	3	2	3	4	3	3	3	2
1 = Little 5 = Much	Evaluation required	4	2	4	5	2	4	3	2	3	4	4	4

Figure 22: Attributes of ACP Activities(Task Model level): Checkmate (amalgamated)

Experience required : The criterion which Doug was using here was the rank of the officer who normally carried out the activity; 3 indicated an activity which was normally assigned to a major, 4 an activity normally assigned to a lieutenant-colonel, and 5 an activity which normally required a colonel to perform it.

Seriousness of mistake : Doug's criterion here was the length of time for which a mistake could go uncorrected in the planning process. For example, an incorrect decision on the enemy's most likely course of action could go uncorrected until the end of the war (thus meriting a high score), while a mistake in obtaining policy and guidance from CinC/JFC will always be corrected at the first briefing.

Likelihood of mistake : No comments made.

Time required : Doug stated that he was considering activities within a 3-day time frame (the length of an average planning cycle), so a small number indicated an activity taking a few minutes, whereas a large number indicated an activity taking hours or even a whole day.

Analytic vs Synthetic : No comments made.

Evaluation required : No comments made.

A.1.2 Results

Repertory grids were eventually obtained from five experts; Doug Holmes, Joe Roberts (a former member of Checkmate) and three current members of Check-

mate staff[9]. The full set of grids can be seen in section A.1.5. Doug and Joe held the opinion that the Checkmate staff would be able to provide more accurate values for the repertory grid than they could, so the final analysis was done on a repertory grid which amalgamated the scores of the three Checkmate staff (see figure 22). The Checkmate staff largely agreed with each other on most of the attributes; where they did not agree, they were asked to provide explanations. These explanations often related to underlying assumptions; some of these explanations have been incorporated into the descriptions of activities given below, and a few values have been weighted according to the explanations given. The main area of disagreement was on the **Analytic vs Synthetic** attribute; it was felt that the knowledge engineer had given the Checkmate staff insufficient explanation on the meaning of this attribute, and so it was excluded from further analysis.

The results of the repertory grid technique were subjected to statistical analysis (see Figure **??**). This analysis showed a strong correlation between the scores provided for **Experience required** and the scores provided for **Seriousness of mistake**; there was also a strong correlation between the scores provided for **Time required** and the scores provided for **Evaluation required**. The former correlation suggests an underlying philosophy, that it is more important to avoid serious mistakes than to minimize the total number of mistakes; the latter correlation is to be expected, since evaluation takes time. It is usually superfluous to include two strongly correlated attributes in the task model; **Evaluation required** has therefore been eliminated from the task model. However, both **Seriousness of mistake** and **Experience required** have been retained in the task model. This is done because the experts made a number of aside comments about the seriousness of mistakes which can be displayed with this attribute; while the level of experience required is an easy statistic to acquire and verify. It is easy because different levels of experience required correlate with the rank of the officer required to perform an activity, and the correlation can be checked easily using the heuristic used by Doug Holmes (see section A.1.1).

A.1.3 Repertory grids: expertise model level

The repertory grid technique was also applied to the activities which appear in figures 13, 18 and 20, in order to see if useful information could be obtained from this technique. Little analysis has been completed on these repertory grids so far.

[9]Checkmate is a group of expert air planners at the Air Force Headquarters in the Pentagon, who may play a role in a JTF by augmenting the JFACC planning group or by working separately from the JFACC planning group. Checkmate was originally a war gaming center for evaluation of plans with a focus on high level strategy; for example, Checkmate modeled WWIII in Europe so that logistics, purchasing and training could be planned in the event that a crisis occured. However, the senior Air Force officers often use Checkmate to supplement their planning staff. As a result, Checkmate personnel have real world planning experience even though it is not in the group's original charter.

An example of an "expertise model" level repertory grid – the one acquired from Doug Holmes – is shown in Figure 23.

Prioritizing air objectives, tasks, targets	Identify enemy CoGs (in each sub-area)	Identify Air Objectives (for each sub-area)	Prioritize Air Objectives	Finally review and unify lists of air objectives	Brief JFACC on air objectives	Identify enemy CoGs (for each air objective ???)	Identify Task Objectives	Prioritize Task Objectives	Finally review and unify lists of Task Objectives	Brief JFACC on Task Objectives	Identify enemy CoGs (in a way which is specific to target	Identify targets	Prioritize targets	Analyze feasibility of plan	Brief JFACC on Air Campaign Plan	Review targets
1 = Little 5 = Much																
Experience required	5	4	4	5	5	3	3	3	5	4	3	3	3	5	5	5
1 = Trivial 5 = Very serious																
Seriousness of mistake	4	4	3	4	4	3	3	3	4	3	3	2	3	4	4	2
1 = Rare 5 = Frequent																
Likelihood of mistake	3	3	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	3	2	2	3
1 = Short 5 = Long																
Time required	5	3	2	1	4	3	2	2	2	3	3	4	4	2	4	3
1 = Analytic 5 = Synthetic																
Analytic vs Synthetic	2	4	1	4	3	2	4	1	4	3	2	4	1	1	4	4
1 = Little 5 = Much																
Evaluation required	2	3	5	4	1	2	3	5	4	1	2	1	5	5	2	3

Figure 23: Attributes of ACP Activities(Task Model level): Doug Holmes

A.1.4 Statistical analysis of repertory grids

Once the grid has been completed, it's possible to perform statistical clustering on the value supplied, to see if there is any implicit categorization of the activities reflected in the scores provided for each activity. Figures **??** and **??** show the results of performing statistical cluster analysis on the scores in the grid shown in Figure 22; Figures 24 and **??** show the results of cluster analysis on the grid shown in 23. This gives some idea of the (subjective) similarity of activities on the attributes identified in the grid. The result of cluster analysis is a "taxonomic" hierarchy, in which the "classes" are actually nodes identifying the percentage of similarity between activities, or groups of activities. For example, in Figure 24, the identification of enemy Centres of Gravity is carried out 3 times (when prioritizing Air Objectives, Task Objectives and Targets); the latter two are scored identically (100% similarity) whereas the prioritization of Air Objectives only merits 79% similarity with these two.

It is often instructive to ask the expert why certain activities are considered similar or different. In the example above, Doug suggested that this phenomenon was due to the fact that it's harder to identify Centres of Gravity at the first attempt; once the task has been done once, at a high level, it is less difficult at lower levels of detail. In another example, Doug was asked why "Identify Targets" was so different from the other activities (see Figure 24). By looking at the scores in the grid, it can be seen that "Identify Targets" is the only activity which requires a lot of time but does not require much evaluation or experience. This observation led the knowledge engineer to suggest that "Identify Targets" might be a suitable activity for automation using conventional (i.e. not knowledge-based) computing; Doug replied that such a task was already being undertaken.



Figure 24: Cluster Analysis of Activities: Prioritization of Objectives and Targets (Doug Holmes)

A.1.5 Full set of acquired repertory grids

To be filled in

B The IDEF3 modelling technique

The following collection of IDEF3 diagrams represent the Air Campaign Planning process as elicited from a number of experts. The notation and benefits of this method are discussed in a previous paper (see [Lydiard, 1995]).

Five processes are shown at the highest level. Each of these is decomposed into subprocesses which are related to their parent by the numbering system. This consists of a prefix formed from the parent UOB reference number, the number of the decomposition and a unique reference number.

Concurrency between subprocesses within a single decomposition is illustrated using asynchronous & junctions. The fan-out junction indicates that both subprocesses must start, and the fan-in junction indicates that both of those subprocesses must complete before the next subprocess can initiate.

The decomposition of UoB 3 "plan the air campaign" refers to various briefings. These are shown as synchronous referents which indicate that the referent process (the briefing) must initiate and complete before the focus process is considered to

be complete.

Finally the decomposition of UoB 5 “evaluate air campaign” uses exclusive OR junctions showing that if new policy and guidance has been received either the air campaign will cease or the air objectives will need to be reviewed as indicated by the unconditional Go-To referent, which loops the process back to 3.1.16 “identify and prioritise air objectives”. When there is no new policy and guidance the task objectives will need to be reviewed, as indicated by the unconditional Go-To referent, which loops the process back to UoB 3.1.17 “identify and prioritize task objectives”.



Figure 25: Key to IDEF3 diagrams



Figure 26: Air Campaign Planning: Top Level Processes



Figure 27: Preparing for an Air Campaign

C Domain knowledge for Air Campaign Planning

C.1 List of objectives

This list of objectives has been derived from a document supplied by Checkmate in November 1995, giving objectives which have been defined in planning for actual military exercises.

This document describes these objectives using the following template:

ACHIEVE GOAL on `Center of Gravity` with optional constraint.

Some objectives are rephrased to enable them to fit this template. The goal and the Center of Gravity are highlighted by using SMALL CAPITALS and `teletype font` respectively.

The code numbers at the beginning of each objective show which higher level objectives are addressed by the lower level objectives; for example, air objective B5.1 fulfils CinC objective B5.

C.2 CinC objectives

C.2.1 Leadership

A1: ISOLATE and NEUTRALIZE `YOC political control` of armed forces

A2: ISOLATE and NEUTRALIZE `YOC political leadership` from the population



Figure 28: Preparing for Air Campaign Planning



Figure 29: Planning an Air Campaign

A3: *Ensure regional stability by reducing Yellowland Orangeland Cooperative (YOC).* This is a national or political objective which should really be considered at a higher level of command than the other CinC objectives. However, it has been rephrased to:

REDUCE `Yellowland Orangeland Cooperative (YOC)` to ensure regional stability

A4: *Provide for Stability of the Region.* This too is a national or political objective; it is too loosely defined for rephrasing to be possible.

A5: PROTECT the lives of `US citizens` and `forces` in the region. This is probably better categorized as a National Population objective.

A6: ISOLATE and NEUTRALIZE `YOC military control` of armed forces



Figure 30: Executing an Air Campaign Plan



Figure 31: Evaluating an Air Campaign

A7: *Isolate and neutralize YOC military's effect on population.* For consistency with objective A6, this has been rephrased to:

ISOLATE and NEUTRALIZE `YOC military control` on population

C.2.2 Key Production

B1: *Separate YOC military structure from primary electrical sources.* In order to match objective B2, this has been rephrased to:

DENY USE of `electricity` to YOC military structure.

B2: *Deny use of primary electrical sources to YOC population.* Rephrased[10] to:

DENY USE of `electricity` to YOC population

B3: NEUTRALIZE `YOC petroleum production` supporting warfighting effort

[10]The term "electrical production", which appears in the Air Objectives (e.g. B2.1), is more general than "primary electrical sources". However, "electricity" is a more general term still, which is at the same level as "petroleum products".

B4: DENY USE of `petroleum products` to YOC population

B5: NEUTRALIZE `production of chemical products`

B6: *Prevent chemical products from becoming weapons of mass destruction.* This has been rephrased to:

DENY USE of `chemical products` for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction.

B7: NEUTRALIZE `YOC special weapons capability` and `delivery means`

B8: *Defend against Weapons of Mass Destruction.* The current phrasing of this objective is identical to objective E7; it has therefore been removed from this section. Air objectives B8.1, B8.2 and B8.3 are renumbered to E7.1, E7.2 and E7.3.

C.2.3 National Infrastructure

C1: DENY USE of `national roadways` for transport of military equipment

C2: DENY USE of `national railways` for transport of military equipment

C3: DENY USE of `national waterways` for transport of military equipment

C4: DENY USE of `national communications nets` to transport military information

C5: INTERRUPT the flow of goods on `national roadways`

C6: INTERRUPT the flow of goods on `national railways`

C7: INTERRUPT the flow of goods on `national waterways`

C8: INTERRUPT the flow of information on `national communication networks`

C9: *Build sufficient combat power for future offensive operations.* This has been rephrased to:

OBTAIN sufficent `Blue Forces` for future offensive operations.

C10: *Ensure Freedom of Navigation.* This has been rephrased to:

PERMIT SAFE ACCESS to `national waterways` for Blue shipping.

C11: SUSTAIN `(Blue) Forces` for Minimum of 45 Days

C.2.4 National Population

D1: DENY USE of `national television systems` to transmit military information

D2: DENY USE of `national radio systems` to transmit military information

D3: DENY USE of `national computer systems` to transmit military information

D4: DENY USE of `national television systems` to influence YOC population

D5: DENY USE of `national radio systems` to influence YOC population

D6: DENY USE of `national computer systems` to influence YOC population

D7: CONDUCT NEO of `US personnel` and `other volunteer Foreign Nationals`

D8: NEUTRALIZE `YOC economic centers` to slow the flow of military resources

D9: *Deny access to YOC economic centers.* This has been rephrased to:

DENY USE of *national transportation networks* leading to YOC economic centers.

In this form, it can be seen that this is an infrastructure objective rather than a national population objective.

D10: *Employ C2W methodologies.*

USE C2W methodologies to influence `YOC population`.

This is a high level objective; in order to match the level of detail of the other objectives, individual C2W methods should be specified.

C.2.5 Fielded Forces

E1: DETER `YOC aggression` against B/G

E2: DETER `Yellowland aggression`

E3: *Conduct Land, Sea and Air operations to restore the sovereignty of B/G.* Like A3, this is a national or political objective which should really be considered at a higher level of command than the other CinC objectives. However, it has been rephrased to:

RESTORE THE SOVEREIGNTY of `B/G` by fielding military forces.

E4: STOP `YOC forces` north of Desired Area

E5: DEFEND `B/G` from YOC Attack

E6: DEFEND `Greyland` from YOC Attack

E7: *Defend Against Weapons of Mass Destruction.* Rephrased to:
DEFEND `Blue forces` Against Weapons of Mass Destruction

E8: DISRUPT `YOC Special Forces Capability`

C.3 Air Objectives

C.3.1 Leadership

A1.1: DISRUPT `YOC political control` of armed forces

A1.2: DESTROY `YOC political control` of armed forces

A1.3: DISRUPT and DEGRADE `YOC intelligence capability`

A1.4: ISOLATE `YOC National Command Authority`

A2.1: DISRUPT `YOC political control` of population

A2.5: DESTROY `YOC political control` of population

A6.1: DISRUPT `YOC military control` of armed forces

A6.2: DESTROY `YOC military control` of armed forces

A6.3: DISRUPT and DEGRADE `YOC intelligence capability`

A7.1: DISRUPT `YOC military control` of population

A7.2: DESTROY `YOC military control` of population

C.3.2 Key Production

B1.1: DISRUPT `key electrical facilities` providing power to YOC military

forces B1.2: DESTROY `electrical facilities` providing power to YOC military forces

B2.1: DISRUPT `electrical production` to YOC

B2.2: DESTROY `electrical production` to YOC

B3.1: DISRUPT `petroleum production` providing fuel to YOC military forces

B3.2: DESTROY `petroleum production` providing fuel to YOC military forces

B4.1: DISRUPT `petroleum production` throughout YOC

B4.2: DESTROY `petroleum production` throughout YOC

B5.1: DISRUPT `chemical production` facilities

B5.2: DESTROY `chemical production` facilities

B7.1: DESTROY strategic targets (`pol-mil C2` and `NBC/TBM capability`)

C.3.3 National Infrastructure

C1.1: DRIVE YOC into `desired chokepoints` and `restricted LOCs`

C1.2: DISRUPT MOVEMENT of `YOC forward corps` and `committed 2nd echelon forces`

C2.1: DRIVE YOC into `desired chokepoints` and `restricted LOCs`

C2.2: DISRUPT MOVEMENT of `YOC forward corps` and `committed 2nd echelon forces`

C3.1: DRIVE YOC into `desired chokepoints` and `restricted LOCs`

C3.2: DISRUPT MOVEMENT of `YOC forward corps` and `committed 2nd echelon forces`

C3.3: *Attack critical naval targets.* Given that this supports CinC objective C3 (Deny use of national waterways for transport of military equipment), this has been rephrased to:

ATTACK `naval transport ships` which are capable of transporting military equipment on national waterways.

C4.1: DISRUPT `command and control` of YOC Air/Land/Sea forces.

C4.2: DISRUPT and DEGRADE `YOC intelligence capability`

C8.1: DISRUPT `command and control` of YOC Air/Land/Sea forces

C8.2: DISRUPT and DEGRADE `YOC intelligence capability`

C9.1: DEPLOY `(Blue) forces` capable of deterring YOC aggression

C9.2: DEPLOY `(Blue) forces` capable of supporting NEO

C.3.4 Fielded Forces

E4: *Disrupt YOC Ground Scheme of Maneuver.* Rephrased to: DISRUPT Ground Scheme of Maneuver of `YOC mechanized land forces`

E7.1: DESTROY strategic targets (`pol-mil C2` and `NBC/TBM capability`)

E7.2: DISRUPT `YOC Weapons of Mass Destruction capability`

E7.3: DESTROY `YOC Weapons of Mass Destruction capability`

C.4 Task Objectives

These had not been sorted by Checkmate at the time of writing. Categorization has been performed by the author of this document. Where a task objective falls into one category but services an air objective in another category, it is categorized under the former. For example, *Destroy known NBC logistics support* is categorized under **National Infrastructure**, even though it supports the air objective *Disrupt YOC Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability*, which is categorized under **Key Production**.

C.4.1 Leadership

YOC forces :

DESTROY `key national headquarters`
DISRUPT `YOC reconnaissance/surveillance capabilities`
DISABLE known `NBC C3 capability`
DISRUPT `C3I` to frontline offensive units
DISRUPT enemy `control of air operations` and `(control of) air defenses`
DESTROY `key command centers`
DESTROY `air defense C3I`
DISRUPT `key command and control nodes`
DISRUPT `TBM C2`
NEUTRALIZE `airborne C3 capability`
DISRUPT `key C3` nodes
DESTROY `key YOC LADS C2 facilities`
DESTROY `command centers` & `comm nodes` to disrupt YOC political and military direction of armed forces
DESTROY `army, corps, and division HQs` or ISOLATE `them` from subordinate units
Sever LOCs in support of GCC ground scheme of maneuver. Rephrased to: SEVER local `command centers` in support of GCC ground scheme of maneuver. Rephrased to:

DESTROY coastal surface surveillance radar C2
DESTROY key YOC LADS C2 facilities
DISRUPT naval C3I
DISRUPT Political Leadership of YOC Forces
DESTROY Command and Control Facilities in the forward area
DESTROY key YOC LOC's supporting forward troops
RENDER INEFFECTIVE C2 from YOC leadership to ballistic missiles

Blue forces :
PROVIDE battle management/C3I capability
PROVIDE surveillance and reconnaissance of region
DESTROY YOC intelligence collection/dissemination capability
EXPLOIT CUWTF intel and targeting when tasked by the B/G C3

C.4.2 Key Production

DESTROY known NBC research facilities
DESTROY known NBC production facilities
ATTRIT military production capability
DISRUPT electrical power supply to LADS and pol-mil C3I
DISRUPT/DESTROY military vehicles, armor, and artillery assembly & repair facilities
DISRUPT/DESTROY remaining POL production and storage
DISRUPT/DESTROY remaining munitions and propellant production and storage
DISRUPT NBC production and storage capability
DISRUPT nuclear reactor & fuel/ore processing
DESTROY YOC mining capability
DISRUPT YOC Electrical Power Distribution
DESTROY Naval Production Capability

C.4.3 National Infrastructure

DISRUPT YOC naval port operations
DESTROY logistics/maintenance/supply areas
DISRUPT SATCOM capability
DESTROY known NBC logistics support
DESTROY known NBC stockpiles and storage facilities
DISRUPT electrical power grid
DESTROY key naval communications nodes and EW/GCI
DESTROY railroad transportation terminals and facilities
DESTROY key bridges & tunnels

DISRUPT operations along LOCS/chokepoints
DESTROY POL storage/distribution facilities

C.4.4 National Population

None given.

C.4.5 Fielded Forces

YOC forces ATTRIT follow on forces
ATTRIT front line forces
ATTRIT enemy fighter/bomber force
DESTROY key SAM sites
DESTROY SAM sites threatening air operations throughout YOC
DISRUPT maneuver and momentum of committed forces with CAS
NEUTRALIZE YOC 240/170mm artillery
DESTROY remaining mech & armor assets of 2nd echelon forces and strategic reserves
DISRUPT YOC SAM/AAA sites along coastal corridors
DESTROY Silkworm missile/sites and storage
DISRUPT/DESTROY SAM/AAA/GCI affecting insertion corridors and drop zones
RENDER INEFFECTIVE YOC target acquisition systems
DESTROY landmines
DESTROY key EW/GCI sites supporting YOC defense assets
Destroy coastal surface surveillance radar sites and C2. Divided into two: DESTROY coastal surface surveillance radar sites is categorized here; destroying the radar's C2 is categorized under Leadership
Neutralize YOC capability to utilize its aircraft and airfields. This is a higher level objective, since "capability to utilize" might encompass fuel, pilots, repair facilities, etc.
DESTROY major YOC surface and sub-surface combatants and SOF insertion platforms
DISRUPT YOC Ground Forces With CAS
DESTROY Tactical SAMs in YOC
DESTROY Strategic SAMs in YOC
DESTROY EW/GCI radars within 100 Km of the border
DISRUPT YOC Fighter/Bomber Operations
DESTROY Coastal Surveillance/Fire Control Radars
DESTROY YOC SAM/AAA sites
DESTROY Silkworm missiles/sites and storage
DESTROY key EW/GCI sites supporting YOC defense assets
DISRUPT YOC fighter capability

DISRUPT/DESTROY SAMs on border, AAA near drop zones, and EW/GCI threatening CUWTF insertions

DISRUPT YOC SAM/AAA sites along coastal corridors

DISRUPT YOC bomber capability

DISRUPT maneuver and momentum of committed forces with CAS

Disrupt movement & maneuver into M-K corridor. Rephrased to: DISRUPT movement & maneuver of forces into M-K corridor

ATTRIT forces in Wonchor corridor

DISRUPT/DESTROY 240mm/170mm artillery beyond the FSCL

DISRUPT 240mm/170mm artillery inside the FSCL

DISRUPT mechanized and armored formations between FLOT and FSCL

DESTROY YOC SOF infiltration aircraft

DESTROY major YOC surface and sub-surface combatants and SOF insertion platforms

DESTROY SAMs beyond 100km of the DMZ

Assist in holding defense north of capital city by DESTROYING YOC non-hardened artillery and vehicles

ATTRIT Naval Bases and their Employment Capability

DESTROY enemy OCA assets

YOC supply, storage & repair facilities DESTROY TBM launchers, storage, and support

DISRUPT TBM shipment/transshipment

DISRUPT resupply of naval POL, munitions, & spares

DESTROY ammo storage

DESTROY naval ship repair & resupply facilities

Disrupt naval surface craft bases, support facilities, and naval C3I. This objective has been divided into 3 objectives: DISRUPT naval surface craft bases and DISRUPT support facilities are categorized under **Fielded forces**, while disrupting naval C3I is categorized under **Leadership**.

DISRUPT marshalling areas and sustainment capability beyond the FSCL

DISRUPT marshalling areas, supply, and corps C2 beyond FSCL

Blue forces *Employ passive defensive measures.* Rephrased to: ASSIGN and PROVIDE military equipment which is capable of passive defense.

PROVIDE ground/naval point defense for protection of Blue COGs from air & TBM attacks

CONDUCT CAS in support of the Rear Area Security Forces

Support B/G ground scheme of maneuver and deception plan through AI. Rephrased to: PROVIDE AI to support B/G ground scheme of maneuver and deception plan.

High level objectives The following were listed as task objectives, but are more appropriately categorized as either CinC objectives or Air Objectives.

Disrupt YOC ability to employ weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This is almost identical to Air Objective B8.2, and it belongs at the Air Objectives level.

DISRUPT Employment of `Weapons of Mass Destruction` by YOC Forces

DISRUPT `military activity` in the area of the planned NEO

DESTROY `command centers and comm nodes` to disrupt YOC political direction of armed forces

Unclassified DESTROY `RADRELs` – unknown abbreviation

EMPLOY `SIGINT collection assets` – unknown abbreviation

EMPLOY `HVAA assets`/Provide adequate HVAA protection – unknown abbreviation

C.5 Centers of Gravity

The centers of gravity which have been elicited from the sets of objectives have been categorized into hierarchies. These hierarchies are shown below. The aim of producing these hierarchies is to permit a near-exhaustive approach to identification of centers of gravity. By working from the top of a hierarchy downwards, planners can easily identify if they have considered all relevant categories of centers of gravity.

The 5 top level centers of gravity in these hierarchies are `Leadership`, `Key Production`, `National Infrastructure`, `National Population` and `Fielded Forces`. These correspond to Col. Warden's "5 rings" approach to identification of centers of gravity. The approach which has been taken to developing these hierarchies is top-down extrapolation; that is, if there are several centers of gravity at the same level of a hierarchy, and one of them is decomposed in a certain way, then the others are assumed to be decomposable in the same way. An example of this can be found in Figure 35, which shows centers of gravity connected with transportation. Since road, rail, inland waterways, coastal shipping and civil air transport are all transportation *networks*, then the hierarchy assumes that the key centers of gravity for all these types of transportation can be categorized as *nodes*, *choke points* or *segments*.

A key component of the hierarchies which contributes to the goal of identifying all relevant centers of gravity is the identification of *intra-hierarchy links*. These show where a center of gravity in a different part of the hierarchy is relevant to the current center of gravity. The name of the related hierarchy is displayed in the bottom half of the CoG node. For example, one form of communication is by newspapers and printed media; the distribution of these requires transportation. A planner examining the **segments** of the newspaper communication network would therefore be directed to look at the centers of gravity for the appropriate type(s) of **transportation**.

Following these intra-hierarchy links may lead to the identification of unexpectedly relevant centers of gravity. To take an example based on real life, a planner who was attempting to prevent a large army of tanks from invading would examine the hierarchy for **Fielded Forces**, and would discover "Logistics" as a center of gravity. In this category, he would be invited to consider **Ammunition**, **Fuel**, **Spare Parts** and **General Munitions**. On examining Fuel, he might decide that fuel **storage** is a potential center of gravity; but not only is it difficult to attack, it is also an inadequate supply for a large army of tanks. This inadequacy suggests that the other possible source of fuel – a supply line – should be considered.[11] Here an intra-hierarchy link applies; the fuel is either supplied by transport vehicles (in which case a link must be made to **National Infrastructure: Transportation**) or, as in this case, it is supplied by pipeline, in which case the appropriate starting point is **National Infrastructure: Fuel**. Since fuel pipelines form a network, then **nodes**, **choke points** and **segments** must be considered. The segments in a fuel network are pipelines; it turns out that there are only 5 pipelines used for pumping fuel to these storage areas, which makes the pipelines a possible center of gravity. However, fuel pipelines are hard to attack and easy to repair. The nodes in the network are the input fuel plants and the storage areas, which are either too heavily defended or too far away to consider. The consideration of choke points, however, leads to the identification of three (undefended) pumping stations at a point where the gauges of the fuel pipes change, thus ensuring that all fuel is routed through these three stations.

Observations

1. The centers of gravity which are identified in the different types of objectives correlate fairly closely with the different levels of the hierarchies. Most of the centers of gravity identified in the CinC objectives appear in the third level of the hierarchy (e.g. `national roadways`; most centers of gravity identified in the air objectives appear in the fourth level of the hierarchy (e.g `choke points`); and most centers of gravity identified in the task objectives appear in the fifth level of the hierarchy (e.g. `bridges`).

2. While the planners do identify Blue Centers of Gravity as well as hostile and adjoining Centers of Gravity, there is evidence that Blue Centers of Gravity are not considered in the same level of detail. The centers of gravity identified for Blue in the CinC objectives (e.g. "sustain `forces` for a minimum of 45 days") and in the air objectives (e.g. "deploy `forces`") belong to the first or second levels of the hierarchies of centers of gravity. In addition, the

[11] In fact, there are two other possible sources of fuel; direct acess to a fuel production plant, and siphoning it from other vehicles. The former is unlikely to avoid notice, and the latter is infeasible for a large army, even if they were not using specialized fuel.

goals applied to these centers of gravity imply a higher level of abstraction; for example, sustaining a force implies supplying all the needs of that force, which implicitly requires a complete infrastructure to be established for that force (bringing in fuel, taking out casualties, etc). `Infrastructure` is one of Col. Warden's "5 rings", and can therefore be found at the top level of the hierarchy of centers of gravity. Similarly, deploying a force requires considerable attention to be paid to the transportation requirements of that force[12] including but not limited to military air transport; `transportation` is a 2nd level center of gravity.

It would seem sensible (if time is available) for the planners to analyse Blue centers of gravity to the same level of detail as hostile and adjoining centres of gravity (if possible), to the level of identifying likely targets for any hostile and adjoining planners who might be conducting a similar exercise.

[12] This assumes that deploying a force refers to the movement of a force into the battleground, as opposed to allocating new units to the theatre.



Figure 32: CoGS: Leadership



Figure 33: CoGS: Key Production 1: General



Figure 34: CoGS: Key Production 2: Military



Figure 35: CoGS: National Infrastructure 1: Transportation



Figure 36: CoGS: National Infrastructure 2: Communications



Figure 37: CoGS: National Infrastructure 3: Fuel & Power



Figure 38: CoGS: National Population



Figure 39: CoGS: Fielded Forces 1: Special Weapons



Figure 40: CoGS: Fielded Forces 2: Land forces



Figure 41: CoGS: Fielded Forces 3: Naval forces



Figure 42: CoGS: Fielded Forces 4: Air forces



Figure 43: CoGS: Fielded Forces 5: Logistics

C.6 Goals

Observations

1. The goals imply different levels of effect against centers of gravity. For example, DENY USE appears to be a stronger effect than DISRUPT. A table has been prepared which shows suggested orderings of goals, from the least effect at the top to the greatest effect at the bottom (table 4, page 96).

2. The planners identify Blue (friendly) centers of gravity as well as hostile and adjoining centers of gravity. This can be seen from the use of goals such as PERMIT and SUSTAIN as well as DENY USE and DISRUPT. It seems likely that, for every goal which can be performed against enemy centers of gravity, there is an equal and opposite goal to support Blue centers of gravity; for example, the opposite of "Attrit" is "Build up". The planners rarely consider such goals at the moment, but a list of positive goals, if provided, could have two effects:

   - it could provide the planners with alternatives to maintaining the status quo by preventing disruption/destruction of Blue centers of gravity;
   - it could also serve to raise awareness of the need to protect Blue centers of gravity.

C.7 Goals identified

The goals identified are as follows:

- CinC Objectives
  - Leadership
    - Isolate;
    - Neutralize;
    - Protect
  - Key Production
    - Deny use;
    - Neutralize
  - National Infrastructure
    - Deny use;
    - Interrupt;
    - Obtain;
    - Permit use;

        * Sustain
    - National Population
        * Deny use;
        * Conduct NEO;
        * Neutralize;
        * Use
    - Fielded forces
        * Deter;
        * Defend;
        * Disrupt;
        * Stop

- Air Objectives
    - Leadership
        * Isolate;
        * Disrupt;
        * Degrade;
        * Destroy
    - Key production:
        * Disrupt;
        * Destroy
    - National Infrastructure
        * Drive (i.e. compel to move);
        * Disrupt;
        * Attack;
        * Deploy.
    - National Population
        * *Disrupt*[13]
    - Fielded forces
        * Disrupt;
        * Destroy

[13]No air objectives are specified for national population. This goal is specified because NEUTRALIZE appears in the CinC objectives, and so an analogy can be drawn with the Leadership and Key Production objectives.

- Task Objectives
  - Leadership
    - Sever;
    - Disrupt;
    - Disable;
    - Neutralize;
    - Render ineffective;
    - Destroy;
    - Exploit;
    - Provide.
  - Key production:
    - Disrupt;
    - Attrit;
    - Destroy
  - National Infrastructure
    - Disrupt;
    - Destroy
  - National Population No task objectives specified.
  - Fielded forces
    - Disrupt;
    - Attrit;
    - Neutralize;
    - Destroy;
    - Provide;
    - Conduct CAS.

C.8 Ordering and definitions of goals

Table 4 lists identified goals in a suggested order, from the least effect to the greatest. Definitions of each goals are also suggested in order to support the ordering.

C.9 Goals and suggested opposite goals

Table 5 lists goals, and suggests opposite goals. Note that these opposite goals are intended to be the positive antithesis of each destructive goal, as opposed to simply maintaining the status quo by preventing the destructive goals from being achieved.

Goal	Definition
Leadership	
Disrupt	Temporarily reduce effectiveness
Degrade	Permanently reduce effectiveness
Isolate/Sever	Reduce effectiveness to zero until further notice
Neutralize/Disable/ Render ineffective	Reduce effectiveness to zero until further notice
Destroy	Permanently reduce effectiveness to zero
Key production	
Disrupt	Temporarily reduce production
Attrit	Permanently reduce production
Destroy	Permanently stop production
Infrastructure	
Disrupt	Reduce the flow
Destroy	Permanently stop the flow
National Population	
Disrupt	Temporarily reduce effectiveness
Fielded forces: location	
Deter	Make it dangerous (politically or militarily) for YOC forces to advance or attack
Defend	Reduce the effectiveness of YOC forces when attacking
Drive	Compel YOC forces to travel on certain routes
Stop	Prevent YOC forces from advancing
Expel	Compel YOC forces to retreat
Fielded forces: capability	
Disrupt	Temporarily reduce military capability of YOC force
Attrit	Permanently reduce military capability of YOC force
Neutralize	Temporarily reduce YOC force's military capability to zero
Destroy	Permanently reduce YOC force's military capability to zero

Table 4: Goals, ordered by effect

Goal	Opposite
Leadership	
Disrupt	Put into order
Degrade	Improve
Isolate	Connect
Neutralize	Restart
Destroy	Create
Key production	
Disrupt	Put into order
Destroy	Create
Infrastructure	
Disrupt	Put into order
Interrupt	Restart
Deny use	Permit use
Destroy	Create
National Population	
Disrupt	Put into order
Fielded forces: location	
Deter	Encourage
Defend	Attack
Drive	Open new routes
Stop	Advance
Expel	Hold position
Fielded forces: capability	
Disrupt	Put into order
Attrit	Build up
Neutralize	Restart
Destroy	Create

Table 5: Goals and their opposites

C.10 Constraints

Many CinC objectives and Air objectives, and some task objectives, have associated constraints. These constraints may be:

- geographical (e.g. "Destroy SAMs **beyond 100km of the DMZ**");
- temporal (e.g. "Sustain (Blue) forces **for a minimum of 45 days**");
- categorical (e.g. "Deny use of national roadways for the transport of **military equipment**");
- capability (e.g. "Deploy (Blue) forces **capable of deterring YOC aggression**").

Lists of identified constraints can be seen in table C.10 and table 6.

Observations

The constraints are diverse, but a few patterns can be seen:

- The distinction between **military** and **civilian** is frequently drawn. Typically, the goals specified will have stronger effects on the military than on the civilian population. For example, objectives exist to DENY USE of national roadways, railways and waterways for transporting military equipment, but only to DISRUPT the flow of goods. However, in some cases (e.g. disrupting communication networks), it is necessary to cause equal disruption to both the military and the civilian populations. It is common for the planners to avoid deliberately targetting the civilian population, since past experience suggests that it does more harm than good.
- Another distinction which appears to be important is the distinction between **weapons of mass destruction** and other weapons. This is reflected in the hierarchies of centers of gravity, where "special weapons" (i.e. nuclear/ biological/ chemical weapons and ballistic missiles) are treated separately from other weapons.
- In the higher level objectives, the majority of geographical constraints are concerned with fielded forces, and their locations in relation to battlegrounds and demilitarized zones. However, there are also some concerns related to the whole region, typically connected with evacuation of U.S. civilians and other non-combatants.

Geographical	
US citizens	in the region
US forces	in the region
YOC aggression	against B/G
YOC forces	north of Desired Area
B/G	(a geographical constraint is implicit in the CoG)
Temporal	
YOC economic centers	to slow the flow of military resources i.e. until the flow of military resources is sufficiently slow
Categorical	
YOC political control YOC military control	YOC armed forces
YOC political control YOC military control primary electrical sources petroleum products national television systems national radio systems national computer systems	YOC population
national roadways national railways national waterways	Transport of military equipment
national roadways national railways national waterways	Transport of goods
national communications networks national television systems national radio systems national computer systems	Transmit military information
YOC petroleum production	supporting warfighting effort
chemical products	for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction.
national waterways	for Blue shipping.
national transportation networks	leading to YOC economic centers.
Blue forces	Against Weapons of Mass Destruction

Geographical	
Temporal	
Categorical	
YOC political control YOC military control electrical facilities petroleum production chemical production?	YOC armed forces
YOC political control YOC military control electrical production petroleum production chemical production	YOC population
naval transport ships command and control	which are capable of transporting military equipment on national waterways. YOC Air/Land/Sea forces
Capability	
(Blue) forces	capable of deterring YOC aggression
(Blue) forces	capable of supporting NEO

Table 6: Constraints: Air Objectives Level

D The CommonKADS methodology

D.1 Organizational Model

The CommonKADS organizational model recommends examination of an organization from five major perspectives:

- the **activities**[14] of the organization;
- the **structure** of the organization;
- the **processes** in the organization;
- the **power/authority** in the organization;
- the **resources** in the organization.

Each perspective is represented by a single diagram, or by text. These five perspectives can be combined into cross-products which provide the most useful information. For example, the CommonKADS Organizational Model was used to model a Social Security department; a cross-product of activities and structure was produced which highlighted an area of inefficiency, because one of the activities (archiving) was being performed by three different divisions of the department [deHoog *et al*, 1993].

D.2 Task model

The Task model shows the tasks carried out in the course of a particular process. If the organizational model indicates a particular function which might usefully be automated, a task model can be produced which provides a detailed description of the tasks which carry out that function. The task model may also identify the inputs and outputs of each process (or task), and the decomposition of tasks into more specific sub-tasks. Its purpose is to allow identification of tasks which could usefully be performed by an automated system, or by a program and a user working in conjunction.

A typical task model is shown in Figure 44, using the graphical format which was originally specified in [deGreef & Breuker, 1992]. The model represents the tasks involved in the preparation of a meal; such a model might be used by a large restaurant or a hotel which was considering a reorganization of its business.

In this diagram, the boxes represent tasks; the arrows represent inputs and outputs of tasks; the lighter lines show the decomposition hierarchy of tasks; and

[14] CommonKADS actually calls these "functions" rather than "activities". However, for reasons which are explained in [Uschold *et al*, 1995], I have chosen to use the term "activities" throughout this document.



Figure 44: Task model: preparing a meal

the shading indicates those tasks which are worth considering for implementation using a computer system.

D.3 Agent Model

The Agent model represents the capabilities required of the agents who perform a process, and constraints on their performance. The agent model represents all the agents which participate in a problem solving process. It is often useful to develop two agent models: one which is based on the task model, showing which agents are currently involved in performing particular tasks, and one which predicts the agents and capabilities required to carry out future tasks.

An example of an agent model, using the graphical format suggested by the CommonKADS Workbench, is shown in Figure 45.



Figure 45: Agent model: Preparing a Meal

D.4 Communication Model

The Communication model shows the communication required between agents during a process; it may also specify the form of messages, and specify who takes the initiative in a transaction. The communication model indicates all the transactions which take place between different agents. Normally, this will comprise transactions between a knowledge based system and other agents. It is therefore often convenient to combine the Communication model with the Agent model.

An example of an communication model, using the graphical format suggested in the KADS-II report on the CommonKADS Communication Model ([Waern *et al*, 1994]) is shown in Figure 46.



Figure 46: Communication model: Preparing a Meal

D.5 Expertise Model

The Expertise model is a model of the expertise required to perform a particular task. This model is divided into three components:

- declarative knowledge about the domain;
- the inference processes required during problem solving;
- a task structure sepcifying the hierarchical decomposition and ordering of the inference processes.

D.5.1 Expertise Model: Domain Level

The domain knowledge in the model of expertise represents the declarative knowledge which has been acquired. CommonKADS suggests that each item of declarative knowledge is classified into one of the four categories outlined below:

- **Concepts**: classes of objects in the real or mental world of the domain studied, representing physical objects or states;
- **Properties**: attributes of concepts e.g. *colour*.[15]
- **Expressions**: statements of the form "the *property* of *concept* is *value*";
- **Relations**: links between any two items of domain knowledge.

[15]CommonKADS also supports *attributes*, which are properties which can belong to multiple concepts, and which are defined independently from concepts for convenience. *Weight* might be an example of a CommonKADS attribute.

Once items of domain knowledge have been classified, they can be used in *domain models*, which show relations between different items of knowledge. For example, a domain model might show all acquired examples of one concept **causing** another; or it might show a taxonomic hierarchy of concepts, connected to each other by **is-a** relations. Figure 47 shows an example of a domain model; this model represents indicative relationships between certain symptoms of a manufacturing machine, and possible faults with that machine.



Figure 47: A domain model which links expressions with concepts

CommonKADS also recommends that the domain knowledge is represented at a more abstract level, at which generic statements about the structure and contents of domain models are expressed. The terms used at this abstract level are stored in a *model ontology*, and the statements at this abstract level are known as *model schemata*. This abstraction is intended to form a basis for re-using domain models in different problem solving situations.

The domain knowledge in the CommonKADS Expertise model therefore consists of a *domain ontology* (i.e. a collection of classified terms) and a number of *domain models* which represent relations between items from the domain ontology. In addition, it is recommended that an abstract view on the domain knowledge is created.

D.5.2 Expertise Model: Inference Knowledge

The second subdivision of the Expertise Model records knowledge about inference which may be performed in order to solve a problem. This information is represented in *inference structures*, which are diagrams showing how various **inferences** and **knowledge roles** link together to perform problem solving.

Both KADS-I and CommonKADS provide a library of generic inference structures, indexed by the type of task which is being performed (classification, diagnosis, configuration, etc.). These generic inference structures can be used as a starting point for developing an inference structure for a particular application.

An example of an inference structure can be seen in Figure 48.



Figure 48: Inference structure: Machine Fault Diagnosis

In this inference structure, machine fault diagnosis is seen as a process of:

1. decomposing a set of possible faults, on the basis of some symptoms, to produce a set of hypotheses about the current fault;
2. selecting a suitable test to narrow down the set of hypotheses;
3. deciding what the expected result of this test would be if any of the hypotheses were correct;
4. performing the test and observing or measuring the result;

5. updating the set of hypotheses, by removing any which do not conform with the result of the test.

The last four steps are performed iteratively until only one hypothesis remains, or until no further tests are available. This inference structure therefore represents the "Sherlock Holmes" approach to diagnosis: by eliminating the impossible, whatever remains must be the truth.

It can be seen that knowledge roles are represented as boxes, and inference steps as ovals; arrows link knowledge roles with inference steps. Variations on the basic graphics include inference steps with a "double oval" (indicating that this inference step is expanded into more detail in a lower level inference structure) and bold outlines on knowledge roles (which indicate that a knowledge role is *static*; that is, the knowledge it represents is not changed in any way during problem solving.

D.5.3 Expertise Model: Task Level

The task level of the model of expertise is normally represented as a graphical hierarchy. However, textual representation is also possible, and can be more informative; see [Kingston, 1993b] for an example.

Task knowledge differs slightly between KADS-I and CommonKADS, because KADS-I has an explicit *strategy* level of knowledge, whereas CommonKADS considers strategic knowledge (now known as *problem solving knowledge*) to be orthogonal to the domain-inference-task decomposition of the Expertise Model. In both cases, however, the task knowledge which needs to be modelled consists of various tasks which have to be performed and goals which have to be achieved, and breakdowns of these tasks into subtasks. In addition, CommonKADS has an explicit category for tasks which pass information to or from the problem solving process (known as *transfer tasks*); a selection of *problem solving methods* (pre-defined generic task structures); and a detailed specification of how tasks should be defined.

An example of a task structure can be seen in figure 49.

This diagram represents a decomposition hierarchy, showing the tasks which must be performed in order to diagnose faults in a machine.

CommonKADS also provides definitions for a library of *problem solving methods* i.e. pre-defined task structures for certain tasks. However, this "library" currently contains very few problem solving methods (cf. [Kingston, 1993a]).

D.6 Design Model

The Design model culminates in the design of a knowledge based system to perform all or part of the process under consideration. The design process in CommonKADS is broken down into three stages:



Figure 49: Task structure: Machine Fault Diagnosis

- **Application design**: decomposing the Expertise Model into a number of components. Decomposition can be functional, object-oriented, or specific to a particular AI paradigm (e.g. blackboard systems).
- **Architectural design**: deciding on the AI techniques and representations which would be most appropriate for implementing the different decomposed items.
- **Platform design**: deciding how to implement these AI techniques and representations in the chosen programming tool on the chosen hardware.

While it is possible to represent the Application Design (at least) in diagrams, CommonKADS does not recommend any graphical format for the Design Model; instead, it is expected that the different stages of this model will be represented using text. However, during the course of a recent project [Kingston *et al*, 1995], a graphical representation for the Design Model was used (see figure 50); the four columns of nodes represent:

- tasks (from the Task Structure of the Expertise Model);
- functional units (the Application Design);
- knowledge representation techniques (the Architectural Design);
- particular knowledge representations and inference techniques (the Platform Design).



Figure 50: Design model: Diagnosing faults in machinery